The role of the Yao in the development of trade in East-Central Africa, 1698 - c. 1850

by

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Abstract

Long distance trade routes, based on ivory, from the interior of East-Central Africa to Moçambique and Kilwa were forged by the Maravi and the Yao, respectively, during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, and by about 1698 the Yao apparently dominated both these routes. After 1698, factors influencing the ivory trade at the coast caused the Yao to shift most of their trade from Kilwa to Moçambique, where Yao ivory soon constituted the basis of the island's trade. In the interior, the Yao traded with the Maravi and, through the Bisa, with the recently established Eastern Lunda state of the Mwata Kazembe. After 1750, Kilwa slowly began to revive as Zanzibar, under Omani hegemony, became an increasingly important coastal entrepôt, while the trade of Moçambique was plagued by Makua belligerence and by Portuguese harassment of the Indian trading community there. By 1785, influenced in particular by the better price paid for ivory at Kilwa, most Yao had rechannelled their trade back to Kilwa.

Concurrently, the substance of trade in East-Central Africa was being altered, as slaves became an increasingly important commodity due to the rising demands of both the Arabs and French traders from the Mascarene Islands. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, although ivory still dominated the Yao trade to Kilwa, those Yao who continued to trade to Moçambique were already basing their trade on slaves. By the late 1830s slaves had also become dominant along the Kilwa route, which continued to command the bulk of Yao trade. The Ngoni invasions and mid-century dispersal of the Yao, caused by Makua and Lomwe attacks from the east, transformed the Yao from traders into invaders, as they spilled into Malawi and Tanzania, and marked the beginning of Yao political hegemony over a wider area of East-Central Africa, while destroying the earlier pattern of trade.

PREFACE

The history of East-Central Africa is a particularly fascinating subject, with ample possibilities for further investigation. I am grateful to both Dr. J. Richard Gray and Professor Roland Oliver for directing my attention towards this area of Africa, in which I have set my thesis, and in which I hope to undertake further historical studies. My thanks also go to the Research Fund of the University of London, whose generosity facilitated the undertaking of research in Lisbon during the summer of 1964.

In this study I have tried to modernize all Portuguese personal names, despite the fact that even today there is precious little consistency in the spelling of these by individual Portuguese. Whenever possible I have given Swahili names in the Kiswahili form, and Arabic names in a modified Arabic form, basing the latter on the spelling utilized in the Oxford History of East Africa. Regarding the orthography of African names, I have sought no more than internal consistency. Makua names are given in their most common contemporary Portuguese form. I have preferred 'c' to 'ch' in the case of the Cewa, and in all Ciyao sectional names and words; thus, 'Macinga,' not 'Machinga' Yao. At the same time, I have used 'Mangoche,' the place, to distinguish it from 'Mangoce,' the Yao section. Similarly, I have retained 'Maravi' for the people, but employed 'Malawi' for certain references, in the hope of avoiding confusion.

I wish to express my gratitude to the Directors and Staffs of the various archives, in Portugal, France, and England, in which I have completed the research for my thesis. I am specially grateful to Professor C.R. Boxer and to the Marquesa of Cadaval for allowing me to see manuscripts in their private collections.

To Dr. J. Richard Gray I owe my sincerest thanks, not only for his keen scholarly counsel in the study of African history, but also for his friendship and encouragement.

Finally, only my wife, and perhaps not even she, knows how indebted I am to her.

CONTENTS

LIST OF MAPS

ABBREVIATIONS

AC	Arquivo das Colónias
ACL	Academia das Ciências de Lisboa
Add.MSS	Additional Manuscripts
AF	Archives Nationales de France
AHU	Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino
APO	Archivo Portuguez-Oriental
BFUP	Boletim da Filmoteca Ultramarina Portuguesa
BM	British Museum
BNL	Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa
CEHU-MF	Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos - Microfilm collection
CM	Caixa Moçambique
CO	Colonial Office
Cod.	Códice
Col.	Colonies
CT	O Chronista de Tissuary
EHGEP	Junta de Investigações do Ultramar, Estudos de História da Geografia da Expansão Portuguesa, Anais, ix, Tomo I, "Fontes para a História, Geografia e Comércio de Moçambique (Sec. XVIII)," ed J.F. de Carvalho Dias, Lisboa, 1954.
FG	Fundo Geral
FKI	G.S.P. Freeman-Grenville, The French at Kilwa Island: An Episode in Eighteenth-Century East African History, Oxford, 1965.

FO	Foreign Office
Gov.	Governor
HEA	R. Oliver and G. Mathew (eds.), History of East Africa, i, Oxford, 1963.
JAH	Journal of African History
LM	Livro das Monções
Moç.	Moçambique
MR	Ministéiro do Reino
NJ	Nyasaland Journal
PRO	Public Record Office
Prov. Govt.	Provisional Government
RSEA	G.M. Theal, Records of South Eastern Africa, London, 1898-1903.
SD	Freeman-Grenville, The East African Coast: Select Documents from the first century to the earlier nineteenth century, Oxford, 1962.
Sec.St.	Secretary of State
SGL	Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa
TDB	Tanganyika District Books
TNR	Tanganyika Notes and Records
TT	Arquivo Nacional da Tôrre do Tombo
UMCA	Universities' Mission to Central Africa

GLOSSARY

Alfândega royal custom-house

Alvará a royal or vice-regal decree

Arroba a weight of about 32 pounds

Auto de visita writ of inspection

Bando a proclamation

Bar, bares a weight which varied between about 518 to 650 pounds; composed of either 15 arrobas, or 20 faraçolas

Carta patente official letter of installation

Compagnie des Indes the French East Indies Company

Cruzado a silver coin equal to 400 réis

Despacho a writ, or clearance; dispatch

Devassa a judicial investigation

Estado da Índia State of India, the name applied to the Portuguese possessions east of the Cape of Good Hope, of which Moçambique formed a part until 1752

Faraçola a weight varying from 18 to 30 pounds; composed of 12 mainas

Junta do Comércio Board of Trade

Laka a single sail, single outrigger canoe used by the maritime peoples of Madagascar

Machila a rough, durable cloth woven by Africans north and south of the Zambezi

Maço bundle, packet

Maina a weight of about $1\frac{1}{2}$ to $2\frac{1}{2}$ pounds

Morador a Portuguese colonist, as opposed to non-Portuguese inhabitant

Pangaio a generic term for several varieties of Arab and Swahili coasting vessels

Parecer an opinion, or recommendation

Pataca the Portuguese name for the Austrian Maria Theresa and Spanish dollars, equal in the eighteenth century first to 3, then to 4, and when marked, to 6 cruzados

Patamar, patamares an African, or mulatto, trading agent, usually slave, who travelled in the hinterland on behalf of his master at the coast

Piastre the French equivalent of pataca

Portaria an official decree, regulation, or diploma

Real, réis the basic Portuguese monetary unit

Regimento a royal or vice-regal set of instructions

Requerimento a formal petition

Residência a judicial investigation conducted at the completion of an official's tenure of office to see if he had fulfilled, or contravened, his instructions

Santa Casa da Misericórdia Holy House of Mercy, a charitable brotherhood

Senado da Câmara Municipal Council

Termo da posse term of tenure

Tostão, tostões a coin of 100 réis

Velório beads, usually Venetian

CHAPTER ONE

The Development of Overland Trade Routes up to 1698

1. The trade of medieval Kilwa

East-Central Africa, as defined in the present study, is an area which has been largely ignored by historians of pre-colonial Africa. Forming a wedge, with its base lying along the East African coast, between Kilwa and the mouth of the Zambezi River, and its point reaching the Luapula River, at the court of the Mwata Kazembe, it includes southern Tanzania, northern Moçambique, Malawi, and northern Zambia. The entire area lies north of the Zambezi. Intersected by several international boundaries which date from the colonial period, there have subsequently been only limited attempts to study the area as an historical region, although it has for some time been recognized by ethnographers as constituting part of a larger Central African culture area.(1) There is also an historical unity to the region, based on inter-African commercial relations, which became particularly cohesive during the eighteenth century. This is the wider setting of this study. More specifically, it is the role played by the Yao in these affairs which concerns us, so that the emphasis inevitably falls on the eastern half of the region.

A study of trade in this area during the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth centuries cannot be attempted, however, without first examining the development of overland trade routes before that

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(1) See H. Baumann & D. Westermann, Les Peuples et les civilisations de l'Afrique (trans. L.Homburger), Paris, 1948, pp.146-70; G.P. Murdock, Africa - Its Peoples and Their Culture History, New York, 1959, pp.290-306; A.I. Richards, "Some Types of Family Structure amongst the central Bantu," in A.R. Radcliffe Brown & D. Forde (eds.), African Systems of Kinship and Marriage, London, 1950, pp.207-51; M. Douglas, "Matriliny and Pawnship in Central Africa," Africa, xxxiv, 4, 1964, pp.301-13.



Map I: The Western Indian Ocean

period. This is especially important in view of the writer's interpretation of the pattern of trade after 1698, when the Omani Arabs finally succeeded in evicting the Portuguese from Mombasa and in limiting Portuguese footholds on the East African coast to those south of Cape Delgado.

The first point which should be emphasized is that there are no firm bases for postulating the existence of any sort of trade route, or network, however rudimentary, extending inland from medieval Kilwa Kisiwani to the remote interior. For several centuries after its settlement in about the ninth or tenth century, Kilwa remained a small, rather insignificant town, with only limited trading connections. According to the revised chronology suggested by Neville Chittick, the immigration of Shirazi colonists (from the Banadir coast?) in the second half of the twelfth century resulted in the growth of Kilwa to a town of great importance on the coast, equal to Kisimani Mafia, but overshadowed by Mogadishu. A century or more later, Kilwa had captured most of the gold trade of Sofala from Mogadishu and consequently replaced it as the principal trading state on the East African coast. At about the same time, Kilwa also extended its political hegemony to include Mafia, perhaps Pemba and Zanzibar, and much of the immediate mainland coast.(1) But Kilwa's commercial domination was based on its control of the sea route to Sofala and of that place itself, not on any trade it carried on with the peoples of its own hinterland. Certainly, there was an important trade route from the Rhodesian goldfields to Sofala, but there was none leading from that interior to Kilwa.

Roger Summers has visualized the existence of a medieval trade route along which gold was carried from Rhodesia to Kilwa, but there is virtually no evidence to support his argument. The appearance of

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(1) N. Chittick, "The 'Shirazi' Colonization of East Africa," JAH, vi, 3, 1965, pp.275-94; cf. G.S.P. Freeman-Grenville, The Medieval History of the Coast of Tanganyika, London, 1962, pp.74-98, 201-2.

Arab cane beads in one of the levels which he excavated in the Ziwa complex surely cannot be sufficient evidence for his conclusion that "Ziwa's contacts are clearly with the north-east and point to Kilwa rather than Sofala," which was not only much nearer to Ziwa, but which he himself noted was also "the port of entry for imports connected with Rhodesian Ruins, including Inyanga." Furthermore, the fact that Summers supports his hypothesis linking Ziwa and Kilwa with the erroneous dating of Kilwa's foundation to the seventh or eighth century only increases one's doubts as to the veracity of this reconstruction. Gervase Mathew, with perhaps more justice, has found Summers' hypothesis acceptable by attributing the development of overland connections between Ziwa and Kilwa to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. This period is not only one during which Kilwa's commercial dominance of the coast was at its height, but also one which Summers has given as an alternative, though personally less favoured, dating for Ziwa. Nevertheless, one still cannot accept the Ziwa-Kilwa hypothesis, for, contrary to Mathew's assertion, Summers has not "found traces of such a route."(1)

There is yet another source which has caused some writers to infer the existence of a land route leading from Kilwa to the Sofalan gold fields: the Travels of Ibn Battuta, the greatest medieval Islamic traveller, who visited Kilwa, Mombasa and Mogadishu, in 1331. In an early, abridged translation of Ibn Battuta's Travels, Sir H.A.R. Gibb speculated, on the basis of Ibn Battuta's identification of the auriferous area in the hinterland of Sofala as Yufi, the same name by which the great traveller also designated a vaguely known country in West Africa, that there was a transcontinental trade between the Sofala hinterland and the Mali empire. This seems highly unlikely; Gibb, in his later, integral translation of the Travels, has noted in preference that Ibn Battuta was confused in making this identification.

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(1) R. Summers, Inyanga - Prehistoric Settlements in Southern Rhodesia, Cambridge, 1958, p.265; G. Mathew, "The East African Coast until the Coming of the Portuguese," in HEA,i, p.117.

Mathew, however, in acknowledging Gibb's earlier suggestion, has misinterpreted this to read that the hypothetical route from West Africa led not to Sofala, but to Kilwa. A further inconsistency exists in Mathew's reasoning that there was a route inland behind Kilwa in the medieval period. While he has observed correctly that "No record or tradition suggests that Kilwa traders ever penetrated inland," he has noted in the same place that "The penetration /Inland/ would still seem to have been from the coast to the interior."(1) In view of such a total lack of evidence in support of this hypothesis, it is difficult to attach any reliability to these speculations.

Dr. G.S.P. Freeman-Grenville has also interpreted Ibn Battuta to argue for the existence of a route between the far interior and Kilwa in medieval times. He bases this on his own translation of the relevant passage in the Travels, which reads: "A merchant told me that Sofala is half a month's march from Kilwa. . ." Gibb, on the other hand, has translated the same passage in the following manner: "I was told by a merchant that the city of Sufāla lies at a distance of half a month's journey from the city of Kūlwa. . ."(2) Not being an Arabist, the present writer cannot comment on the merits of either translation, but Gibb's rendering of "journey", seems preferable to Freeman-Grenville's more limiting choice of "march." An overland march from Kilwa to Sofala could not possibly have been

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(1) H.A.R. Gibb (trans.), The Travels of Ibn Battuta (abridged), London, 1929, pp.379,n.15,382,n.33; ibid., The Travels of Ibn Battuta, (complete ed.), Cambridge, 1962,ii,p.380 & n.61; HEA,i,pp.112, 117; cf. Freeman-Grenville, Medieval History, p.106. Some scholars, e.g. Gibb, Travels (abridged),p.379,n.16, citing Cooley, & Travels (complete ed.), p.380,n.61, E.W. Bovill, The Golden Trade of the Moors, London, 1961,p.96, & J.S. Trimingham, A History of Islam in West Africa, London,1962,p.130, have suggested that the Yufi of West Africa were the Nupe, but the foremost authority on these people has doubted this identification: see S.F. Nadel, A Black Byzantium - The Kingdom of Nupe in Nigeria, London, 1961 reprint, p.404.

(2) Freeman-Grenville, "The Coast, 1498-1840," in HEA,i, p.147; SD, p.31; Gibb, Travels (complete ed.),ii,p.380; cf. Freeman-Grenville, Medieval History, pp.204-5.

completed within a fortnight's time, as they lie nearly eight hundred miles apart in a direct line of march, which would entail crossing some very hilly country. On the other hand, provided with a fair wind, the customary sea route from Kilwa to Sofala could easily have taken no more than a fortnight to complete.(1)

In addition to these largely negative arguments refuting the existence of a medieval overland trade route extending behind Kilwa, there is one strong positive piece of evidence which can be cited in the same cause: Ingombe Ilede, situated on a ridge lying just north of the Zambezi River, in the Gwembe Valley. Excavations undertaken by J.H. Chaplin and Brian Fagan have revealed that this site was, during the middle and later stages of its occupation from the late seventh to tenth centuries, a trading centre of some importance, with obvious connections with the coast. These were clearly maintained by means of contacts down the Zambezi, the principal highway to the interior of Central Africa and the one by which the Portuguese moved inland in the sixteenth century. In view of the antiquity of this route, which was well established long before

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(1) I have been unable to locate any contemporary sources giving the normal sailing time between Sofala and Kilwa. In 1505 the São Rafael, which was taking the Viceroy D.Francisco de Almeida to India, sailed from 30 leagues south of Moçambique to Kilwa in four days' time, and from there it took five days to sail to Mombasa, a further distance of 60 leagues. The same source gives the distance between Kilwa and Sofala as 255 leagues; but one cannot mathematically work out the sailing time on this basis, for it took the São Rafael only two days to cover 60 leagues on the voyage from south of Moçambique to Kilwa. "Do (sic) viagem de Dom Francisco d'Almeyda primeyro viso rey de India... ," 22 May 1506, in Documentos sôbre os Portugueses em Moçambique e na África Central, Lisboa, 1962,i,pp.522-5, 528-9. Gibb, Travels (complete ed.),ii,p.379,n.58, states that "The journey from Mogadishu /to Kilwa, some 850 miles south in a straight line/ towards the end of the north-east monsoon in Feburary or early March might take from six to ten days." A.Villiers, The Indian Ocean, London, 1952,p.85, has sailed in an Arab vessel from Zanzibar to Muscat, more than 2000 miles, in "a little over three weeks."



Map 2: The Peoples of East-Central Africa

Map 3: East-Central Africa



Map 3: East-Central Africa

Kilwa gained control of the Sofala gold trade, it seems highly unlikely that a new, more arduous route would have been developed overland from Kilwa to the Zambezi.(1)

There are, then, neither archaeological nor documentary bases which would indicate that medieval Kilwa was in any sort of overland commercial contact with the peoples of the interior. On the contrary, Kilwa rose to a position of commercial pre-eminence on the East African coast by virtue of its control of the seaborn trade to Sofala. This monopoly was certainly challenged, and probably broken, by the expansion of the Nabhani kingdom of Pate in the beginning of the fifteenth century. Thereafter, the unexplained rise of Mombasa also contributed to a gradual decline in Kilwa's commercial domination of the coast. Internal dissensions also sapped Kilwa's vitality, and by the end of the fifteenth century Sofala was able to assert its independence from the suzerainty of Kilwa.(2) Nevertheless, until the arrival of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean, Kilwa, despite its decline, continued to trade for the gold of Sofala by the familiar sea route, while contacts with the mainland behind Kilwa remained as tenuous as ever.

2. The arrival of the Portuguese

The intrusion of the Portuguese into the Indian Ocean after 1498 signalled the beginning of a new era throughout the East. One important effect which it had there was the redirection of the Indian Ocean spice trade as a result of Portuguese control of the

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(1) B.M. Fagan, Southern Africa during the Iron Age, London, 1965, pp.94-9; see idem., "Radiocarbon dates for Sub-Saharan Africa (from c. 1000 B.C.) - III," JAH, vi, 1, 1965, p.111.

(2) Freeman-Grenville, Medieval History, pp.111-40; HEA,i,pp.119-25, 198-9, 202; Chittick, "The 'Shirazi' Colonization of East Africa," p.295.

seas and of certain strategic ports.(1) In East Africa, Portuguese activities revolved around their desire to control the gold trade of Sofala. Consequently, in 1505 they first established a factory and built a fort at Kilwa, which was forcibly subjugated to the Portuguese Crown, and then founded a factory at Sofala, where news of Kilwa's fate precluded the use of force. The Portuguese rigorously pursued a policy of squeezing the Muslims out of the gold trade; and Kilwa, already in decline, became moribund. The Portuguese soon realized that, controlling Sofala as they did, Kilwa was only an unnecessary expense on their meagre resources. Kilwa's wealth had come from the duties its Sultans had levied on the trade of Sofala; deprived of these it was commercially impotent. Furthermore, Kilwa was a less convenient port of call for vessels sailing between Portugal and India than was Moçambique, where the Portuguese had established a settlement for this purpose in 1507. Thus, in 1512, the Portuguese withdrew their garrison from the fortress at Kilwa and left the island to its traditional rulers.(2)

Liberated from the commercial stranglehold with Portuguese occupation had enforced, Kilwa's fortunes revived noticeably, as its merchants joined those from the other coastal towns in avoiding Portuguese control over the Rhodesian gold trade. This they did by not going to Sofala, where the Portuguese were masters, but

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(1) See C.R. Boxer, "The Portuguese in the East, 1500-1800," in H.V. Livermore (ed.), Portugal and Brazil, Oxford, 1953, pp.189-95. The opposite point of view has also been expressed by several writers, but their conclusions would appear to be based on insufficient data: cf., e.g., A. Toussaint, History of the Indian Ocean, (trs. J. Guicharnaud), London,1966,pp.112-14.

(2) A. Lobato, A Expansão Portuguesa em Moçambique de 1498 a 1530, Lisboa, 1954, i,pp.51-258, 262-5; ii,pp.15-51; E. Axelson, South-East Africa, 1488-1530, London, 1940, pp.64-97; J. Strandes, The Portuguese Period in East Africa (trans. J.F. Wallwork), Nairobi, 1961, pp.38-81, 103-116; cf. Boxer, "Moçambique island and the "carreira da Índia"," Stvdia,8, 1961, pp.95-132.

rather to Angoche, or other points along the coast between Moçambique and the Zambezi delta. The Angoche coast quite probably had ancient ties with the Zambezi route to the interior, perhaps even serving as an embarkation point to Ingombe Ilede. As early as 1506 the Portuguese had learned that a small amount of gold, no more than about 5% of the amount which they believed the Swahili traders annually carried away from Sofala before their establishment there, was exported by way of Angoche, probably by individuals seeking to avoid the restrictions imposed there previously by the Sultan of Kilwa. During the first half of the following decade, however, Angoche had become a much greater threat to the gold trade of Sofala, as increasingly large numbers of Muslim traders sought to avoid Portuguese supervision of the trade. Traders from Kilwa sailed past Moçambique to Angoche, where their merchandise was transported to the Zambezi and landed some six leagues upstream at the town of a powerful African chief. Here they paid duties to this chief, who then supplied them with dug-outs for carrying their goods farther up the Zambezi. After making a portage around some rapids, lying at an unspecified distance up-river, they continued a further twenty leagues until they reached a mountain called Otanga, where a large settlement was situated. According to António de Saldanha, Captain of Sofala and Moçambique, it was there that "all the Kaffir and Moorish merchants of the land gather together and where they sell and set up their markets." Having seen the Portuguese withdraw from Kilwa, it seems not unlikely that the Muslim traders hoped, by undermining the gold trade to Sofala, to force the Portuguese to retire from Sofala, as well.(1)

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(1) Strandes, Portuguese Period, p.111; Lobato, Expansão, ii, pp.21-5, 54-5, 117-23, 128-9, 134-5; iii,pp.22-4, 103-18; Axelson, South-East Africa, pp.109, 121-6, 145; Diogo de Alcaçova to Crown, Cochin, 20 November 1506, in Documentos sôbre os Portugueses, i, pp.389-401, at 395; António Carneiro, summary of letters from António de Saldanha to Crown, [1511] ibid., 1964, iii,pp.11-19, at 15; Gaspar Veloso to Crown, [1512], ibid., iii, pp.181-9, at 187.

Had there been any tradition of an overland route from Rhodesia to Kilwa in medieval times, surely this would have been revived after the Portuguese withdrawal from Kilwa in 1512? The recourse which the Swahili traders of the East African coast, including those from Kilwa, had to the Angoche-Zambezi route in order to subvert the effectiveness of the Portuguese control of Sofala is yet another indication that there was no overland trade route connecting Kilwa with the Zambezi before the arrival of the Portuguese on the coast.

In the second and third decades of the sixteenth century it became apparent to the Portuguese that if this clandestine trade were to be terminated, they would have to establish themselves in the interior.(1) They therefore began the gradual occupation of the area which was to become known as the Rivers of Sena by ascending the Zambezi and establishing a fair on the right bank, at Sena, in 1531. Some time thereafter, another Portuguese fair was founded farther upstream, on the same bank, at Tete; in 1544 a factory was set up at Quelimane to supervise the entrance of vessels at the several mouths of the Zambezi. By 1560 both Sena and Tete had become important markets. Nine years later the ill-fated visionary, Dom Sebastião, King of Portugal, was persuaded to attempt to conquer the Rhodesian mines for the Portuguese Crown. But the massacre, in 1575, of some two hundred Portuguese troops which had been stationed at Chicoa, up the Zambezi beyond Tete, put an end to this unsuccessful episode.(2)

During this half-century, when the Portuguese were seeking to master the commerce of the Rivers of Sena, a change had apparently

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(1) Lobato, Expansão, ii, pp.44,53-5,62-3,81-4,95,145-5,151-2; iii, 213-17,236,243-4,317-18,323-7,356-8,369-71,375-6,383-7; Axelson, South-East Africa, pp.149-50,154, 158-9.

(2) J.J. Teixeira Botelho, História Militar e Política dos Portugueses em Moçambique da Descoberta a 1833, Lisboa, 1934, pp.93-4, 146-7,162-70,175-207; J. Duffy, Portuguese Africa, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1959, pp.35-8, 107-8; Lobato, "Para a História da Penetração Portuguesa na África Central," in his Colonização Senhorial da Zambézia e Outros Estudos, Lisboa, 1962, pp.77-80; ibid., Evolução Administrativa e Económica de Moçambique, 1752-1763, Lisboa, 1957, pp.169-72; see J. de Alcântara Guerreiro, "Inquérito em Moçambique no ano de 1575," Stvdia, 6,1960, pp.7-18.

taken place in the trade of Kilwa. Following the Portuguese retirement from Kilwa in 1512, the only Portuguese point of occupation along the coast of East Africa, north of Cape Delgado, was at Malindi. There, a Captain of the Malindi coast, operating from an unfortified base, did his best to safeguard Portuguese interests, particularly commercial, on that coast. At first, Kilwa clearly ignored any claim to authority by the Captain of Malindi over its trade. In addition to its merchants' cultivation of the Angoche trade, Kilwa also furnished Moçambique with provisions. But relations with the Portuguese were not always cordial: in 1519 the crew of a shipwrecked Portuguese vessel were massacred by Swahili in the vicinity of Kilwa. Towards the end of the following decade several French ships are known to have spent some time at Kilwa without suffering attack from the Swahili.(1) Sometime after 1530, however, it would appear that Kilwa gradually began to re-orient its external trade to the north and that the Portuguese at Malindi began to play a more important role in this trade. Simultaneously, Kilwa seems to have begun to carry on a more substantial trade with its own hinterland than it had ever known previously. Both these developments would seem to have been caused by the Portuguese penetration inland up the Zambezi.

As the Portuguese gradually extended their influence in the Rivers of Sena the contraband gold trade on which Angoche had flourished must have declined correspondingly. As the Rhodesian gold trade fell under closer Portuguese control, the traders of Kilwa, a town which itself produced nothing of commercial value, its sole function being that of an entrepôt, had to seek other items of trade if their town were to remain of any importance. The gold of Rhodesia had been the staple of Kilwa's commercial life for nearly five centuries; now it was replaced by ivory coming from its own

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(1) Lobato, Expansão, ii, pp.76-9, 89-90, 152, 154, 181; iii, pp. 285-7.

hinterland. In 1511, it was reported to King Manuel of Portugal "that only a little ivory comes from Kilwa and that much comes from Sofala."(1) It would appear from this statement that prior to the mid-sixteenth century even Kilwa's ivory, as well as its gold, trade was based on Sofala. With so little to go on, one cannot be dogmatic about the details of this change, but the description which the Jesuit priest Monclaro has left us of Kilwa's trade in 1571 leaves little doubt that such a change had indeed taken place:

> These Moors have some commerce with the islands of Comor, and in the interior in ivory, which they buy from the Kaffirs to sell to the Portuguese who are always on these parts, or to the factor of the captain of the said /Malindi/ coast, whence there come also quantities of honey and wax. (2)

Monclaro makes only a vague passing reference to a trade in gold. His remarks also indicate that the Portuguese at Malindi had assumed a more important role in the trade of Kilwa during the previous decades. One should not assume, however, that the Portuguese had any manner of political control over Kilwa at this time, a mistake which a nineteenth century governor-general of Moçambique made in referring to Kilwa as "our land after 1529."(3).

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(1) Carneiro, summary of letters from Afonso de Albuquerque to Crown, /1511/, in Documentos sôbre os Portugueses, 1965, ii, pp.5-9,PP2.

(2) Relação da Viagem que fizeram os Padres da Companhia de Jesus com Francisco Barreto na conquista de Monomotapa no anno de 1569 feita pelo padre Monclaro da mesma companhia, in RSEA, iii, pp.157-255, at 164, trs.211; trs. also in SD, p.138. This expedition reached Moçambique on 16 May 1570. Before attempting to conquer the lands of the Mwanamutapa, Barreto directed his attention to the coast north of Cape Delgado in 1571. Monclaro does not indicate when he himself arrived at Kilwa, but makes it clear that he spent some four weeks there. Freeman-Grenville wrongly dates this side trip to 1569; SD, p.138, and HEA,i,pp.136,140,145,151; cf. Strandes, Portuguese Period, pp.136-7.

(3) S.X. Botelho, Resumo para servir de introducção a Memoria Estatistica sobre os dominios portuguezes na Africa Oriental, Lisboa, 1854, p.17.

To be sure, the Portuguese razed Mombasa in 1528-1529, but by 1541 it was able to repulse another Portuguese attempt to repeat the same. Two decades later there is evidence that Kilwa was still very much independent of Portuguese control.(1) When Monclaro visited this coast, he noted that, while all the local rulers were "poor and without power," those of Kilwa and Malindi were the principal ones. It is likely that he was slighting the importance of Mombasa, but the Sultan of Kilwa was still in possession of Mafia, where a factor of the Captain of Malindi was stationed.(2)

By the last quarter of the sixteenth century, then, Kilwa had already readjusted its commercial orientation from one which had previously been exclusively seaward, to one which now looked to its own hinterland for the majority of its raw trade goods, especially ivory. The initial impulse which instigated this reorientation seems to have come from the coast. It was probably the Swahili merchants of Kilwa who, effectively cut off by the Portuguese from the Rhodesian gold trade after 1530, sought to cultivate the previously insignificant ivory trade with the hinterland of their own town. But the development of well defined, in a directional sense, long distance trade routes between the coast and the interior did not owe its genesis to this impulse. Rather, the impulse came from the interior, largely as a direct result of the extension of Maravi influence over the peoples lying between Lake Malawi and the East African coast.

5. The commercial influence of Maravi expansion

As a result of Portuguese preoccupation with the gold of Rhodesia, East-Central Africa was dealt with only in passing by Portuguese writers of the sixteenth and seventeenth

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(1) Strandes, Portuguese Period, pp.126-7, 132-3; Axelson, South-East Africa, pp.154-8; B. Gomes de Brito, Historia Tragico-Maritima, Lisboa, 1904, ii,p.69.

(2) RSEA,iii, pp.164,169, trs. 211,216; SD, pp.139,143.

centuries.(1) Nevertheless, there is sufficient documentation to enable one to discuss developments there during this period with a reasonable degree of confidence. According to tradition, the Maravi migrated to the region south and southwest of Lake Malawi from Luba country, in the Congo basin. This migration was not, however, the mass movement of an entire nation, but rather, as both R.A. Hamilton and M.G. Marwick have concluded, the arrival of chiefly invaders who imposed their rule over a long-established indigenous population.(2) No one will argue with E.H. Lane-Poole's opinion that this migration took place prior to 1500; it is more difficult, however, to determine the date of this arrival more precisely.(3) It is clear, from the discovery of copper crosses at Ingombe Ilede, that commercial ties between the Katanga and the Zambezi were of considerable antiquity, dating from towards the end of the first millennium.

It is possible that the Maravi invaders were part of a more general movement which included the arrival of the Karanga clans in Rhodesia, who formed the ruling hierarchy of the empire of the Mwanamutapa. From archaeological research at Zimbabwe, we know that the arrival of the Karanga ruling clans is to be assigned to Period III there, which has been radiocarbon dated to between about 1080 and 1450. On the other hand, it is only in Period IV, beginning about 1450, that copper artifacts, suggesting Congo connections, make their appearance at Zimbabwe; these would appear to have been introduced with the arrival of the Rozwi, or Mbire, clans, whom Abraham believes entered Rhodesia at this time. It

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(1) e.g. "It was gold that lured the Portuguese into the interior. It was the absence of gold north of the Zambezi that rendered penetration in that direction unremunerative..." Axelson, "Portuguese settlement in the interior of south-east Africa in the seventeenth century," Congresso Internacional de História dos Descobrimentos, Actas, v, 2, Lisboa, 1961, p.5.

(2) R.A. Hamilton, "Oral Tradition: Central Africa," in Hamilton (ed.), History and Archaeology in Africa, London, 1955, p.21; M.G. Marwick, "History and Tradition in East Central Africa through the Eyes of the Northern Rhodesian Cewa," JAH, iv,3, 1963, p.378.

(3) E.H. Lane-Poole, Native Tribes of the Eastern Province of Northern Rhodesia (Notes on their Migrations and History), third ed., Lusaka, 1949, pp.21-2, 37.

seems more likely that the Maravi invaders formed part of this later migration, with its clear ties with the Congo, than the earlier, Period III, influx, which does not seem to have had these connections. As 1450 is certainly the latest date by which the Rozwi, or Mbire, had established their rule at Zimbabwe, it seems reasonable to suggest that the Maravi invasion may have taken place during the course of the fourteenth century, perhaps beginning even as early as the later thirteenth century.(1)

Today, there are apparently no people living in this region who call themselves Maravi, or, in its correct Cinyanja form, Malawi, which apparently became archaic as they gradually evolved into more distinct component parts. Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that the name was not merely one, based on a geographic designation, which the Portuguese applied to the people living north of the Zambezi and west of the Shire.(2) Not only is there evidence that a small group of Maravi who migrated to Mtawanya, in Tanzania, during the nineteenth century were still using that name in reference to themselves as late as about 1930, but, at the same date, in Dowa District of what was then British Nyasaland, A.G.O. Hodgson observed that even now among the Achewa and Anyanja there may be found old men who will say, 'We are Amaravi'." Thus, one cannot accept Price's opinion that "No people are known to have called themselves Maravi."(3)

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(1) D.P. Abraham, "Ethno-history of the Empire of Mutapa. Problems and Methods," in J.Vansina et al (eds.), The Historian in Tropical Africa, London 1964, pp.106-8; idem, "The Political Role of Chaminuka and the Mhondoro Cult in Shona History," in Conference of the History of the Central African Peoples, Lusaka, 1963, 14 pp.; B.M. Fagan, Southern Africa during the Iron Age, London, 1965, pp.102-25, especially 124.

(2) See AHU, CM 30, anon., "Descripçaõ do Imperio de Manomogy, ou Caronga da lem do Rio Zambeze," n.d., enclosed in Cristovão de Azevedo de Vasconcelos to D.Diogo de Sousa, Sena, 2 March 1794, summarized in Lobato, Evolução, pp.56-60, at 57, and reprinted in idem, "A terra, a gente e a vida nos sertões de Moçambique nos fins do século XVIII," in idem, Colonização, pp.123-7, at 125.

(3) TDB, ii, Mikindani: "Tribal History and Legends," pp.6,9 (212,216); A.G.O. Hodgson, "Notes on the Achewa and Angoni of the Dowa District of the Nyasaland Protectorate," The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, lxiii, 1933, p.127; T. Price, "More about the Maravi," African Studies, xi, 2, 1952, p.75.

For most of the sixteenth century nothing at all is known of developments in the interior of East Central Africa. Monclaro makes no references to the Maravi (1), but his allusion to the boat traffic up the Shire and, in particular, to the ivory trade carried on by the Swahili around the southern end of what should probably be identified as Lake Malawi, indicates that the region was at peace in the early 1570s.(2).

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(1) The Mongazes against whom the Portuguese fought in 1572, as recorded by Monclaro, lived south of the Zambezi. They do not appear to have been Maravi. See RSEA,iii,pp.188-97, trs.237-48. W.H.J. Rangeley, "The Portuguese," NJ,xvii,1, 1964,p.50, suggests that Mongazi was an Nyai chief. H.Salt, A Voyage to Abyssinia, London, 1814, p.62, incorrectly believed them to be Yao.

(2) RSEA, iii,pp.177-8,trs.226; cf. Lobato, Expansão,iii, p.358, where he speaks of Swahili trading "na costa do Niassa" in about 1525. It should be understood that these earlier traders were reaching Lake Malawi by way of the Zambezi and Shire Rivers, not by any direct overland route west from the coast. Monclaro's evidence of inland trading behind Kilwa, however, means that one cannot rule out this possibility, although it seems unlikely at this date. See above, pp. 22-3 ; below, pp.55-7, 60 . The conclusion drawn by Sir John Gray, from a passage in Diogo do Couto's Da Asia (Década iv), that "it would appear safe to say that goods were reaching Kilwa from Angola in the middle of the sixteenth century." with the tacit implication that this was carried out along a completely overland route, must be accepted with reservations. Dos Santos refers to contacts between the peoples of the Rhodesian hinterland and those of the Angolan interior, but without mention of the coastal traders ever having travelled that way. Sir John's identification of Couto's "kingdom of Atonde" as Abutua, while plausible, in light of Dos Santos' note, seems unfounded on an etymological basis. Perhaps a preferable reading would be to identify Atonde as the important Zambezi market of Otonga. Clearly, further documentation is required in order to solve this problem. See J.M. Gray, "Commercial Intercourse between Angola and Kilwa in the Sixteenth Century." TNR, 57, 1961, pp.173-4; J. dos Santos, Ethiopia Oriental, Évora, 1609, i,fl.55v-56; reproduced in RSEA, vii,pp.90-1, trs. 274; cf. Stvdia, 5,1959, p.197.

Only a decade later, however, the whole of East-Central Africa, from Maravia to the coast, was thrown into an acute state of turmoil which seems to reflect the sudden expansion of Maravi influence from within the bounds of Maravia proper to large areas lying to the east of Maravia, right up to the coast itself.

The disturbances caused at Moçambique by the powerful Makua chief Mauruça, and the ravages of the Zimba, might, by themselves, appear to have little to do with the spread of Maravi influence over the eastern half of East-Central Africa. In fact, there is evidence which strongly suggests that they were both intimately connected with that phenomenon. In 1585 the Portuguese garrison at Moçambique suffered an ignominious rout at the hands of Mauruça, whose successors plagued the Portuguese well into the nineteenth century. Mauruça was lord of the Makua who inhabited the mainland opposite Moçambique island. He and his followers had only recently moved to that part of Macuana, however, and had forcibly subjugated the Makua who had lived there previously. According to Fr. João dos Santos, O.P., whose monumental Ethiopia Oriental, published at Évora in 1609, contains a wealth of information on East and Southeast Africa at the end of the sixteenth century, Mauruça's people were a fearsome lot of cannibals who scourged the country immediately behind the coast for several years without disturbing the Portuguese. But in 1585, when Nuno Velho Pereira was Captain of Moçambique,(1) they began regularly to terrorise the Portuguese settlements on the coast itself. Pereira decided to punish Mauruça and mounted an expedition of nearly four hundred men, including forty Portuguese soldiers and moradores, or colonists, to destroy his main village, which was situated some three or four leagues inland. Commanded by António Pinto, the column marched to their destination by night and attacked Mauruça's village at dawn. The raid was a complete success and the settlement was destroyed. The ease of the victory lulled the Portuguese into a

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(1) See Z. Sarmento, "Um santareno no Oriente: Nuno Velho Pereira - Notas biográficas," C.I.H.U., Actas, v, 1, pp.265-75.

sense of false security; as they made their separate ways back to the coast, being carried in litters by their slaves, they were attacked by the enemy, who had fled from their village and concealed themselves in the bush. Almost the entire Portuguese force was annihilated, and only two or three Portuguese and a few slaves safely reached the coast some three days later. Mauruça remained unchastised, and his Makua continued to plunder the mainland at will for some time thereafter. Eventually, Mauruça realized that it was to his advantage that there be peace in his lands, and an agreement was struck with the Portuguese so that there might be trade with them. Nevertheless, Dos Santos makes it quite clear that there were many instances of violence by the Makua against the Portuguese in the succeeding years.(1)

At about the same time that Mauruça and his Makua were plundering the mainland opposite Moçambique, the infamous Zimba, who have gained much notoriety in the history of East Africa, were wreaking havoc from the Zambezi to Malindi. Dos Santos, to whom we owe most of our knowledge of the Zimba, says that they were a cannibalistic tribe living to the north of the Zambezi, to the east and northeast of Tete. The earliest known reference to them dates

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(1) J. dos Santos, Ethiopia Oriental (1609),i,fl.74-7; ibid., Lisboa, 1891,i,pp.258-64; RSEA,vii,pp.125-7,trs.309-14. Diogo do Couto gives an alternative version of these events in which neither the Makua nor Mauruça figures. Couto writes instead of Africans whom he calls Macabires and Ambios, whose leaders were Mambeca, Maarvea and Odeburi. In his account, it is Odeburi whose village was attacked by the Portuguese. Couto's version, written in 1595, seems to be far less reliable than Dos Santos', whose ethnographic details and nomenclature are undeniably correct. Couto, writing in India, also interpolates much extraneous material into his account, while Dos Santos, who was at Moçambique from 13 August to 1 November 1586, scrupulously avoids such speculation. It is worth noting, however, that Couto assigns the beginning of this period of unrest in East-Central Africa to about 1570. Couto, Da Asia, Década x, Lisboa, 1788, Livro 6, cap.xiv, pp.98-105; Dos Santos, Ethiopia Oriental (1891),ii,pp.179,191. For the reaction in Portugal to this massacre, see CEHU-MF, LM 5-A, fl.162-6, Crown to D. Duarte de Meneses, Lisboa, 22 January 1587, summarized in BFUP, 2 (1955), p.266(No.15), and published in APO, iii, No. 24, PP 15, p.84, where it is misdated to 21 January.

from 1561, when they appeared in their proper location on the world map of Bartolomeu Velho.(1) Sometime in the 1580s, a minor but ambitious Zimba chieftain is said to have been anxious to make himself a name. Consequently, he and his followers abandoned their homeland and began warring on the peoples lying to their east. By killing and, allegedly, eating their way "through all the places and kingdomes of Kaffraria," this Zimba band soon snowballed into a horde of some 15,000 individuals, relentlessly moving to the east. About 1588, having passed along the coast opposite the Kerimba Islands, the Zimba reached Kilwa, which they besieged for several months in an effort to take it. But they failed in all their attempts to cross the strait separating the mainland from the island and town of Kilwa, until a Muslim who lived there showed them a ford on the condition that he and his family be spared. The Zimba crossed to Kilwa by night and, in the ensuing massacre, slaughtered and captured some 5,000 inhabitants of the island, while only a handful managed to flee. After reportedly devouring their victims, the Zimba, leaving Kilwa a ghost town, continued to march northwards along the coast until they arrived opposite the island of Mombasa.

At Mombasa, the Zimba were prevented from crossing to the island by two Turkish galleys which were guarding the Makupa ford. The Turks, led by the dashing Mir Ali Bey, had set themselves up at Mombasa with a view to making it a permanent base from which to drive the Portuguese from East Africa. The Portuguese, having previously been caught off guard by the same Mir Ali Bey in 1585-1586, were advised of his plans this time, and in January 1589 a large fleet sailed from Goa for East Africa. This fleet arrived at Mombasa on 5 March to find the Turks and the people of the town, who had always opposed the Portuguese, confronted by the Zimba. A few Portuguese

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(1) W.G.L. Randles, "South East Africa and the Empires of Monomotapa as shown on selected printed maps of the 16th century," Stvdia, 2, 1958, p.159, and photographic reproduction of Velho's map.

sorties weakened the Turkish defence, and on 15 March the Zimba crossed over to Mombasa, and laid waste to the island. Having sated themselves at Mombasa, the Zimba pressed on to Malindi. Here, however, the tables turned on them. The local townsmen, aided by a small Portuguese garrison, were able to keep the Zimba at bay for a while. Dos Santos reports that Portuguese gunfire took a heavy toll of the enemy. But, eventually, superior numbers began to sway the battle, and the Zimba scaled the low ramparts. At this decisive moment, a force of three thousand Segeju tribesmen, a pastoral people of mixed Somali-Nyika blood, fell upon the Zimba from behind. The Zimba were all but annihilated, and the power of this branch of the tribe broken as a result. Only a hundred men and their once ambitious leader are said to have returned safely to their homeland north of the Zambezi.(1)

While nothing more was heard from the Zimba to the north of the Ruvuma River, they are known to have caused the Portuguese a great deal of trouble in the Rivers of Sena from 1590 to 1595. In 1592 the Portuguese attempted to chastise the Zimba, who had been terrorising Africans friendly to the Portuguese opposite Sena, on the other side of the Zambezi. But two Portuguese columns from Sena and Tete were separately wiped out by the Zimba in the field, with the

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(1) Dos Santos, Ethiopia Oriental (1609),i,fl.65, 69-71v, (1891), 228-9,241-4,277-9, RSEA, vii, p.107,114-18, trs.293,299-304; for the Turkish raids along the East African coast and related events, see Strandes, Portuguese Period, pp.145-63; Boxer, "The Portuguese on the Swahili Coast, 1593-1729" in Boxer & C.de Azevedo, Fort Jesus and the Portuguese in Mombasa, 1593-1729, London, 1960, pp.11-86, at 19-25; for the Segeju, see the sources cited by Boxer, "Swahili Coast," pp.24-5,n.3, and J.S. Kirkman in Strandes, Portuguese Period, pp.349-50. Although the passage in which Dos Santos discusses the Zimba is a bit vague in places, it should not have given rise to the various errors in both detail and interpretation which later writers have made in writing about the Zimba: e.g., Axelson, Portuguese in South-East Africa, 1600-1700, Johannesburg, 1960, p.9, misdates the Zimba sacking of Kilwa to 1593; Freeman-Grenville, apparently relying on the picturesque but badly bowdlerized translation of Samuel Purchas (1625-1626), presents one with an inaccurate version of parts of Dos Santos' account, HEA,i,p.158; see SD, pp.146-9, for the relevant parts of Purchas' translation.

Captains of both settlements counted among the dead. The next year, D. Pedro de Sousa, Captain of Moçambique, led an expedition of two hundred Portuguese and fifteen hundred Africans against the Zimba. For two months they unsuccessfully besieged the Zimba's encampment, or settlement - Dos Santos makes no distinction - which was heavily fortified with wood and earth walls. Finally, Sousa determined to raise the siege and retire to Sena. According to Dos Santos, his decision was based on false information which was fabricated by fainthearted residents of the Rivers who implied that Sena, being undefended, was being subjected to raids by a local African chieftain in their absence. The Zimba, thus relieved, assailed the abandoned Portuguese camp, killed a few stragglers, and appropriated the Portuguese artillery. Thus the Zimba remained undisputed masters of the north bank of the Zambezi, their arrogance undiminished. As happened with Mauruça, however, relations were eventually normalised and a peace struck between the Zimba chief and the Portuguese.(1)

Pursuing the connection between these events and Maravi expansion, we see that in 1596 the King of Portugal, Felipe I (1591-1598), addressed a letter to the Viceroy of India which included references to letters written to the Viceroy from Pedro de Sousa. According to these letters to Sousa, the Viceroy knew that he, Sousa, "was in the river of Cuama [Zambezi] with nearly 80 soldiers whom he had taken with him to expel forcibly from those lands a Negro who was disturbing trade there..." Three years later, Felipe II (1598-1621) sent the Viceroy instructions regarding the outfitting of both Sena and Tete, which were still unfortified. These were to be carried out by Nuno da Cunha de Ataide, Sousa's successor as Captain of Moçambique, who had urgently sought the Viceroy's permission "to be able to go castigate Tondo, because after he defeated Dom Pedro de Sousa he remained excessively insolent."

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(1) Dos Santos, Ethiopia Oriental (1609),i, fl.65-9,(1891), i, pp.232-40, RS&A, vii, pp.107-14, trs. 295-9.

Furthermore, Da Cunha was reported to believe that by crushing Tondo the Portuguese would be able to obtain possession of the eagerly sought silver mines of Chicoa.(1)

It seems most probable that this Tondo should be identified with Rundo, whom the Jesuit, Manuel Barreto, described as being "the second person in the empire of Maravi" in 1667. In Barreto's day, Rundo, or Lundu, in its proper form, was ruler of the "kingdom" of Bororo, which extended fifty leagues north along the coast from the Zambezi delta and fifty-two leagues up the Zambezi to the confluence of the Shire, which Barreto calls the Embebe, or Morambara, after the prominent Mount Murrubala, which lies just to the north of the Zambezi and east of the Shire.(2) Barreto's information makes it clear that Lundu's sphere of influence extended from the Shire eastwards.

Traditions collected by Eduardo do Couto Lupi around Angoche at the turn of the present century record vividly the expansion of Lundu's hegemony over the vast, ill-defined area of Bororo. According to these traditions, a few centuries previously, the aboriginal Makua of the Angoche hinterland were invaded by people who either called themselves, or were called by the Makua, <u>má-rundu</u>, which Lupi translates as "people of the Rundu." Their distinguishing characteristic was the violent warfare which they waged, "<u>destroying everything, killing all, and even having cannibalistic habits.</u>" /Italics in original/ In their relentless drive eastwards from the southwest, the <u>má-rundu</u> swept many people who lay in their path ahead of them in great disorder, as well as setting many others to flight on their flanks. The tradition adds that they continued their

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(1) Crown to Viceroy, Lisboa, 28 January 1596, in <u>APO</u>,iii,no.206, pp. 585-95, at 583; same to same, Lisboa, early 1599, although letter is misdated to 21 November 1598, in <u>ibid</u>, iii, no.365, pp.921-52, PP 18, p.927, and note on p.911.

(2) M. Barreto, "Informação do Estado e Conquista dos Rios de Cuama...," Goa, 11 December 1667, in <u>RSEA</u>, iii, pp.442,446,450,trs. 470, 475, 480. Barreto served in the Rivers from 1665 to 1667: D.P. Abraham, "Maramurca: An Exercise in the combined use of Portuguese Records and Oral Tradition," <u>JAH</u>,ii,2,1961, p.218, n.4.

march, moving always to the northeast, until they reached Mossuril, on the mainland opposite Moçambique, where they killed "all the whites and Arabs, as they had done in Sena", and that "they were only checked and repelled at a fortified village /āringa/ where the á-cunha (whites) had pieces of artillery." /Italics in original/ All this, Lupi assures the reader, is what he was told by "the people who commit to memory the history of the region." There were still more details to this tradition, but Lupi omits any reference to them, as he considered them unnecessary to his argument, which was the identification of the má-rundu with the Zimba, as described by Dos Santos.(1)

Fully realizing the reservations with which one must inevitably approach traditions presented in this format,(2) there is clearly much to be said in favour of Lupi's conclusion. Dos Santos relates that when he was returning from Sofala to Moçambique in April 1595, a storm forced his vessel to take port in the mouth of the Quizungo River (which Lupi identifies as the Tejungo, at the southern limit of Angoche territory), whence she was unable to set sail again for 52 days. While he and his companions were stranded there, they were unable to procure provisions from the mainland, not only because there was a great famine at the time but also because the Zimba were then in occupation of the country. The local Makua had fled from the mainland to a deserted island lying off the coast.(3) As for the attack on Mossuril, with its reference to similar destruction previously wrought at Sena, correspondence for these may be found in Mauruça's devastation of the Portuguese column in 1585 and in the Zimba's massacre of the Sena and Tete detachments,

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(1) E.de C. Lupi, Angoche - Breve memoria sobre uma das capitanias-mores do Districto de Moçambique, Lisboa, 1907, pp.116,119-25, 162-9.

(2) See J. Vansina, Oral Tradition (trs. H.M. Wright), London, 1965.

(3) Dos Santos, Ethiopia Oriental (1609), ii, fl.85, (1891), ii, pp. 260-2, RSEA, vii, pp.181, trs. 368-9.

near Sena, in 1592.(1) Similarly, the defeat of the Zimba at Malindi may be reflected in the traditional account of how the má-rundu were finally stopped. If the tradition is at all accurate in its details, the placement of the má-rundu devastation of Sena before the battle at Mossuril is not a matter which would invalidate the data. Mauruça and his Makua, whom Dos Santos definitely identifies as recent arrivals to the coast, may well have been one of those groups which Lupi says were driven from their homelands by the má-rundu. The identification of the Zimba of this invasion with the má-rundu would also seem to be a very reasonable conclusion. No other mass movement of people in the interior of northern Moçambique and southern Tanzania is known to have taken place between the arrival of the Portuguese and the crossing of the Zambezi by the Ngoni in 1835.

Lupi records a tradition which explains that the way in which the true má-rundu consolidated their authority after passing through the Angoche district was by installing má-rundu individuals, or families, as chiefs over those people who had submitted to their rule. At the beginning of the present century, virtually every chief of any importance in the district of Angoche claimed má-rundu descent, while there has not yet been reported any similar survival of a ruling tradition deriving from the Zimba within the entire area of the invasion.(2) Although there were certainly areas which were spared the effects of this great invasion, further field research along these lines around Angoche and among the other Makua living just behind the coast of northern Moçambique, particularly

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(1) Cf. R.M. Bordalo & L. de Lima, Ensaios sobre a Estatistica das Possessões Portuguezes no Ultramar, 2a Serie, Livro IV, "Provincia de Moçambique," Lisboa, 1859, pp.13,108, hereafter cited as Bordalo, Estatistica.

(2) Lupi, Angoche, pp.125-6.

opposite Moçambique Island, might possibly be rewarding.(1) As for the name "Zimba", it would appear that this appellation was a blanket term given by outsiders, probably African as well as Portuguese, to any bellicose people in East-Central Africa at that particular period.(2) As such, it is not surprising that Dos Santos should have called the má-rundu invaders by that name.

The last, and perhaps most obvious, point to be made in connection with this invasion is that the má-rundu, or "people of the Rundu," were surely warriors who owed their allegiance to Lundu. The má-rundu invasion should, therefore, be identified with the expansion of Lundu's hegemony over the "kingdom" of Bororo, as Barreto called it, in reality a large region throughout which many, if not most, chiefs owed their prestige to their connection with Lundu, who was thereby able to exercise at least a nominal hegemony over its people.

It must be remembered, however, that in 1667 Lundu was only "the second person in the empire of Maravi." Barreto explicitly states that the Bororo chiefs were subject to the Maravi, who were ruled by a powerful chief named Caronga, or Kalonga, in its proper form.(3) Reconstruction of the process by which Kalonga became the overlord of the Maravi "empire", which allegedly stretched from Maravia up to Mombasa, is complicated both by the paucity of references to Kalonga and by the frequent references which one encounters in the first third of the seventeenth century to a chief of corresponding importance

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(1) See A. dos Santos Baptista, Monografia Etnográfica sobre os Macuas, Lisboa, 1951, pp.16-20, for reference to Makua traditions which refer to an invading group from south of Lake Malawi coming to the Montepuez River and the effect this had on the local population.

(2) This name survives today in the form azimba, which is that of a Maravi sub-group living in the north of Sena, but no modern researcher has collected traditions among them in an effort to see what their exact connection is with the Zimba who terrorised East-Central Africa in the late sixteenth century. See A. Rita-Ferreira, "Os 'Azimba' (Monografia Etnográfica)", Boletim da Sociedade de Estudos de Moçambique, xxiv, 84-85 (1954), pp.47-140,5-116. Rita-Ferreira did not carry out this sort of investigation for his monograph, or, if he did, he has not yet published his results.

(3) RSEA, iii, pp.442,450, trs. 470, 480.

named Muzura. Nevertheless, one can show that the extension of Maravi influence over a vast area of East-Central Africa, including the conquests made by Lundu in Bororo, led to the development of well defined trade routes leading from the interior to the coast.

The earliest mention of Muzura was made by Padre António Gomes, S.J. Writing in 1648, he noted that when Diogo Simões Madeira had gone to battle with troops from Tete in order to prevent the overthrow of Mwanamutapa Gatsi Rusere by dissident chiefs who were nominally subordinated to the Mwanamutapa, he was aided by 4,000 Maravi warriors whom he had sought from Muzura.(1) This campaign took place in 1608.(2) Clearly, Muzura was already a major power in East-Central Africa before the end of the first decade of the seventeenth century. Within two decades, however, Muzura's relations with the Portuguese had seriously deteriorated. In 1624 it was reported that the trade of the Rivers was completely at a standstill as a result of the war he was waging against Sena and Tete. The situation in the Rivers was further complicated by the death, in the previous year, of the Mwanamutapa, which had led to fighting among his sons on the right bank of the Zambezi. Apparently seeking to extend his rule, Muzura, aided by a chief named Chombe, who had caused the Portuguese much trouble ten years before, crossed over to the south bank of the Zambezi. According to the Jesuit Padre Miguel Ruíz, Muzura captured a great deal of booty in this war, including gold and thousands of head of cattle, although he did not capture the lands of the Mwanamutapa.(3) By late 1630, an official with three years' experience in Moçambique

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(1) "Viagem que fez o Padre Ant.^{o} Gomes, da Comp.^{a} de Jesus, ao Imperio de de (sic) Manomotapa; e assistencia que fez nas ditas terras d.^{e} Alg'us annos," addressed to Padre João Marachi, S.J., Varcâ-Salcete, 2 January 1648; notes by Axelson, Stvdia, 5, 1959, pp. 155-242, at 185-4.

(2) Axelson, Portuguese, p.52.

(3) AHU, CM 1, Diogo de Sousa de Meneses, Moç., 1 April 1624; Archivum Romanum Societatis Jesu', Goa, 55 II,fl.750-72v, Sebastian Barreto to Vitelleschi, Goa, 15 December 1624, pp. 40-2, 67. I am indebted to Dr. J. Richard Gray for allowing me to utilise his notes. In 1572, Chombe was considered "our great Friend" by the Portuguese: RSEA, iii, p.189, trs.239.

was recommending to the Crown that it was particularly important that the Portuguese seek to befriend Muzura, "King of the Bororos." This opinion was apparently shared by others, for the Viceroy had earlier in the year sent a present to Muzura for the same purpose, because Muzura controlled the copper trade carried on by the Portuguese in the Rivers.(1) Furthermore, the evidence supplied by Padre Luís Mariano, S.J., shows that the Portuguese in the Rivers also were aware of the great abundance of ivory in the country to the north of the Zambezi, as well as of the cheap price for which it could be purchased from the Africans.(2)

But Muzura and his Maravi had another outlet for their trade with the Portuguese: Moçambique. In the early 1630s, a serious conflict erupted between the Castellan of Moçambique, Cristovão de Brito de Vasconcelos, and the moradores, over the trade carried on by the latter with the Maravi. This trade was conducted on the mainland, opposite the island. Cloth, firearms, and gunpowder were traded to the Maravi, who returned overland with these to the Rivers. One morador, named Francisco Botelho, went so far as to sell his land and houses for a sum of about 2,200 or 2,500 cruzados, all of which he then employed in buying cloth for trading with the Maravi. Although it is not stated what the Maravi were trading to the moradores, the principal item of trade was undoubtedly ivory. For the record, the Castellan advised that this trade prejudiced the Crown's control over the trade of the Rivers. Another, unstated, reason for which Brito de Vasconcelos may have opposed this trade so strongly was that the external trade of the Rivers was, at that time,

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(1) Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid, Cod.2562, fl.289-92, "Copia da informação que deu Pero d'Allmeida Cabral dos Rejnos de Monomotapa, e Rios de Cuama por mandado de Sua Magestade em carta sua de 15 de Novembro de 1630," at 290v.; Axelson, Portuguese, p.72. Axelson (pp.73-4) summarizes Almeida Cabral's report, but omits any mention of the reference to Muzura, for which I am again grateful to Dr. Gray.

(2) P. Aloysius Mariana (sic) ad Praepositum provinciae goanae, Moç., 1624, in C. Beccari, Rerum Aethiopicarum Scriptores Occidentales inediti a Saeculo XVI ad XIX, Rome, xii, (1912), pp.112-14; cf. ARSI, Goa 33 II, fl,769-72v.

the monopoly of the Captain of Moçambique: since the death of Nuno Álvares Pereira, in June 1631, Brito de Vasconcelos had himself become interim Captain.(1) Whatever his motives, Brito de Vasconcelos issued orders that no one from Moçambique was allowed to trade with the Maravi, and that transgressors would suffer heavy penalties.(2)

The great question raised by the letter of Brito de Vasconcelos is what circumstances led to the development of a substantial overland trade by the Maravi between the Rivers and Moçambique. The answer is suggested in the royal letter confirming the measures taken by the Castellan to suppress this trade. According to this dispatch, Brito de Vasconcelos wrote to the Crown, in a letter which has not yet been unearthed, that the origin of this trade was to be found in "the proximity of the Maravi Kaffirs, who have conquered a great part of the mainland by Moçambique and up to Mombasa." The presence, in strength, of the Maravi at the coast was attested by their subsequent offer, as a reaction against the Castellan's prejudicial orders, to aid four Dutch vessels, which were then cruising along there, in besieging Moçambique. In an attempt to counter this sudden hostility by the Maravi, Brito de Vasconcelos tried to induce the local Makua, the "enemies of the Maravi," to take up arms against them. Although he went so far as to offer to build the Makua a wooden fortress on the mainland, at Cabaceira, they refused to be drawn into conflict with the Maravi.(3) But this answer itself raises the obvious problem of resolving this account of Maravi conquest opposite Moçambique with what we already know about the Zimba/<u>má-rundu</u> invasions of this area at the end of the previous century.

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(1) Axelson, <u>Portuguese</u>, p.76; Bordalo, <u>Estatistica</u>, p.113.
(2) AHU, CM 1, Cristovão de Brito de Vasconcelos, <u>provisão</u>, Moç., 7 January 1632.
(3) CEHU-MF, LM 17, fl.138, & LM 18, fl.33v., Crown to Viceroy, Lisboa, 27 February 1633, briefly summarized in <u>BFUP</u>, 9, 1958, pp.263 (No.79), 308(No.17), respectively; see also, same to same, Lisboa, 12 February 1636, in <u>RSEA</u>, iv, pp.267-70, which summarizes the contents of the same letter from Brito de Vasconcelos.

At first sight, there would appear to be no problem here at all, for we know that Lundu was himself a Maravi chief. But the Portuguese never identified him as such, regarding him only as the King of the Bororo, who were correctly regarded as belonging to a distinct and different ethnic group.(1) Thus, within the context of the documentation, the puzzle is a very real one. The key to this problem is revealed in António Bocarro's monumental Livro do Estado da Índia Oriental, written in 1635, and revised by Pedro Barreto de Rezende about a year later.(2) According to Bocarro, who became keeper of the archives of Goa in 1631, the mainland opposite Moçambique was ruled by Muzura, "who came from the Rivers of Cuama to conquer the Makua who lived there." Muzura was master of the coast from Samacoco, some ten leagues to the north of Moçambique, to the bar of Mogincual, twelve leagues south of the island; to the south, he ruled up to Quelimane, as well as to Semana.(3) He was

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(1) See below, p.43 . The name "Bororo" was a term rather haphazardly applied by the Portuguese to all the Africans who lived north of the Zambezi and east of the Shire, as well as to this country. The people now inhabiting the lower Zambezi area, among whom are numbered a small group known as Lolo (i.e., Bororo), are an ethnically mixed lot. See Rita-Ferreira, Agrupamento e Caracterização Étnica dos Indígenas de Moçambique, Lisboa, 1958, pp.53-4, 70.

(2) There are a number of variant manuscript copies of this work in existence. One, in the possession of the Biblioteca Pública de Évora, is reproduced in Arquivo Português Oriental (nova edição), Bastorá, iv,2 (1), 1937, and iv, 2(2), 1958, pp.1-64, at iv, 2(1), pp.13-15; for Rezende's copy, see BM, Sloane Ms. 197, at fl.100 & v.; for an 18th century copy containing variations on both, see BNL, FG, Cod. 29, "Relação das Plantas, & Descripsões de Todas as Fortalezas, Cidades, e Povoaçoens que os Portuguezes tem no Estado da India Oriental," at fl.7; this latter has been published, with an introduction and comments, by A. Botelho da Costa Veiga, Relação..., Lisboa, 1936; see also, Boxer, "António Bocarro and the 'Livro do Estado da Índia Oriental' - A bio-bibliographical note," Garcia de Orta, número especial, 1956, pp.203-19.

(3) Samacoco, or Somoroco (BNL, FG,Cod.29), would seem to be identifiable as modern Simuco (14° 00' 1" S., 40° 33' 4" E.), or the inlet of that name; the modern town of Mogincual (15° 34' 0" S., 40° 24' 9" E.) is situated on the northern bank of the Mogincual River, the bar of which extends northward from the southern bank; it has not been possible to identify Semana. Dicionário Corográfico da Província de Moçambique, Coimbra, ii, 1921, pp.64,123-4; Atlas de Moçambique, Lourenço Marques, 1962, fl.5,8.

regarded by the Portuguese as being "extremely cunning and very powerful." Bocarro then states that

> This King is at peace with the Portuguese, and he used to keep it better than today, before he was so powerful, because since he has defeated, with our help, a Kaffir King called Rondo, with whom he was fighting, he thinks of making war against us; it is said that some Portuguese have been killed in his lands by his order, and he wrongs us at every occasion.

The victories which Muzura had gained over other chiefs had resulted in his not being satisfied with the name of "King," and he reportedly wished to be addressed as "Emperor," as was the Mawanamutapa. His might was enforced by an army of 10,000 to 12,000 men.

The only trade goods which Bocarro knew to have come from Muzura's country were ivory and machilas, a rough, extremely durable cloth woven by the Maravi and frequently traded, to the detriment of imported Indian fabrics, with the people to the south of the Zambezi. Neither gold nor silver were known to have come from his lands, but it was reported that there were copper mines, although these had not yet been discovered by the Portuguese. Within the effective limits of his rule, Muzura was the only person who could trade, as a result of which this area had been abandoned by many people. Bocarro concludes his account of Muzura's country by noting that both the soldiers and the moradores of Moçambique traded to it for ivory, machilas, and provisions, and that this trade did not contravene the monopoly of the Captain of Moçambique.

This invaluable account from Bocarro, a man who had all the necessary sources at his immediate disposal and who was especially interested in the history of Portuguese East Africa, leaves little doubt as to the circumstances which led to the extension of Maravi influence over a vast area of East-Central Africa. Out of the turbulence of the late sixteenth century emerged two chiefs who dominated all others on the northern bank of the Zambezi River:

Lundu, to the east of the Shire, and Muzura, to its west. There was a struggle for absolute supremacy between these two rulers, with the latter emerging on top. In the eyes of the Portuguese, Muzura's victory over Lundu established the primacy of Maravi rule over all the lands which had already been subjugated by Lundu, including those opposite Moçambique. This, they thought, was an accomplished fact by 1635, when Bocarro completed his Livro do Estado da Índia Oriental, although his testimony that Muzura's relations with the Portuguese deteriorated after they helped him to defeat Lundu suggests that this event may have taken place between 1608, when Muzura sent 4,000 warriors to take part in the Portuguese campaign against Mwanamutapa Gatsi Rusere, and 1624, when he was at war with his former allies. Above all, it seems incontestable, given the paucity of available source material, that the Portuguese conception of a Maravi "empire", which was first expounded by Barreto in 1667, dates from this period.

There still remains the problem of identifying the ruler of this putative empire. In 1648, Gomes says he was called Muzura; in 1667, Barreto refers to him as Caronga. Neither writer ever calls him by another name; the personal name "Caronga" never occurs before 1667, nor that of "Muzura" after 1648, and between these two dates no known references are made to this ruler at all. One may attempt to resolve this enigma in either of two ways. The first relies heavily on one's acceptance of Maravi tradition; the second is based on a combination of apparent logic and judicious speculation.

Following orthodox tradition,(1) the Maravi were led from Luba country to Malawi, an area located at the southwest of Lake Malawi,

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(1) Unfortunately, the principal sources of Cewa, Nyanja, and Mang'anja tradition have been published only in the vernacular. See, e.g. S.Y. Nthara, Mbiri ya Acewa, Zomba, 1945, "of which an English translation is prepared and awaiting a publisher," according to T.C. Young, "Place-Names in Nyasaland," NJ, vi, 2, 1953, p.36; see also, idem, "The Malawi people in Central Africa," African Studies, xi, 2, 1952, p.91; E. Mwale, Za Acewa, London, 1952; E.W. Chafulumira, Mbiri ya Amang'anja, Lusaka, 1948.

by a chief called Kalonga. Kalonga sent a junior matrilineal kinsman ("younger brother") named Undi, to settle the Kapoche River headwaters. Undi, in turn, was aided by his junior matrilineal kinsman, Cimwala, who thus attained status in the area second only to Undi. In time, Undi was ruler of all the southern Cewa, with his immediate rule being to the east of the Kapoche, while Cimwala ruled to the west of that river. Similarly, after sending Undi to the Kapoche, Kalonga divided the country lying north of Undi's area between the lake and the Luangwa River amongst several chiefs whose exact relationships, in terms of priority, have become somewhat muddled as a result of more recent political disputes.(1) At what appears to be an earlier stage of the Maravi wanderings than Undi's separation from Kalonga, the antecessors of the modern Nyanja and Mang'anja left Malawi under the leadership of Kaphwiti and his junior matrilineal kinsman, Lundu. Kaphwiti established his headquarters at Malawi-wa-Kaphwiti, to the west of the Shire, on the Wamkurumadzi River, while Lundu's town was Mbewe-wa-Mitengo, farther to the south on the Shire, about fifteen miles below modern Chikwawa.(2)

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(1) Marwick, "History and Tradition." pp.378-81; cf. J.G. Pike, "A Pre-Colonial History of Malawi," NJ, xviii,1,1965, pp.32-4; A.J. Mazula, "História dos Nianjas," Portugal em África, xix, 1962, pp.162-5, although most of this article must be read with the greatest scepticism and much of it rejected out of hand.

(2) Rangeley, "Two Nyasaland Rain Shrines: Makewana - The Mother of all People," NJ, v,2,1952, pp.31-2; idem, "Mbona - the Rain Maker," NJ, vi,1,1953, p.8; Pike, "A Pre-Colonial History of Malawi," p.55. According to an eighteenth century Portuguese tradition, the first Kalonga was the eldest son of a Maravi chief who was married to a daughter of the Mwanamutapa: see ACL, Azul MSS 384, No. 2, Dionísio de Melo de Castro to Pedro de Saldanha de Albuquerque, 20 January 1765, also in EHGEP, pp.121-49, at 139; see also ibid.,, p.132; Price, "More about the Maravi," p.77. An earlier reference to this tradition may be read into the statement that Kalonga usurped his empire from Mwanamutapa: A. de Conceição, "Tratado dos Rios de Cuama," Rios de Cuama, 1696, in CT, ii,1867, p.42. Gomes, "Viagem," pp.199-200, reports the story that the founder of the "empire" of Bororo was once a captive of the Portuguese, who fled north of the Zambezi and, by his prowess as a hunter and warrior, eventually became a great chief.

In 1616, Gaspar Bocarro, in the course of a remarkable overland journey from Tete to Kilwa, spent a fortnight at Marauy, Muzura's capital. Marauy was located at about a week's journey northeast from Tete and a day's distance or so from a great expanse of water from which the Shire flowed to the Zambezi. Rangeley, who was not very familiar with the Portuguese sources, has argued for the identification of Muzura and Marauy with Kaphwiti and Malawi-wa-Kaphwiti.(1) Mang'anja and Nyanja tradition is rather vague on the early relationship between Kaphwiti and Lundu, as Lundu eventually usurped most of Kaphwiti's power, but it has been recorded most positively by Murray that Kaphwiti once was the most powerful Maravi chief in the Shire watershed.(2) If Rangeley's identification is correct, the evidence provided by Gaspar and António Bocarro proves that this was indeed true at the beginning of the seventeenth century.

Continuing with the proposition that Muzura and Kaphwiti were the same chief, one wants to know, then, what were the circumstances which led to Muzura's decline of power. Regrettably, the translated traditions are silent on this point, but a possible answer is suggested by the accounts of Mariano and Gomes. Mariano gives the names of two other important chiefs living beyond Muzura's kingdom, in 1624, ruling the country along the shores of what is surely Lake Malawi. These were Massi and Ruvenga, the one being a fortnight's march from Muzura's Maravi, and the other being yet another fortnight's march beyond that. It seems quite possible that Massi should be identified with either the important Cewa chief Mwase, whose bailiwick is now far to the northwest, around Lundazi in modern Zambia, or with the other, latterly more powerful, Cewa chief called Mwase, whose dominion centres on Kasungu, in modern Malawi, north of

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(1) Rangeley, "Mbona," p.8; idem, "Bocarro's Journey," NJ, vii,2,1954, pp.15-21; idem, "The Portuguese," NJ, xvii, 1,1964, pp.57-8; cf. Hamilton, "The Route of Gaspar Bocarro from Tete to Kilwa in 1616", NJ, vii,2,1954, pp.8-10; Marwick, "History and Tradition." p.382.

(2) S.S. Murray, A Handbook of Nyasaland, London, 1952, p.80; Rangeley, "Mbona," p.8; idem, "Bocarro's Journey," p.15.

the Bua River. Ruvenga, on the other hand, seems to have no easily identifiable modern survivor. According to Mariano, Massi/Mwase was a friend of the Portuguese, who were then at war with Muzura, but it was not possible to reach Massi/Mwase's lands without passing through the aggressor's.(1) By the time that Gomes wrote, in 1648, Muzura's relations were again cordial with the Portuguese, and those who did business with him were impressed by the fairness of his dealings. Gomes also records that Muzura was at war with "other Kingdoms" to the north-northwest, and that the principal reason of some of them for pursuing this war was that they had hitherto been denied the right to travel through his lands "to go to trade with us, and to seek cloths for clothing themselves."(2) It is possible that Muzura's power was broken in a struggle over the control of trade routes with Massi/Mwase. This would have left Lundu as the only great chief in the Shire Valley.

Although Muzura's decline enabled Lundu to extend his immediate dominion, it still left him, at least in Barreto's eyes, ultimately subordinate to Kalonga, the original Maravi leader. It is, of course, possible that the Kalonga known to the Portuguese was not the same chief who led the Maravi migration from Luba country, for Kalonga is merely a title meaning "king." Thus, Massi/Mwase could

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(1) Beccari, Rerum Aethiopicarum, xii, 1912, pp.113-14. The distances given by Mariano should not be taken literally, as Portuguese writers of the period were prone to expressing distances in terms of "a fortnight's march" (quinze dias de caminho). If one is to make a choice between Mwase Lundazi and Mwase Kasungu, it must be based on what Cewa tradition reveals about the emergence of the Kasungu chiefdom. Cf. Hamilton, "The Route of Gaspar Bocarro," p.7.

(2) Gomes, "Viagem," pp.200,205.

have been Barreto's Kalonga.(1)

Another reading of Gomes' information suggests that it was Kalonga himself who took Muzura to task for rank insubordination in refusing to allow him, the paramount Maravi chief, to trade directly with the Portuguese, but the Portuguese and Maravi sources available by which one can test this hypothesis are few. Except for Mazula's isolated and confusing references to Chief Msumba, the name adopted by Kalonga Cimbano and thereafter utilised by his successors, there do not appear to be any published Maravi traditions in translation which refer to Kalonga after he had led the Maravi migration and had dispatched his junior kinsmen to settle the land.(2) Tradition states that Kalonga settled at Mankhamba, just south of the Lintipe River, the northern limit of the traditional location of Malawi as described by the Cewa, and close by the lake, after sending off his lieutenants.(3) This

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(1) Marwick, "History and Tradition." p.378, and ref. cited. Arguing on the same basis that the Kalonga known to the Portuguese was Undi is not acceptable. Duly has found a tradition in the lower Shire valley which names Undi as having been the supreme Maravi leader, and both Lacerda (1798) and Gamitto (1831-1832) refer to Undi as the head of the entire Maravi nation. Earlier Portuguese sources indicate rather conclusively, however, that Undi's dominion was more limited than these statements suggest and that Kalonga was indeed Undi's paramount. A.W.R. Duly, "The Lower Shire District," NJ, i,2,1948, p.17; F.J. de Lacerda e Almeida, Travessia da Africa, Lisboa, 1936, p.176; A.C.P. Gamitto, O Muata Cazembe..., Lisboa, 1854, trs. I. Cunnison as King Kazembe, 2 vols., Lisboa, 1960; in the present study, all references are to this translation, which see, i, pp.68,92; ii, p.195; TT, MR, maço 604, António Pinto de Miranda, "Memoria sobre a Costa da Africa," c. 1766, ff.44, reproduced in A.A. de Andrade, Relações de Moçambique Setecentista, Lisboa, 1955, pp.225-312, at 281; AHU, CM 30, anon., "Descripsaõ de Imperio de Manomogy, ou Caronga, da lem do Rio Zambeze;" cf. Pike, "A Pre-Colonial History of Malawi," p.35.

(2) Mazula, "História dos Nianjas," pp.237-8; see also ibid., pp.165-6. Msumba's, or Messumba's, settlement is located at 12° 36' 8" S., 34° 47' 2" E., north of Metangula, Distrito do Niassa, Província de Moçambique, almost halfway up the eastern side of Lake Malawi. See Atlas de Moçambique, fl.9; the Dicionário Corográfico, i, 1919, p.86, notes only the Msumba opposite Likoma Island, near Cóbuè (Kobwe); for refs.to late 19th century Msumba, see W.P. Johnson, My African Reminiscences, 1875-1895, London /c.1924/; A. Ambali, Thirty Years in Nyasaland, London, /c.1923/.

(3) Rangeley, "Two Nyasaland Rain Shrines - Makewana," pp.51-2.

puts him well to the north-northwest of Muzura and in between this chiefdom and the present locations of either of the two Mwases. While one cannot identify Kalonga's town from Portuguese sources, as Rangeley has done with Muzura's, one Teodósio Garcia, who had lived in the Rivers of Sena for thirty-five years and had been Kalonga's friend for many of these, last visited him in 1679. His march from Chicoa to Kalonga's town took twenty days to complete. This seems long for the distance covered, but Garcia was an old man; in fact, he died two days after his return to the Rivers.(1) Certainly, Mankhamba could have been reached from Chicoa within this time. If the same may be said for Kasungu, or even Lundazi, Garcia's friendship with Kalonga assures us that if the great chief were either of the two Mwases, Garcia would clearly have called him by that name. Massi/Mwase may have been known to the Portuguese before Kalonga, but, once the latter became known, there is no evidence for believing that he was ever confused with Massi/Mwase thereafter. It seems preferable to propose that Muzura's loss of power followed on his defiance of and conflict with Kalonga, the paramount chief of the Maravi. Thus, as Barreto observed for the first time in 1667, perhaps two or more centuries after the first Kalonga had led the Maravi to Malawi from Luba country, his descendant was still the most important chief in Maravia, as he had, perhaps, always been. The belated appearance of Kalonga's name in Portuguese records may be accounted for by the fact that while Lundu remained subordinate to his over-weening senior chief Muzura, the Portuguese were unaware of the existence of a supreme Maravi chief, whose more limited, personally administered, chiefdom lay beyond Muzura's realm.(2)

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(1) AHU, CM 2, Teodósio Garcia to Crown, Quelimane, 20 June 1679; AHU, Cod.212, fl.94-5, Conselho Ultramarino, parecer, Lisboa, 20 July 1680; see Axelson, Portuguese, pp.153-4.

(2) In this respect it is worth noting Livingstone's observation (1861) that the Mukumadzi (Wamkurumadzi) River was the boundary between the Mang'anja and Maravi tribes. As we know, Muzura's town was located on this stream. Livingstone makes only one passing reference to this, by then, unimportant chief, whom he calls Kapuiti, without indicating the precise location of his village. See J.P.R. Wallis (ed.), The Zambezi Expedition of David Livingstone, 1858-1863, London,i,pp.189,188.

Having reached this tentative reconstruction of the process whereby Kalonga reasserted his supremacy over Muzura, one must admit, in view of the nature of the sources and the lack of further documentation, the very real possibility that Muzura was the personal name not of Kaphwiti, but of a Kalonga. Indeed, the comparative imperial position which each occupied in contemporary Portuguese sources, as well as the traditional pre-eminence of Kalonga, immediately suggests this identification.

Dos Santos makes an interesting reference to "a place called Chicarongo, which is ten leagues from Tete," where the Portuguese defeated a Mumbo chief named Quizura. This was before the great Zimba migration of the 1580s, during a most confused period in the area north of the Zambezi. Dos Santos may not have been well acquainted with these names and it is possible that Chicarongo was not a place, but a chief, Caronga, and that his name was not Quizura, but Muzura. Furthermore, Dos Santos may have been mistaken in believing that the name "Mumbo" was that of a people, whom he places among the Zimba. Rather, it may be that he had heard of a great Mambo, or chief, living among them, and that he misinterpreted this information, incorrectly making a separate people of the Zimba chief. Thus, one could suggest that the Mambo Kalonga, who was also known as, or whose personal name was, Muzura, was the great Zimba chief whom the Portuguese defeated before the late 1580s.(1)

That Maravi tradition does not appear to have recorded such a defeat is not at all surprising. Court traditions in African societies frequently omit all mention of defeats, as their purpose is primarily to establish the right to authority of the royal families of the society. A possible interpretation of the events leading up to the confrontation which, it is suggested, might have taken place between the Portuguese and the Maravi paramount chief,

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(1) Dos Santos, Ethiopia Oriental (1609),i,fl.65, RSEA, vii, p.107, trs. 292; cf. ibid., vi, p.550, trs. 403-4; see above, pp. 29-30.

Kalonga, is that the Portuguese move up the Zambezi not only effectively cut off the merchants of Kilwa from the Rhodesian gold trade, but also deprived the Maravi chief of his lucrative copper and ivory trade with these same Swahili traders. If the Maravi invasion had taken place during the fourteenth century, it is very likely that their chiefs, in particular Kalonga, had a considerable economic stake in the Swahili trade in the Zambezi valley. The absence of gold to the north of the Zambezi did not cause the Swahili, unlike the Portuguese, to turn their backs on that region. Copper, both Katangan and Rhodesian, and ivory were highly valued by them. In particular, we know that the abundance of ivory in Maravia had lured Swahili traders far up the Shire River by the first quarter of the sixteenth century. The unwillingness of the Portuguese to trade in these goods, an attitude which persisted into the middle of the eighteenth century, might easily have led to a conflict between Kalonga and the Portuguese, as the former mainly sought to find a market for his ivory and copper.(1)

By the late 1580s, this tentatively proposed Maravi economic frustration, which quite possibly had created considerable political unrest in Maravia, may well have produced a violent migration such as that which Dos Santos ascribes to the Zimba. In this light, the extension of mă-rundu influence, which we have seen to be identical with the Zimba migration, would be the consequence of Lundu's half-century search for a new market for the ivory and copper trade, especially the former, on which the wealth of the Maravi chiefs was based. Such a market existed at Moçambique, where the moradores were excluded from the gold trade by virtue of the monopoly of the Captain of Moçambique. Similarly, Muzura's defeat of Lundu would be seen as the final step in the re-establishment of the traditional Maravi hierarchy, which was upset during the middle

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(1) See above, p. 27, n. 2 ; below, pp. 140-2.

decades of the sixteenth century.

Despite Rangeley's positive identification of Muzura with Kaphwiti, the second of these two interpretations appears to be more plausible than the first. If Muzura/Kalonga was only ten leagues from Tete before the late 1580s, there is no reason why, in pursuance of his struggle to reassert his authority over Lundu, he should not have had his headquarters during the first decades of the seventeenth century somewhere west of the Shire, where Bocarro found Muzura in 1616. Nor, in view of his mobility, should it be surprising to find Muzura/Kalonga, his primacy once again acknowledged by Lundu, back near Lake Malawi within a decade, where Mariano's account seems to place him in 1624, where Garcia apparently visited his descendant in 1679, and where Maravi tradition confidently asserts he established his capital after dispatching the subordinate Maravi chiefs to their respective areas of influence.

Clearly, more basic research needs to be done into this very important subject. Detailed examination of both Portuguese sources and Maravi traditions, not to mention archaeological investigation of Iron Age sites in this area, are essential to a better appreciation of the politico-economic history of the Maravi empire.

We must now return to the key problem of how the growth of Maravi prestige over much of East-Central Africa affected the development of long distance trade routes in that area. As we have previously seen, intimate commercial ties were already established between the Maravi and the Portuguese of Moçambique by about 1650. Considering the bitter hostilities between the Portuguese and Mauruça in the 1580s, and the consequent absence of trade relations between the two parties, it appears most likely that the overland route from Maravia to Moçambique only became operative after the Maravi conquest of Bororo had been completed. Until then, the struggle between Muzura and Lundu undoubtedly prolonged the unstable

conditions which had reigned in the area since the late sixteenth century. In such circumstances there could not have been much in the way of trade between Maravia and Moçambique. Stability, and conditions favourable to such long-distance trade, only came with the victory of Muzura and the creation of what the Portuguese came to regard as the Maravi empire.

The conflict between Brito de Vasconcelos and the moradores of Moçambique was eventually decided in favor of the latter. After first upholding the Castellan's provisions against trade with the Maravi, the Crown ordered that a devassa, or judicial investigation, be taken to determine the facts of the case. Although the Viceroy agreed to arrange the inquiry, he strongly defended the right of the moradores to continue this trade, as it was their sole means of earning a living. He also argued that they were especially due this right in gratitude for the valuable assistance they had given to the Portuguese garrison in withstanding the three Dutch sieges of the fortress of São Sebastião, at Moçambique, earlier in the century. Considering the convictions of the Viceroy, it is not surprising that the Crown subsequently followed his recommendations and that nothing further is heard of the devassa.(1) By 1635, whatever misunderstandings had arisen between the Maravi and the Portuguese of Moçambique, as a result of Brito de Vasconcelos' prohibition, had been resolved, and amicable relations prevailed. In that year it was reported that the Maravi had aided the Portuguese in a campaign against some local Swahili. This co-operation on the part of the Maravi reinforced the Crown's previously expressed recommendations in favor of their trade with the moradores of

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(1) CEHU-MF, LM 17, fl.138, & LM 18, fl.55 & v., Crown to Viceroy, Lisboa, 27 February 1655, and reply, Goa, 19 October 1655, which is recorded on fl.55 of LM 18, opposite the letter from the Crown; Crown to Viceroy, Lisboa, 28 March 1655 & 12 February 1656, in RSEA, pp.265-70; on the Dutch siege of Moçambique, see Axelson, Portuguese, pp.15-29, to which may be added A. Meyrelles do Souto (ed.), "Historya dos Cercos que os Olandezes puzerão à Fortaleza de Mozambique o Anno de 607 e 608," Stvdia, 12,1963, pp.465-548.

Moçambique, which were duly repeated to the Viceroy in 1640.(1)

The only other reference to the influence of the Maravi along the coast which precedes Barreto's invaluable account affirms that this was still considerable in 1649, and that the Maravi were "greatly feared along this coast."(2) But it is only Barreto who furnishes any details on the nature of Maravi domination in this area and on the operation of trade between Moçambique and Maravi country. According to him, the Makua were ruled by a number of petty chiefs, "who all obey in the first place the great emperor of the entire nation of the Makua." This emperor must have been Mauruça, who was undeniably the most powerful Makua chief in the neighborhood of Moçambique, which was, effectively, the only part of Macuana known to the Portuguese. Thus, his elevation to emperor by Barreto is quite understandable. Similarly, Bororo was carved up among numerous local rulers, who equally were the subjects of Lundu.(3) On the other hand, Barreto makes it perfectly clear that the Maravi were dominant throughout the entire region and suggests that this influence was the result of their force of arms. The Makua rendered the Maravi "such obedience as they are compelled to by violence," while the Bororo were "subjected by force to the Maravi." Sanculo, on the mainland just south of Moçambique, was "infested by the Maravi," while Quelimane had occasionally been attacked by the Bororo "under the

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(1) BFUP, 14, 1960, pp.85-6 (No.20); CEHU-MF, LM 21-A, fl.90, Crown to Viceroy, Lisboa, 11 March 1640, summarized in BFUP 13, 1959, pp.712-13 (No.47); see also, CEHU-MF, LM 21-B, fl.503-4 v, "Lista de 45 cartas de Sua Magestade, tocantes ao governo, que vão respondidas por este maço No.1," No. 41, for a passing reference to this trade, summarized in BFUP, 20, 1962, pp.149-50 (No.69).

(2) This observation is taken from the account of Padre António Francisco Cardim, S.J., "Relação da Viagem do galeão S. Lourenço e sua perdição nos baixos de Moxincale em 3 de Setembre de 1649," Lisboa, 1651, in Gomes de Brito, Historia Tragico-Maritima, x, 1905, pp.161-88, at 182.

(3) See above, pp. 35-6 . For the fragmented political organization of these peoples, see, e.g., the summaries of Rita-Ferreira, Agrupamento, p.71, and M. Tew (Douglas), Peoples of the Lake Nyasa Region, London, 1950, p.25.

name of Maravi." The final proof of Maravi dominance in East-Central Africa is in Barreto's sharp observation: "The Maravi are very warlike, and are feared among all the Kaffirs as the Bororo and Makua are despised, so that as any Kaffir is offended at being called a Bororo or Makua, so it is a great honor to be a Maravi. . ."(1) It seems certain, then, that Barreto's much maligned Maravi empire did, in fact, exist. It was not, assuredly, an empire-state, nor was it a confederation. There are no grounds for believing that it ever was actually administered as any sort of a unified state, although tribute was undoubtedly extracted by the Maravi whenever possible. Rather, it was a vast area which, after having been duly impressed by Maravi military strength, was bound together by Maravi commercial dominance.(2)

Following the dispute between Brito de Vasconcelos and the moradores of Moçambique, the Crown had repeatedly issued orders which granted the right of the latter to trade with the Maravi,

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(1) RSEA, iii, pp.456, 442-3, 450-1, trs. 463-4, 470-1, 480.

(2) S. de Castro, "Os Lómuès no Larde," Boletim Geral das Colónias, 304, 1950, p.25, and "Os Lomues do Larde - elementos para um monografia histórico-ethnográfica," Boletim da Sociedade de Estudos de Moçambique, xxii, 76, 1952, pp.41-4, makes intriguing references to the Marravi being one of the original groups inhabiting Larde, the modern name for the former district of Angoche, where Lupi gathered his traditions about the má-rundu. See also, AHU, Cod.1452, fl.52-4, Manuel da Silva Gonçalves to José Joaquim Rodrigues, Moç., 7 April 1852, which recommends to Rodrigues, as the new Captain of Fernão Veloso (14° 27' 5" S., 40° 40' 9" E.), located midway between Moçambique and Simuco, the northern limit of Muzura's dominion, according to António Bocarro, that he should treat the Maravi chief called Meua, who lived not far from the Portuguese establishment there, with particular respect. Enclosure number 4 of this letter, "Relação dos Generos, que se remetem, para o saguate de Regulo Meua," shows that Meua was the only chief to whom Rodrigues was to send presents on his arrival at Fernão Veloso. Cf. H.E.O'Neill, "A Three Months' Journey in the Makua and Lomwe Countries," Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society, iv,1882,p.200: "Though separately and distinctly independent, there is a commonality of interests along the lines of the trade routes, binding most of these petty chiefdoms..."

"but the governors of Moçambique have prevented it under various pretexts, as they have other trade. . .and they usurp everything," Barreto lamented, "so that now only one or two moradores have any capital, whereas in past years the town contained many rich merchants. If His Majesty does not put a stop to this, Moçambique will soon be deserted, and the Captain will be left alone with the keys of his fortress." Indeed, in the 1640s, it had been alleged that the governors sometimes seized the goods of the moradores forcibly, and that the greed of these officials was at the root of the state of destitution into which Moçambique and the Rivers of Sena had fallen.(1) In spite of these vexations, which, of course, were felt by the Maravi traders, as well as by the moradores, this trade continued to be pursued. Barreto claims that the reason for this was that

> It is much easier for the traders who go from Moçambique to Maravi, and there meet those of Tete, to bring their ivory to Tete than to carry it to Moçambique, but they avoid coming to Tete in order not to be subjected to the monopoly of the governor of Moçambique.

Although he does not explicitly say so, Barreto is here certainly referring to African, not Portuguese traders. He elsewhere emphasizes that the Portuguese of Moçambique dared not enter Macuana and adds later that "The merchants of Moçambique trade in this kingdom /of Maravia - sic Theal/ with the Makua, those of Quelimane with the Bororo, those of Sena with the Rundo, and those of Tete with the said Maravi and in his /Kalonga's/ court."(2) This

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(1) AHU,CM 2, anon., document, beginning, "Em prezença do Conde da Torre.." /Lisboa/ n.d., but from the 1640s. The document is based on the testimony of two experienced men from Moçambique and the Rivers, Carlos Luís de Almeida, who had last served in East Africa as Captain of the Rivers of Cuama, and Manuel da Silva Louzado. They had been summoned to give witness before the Count, who became a member of the Conselho do Estado in 1641, and died in 1651. Grande Enciclopédia Portuguesa e Brasileira, Lisboa e Rio de Janeiro, n.d., xxxii, p.203.

(2) RSEA, iii,pp.437,447-8,451, trs.464-5,476-7,480; see Axelson, Portuguese, p.151, for complaints made to the Crown in 1663 against the Captain of Moçambique's violating the trading rights of the moradores.

statement indicates that the local Portuguese merchants of each settlement traded directly only with those people in whose lands they were located. Interior trade, such as that between Moçambique and Maravia, was completely in the hands of the Africans.

It seems probable that by carrying his ivory to a competitive market - the moradores of Moçambique - the African trader could secure a far more favorable price for it than if he had to dispose of it at Tete, where the monopoly of the Captain of Moçambique enabled him effectively to dictate the price of ivory, no doubt to his own advantage. In the eighteenth century, this pattern of trade continued, as various factors combined to depress the value of ivory, so far as the African trader was concerned, in the Rivers. Later in the same century, similar circumstances caused him to forsake Moçambique, to a large extent, and to carry his merchandise to Kilwa, where he was able to turn an even greater profit. To most contemporary European eyes, he may have seemed rather simple for exchanging precious ivory, as well as other desirable goods, including slaves, for rather inexpensive cloth and beads; but the long distance African trader in East-Central Africa was a shrewd businessman, keenly aware of the market in which he was operating. Indeed, this was a fact which greatly impressed several of the more perspicacious Portuguese officials of the period.(1)

There is not nearly so much information concerning the overland trade route from Maravia to Kilwa in the seventeenth century as there is for that to Moçambique. The first evidence that such a route had been established is the account of Gaspar Bocarro's historic journey of 1616. In fact, until the middle of the eighteenth century, this is the only Portuguese source which indicates the existence of a route to Kilwa, which goes equally unnoticed in the Livro do Estado da India Oriental and the reports of Gomes and Barreto. Despite the exaggerated claims by contemporary Portuguese observers that the Maravi empire extended up to Mombasa and that it thus adjoined

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(1) See below, pp. 138-9, 152-3, 160, 202.

Ethiopia, the Maravi exercised no military domination over the regions through which the route to Kilwa ran. On the other hand, Antônio Bocarro's description of Gaspar Bocarro's march from Muzura's town of Marauy to Kilwa clearly reveals that Muzura's commercial influence extended along the entire route. Muzura dominated neither Manguro, which extended roughly from the Mandimba hills to the Ruvuma River, nor the country lying between the Ruvuma and the Kilwa coast, as he reportedly did Bororo and Macuana, but he was well respected throughout the entire area. The ease with which Bocarro completed his march, during most of which he was guided by several of Muzura's subjects, as well as the nature of the relations which existed between Muzura and the two principal chiefs in these regions, Chicoave and Manhanga, attest to this state of affairs. Chicoave is said to have been "a friend and almost a vassal of Muzura, because he stands in awe of him," but the fact that Muzura "sent the Kaffir a present, that he might let Bocarro pass and provide him with guides" surely reveals that Chicoave was not his vassal. Muzura also sent presents to Manhanga, who reciprocated with cloth obtained in trade from the coast, for the same purpose; so the assertion that "this Kaffir also obeys Muzura" would seem to be the product of a similar misinterpretation of the situation. It is striking enough, however, that Muzura's reputation and influence extended from his own country, southwest of Lake Malawi, to beyond the Ruvuma River.(1)

As we have seen, during the middle decades of the sixteenth century, the merchants of Kilwa gradually began to cultivate a trade in ivory with the people of the hinterland.(2) After the devastation wrought by the Zimba at Kilwa in 1588, it must have taken several years before more than a trifling trade of this sort could have been re-established. Besides the determination and vitality of the people of Kilwa who survived the Zimba massacre to revive their town,

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(1) SD, pp.166-7.
(2) See above, pp. 21-4.

the principal factor in the revival of this trade was the presence of the Portuguese at Kilwa. In 1592, the Portuguese seat of power on the coast of East Africa north of Cape Delgado was transferred from Malindi to Mombasa, where, in the following year, construction began on the monumental Fort Jesus. In 1594, an alfândega, or royal custom-house, was established at Mombasa. It was intended to be the sole official port for the import and export of all merchandise within the nominal jurisdiction of the Portuguese in that part of the world. According to the vice-regal instructions to the new Captain of Mombasa in 1598, no Portuguese were to be allowed to settle in any coastal or island town outside of Mombasa, not even in Kilwa or Zanzibar, whose rulers were known "for the long-standing friendship which they have with the Estado /da Índia/," or State of India, as the entire Portuguese establishment east of the Cape of Good Hope was known. Within several years, however, the Captain of Mombasa had his personal factor established at Kilwa, among other places along the coast, for, despite specific instructions not to monopolise all trade for themselves, this is precisely what the Captains usually strove to do. During the course of the century, however, the trading monopoly of the Captain of Mombasa seems to have become accepted by the Crown.(1)

As the Sultan of Kilwa exercised hardly any independent power (although he still maintained at least a nominal hegemony over Mafia Island), he soon fell under considerable Portuguese influence. In 1614, the Sultan's support of the Portuguese led to his assassination by an anti-Portuguese vassal who then apparently seized power for his faction. The Portuguese took the Sultan's young son under their protection after the assassination, but it is

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(1) Boxer, "Swahili Coast," pp.25-9; C. Azevedo, "Fort Jesus," in Boxer & Azevedo, Fort Jesus, pp.89-117, especially 94-5; Strandes, Portuguese Period, pp.164-75, 241-2; BNL, FG, Cod.1987, fl.69-72v., "Regimento que Levou Rui soares de mello capitão da fortz^a de Mombaca," n.d., but ascribable to no later than 1598, when Soares de Melo became Captain of Mombasa; Dos Santos, Ethiopia Oriental (1609), i, fl.113v., (1891), i, pp.379-80; see Boxer & Azevedo, Fort Jesus, Appendix A, p.118.

not known whether he was himself installed as Sultan after the Portuguese reaffirmed their supremacy in Kilwa. When Gaspar Bocarro reached Kilwa in 1616 "the factor and other Portuguese" who received him there seem to have been in control of the place. By 1631, the oppressive behavior of successive Portuguese factors from Mombasa at Kilwa had created a state of near revolt among its inhabitants, and the Sultan was only appeased by the persuasion of a visiting Portuguese judge who conducted an investigation into the matter. It was perhaps the antagonising conduct of Portuguese factors at Kilwa which caused at least one Captain of Mombasa, Francisco de Seixas Cabreira, to exercise his monopoly of the ivory trade there through a Muslim personal agent, in his case, one Sharif Alaum, a native of Kilwa.(1)

Portuguese control over the Mombasa coast, as it was called, was never very secure. A major uprising at Mombasa in 1631 threw the Portuguese out of their one coastal stronghold, but it was re-taken in the following year. Throughout the century, however, Kilwa remained friendly and well within the commercial sphere of the Captain of Mombasa, even after Oman began to challenge Portuguese supremacy on the East African coast. The rise of Oman under the new Yorubi dynasty, which came to power in 1624, and the decline of Portuguese domination in the Indian Ocean, which was largely the result of Dutch expansion, combined to result in the Omani capture of Muscat from the Portuguese in 1650. By being quick to adapt European ship design, the Omanis were soon able to present the Portuguese with a formidable challenge in East Africa. Already in 1652 Arab raiders from Oman seriously threatened the Portuguese hold on the coast, and Kilwa was raided by a fleet mounted by the pro-

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(1) Dos Santos, Ethiopia Oriental (1609), i,fl.114v., (1891),i, p.384; CEHU-MF, LM 12, fl. 161-7v, D. Jerónimo de Azevedo to Crown, Paragem das Queimadas, 31 December 1614, summarized in BFUP 4,1955,p.767 (no.109); SD, pp.168,183-4; Arquivo Português Oriental (n.e.),iv,2(1),pp.57-8; Axelson, Portuguese, p.85; Strandes, Portuguese Period, p.220. After 1631, there were probably no unofficial Portuguese residents at Kilwa: see Boxer, "Swahili Coast," p.41.

Arab ruler of Pemba. But Portuguese hegemony was shortly re-established in general, with Kilwa remaining far more strongly within their fold than other towns. While the Omanis continued to test Portuguese strength along the coast, even attempting unsuccessfully to seize Moçambique in 1670, Kilwa remained largely untouched by these events until after the Omani capture of Mombasa in 1698.(1)

The only further information on Kilwa until 1698 which has so far come to light is found in the Journal of William Alley, an Englishman, who spent several months at Mombasa in 1667. Mombasa he described as "a place of noe great traffiq," but what there was clearly lay in the hands of the Captain, or Governor, of the coast.

> Mombaza its selfe seldome sens anything considerable, their onely trade consisting in their small boates, with which the Governor sends downe to Quilo, Pembah, and Zanzebar, and oft times to Musembeque. Their returnes are gould, amber /ambergris/, elevants teeth, and slaves, most of which commodity they purchase at very inconsiderable rates, and for which the Governor maintains continually a factory at Quilo att his own charge.(2)

While there must have been a certain amount of independent exporting done by the Swahili merchants of Kilwa, it seems likely that the most important buyer at Kilwa was the Captain of Mombasa. His prominence was established there at the very beginning of the seventeenth century, when Kilwa was at its weakest, and despite occasional set-backs it seems to have remained the most vital commercial force at Kilwa throughout that century.

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(1) Strandes, Portuguese Period, pp.178-240. Axelson, Portuguese pp.78-96,127-8,139-45,151-3,155-8; CEHU-MF, LM 22-B,fl. 587-90v., at 588v., Francisco de Seixas Cabreira, Mombasa, 30 August 1652, summarized in BFUP,21,1962, pp.446-8, but the reference to Kilwa is omitted; AHU, Cod.211,fl.305-6, Conselho Ultramarino, consulta, Lisboa, 9 October 1654; see Boxer, Four Centuries of Portuguese Expansion, 1415-1825 : A Succint Survey, Johannesburg, 1961, pp.45-55.

(2) SD, p.190.

Kilwa's recovery after the invasion of the Zimba was not due to the fact that it was the beginning of a route to the interior(1); rather, it was because Kilwa was the terminus of a route from the interior. Before the expansion of Maravi commercial influence in East-Central Africa, there is no evidence that Kilwa was attracting trade from as far inland as Maravia. Furthermore, the disruption to trade caused by the Zimba hordes was not limited to Kilwa itself, for when Gaspar Bocarro left the village of Manhanga, situated three days' march from the Ruvuma, in Tanzania, he "travelled seven days through a deserted country, because the land had been devastated by the Zimbas, who passed over it with an army."(2) Considering the evidence available on the trade of Kilwa in the first two centuries of Portuguese involvement in East Africa, together with that concerning the development of interior trade to Moçambique in the same period, it would appear that a significant factor leading to the initiation of a unified trade route between the far interior of East-Central Africa and Kilwa was the commercial influence of the Maravi.

4. The role of the Yao

The principal compilation of Yao tradition, Yohannah B. Abdallah's Cikala ca Wayao, emphasizes the role of the Yao in the inauguration of trading between the interior and Kilwa.(3) This is to be expected, especially as Abdallah was himself a Yao. Here there is no mention of Maravi commercial influence, which from Portuguese sources alone would seem to be more important than any other. Yet from the earliest contemporary references to the Yao,

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(1) Cf. Mathew, "The Culture of the East African Coast in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries in the Light of Recent Archaeological Discoveries," Man, lvi, 1956, No. 61, p.65.

(2) SD, p.167.

(3) Y.B. Abdallah, The Yaos (arranged, ed., and trans. M. Sanderson), Zomba, 1919. I have been unable to locate a published copy of this book and have used instead a duplicated typescript which was presented to the library of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, by H.L. Duff before its publication.

in the 1730s and 1740s, it is clear that the Yao were the most prominent long distance traders in East-Central Africa. Indeed, an important document from the 1750s suggests that they dominated the routes to both Kilwa and Moçambique by the end of the seventeenth century.(1) It seems unlikely that this can be explained away by arguing that the Portuguese made no distinction between Yao and Maravi traders at Moçambique in the seventeenth century. Nor does this necessarily imply that the commercial influence of the Maravi was any less vital in forging these routes to the coast. On the other hand, this state of affairs does indicate that the picture one gets from the sources which we have so far examined errs in suggesting that the Maravi were the only important traders between the interior and the coast.

The heart of Yao country lies in the northwest of Portuguese East Africa, bounded, approximately, by the Rivers Lucheringo, or Luchulingo, to the west, the Luambala to the south, the Lugenda to the east, and running off to the north towards the Ruvuma. Like most of East-Central Africa it is an area of light woodlands; it is a well-watered, fertile country. While the general elevation of the area is high, it is marked by a series of hills and occasional abruptly rising peaks.(2) According to Abdallah, the entire Yao nation regards one of these hills, appropriately known as 'Yao' hill, as its place of origin. Other sources confirm the central position which this hill, "the birthplace of all the Yaos," occupies in Yao mythology.(3) This sort of legend is not unique: among neighboring peoples it is equally prominent in the traditions of the Lomwe, who regard Namuli peaks with veneration, and the Maravi peoples, who look to the hill called Kaphilintiwa as their

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(1) See below, pp.74.

(2) N.B. Valdez Thomaz dos Santos, O Desconhecido Niassa, Lisboa, 1964, pp.27-32 & plates at 20-1.

(3) Abdallah, The Yaos, p.2; see H.S. Stannus, "The Wayao of Nyasaland," Varia Africana III, Cambridge (Mass.), 1922, p.251; Sanderson, "Inyago - The Picture-Models of the Yao Initiation Ceremonies," NJ, viii,2, 1955, pp.36-7; Valdez Thomaz dos Santos, Niassa, p.121.

place of origin.(1) But if one should not accept this tradition literally, it seems proper to look upon this region as the area in which the Yao developed their sense of tribal unity. As such, the tradition, briefly noted by Sousa Lobato, that the Yao "originated in (são oriundos de) a chain of hills running from Mtonya, near Lake Nyasa, to Uizulu, near the Ruvuma River," is closer to reality than the more orthodox tradition.(2)

Like the Maravi, however, there is another tradition which points to the Congo Basin as the ultimate home of the Yao. According to Hetherwick, the Yao living in what is now the state of Malawi believed that man was created on "an island in the midst of a lake called Kapiritimya," beyond Lake Bangweulu, and that one could see the footprints of the first men and animals there, as the clay over which they passed had not yet hardened at the time of their creation. The similarity between this legend and the Maravi myth of creation at Kaphilintiwa is striking. It is quite possible that the Yao who settled in Malawi during the second half of the nineteenth century merely appropriated this legend for their own. The version recorded by Murray strongly suggests this explanation, as it nowhere varies from the Maravi tradition.(3) Still, this need not be the only explanation for the sharing of a legend of origin between two peoples whose cultures are as similar as are those of the Yao and the Maravi.(4)

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(1) H.E. O'Neill, "Journey from Mozambique to Lakes Shirwa and Amaramba," Proceedings of the Royal Geographic Society, vi, 1884, pp.642, 727; S.de Castro, Os Achirimas (Ensaio Etnográfico), Lourenço Marques, 1941, p.9; Marwick, "History and Tradition," p.578; cf. W.E.F. Ward, A History of Ghana, London, 1958, pp.60-1, for the Ashanti legend of origin from "a hole in the ground" at Asantemanso.

(2) A. Sousa Lobato, "Monografia Etnográfica Original sobre o Povo Ajaua," Boletim da Sociedade de Estudos da Colónia de Moçambique, xix, 65, 1949, pp.7-8.

(3) A. Hetherwick, "Some Animistic Beliefs among the Yaos of British Central Africa," The Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, xxxii, 1902, p.94; Murray, Handbook, pp.86-7; cf. B. Heckel, "The Culture and Education of the Yao Tribe," University of London Institute of Education, Studies and Reports, iv, 1955,pp.7,14, which is derived from Hetherwick.

(4) See M. Tew (Douglas), Peoples of the Lake Nyasa Region, London, 1950, pp.2-22, 50-50.

There is no evidence that there was ever a Yao state, either centralized, or as loosely organized as that of the Maravi appears to have been. The traditional dispersal of the various Yao sections from central Yaoland cannot be likened to Kalonga's dispatching of the great Maravi chiefs throughout Maravia. The reason for this dispersal, if it actually occurred, is not known, but Abdallah suggests internal dissension. This seems likely enough, considering the fragmentary nature of Yao political organization. Abdallah describes the dispersal as being "very ancient", not to be confused with the great Yao migrations of the nineteenth century. The eleven sections which he distinguishes spread out in all directions from central Yaoland. The southern limit of the Yao was almost identical with the modern frontier between Malawi and Portuguese East Africa, with the Mangoce Yao settled around Mangoce Hill (Fort Mangoche) and the Macinga Yao occupying the hills stretching away from Mandimba towards the source of the Lugenda River. The Mwera, or Cimbanga, Yao crossed the Ruvuma into modern Tanzania. In between were the Masaninga, Malambo, Mbemba, Makole, Mkula, Njese, and Cingoli Yao. To these may be added the Cisi Yao, whom Abdallah elsewhere describes as a "sect." The Masaninga, by virtue of their domination of central Yaoland, appear to have been the strongest of the Yao sections. There were no Yao groups to the east of the Lugenda.(1)

At a very early date, then, the Yao had occupied an extensive tract of territory extending from the southeast end of Lake Malawi to across the Ruvuma. It is most important to determine the antiquity of this distribution. Gaspar Bocarro passed through this country in 1616. T.C. Young has stated flatly that "at such an early date no Yao tribe existed."(2) This is nonsense. Neither

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(1) Abdallah, The Yaos, pp.2-5,10; J.C. Mitchell, "The Yao of Southern Nyasaland," in E. Colson & M. Gluckman, Seven Tribes of British Central Africa, Manchester, 1961, pp.313-47; idem, The Yao Village, Manchester, 1956, passim; R.G.P. Lamburn, "Some Notes on the Yao," TNR, 29, 1950, p.75.

(2) Young, Notes on the History of the Tumbuka-Kamanga Peoples of the Northern Province of Nyasaland, London, 1932, p.20.

are the interpretations of Rangeley and Hamilton satisfactory. Five days after Bocarro left Muzura's town of Marauy, he reached "the limits of the land of the son /Caramboe/ of Muzura." The territory of Manguro began here. Manguro, as we know, was subject to Chicoave, whose village was situated two full days' march into Manguro, just south of the Ruambara (Luambala) River. A week later Bocarro arrived at the Rofuma (Ruvuma), beyond which Manhanga is said to have ruled. Manhanga's town was three days beyond the Ruvuma. Rangeley has painstakingly reconstructed this route through Manguro with the help of Yao informants who had travelled to Kilwa in trading caravans before the imposition of colonial rule put an end to this traffic. His findings match Bocarro's description of the route possibly a little too perfectly. Without knowing Rangeley's method of interrogation, one cannot regard his identifications without a certain amount of scepticism, particularly as even he considers it prudent to add the qualification, "if indeed my Yao informants are correct." Rangeley's later notes on the Yao include a more specific attempt to identify the Manguro people, but his conclusions are wholly unacceptable. In fairness to Rangeley, it should be said that these notes were published posthumously and seem to predate his more balanced article on Bocarro's route, in which he correctly recognizes that the people to the east of the Mang'anja were "formerly indiscriminately described by the Mang'anja as Nguru."(1)

Hamilton, although he cites an article by Price which clearly shows that Nguru, as used by Cinyanja speakers, was probably a blanket term for "easterners", nevertheless identifies Chicoave as "the chief of a group of the Makua-Lomwe peoples."(2) According to Portugal Durão, the Lomwe living north of the Marata hills, to the southeast of Lake Chilwa, were known among themselves as Nguru at

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(1) SD, pp.166-7; Rangeley, "Bocarro's Journey," pp.22-3; idem, "The Ayao," NJ, xvi,1,1963, pp.8-9,15.

(2) Hamilton, "The Route of Gaspar Bocarro," pp.10-11; T. Price, "The Name 'Anguru'," NJ, v, i, 1952, pp.25-5.

the beginning of the present century; but there is no evidence whatsoever that these people ever lived around the Luambala.(1) It is far more advisable to admit that Bocarro's Manguro folk cannot be identified with any specific modern people on the basis of that name alone. When used by the Maravi, the name "Nguru" was by definition one of imprecision.(2)

When all is said, however, it seems most likely that the distribution of the Yao throughout the northwest of Portuguese East Africa had been achieved by 1616.(3) Bocarro's definition of the boundary between Muzura's lands and Manguro is virtually identical to the southern frontier of Yao occupation as described by Abdallah. If this were so, Bocarro probably entered Manguro in the country of the Macinga Yao and Chicoave was probably a Macinga chief. Just as it is clear that Chicoave was not Muzura's vassal, it seems apparent that the chiefs beyond Chicoave were not subject to his authority. Bocarro's passage through Manguro was facilitated by gifts of cloth, beads and copper bracelets to the chief of each village at which he rested. Of these individuals, Quitenga, two days from the Ruvuma, and Muangongo, whose village was on the south side of that river, merited greater presents than the others. By this measure, Chicoave was the most important chief whom Bocarro encountered in Manguro, but his greater prestige was quite probably due to his commanding the frontier area between Muzura's lands and Manguro, through which the trade route to Kilwa passed. In this position, his co-operation was of the utmost importance to Muzura.

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(1) A.A. Portugal Durão, "Reconhecimento e Occupação dos Territorios entre o Messangiro e os Picos Namuli," Revista Portugueza Colonial e Maritima, iv,2,1900-1901, pp.134-5.

(2) See J. Rebman, Dictionary of the Kiniassa Language (ed. L.Krapf), St. Chrischona, 1877, p.120: "M'nguru, n.gent.(pl.Wanguru), a name given by the tribes W. of the Niassa to those in the E. including both Wahiao /Yao/ and Wajomba /?/;" see also, W.P. Johnson, Nyasa the Great Water, London, 1922, p.106; see below, pp. 261-2. Ed.

(3) Cf. Price, "Yao Origins," NJ, xvii, 2, 1964, pp.11-16. Price's interpretation of early Yao history seems unacceptable in the light of Portuguese documentation.

On the same basis of Bocarro and Abdallah, it would seem that the Mwera Yao had not yet pushed across the Ruvuma into Tanzania, assuming that Manhanga's subjects were none of them Yao. This is entirely possible, as the wider distribution of the Yao probably took place over an extended period of time, rather than in one great movement. The Mwera may have crossed the Ruvuma much later than Abdallah indicates.(1) On the other hand, it is equally possible that the Yao who crossed the Ruvuma were subject to a powerful ruler of another tribe. Similarly, it is not inconceivable that Manhanga was a Yao himself, ruling over Yao, and other, subjects.(2) Although Manhanga's rule reportedly stretched to the coast, this would seem to be a misconception. Manhanga quite probably did rule from the Ruvuma to his town, three days hence; but it is very doubtful that his authority extended from there, through seven days of deserted country, to the villages of Chiponda, "brother of Manhanga." Instead, Chiponda was probably an independent ruler whose ties with Manhanga were a direct result of their mutual stake in trading to the coast. Similarly, the chiefs of the small villages of Ponde and Morengue, separated from Chiponda's by another long stretch of desert land, shared this common interest in trade, but certainly owed no obeisance to either Manhanga or Chiponda. From these small villages to Bucury, a Swahili settlement on the mainland, only a half-day's march from the coast opposite Kilwa, Bocarro again passed through a great stretch of uninhabited country.(3) Thus, the impression which one can get at first reading of the account of Bocarro's journey, that Manguro and southern Tanzania were each ruled by a great chief, is inaccurate. António Bocarro's imperial conception of these two rulers, like Barreto's of Mauruça, was

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(1) See Oliver, "Discernible Developments in the Interior c.1500-1840," in HEA,i,p.208; A. Smith, "The Southern Section of the Interior, 1840-84," in ibid, p.256.

(2) Cf. Gray, "A Journey by Land from Tete to Kilwa in 1616," TNR, 25, 1948, pp.45-6; Hamilton, "The Route of Gaspar Bocarro," pp.11-12; Rangeley, "Bocarro's Journey," p.25.

(3) SD, pp.166-8.

undoubtedly moulded both by his times and by his familiarity with Muzura (Kalonga, in Barreto's case), who more nearly satisfied that role. The route from the border of Maravia to Kilwa was marked, rather, by mutual courtesies among independent chiefs who were bound together by the supremely important motive of long-distance trade.

Further reason for believing that the Yao were the principal traders from Maravia to Kilwa by the early seventeenth century comes from the strong traditional commercial ties between the Yao and Kilwa. According to Abdallah, before the days of trading to the coast, the Yao primarily were agriculturists, although they used to hunt a great deal, as well. They manufactured barkcloth, and produced salt by burning grasses. Abdallah implies that they possessed knowledge of iron-working at the beginning of their traditional history, that it was not a skill imported from outside. Indeed, they were accomplished smiths and "the iron ore in Yao country was easily worked." But his account of how the Cisi Yao "started building forges, furnaces and workshops," and manufacturing iron tools, suggests that the Cisi may have been an immigrant group who introduced this vital skill to the Yao. The Cisi were specifically blacksmiths, "and they dwelt in Yao country, because had they not started forging the country would have been devastated with famine." Consequently, the Cisi were formerly "held in great esteem." This, too, supports the belief that they arrived in Yaoland later than the main body of the tribe. Unfortunately, there is absolutely no archaeological evidence from which one can date the beginning of the Iron Age in northern Moçambique. The Cisi gained great fame and wealth from their unique skill as iron-workers and travelled throughout the country, selling their wares to all the Yao sections, even to those across the Ruvuma. "There was no country which the Wachisi did not visit." Although the Cisi were once "greatly respected and greatly feared," they gradually lost

their fame, reportedly as a result of a decline in the quality of their products, which Abdallah ascribes to conceit.(1)

Not surprisingly, the Cisi are said to have been the first Yao to trade with the coast. Abdallah records:

> It happened that there was a certain district up-country, on the way to the coast, where there were no hoes, and the Achisi did not go there to sell theirs;....these people took foodstuffs and went to sell them to the people who lived near the Coast, and there they bought a piece of white calico. When they got this they took it to buy a hoe at a village visited by the Achisi. And they (the Achisi) carried word of it when trading to another village. In this manner the fame of this calico spread everywhere....(the news) spread throughout Yao-land, disseminated by those who had seen it; and its fame extended also wherever the Yaos went.... That was when the Yaos first began to trade and to penetrate as far as the coast.

Eventually, occasional small groups of Yao banded together to strike out for the coast themselves. Abdallah's collection of traditional lore states that this trade was at first limited to hoes, tobacco, and skins. Carrying their produce across the Ruvuma, Yao adventurers travelled until they reached "the coast at Mchiwi Mchilwa (Kilwa), and so that has always been the part of the coast most favoured by us Yaos, as being known to us from ancient times."(2)

There is evidence from the coast which also attests to ancient ties between the Yao and Kilwa. Burton visited the island in 1857, at which time its inhabitants recounted their "garbled legendary history" to him. On this occasion, Burton learned that "the island

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(1) Abdallah, The Yaos, pp.4,10-11. For nineteenth century accounts of Yao iron-working, see D. Livingstone, Last Journals (ed. H. Waller), London, 1874,i,p.79; E. Steere, The Free Village in Yao Land, Zanzibar, "probably Lent 1876," p.10, which also refers to Yao salt works; UMCA MSS, A1 (iv), /Johnson/, "Up the Lujenda," /1880/; anon., A Journey to Lake Nyasa, /1886/,p.59.

(2) Abdallah, The Yaos, p.12.

was originally inhabited by the Wahiao savages, from whom the present race partly descends. . ." Furthermore, Burton identified a tribe living between the coastal lowlands and the continental plateau rising behind this belt as the Machinga, who were interspersed among the Swahili.(1) Today, the Machinga of the district of Kilwa are recognized as comprising a separate tribe. Moffet believes that "the Machinga are probably a Yao offshoot," although evidence from the Tanganyika District Books suggests that they may alternatively have been Makonde.(2) This is an enigma which cannot be resolved on the strength of the evidence presently at our disposal. Nevertheless, it seems very possible that these Machinga may be related in some way to the Macinga Yao, whom we have seen were probably well placed to take an especially active part in trading to the coast.

The Swahili Ancient History of Kilwa Kisiwani also contains references to these people. After naming "the original people who built Kisiwani," the chronicle continues: "Then came Mrimba and his people. This Mrimba was of the Machinga tribe and he settled at Kisiwani. He became the headman of Kisiwani." It is stated that when the first Shirazi ruler came to Kilwa, he acquired a place in which to settle from Mrimba, in exchange for cloth and beads. This Sultan then married Mrimba's daughter, and Mrimba, accepting a large present of cloth from his son-in-law, removed himself to the mainland. After an unsuccessful attempt to regain Kilwa from the Shirazi ruler, it is said that "Mrimba moved his home, and went to the mainland of the Ruvuma and dwelt there."(3) This section of the Ancient History of Kilwa Kisiwani is probably a nineteenth century rendering of the passage in the sixteenth century Arabic Kilwa Chronicle which alleges

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(1) R.F. Burton, Zanzibar: City, Island and Coast, London,1872,ii, pp.361, 357-8.

(2) J.P. Moffet (ed.), Handbook of Tanganyika, second edition, Dar es Salaam, 1958, pp.225,294,296; TDB,ii,Lindi: "Tribal History and Legends," p.1(190); ibid., ii, Kilwa, pp.14b-16 (186-8); cf. A. Handbook of German East Africa,1916, pp.52-5.

(3) SD, pp.221-2.

that Kilwa was ruled "by an infidel from Muli, who is king of it."(1) The Swahili Ancient History of Kilwa Kivinje, a town which is located on the mainland, just to the north of Kilwa Kisiwani, runs along similar lines.(2) Yet another nineteenth century Swahili history, although primarily concerned with Tumbatu Island, off the northwest coast of Zanzibar, claims that in A.D. 1204, "there arrived in that islet /Tumbatu/ a certain Sultan Yusuf bin Alawi," whose grandson, Ismail bin Abdulla, "became Sultan of Kilwa and married the daughter of a neighbouring Yao chief, named Koranda."(3) This last chronicle, even more so than the two from Kilwa, clearly cannot be accepted at face value. But whatever the limitations of these histories, taken together with Abdallah's collection of traditions, Burton's note, and the possible connection between the Machinga people of Kilwa and the Macinga Yao, they do suggest that the ties between the Yao and Kilwa are probably of considerable antiquity.

There is no doubt that the long distance trade of East-Central Africa was based on ivory. Before the middle of the sixteenth century, there was virtually no call for ivory from the interior at Kilwa.(4) The trade described by Monclaro does not appear to have been very considerable. While it is possible that the Yao may have begun trading some ivory to the coast at this time, it is more likely that this trade only became important after the Zimba disaster, when Kilwa's export trade was apparently dominated by the Portuguese Captain of Mombasa, whose buyers undoubtedly encouraged its development. Without more detailed knowledge of the ivory trade at Kilwa in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, one cannot say any more than that. Certainly, Abdallah's picture of extensive Yao trading to the coast before ivory was in demand is badly out of proportion. There is much of the nineteenth century in his reconstruction of this earlier period. One also doubts that

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(1) Freeman-Grenville, Medieval History, pp.77-8.
(2) See below, p. 208-9.
(3) J.M. Gray, History of Zanzibar from the Middle Ages to 1856, London, 1962, pp.16-17; W.H. Ingrams, Zanzibar: Its History and its People, London, 1930, pp. 144-5.
(4) See above, pp. 22-4.

Yao customs were seriously influenced by the coast before the growth of the ivory trade, as he suggests. Above all, there was no sudden demand, immediately fulfilled in the next trading season, for ivory and slaves.(1) The transition of long-distance trading between Yaoland and Kilwa was a gradual process; slowly growing from an incidental, sporadically pursued exchange of products which were of little consequence to the coastal merchants, to a thriving, well organized trade by the end of the seventeenth century.

Although even at the beginning of the twentieth century elephants were "fairly numerous" in Yao country, the Yao seem to have acquired most of their ivory by trading for it, with their neighbors, rather than by hunting elephants themselves. Maravia still abounded in elephants in the second half of the last century.(2) Thus the joining of forces between the Maravi and the Yao in the ivory trade was probably gradually achieved. Allowing for bias in the documentation, it now appears most likely that the role of the Yao in initiating trade with Kilwa was the crucial factor in the evolution of that particular long-distance route.(3) The growth of Maravi influence coincided with the rise of a considerable, steady demand for ivory at Kilwa. Together, these factors combined to produce a rich trade in ivory between the far interior and Kilwa.

The traditions recorded by Abdallah are silent on the subject of trading to Moçambique. They do, however, note that "the Walolo (Lomwe and Makua) were neighbours and they /the Yao/ used to trade with them too," as they did with the Maravi. But not much can be

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(1) Abdallah, The Yaos, pp.13-15.

(2) J. Stevenson-Hamilton, "Notes on a Journey through Portuguese East Africa from Ibo to Lake Nyasa," The Geographical Journal, xxxiv, 1909, p.521; L. McLeod, Travels in Eastern Africa, London, 1860,i, pp.252-3; R. Codrington, "The Central Angoniland District of the British Central Africa Protectorate," The Geographical Journal, xi, 1898, p.510.

(3) Cf. Mitchell, The Yao Village, p.22, for the wholly unsupportable view that Yao contacts with the coast began with the passage of Arab caravans through their territory.

gained from these passing references, which, in any case, occur in a section of Abdallah where the telescoping of events is more noticeable.(1) Perhaps the role of Yao traders along the route to Mocambique was more important during the seventeenth century than presently available sources indicate; at this stage one can do no more than note this possibility. Portuguese documentation does argue strongly for the priority of Maravi initiative in establishing this route to the coast. By the end of the seventeenth century, however, or by the 1740s at the very latest, the Yao were recognized by the Portuguese as the principal traders to both Kilwa and Moçambique. Whatever the explanation for this apparent substitution of Yao, for Maravi, domination of that route, final conclusions must await a careful scrutiny of sixteenth and seventeenth century Portuguese documents in the archives of Portugal, Spain, and India, with the specific problems which have been raised in this chapter in mind. Greater knowledge of the historical traditions of the Yao, Maravi, and Makua peoples are also essential to the resolution of these questions. Meanwhile, one can merely assert with confidence that by the end of the seventeenth century, two long-distance trade routes were well established in the eastern half of East-Central Africa. One led from Maravia to Kilwa, the other from Maravia to Moçambique. During the next century and a half, a variety of factors operating on the coast affected the ivory market, so as to cause fluctuations in the direction in which the bulk of this trade flowed; others combined to increase the importance of the slave trade.

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(1) Abdallah, The Yaos, p.15.

CHAPTER TWO

The Rise of Trade at Moçambique, 1698-1749

1. The first Yao shift

The most important alteration in the trade of East-Central Africa during the first half of the eighteenth century was the substitution of Moçambique for Kilwa as the primary market for ivory of the far interior. Regrettably, until the creation of an independently administered province of Moçambique in 1752, there is a disappointing lack of documentation concerning this trade. Throughout most of this period, the traditional preoccupation of the Portuguese with the area south of the Zambezi was emphasized by the nature of the commercial organization of the colony. The Captains of Moçambique were deprived by the Crown of their trading monopoly in 1674; but after a quarter century of varying regimes, including ten years of free trading and several forms of control from Goa, the administration of the trade of the Rivers of Sena was delegated to a Junta do Comércio of Moçambique. The Junta had its seat at Goa, the capital of the Estado da Índia, of which Moçambique formed a part, while its affairs were handled in Africa by a Superintendent, who was often the Captain of Moçambique. Meanwhile, the trade of Macuana remained the perquisite of the moradores of Moçambique and the mainland opposite the island. As a consequence of this arrangement, while there is an abundance of correspondence in the Portuguese archives concerning all aspects of the Junta do Comércio, until its dissolution in 1744, there are only incidental references to the trade of Macuana and to the Yao. Nor do matters change until after 1752, when the Portuguese, after two hundred and fifty years on those shores, at last began to pay more attention to the trade coming from the interior of the

continent to Moçambique.(1) Indeed, it is from a document of this period that we learn that there had been, in fact, a shift of trade from Kilwa to Moçambique.

In 1758 Inácio Caetano Xavier, the energetic and well-informed Secretary of the recently formed Government of Moçambique, wrote that the Yao ivory trade, which by then was the mainstay of the island's economy,(2) "formerly was divided, part to Mombasa, and part to this Island, and since the former was lost, all goes to this Market." Later in the same account, Xavier repeated that "before our losing Mombasa the trade of it /Yaoland/ went to that port."(3) Xavier's sources for this extremely important movement of trade are not specified, but Costa Mendes states that he utilized the records of the convent of the Hospitalers of São João de Deus in Moçambique.(4) As Secretary, Xavier undoubtedly had access to a wealth of information, much of which may have been lost since then. Certainly, there is no reason to suppose that he fabricated these notes. In any case, Xavier's premise that there was a shift of Yao trade towards Moçambique in the first half of the eighteenth century is strikingly borne out by the fact that there was a reversal of this movement in the second half of that century.(5) The problem at hand is to discover the factors which caused the shift to occur.

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(1) Teixeira Botelho, Historia, ♦, pp.346-51, 406-7; Axelson, Portuguese, pp.145-6, 176-7, 181-2, 186-7; J. de Alcântara Guerreiro, Quadros da História de Moçambique, Lourenço Marques, 1954, ii, pp.248-9, 189-95.

(2) See below, pp. 108-9.

(3) TT, MR, maço 604, Inácio Caetano Xavier, "Huma Relação do Estado prezente de Mossambique, Senna, Sofala, Inhambane, e todo o continento de Africa Oriental, que S. Magestade Fedelissima domina nesta costa," Moç., 26 December 1758, published in EHGEP, pp.175-215, at 185 & 198; another copy, BNL, FG Cod. 826, is published in Andrade, Relações, pp.139-88, at 155 & 169.

(4) F. da Costa Mendes, Catalogo Chronologico e Historico dos Capitães Generaes e Governadores da Provincia de Moçambique desde 1752. . .ate 1849, Moç., 1892, p.viii; See Andrade, "Fundação do Hospital Militar de S. João de Deus, em Moçambique," Stvdia, i, 1958, pp.77-89.

(5) See below, pp. 145-61, 177-204.

The fall of Mombasa from Portuguese into Omani Arab hands in December 1698 marked an important turning point in the history of East-Central Africa. After Saif ibn Sultan, the reigning Imam of Oman, had taken possession of Mombasa, he continued south along the coast, gaining recognition of his sovereignty at both Zanzibar and Kilwa, although it seems that he met with some resistance at the latter, which may have been sacked by the Omani.(1)

Until the Omani seizure of Kilwa, a large part, perhaps most, of the goods carried to Kilwa from the interior by the Yao probably were purchased by the official factor, or private buyer, of the Portuguese Captain of Mombasa.(2) Whatever the proportion may have been, there can be little doubt that with the Portuguese withdrawal from the coast north of Cape Delgado a considerable market was lost to those Yao who were in the habit of trading to Kilwa. It does not, however, follow that immediately upon the loss of this market the Yao shifted all their trade from Kilwa to Moçambique Island, as Xavier's statement might imply. The very organization of Yao trade seems to argue against such reasoning. While the internal trading network within Yaoland proper must have been extensive by the end of the seventeenth century, trade was never organized on either a nationwide or a sectional basis among the Yao, as it was among the Kazembe Lunda and other African peoples with a more highly centralized political structure than that of the Yao. Normally, trading expeditions to the coast were organized under the direction of a single important chief, the size of the caravan depending on the extent of the chief's authority. Smaller expeditions may well have been put together by the headmen of several lesser villages. Thus it is extremely unlikely that

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(1) See Boxer, "Swahili Coast," pp.57-74; Strandes, Portuguese Period, pp. 245-75; C. Guillain, Documents sur l'histoire, la géographie, et le commerce de l'Afrique Orientale, Paris, 1856,i,p.522; Gray, "A History of Kilwa: Part II," TNR,52, 1952, p.27.

(2) See above, pp. 56-8.

the trade of the Yao to Kilwa could have been massively and suddenly rechanneled to Moçambique after the Omani capture of Mombasa in 1698.

Nor was the change simply a matter of the commercially minded Yao who had been trading to Kilwa turning their efforts to the Moçambique route solely because the Portuguese had abandoned Kilwa. This was obviously an important reason, but it does not tell the whole story. The commercial importance of Kilwa was based solely on its position as an entrepôt for the trade of the hinterland. Without a steady demand from outside, there was bound to be a consonant abatement in the supply from within. The prosperity of Kilwa, in common with all the commercially oriented towns of the coast, depended upon the free and vigorous operation of these two factors. After the Portuguese withdrawal south of Cape Delgado, it appears that Oman failed to fill successfully the economic role previously played by the Portuguese Captain of Mombasa.

In the first flush of triumph it seems that the Omani did trade with some success there. In November 1701 it was reported "that they have profited from the factories which they have along the coast above /Moçambique/ up to Kilwa."(1) Four years later, Charles Lockyer, bound for Moka from Canton in the service of the British East India Company aboard the Stretham, encountered "a Ship of 200 Tuns, that the Arabs had formerly taken from the Portuguese, loaden with Slaves, Ivory, &c. from Mombas." He added that by taking that town "they have secured a rich Trade in Slaves, Gold, and Ivory, to themselves."(2) But in the same year the Portuguese in Goa reported rumors that the Omani Arabs were impinging upon the freedom of the traders of the coast. Five years later a native spy sent up the coast by the Portuguese from Moçambique revealed that there was an Omani garrison of fifty men

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(1) P.S.S. Pissurlencar, Assentos do Conselho do Estado /da Índia/, (1698-1750), Bastorá-Goa, 1957,v, p.125.

(2) C. Lockyer, An Account of Trade in India, London, 1711, pp.205-6.

established at Kilwa, but he also noted that the Arabs had continued to plunder the wealthy inhabitants of the coast and to disrupt the operation of its trade. Furthermore, in 1709 only three trading dhows were reported to have come to the coast from Muscat.(1) The death in 1711 of Saif ibn Sultan plunged Oman into thirty years of civil strife which was only to be resolved by the replacement of the Yorubi dynasty by that of the Busaidi family in 1741 and the election of Ahmad ibn Said al Busaidi as Imam in 1744. Throughout this period, Oman undoubtedly neglected its territories in East Africa.

Yet despite the unstable political situation in Oman, the garrison at Kilwa seems to have continued to hold sway there. Early in 1719 the Count of Ericeira wrote a letter to the Sultan of Kilwa which took note of the harsh treatment the Sultan had received at the hands of the "Mombasa Arabs," information which had been brought to his attention by the Captain of Moçambique, Francisco de Melo e Sousa. The Count reminded the Sultan that the Portuguese had always treated him fairly, and recalled his and his predecessors' fidelity to the Portuguese. The Count offered the Sultan two portions of cloth as a token of continued amity, while declaring that the gift was not in proportion to the Sultan's person or to his own desire, but that it was thus limited in order to avoid giving cause for suspicion "to the Arab enemies."(2) This letter, together with the cloth, was probably presented to the Sultan by the unnamed individual whom Strandes tells us carried out two missions, obviously clandestinely, from Moçambique to the Sultan of Kilwa between 1719 and 1721. No record appears to exist of the Sultan's reply, if he made one, but at about the same time, perhaps taking advantage of the chaos created in Oman by the death of Sultan ibn Saif in 1718, Kilwa is reported to have regained its

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(1) Strandes, Portuguese Period, pp.275-6.
(2) BM, Add. MSS 20, 906, f1.211, D. Luís de Menesses, Conde de Ericeira, to King of Kilwa, Goa, 27 January 1719.

independence by expelling the oppressive Omani garrison. Although the Captain claimed that this was achieved with aid from Moçambique, Strandes rightly points out that "this aid should not be construed as meaning armed force." Indeed, it is far more likely that Portuguese assistance was merely in the form of encouragement to oust the Omani, such as was given to the Sultan by the Count of Ericeira.(1)

Kilwa, however, was still in need of an assured market which could revive its flagging economy and which would encourage the people of the interior to bring their goods to Kilwa. The Portuguese at Moçambique Island were in no position to fulfill this need.(2) Nor did the fleeting Portuguese reoccupation of Mombasa and Pate in 1728-1729 change matters.(3) In the absence of further documentation, it seems probable that the merchants of Kilwa were, of necessity, reduced largely to carrying on an insignificant trade with the smaller towns dotting the coast between the Rufiji delta and Cape Delgado, and with the Kerimba and Comoro Islands, as well as with Mafia Island. It also seems reasonable to assume that the attraction of Kilwa for the Yao and other people of the interior declined accordingly. There was little reason for these people to spend up to three months making the journey to Kilwa, when there was small hope of receiving the goods they sought.

The most probable explanation, then, for the important change in the direction of Yao trade, which was so briefly described by Xavier, is that a combination of three factors caused most of the Yao trading to Kilwa to transfer their trade to Moçambique Island. These factors were 1) the loss to Kilwa of the Portuguese market

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(1) Strandes, Portuguese Period, pp.277-8

(2) See, e.g., CT, ii, 1867, p.55; A. Hamilton, A New Account of the East Indies, Edinburgh, 1727, i, pp.9-10.

(3) See Boxer, "Swahili Coast," pp.75-84; Strandes, Portuguese Period, pp.275-98; for an interesting, but perhaps misinformed, reference to the murder of an Augustinian priest at Kilwa in 1729, see A. da Silva Rego, Documentação para a História das Missões do Padroado Português do Oriente, Lisboa, 1955, xi, p.675.

at Mombasa after 1698, 2) the subsequent failure of Oman to provide Kilwa with a steady demand for its goods (and with a regular supply of cloth and beads with which to purchase those goods), and 3) the active disruption of the pattern of trade at Kilwa by the Omani garrison established there during the first quarter of the eighteenth century.

Compared with the voluminous Portuguese documentation for the Rivers of Sena and relations with the Mwanamutapa, that pertaining to the ivory trade of Macuana, and to the Yao ivory trade, is very scanty. Nevertheless, there are sufficient sources to enable one not only to detect this shift of direction in Yao trade, but also to understand the factors which influenced it and to appreciate the vital importance which the Yao ivory trade soon assumed in the economy of Moçambique. In January 1716 the Viceroy of the Estado da Índia reported that the ivory trade of Macuana was a growing danger to that of the Rivers of Sena, as it drew off much of the ivory which the Junta do Comércio considered rightfully belonged to it. This remark alone seems to substantiate the impression of developing trade, owing to the Yao shift from Kilwa. That Portuguese relations with the Makua were peaceful and that Portuguese attempts to inhibit the trading monopoly of the Indians were minimal, are important indications that conditions at Moçambique were conducive to such a movement of trade. Similarly, the casual references to Yao traders at Moçambique in the 1750s suggest that the Yao shift had taken place a good many years previously.(1)

In reply to the vice-regal letter of 1716 which emphasised the increasingly important ivory trade from Macuana, the Crown mooted the possibility of suppressing the moradores' right to trade freely with Macuana, but noted that this would be a difficult task. On the other hand, although the operation of this trade also afforded easy protection for exporting ivory which was illegally transported from the ports within the Junta's jurisdiction, the new Viceroy

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(1) See below, pp.83-6.

wrote in 1718 that he did not believe that such a drastic measure was necessary. Not only was the ivory trade of Macuana the only source of income for the moradores of Moçambique, it was also, he alleged, so limited that it did no harm to the Junta do Comércio.(1) Two years later, the Junta was suspended and the new Captain, or Governor, of Moçambique was granted a monopoly of the trade which had been its to administer. In view of the seventeenth century conflicts between the moradores and the Captains of Moçambique over the ivory trade of Macuana, there were understandable fears that this freedom would be abrogated in the process. In fact, the new Governor's orders specifically protected the moradores' trade with Macuana, which was similarly unaffected by the re-establishment of the Junta do Comércio in 1722.(2)

Kilwa's prosperity was curtailed by Omani disturbances of the operation of trade there. At Moçambique, interference with the normal pattern of trade there depressed the ivory market during the 1720s. Trade was carried on seasonally at Moçambique, as it was at Kilwa. Every year ships arrived at Moçambique from India during the northeast monsoon (November to March), carrying Indian cloths, above all else; they returned to India laden with ivory and gold, for the most part, with the southwest monsoon (March to September). Although the trade of Macuana was granted to the moradores of Moçambique, it was actually monopolized by Banian, and, to a lesser extent, Muslim traders from India. It was they who financed every aspect of this trade. Owing to an appreciable lack of currency, the moradores who wanted to engage in trade with Macuana had to buy their cloth and beads, which was mostly of Venetian

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(1) BNL, FG, Cod.4408, pp.66-9, Crown to Viceroy, Lisboa, 8 February 1717; ibid., pp.69-72, Viceroy to Crown, Goa, 15 January 1718.

(2) AHU, MI 18, Meneses to Junta do Comércio, Panelim, 2 & 5 January 1720; copies also in BNL, FG, Cod.4406, fl.99; library of Professor C.R. Boxer, Castello-Novo Codex, #-65,fl.190-5; BM, Add.MSS 20, 906,fl.38, published in RSEA, pp.74-5. See also, AHU, MI 18, Junta to Viceroy, /Goa/, 9 November 1720. I am grateful to Professor Boxer for allowing me to see the Castello-Novo Codex.

manufacture, with certain types being of Indian provenance, from the Banians and Muslims who acted as agents, or independent associates, of their fellows in India. The Indian merchants had no assurance that an individual morador would succeed in his trading: often, he lost all his goods to plundering Makua, or to his African or mulatto agent in the hinterland. These agents, called patamares, occasionally returned empty-handed from the interior, claiming to have been robbed, whereas they may actually have been trading on their own account with their master's goods. To protect themselves against these not infrequent losses, the Banian and Muslim merchants charged high rates of interest on the merchandise which they sold on credit to the moradores, many of whom were constantly deep in debt to their creditors. Furthermore, the Banians, though apparently not the Muslim Indians, were allowed to trade personally in Macuana.

Indian domination of the ivory trade of Moçambique and Macuana dated from the later seventeenth century and was stimulated by the granting of a monopoly of the trade between Diu and Moçambique to a company of Banians (Mazanes) in 1686.(1) Although the Banians from Diu enjoyed the protection of the Jesuit College at Moçambique, neither they nor the Muslim Indians were accepted as equals by the moradores. As a rule, they were despised for their power and looked upon with much suspicion.(2) The Muslim Indian community of Moçambique was the first to suffer from this attitude. In 1720, influenced by pressure exerted from Goa by the Holy Office of the Inquisition, the King ordered that Muslims should no longer be allowed to act as captains, pilots, and sailors on boats sent to Moçambique. Three years later he repeated this command, which was designed "to avoid the very considerable evils" which might otherwise afflict Moçambique. The King also instructed the Viceroy to remove

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(1) See viceregal alvará, Diu, 27 March 1686, in AC,i,1917, pp.281-6; cf. AHU, CM 19, Jerónimo José Nogueira de Andrade, Moç., 8 July 1785, for a slightly different copy.

(2) Cf. Boxer, Race Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire, 1415-1825, Oxford, 1963, pp.53-4.

the Muslim Indian who was currently the paymaster at Moçambique, and to replace him with a Christian, "because of the evil results of his residence in that fort, employing the profits which he obtains in the worship of his false prophet and for other lamentable and perverse purposes, moved thereunto by the error of his religion."(1)

In early January 1727, the Viceroy granted a special license to several exceptional men of the Muslim community which allowed them to trade to the mainland of Macuana, a privilege which was apparently forbidden to them otherwise. Although the license was permanent, it carried the restriction that each time any of these men, or their relatives, wanted to exercise this concession, he was obliged to inform the local Commission of the Holy Office that he was so doing. An extremely interesting fact which emerges from this document is that the prohibition against the Muslim Indians was definitely not extended to Muslims who were natives of East Africa, so that Swahili living within the jurisdiction of Moçambique were free to trade without restrictions of any sort.(2) Less than a week later, however, the Viceroy issued a further writ which expressly forbade "the Muslim inhabitants" of Moçambique, the subordinate mainland, and the Rivers of Sena from owning slaves. This seriously hurt their trading, as slaves were needed for transporting the heavy goods in which they dealt and also were utilized as patamares. They were permitted to continue trading for slaves in the interior, but once they brought them to the coast they had to register them immediately with the Holy Office and then

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(1) AHU, CM 17, Crown to Viceroy, Lisboa, (?)21 April 1720; same to same, Lisboa, 7 April 1725, in RSEA, v, pp.124-6. The removal of the paymaster, Basira Mocali, was never carried out; only he could afford the post. See AHU, MI 19, Prov.Govt. to Crown, Goa, 17 December 1724, enclosing Paulo da Costa to Prov.Govt., Moç., 10 August 1724; AHU, MI 57, Junta do Comércio to Crown, Goa, 27 January 1751; enclosing same to Viceroy, /Goa/, 2 December 1750, and Crown to Viceroy, Lisboa, 6 April 1729; see also, Andrade, Relações, p.100.

(2) AHU, CM 5 & Cod.1317, fl.251-3, provisão, João de Saldanha da Gama, Goa, 10 January 1727; see also, AHU, CM 5, António Cardim Frois, Moç., 10 March 1727.

to sell them within six months to Christians. Failing compliance with these regulations, the slaves were to be confiscated and the trader punished. It is not made clear here, as it was in the granting of the petition earlier in the week, if the Swahili were to be included in this restriction, but it does seem that it was the Muslim Indians who were the particular targets of the Inquisition. A year later the Muslims were prohibited from trading "any slave already baptized" and orders were given that they must not try to convert heathen slaves to Islam.(1)

At the end of 1729 the Viceroy observed that as all the traders of Moçambique were Muslims and Gentiles (i.e., Banians), the commerce of that place had fallen off, owing to their great fear of the Holy Office. The Muslims had complained to him that the Governor of Moçambique had issued independent orders which further restricted their activities. These appear to be lost. In 1750, with the approval of the Holy Office, the Viceroy allowed that the Muslims might keep slaves whose parents and grandparents were Muslim, and that any heathen slaves they wished to retain must be converted to Christianity within six months.(2) The assertion of the Count of Ericeira, in 1750, that the ivory trade of Macuana was not at all considerable may reflect the efficacy of these restrictions. On the other hand, the decline in the ivory trade of Moçambique at that time may not have been so very great, for in 1753, citing the records of the local Santa Casa da Misericórdia, or Holy House of Mercy, the Governor-General of Moçambique emphatically disputed this allegation.(3) Harassment of the Banian and Muslim Indian merchants of Moçambique was a contributing factor to the redirection of Yao

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(1) Provisões, Saldanha da Gama, Goa, 16 January 1727 and 9 January 1728, in APO, vi, 1876, pp.286-7, and RSEA, v, pp.143-5, 155-8.

(2) João de Saldanha de Albuquerque to Crown, 19 December 1729, in J.F.J. Biker, Collecção de Tratados. . .nas partes da Asia e Africa Oriental. . ., Lisboa, 1885, x, pp.172-5; provisão, Saldanha da Gama, Goa, 14 January 1730, in APO, vi, 1876, pp. 301-3, and RSEA, v, pp.163-7.

(3) AHU, CM 5, Meneses to Crown, Lisboa, 4 November 1730, ℙ 17; TT, MR, maço 603, Francisco de Melo e Castro to Crown, Moç., 20 November 1753, enclosed in same to same, Moç., 28 December 1755. For the Santa Casa da Misericórdia, see Boxer, "The Portuguese in the East," pp.223-4.

trade back to Kilwa in the later eighteenth century; during the crucial years of Kilwa's decadence the Indians were relatively free to pursue their business as they wished, as may be seen from a French trader's account of Moçambique in 1755.(1)

An even more important factor which later disrupted the Yao trade to Moçambique was the belligerence of the local Makua.(2) During the first half of the eighteenth century Portuguese relations with the Makua were generally pacific, nor are there any reports of internecine fighting among the Makua. In both 1721 and 1722 there were a few skirmishes with the Makua, some of whom raided one of the small Portuguese settlements on the mainland opposite the island, but these were soon resolved in favor of the Portuguese. In 1727 Macuana was reported to be at peace.(3)

It may be suggested, then, that during the first three decades of the eighteenth century the combination of inhibiting influences at Kilwa and the absence of these at Moçambique combined to produce a shift of Yao trade from the one to the other. While it is possible that this was only gradually realized, Portuguese sources concerning the ivory trade from Macuana during these years suggest that it was, in fact, achieved rather quickly. It seems probable that Xavier's evidence should be interpreted in this way.(4) The

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(1) See A. Lougnon (ed.), Recueil trimestriel de documents et travaux inédits pour servir à l'histoire des Mascareignes françaises, iv, Tananarive, 1959, pp.345, 349, 359; see below, pp. 109-16, 174-83.

(2) See below, pp. 119-26, 183-91.

(3) AHU, Mi 25, requerimento, Bernardo de Távora, n.d., but post-30 November 1725, enclosing supporting testimony of Álvaro Caetano de Melo e Castro, Moç., 15 November 1721; ibid., Conselho Ultramarino, "Nomeação de pessoas p.a o posto de Capp.m da Seg.da Companhia de Infantario, q̃ na prezente monçaõ passa de Socorro a O Estado da India," Lisboa, 27 March 1726; AHU, CM 5, Frois to Crown, Moç., 11 August 1727. In 1758, the French geographer J.B. Bourguignon d'Anville described the Makua in terms which suggest the opposite, but his description is derived from Dos Santos (1609); see BL, MS Kes. 1-C-159, fl.26.

(4) See above, p. 75.

first documentary reference to the Yao adds further support to this interpretation. Describing the coast north of Moçambique in 1756, a Sieur Vigoureux, Captain of La Légère, observed that the river (there are several streams) flowing into Fernão Veloso Bay was "on the way of the Yao (mongeaux) Negroes, who are those who come thence to trade at Moçambique."(1) This rather casual observation, by a man who was apparently making his first voyage to Moçambique, clearly seems to indicate that the Yao shift had occurred well before the 1750s.

There are other casual references to the Yao in the late 1750s included in the investigation of the corrupt Governor of Moçambique, Nicolau Tolentino de Almeida. These, too, strongly suggest that the Yao had been trading regularly and in considerable volume to Moçambique for many years. Among many charges levied against him (most of which concerned his illegal dealings with French slavers from the Mascarene Islands), it was alleged, and proved, that Almeida had obstructed the ivory trade carried on by the inhabitants of the mainland with the Yao, both by declaring that it should be the prerogative of several of his cronies, and by ordering soldiers from the fortress to act as his personal trading agents on the mainland when the Yao came during the summer months.(2) Almeida, for his part, sought to justify his reasons for allowing the French to trade for slaves at Moçambique by arguing that since the Yao had not brought their ivory to Mossuril, the only means by which the local traders could earn money with which to pay their Banian creditors was to condone this otherwise illegal situation.(3) Almeida's

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(1) Lougnon, Receuil trimestriel, iv, p.394. See below, pp. 142-44, for a reconstruction of the route followed by the Yao to Moçambique.

(2) AHU, CM 5, CEHU-MF, LM 111-A, fl.3, & BM, Add. MSS 20,890, fl. 38v., Crown to Marquês de Louriçal, Lisboa, 28 April 1740; AHU, CM 5, & CEHU-MF, LM 111-A, fl.4-7, António da Silva to same, São Pedro, 22 & 26 December 1741.

(3) AHU, CM 5, Nicolau Tolentino de Almeida to Crown, n.d., but probably 1741-1742; see below, pp. 94-6.

explanation was clearly an attempt to throw a cloak over his own rather greedy motives in promoting this trade, but even if his story about the Yao not coming was not, in fact, true, the situation in which he cited it clearly indicates the importance of Yao trade to the economy of Moçambique by the late 1750s.

2. The French at Moçambique

It is quite clear that the rise of extensive slave trading in East-Central Africa had its roots in the eighteenth century. Before then, neither the Arabs, nor the Portuguese, had seriously pursued this trade; it was always incidental to the overwhelmingly basic product of ivory.(1) Yet the fame of the Yao arises from their having been the greatest African slave traders in all of East Africa during the second half of the nineteenth century.(2) The slave trade therefore demands careful examination, both in terms of its operation at the coast and its influence on the Yao. This, in particular, requires close investigation, wherever possible, as the increased demand for slaves did not influence all Yao, either concurrently or uniformly. Indeed, the evolution of this important transformation in the commercial priorities of the Yao was a very gradual process. The first manifestation of this change only appears in the last two decades of the eighteenth century; while clear indications that some Yao long distance traders were becoming more influenced by the coastal market for slaves, rather than ivory, do not appear until the beginning of the nineteenth century.

The earliest body of traders in East-Central Africa who were primarily interested in slaves, above all else, were the French merchants from the Mascarene Islands, Île de France (Mauritius) and Bourbon (Réunion). Before the appointment of Bertrand François Mahé de la Bourdonnais as Governor-General of the Mascarene Islands in 1734, they were essentially a burden to the

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(1) Cf. R. Coupland, East Africa and its Invaders, from the Earliest Times to the Death of Seyyid Said in 1856, Oxford, 1938, pp. 51-5; HEA, i, pp.154-8.

(2) See, e.g., Livingstone, Last Journals, i, p.78; HEA, i, pp.208, 227; Oliver & J.D. Fage, A Short History of Africa, Harmondsworth, 1962, p.174.

struggling Compagnie des Indes, the French East Indies Company, which had charge of them. Bourbon was first colonized by a handful of French settlers from Madagascar in 1665, the same year in which Colbert reconstituted the Compagnie. The island was intended to serve as a provisioning station and place of respite for French ships plying the arduous route between France and India, as Moçambique Island and Cape Town already were for the Portuguese and Dutch, respectively.(1) Unlike these two, however, Bourbon was uniquely unsuited for its purpose, as its coast is totally devoid of natural harbors. A half century later the island and its European population of perhaps 800 individuals were still living "as though lost in an inaccessible region of the ocean," according to Saintoyant, who also compared the society to that of a primitive tribe, subsisting on their efforts as hunters and fishermen, there being no crops cultivated on the island.(2) By 1712 the Dutch totally abandoned their unsuccessful attempt to colonize Mauritius, which had begun in 1598, and three years later Guillaume Dufresne, a captain in the Royal French Navy, stopped there long enough to claim it for the French Crown and to rename it Ile de France, although it was not until 1721 that colonists from Bourbon first settled it.

In 1715 six coffee plants were introduced to Bourbon from Moka and in 1718 one of the plants reached fruition. In 1725 the Compagnie, which had again been reorganized in 1717, established a monopoly on the coffee trade, and the growth of plantations dates from this time. It was obvious to the Compagnie that for the trade to prove profitable it was necessary that the crop be cultivated extensively and that this, in turn, required a larger labor force than was then available on the island.(3) In 1717 there were only

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(1) See Boxer, "Moçambique island and the "carreira da India"," Studia, 8 (1961), pp.95-132.

(2) J. Saintoyant, La Colonisation française sous l'ancien régime, Paris, 1929, i, p.391.

(3) See Lougnon, L'île Bourbon pendant la Régence, Paris, 1956.

1100 slaves on Bourbon, according to the estimate of the traveller Le Gentil de la Barbinnais.(1) Although the French had abandoned Madagascar in 1674, almost all of these slaves were from there, as it was the most convenient source of supply.(2) For this reason, many slaves continued to come from Madagascar, but they were never wholly satisfactory as laborers for the French islanders. Grant, for one, wrote in 1749 that slaves, especially those from Madagascar, were "insolent and idle, and consequently of little reliance," and that the latter constituted the majority of the Maroons, runaway slaves who inhabited the forests in the interior of the islands.(3) So while in 1724 an official envoy was sent to certain ports on the east coast of Madagascar to explore the possibilities of expanding the slave trade between them and the French islands, the first notices of the French trading for slaves along the Moçambique coast also appear in the same period.(4)

The initiation of the slave trade between the Mascarenes and Moçambique came about as a matter of chance. As a result of an assault by pirates and rough seas, in 1721 the Count of Ericeira, returning to Lisbon from Goa, had to take port at Saint-Denis, the capital of Bourbon, where he had a cordial reception. He learned there that French slavers at Madagascar were also threatened by pirates. In exchange for a promise of transportation to Europe, Ericeira agreed to write to the Governor of Moçambique and to request that he co-operate with the French with whom this arrangement had been made. Accordingly, two vessels sailed from Bourbon to Moçambique in 1721. Only one cargo of slaves was assembled, but this was the result of disagreements between the French officials in charge of the venture. In spite of doubts which arose in the

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(1) Quoted in G.Azéma, Histoire de l'ile Bourbon depuis 1643 jusqu'au 20 Decembre 1848, Paris, 1862, p.144.

(2) For the French establishments on Madagascar in the seventeenth century, see H.Deschamps, Histoire de Madagascar, deuxième edition, Paris, 1961, pp.67-76.

(3) C. Grant, The History of Mauritius, London,1801, p.297; see also, Lougnon, Correspondence du Conseil Supérieur de Bourbon et de la Compagnie des Indes, (1724-1731), Paris, 1954, pp.xxxv,liii,65; BM Add.MSS 35,765, fl.10.

(4) Deschamps, Madagascar, p.79.

next few years, the Compagnie was anxious to secure a fruitful commerce with Moçambique, which it believed could satisfactorily fulfill the islands' requirements for slaves.(1)

By virtue of the Portuguese royal alvarás, or decrees, of 8 February 1711 and 5 October 1715, foreign trade was strictly forbidden in the dominions of Portuguese Africa.(2) News of the French at Moçambique consequently produced great concern at Lisbon, where the commercial competition of another European power in East Africa was greatly feared. In 1725 the King of Portugal called upon the Viceroy to investigate charges he had received that foreign ships were being allowed to trade at Moçambique. A rumor, later proved to be false, that one Governor had even permitted a French engineer-pilot to stay at Moçambique, thereby enabling the French to assess the fortifications and to chart the harbor there, led to his removal on royal orders. His successor, António Cardim Frões, was instructed that he "must not allow any European nation whatever to hold trade or commerce with the Negroes of that coast." The Crown added that Frões should especially not allow "any of the said nations to establish themselves in the land, employing every possible means to prevent them from doing so, for which it is very necessary that no offence should be given to the Kaffirs inhabiting the said shores."(3)

In fact, until 1733 there was apparently no trade between Moçambique and the Mascarenes, notwithstanding a continued need for slaves at Bourbon.(4) In July of that year the authorities of Bourbon dispatched the Vierge de Grâce for Moçambique and Madagascar to trade for slaves. The instructions issued on this

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(1) Lougnon, L'Île Bourbon, pp.174-9,511,526,539,542; also 79, n.5, & 105-6; idem, Receuil trimestriel, iv, pp.317-26; idem, Classement et inventaire du fonds de la Compagnie des Indes des Archives departmentales de la Réunion (Série C), Nérac, 1956, pp.24-5.

(2) RSEA, v, pp.195-7; AHU, CM 60 & Cod.1307, pp.295-5.

(3) RSEA, v, pp.122-4, 151-5; AHU, MI 29, Crown to Saldanha da Gama, Lisboa, 28 August 1729, with reply, Goa, 11 October 1730, on opposite column.

(4) See Lougnon, Correspondence (1724-1751), pp.xxvi,xxxviii; ibid., (1752-1756), Paris, 1935, pp.xvii,xxi-ii. Portuguese officials were forbidden to trade privately by virtue of a law dated 3 September 1720 & a royal alvará dated 31 March 1721; for the alvará see AHU, MI 18.

occasion reveal that the object of going to Moçambique was secondary to the business of slaving with the Sakalava, who inhabit northwest Madagascar. Indeed, it was only to be a commercial reconnaissance of the entire Portuguese coast, with Sofala as the most particular port of interest. But the Vierge de Grâce reached Moçambique in August and, as a result of the skillful dealings of Gabriel Dejean, commercial agent for the expedition, departed with a cargo of 568 slaves. The journal kept by Dejean during this voyage vividly reveals the manner in which the French had to conduct their trade. Everything had to be done secretly; one could not trade openly. Virtually every important Portuguese official realized what was happening, however, as Dejean was careful to bribe everyone of any importance. In this category were included the Governor, the Chief Justice, the commander of the fort, the Factor, the former Chief Justice, the Jesuit Rector, the Dominican Superior, the Hospitalers of São João de Deus, and the local Vicar. Trade progressed slowly and with some difficulty as long as the Indian fleet was still in the harbor, but when they departed for Goa the French were quickly able to complete their cargo. If the French were to trade at Moçambique, the Portuguese there did not want this news to reach the Court.

Dejean was impressed with the number and quality of slaves available at Moçambique. There was clearly room for expansion here, as probably no more than 800 to 1000 slaves were annually shipped to India; thousands were needed at the Mascarenes. Despite the many petty annoyances of trading in this manner, Dejean was sanguine over the prospects of slave trading at Moçambique. Prices were reasonable, with the top price for a male slave being about 80 to 100 cruzados, each cruzado being worth 400 réis. This was then equivalent to only 32 to 40 piastres, or patacas, as the French and Portuguese respectively called the Austrian Maria Theresa and Spanish dollars which were then the most prevalent form of

coinage in the western Indian Ocean. The total amount spent on presents to the Portuguese was less than 400 piastres, and, though a nuisance, the charge of 2 tostões (half a cruzado) for the baptism of each slave exported was no great expense. Although nearly a third of the Moçambique slaves died en route to the Mascarenes, the sale of those who were safely disembarked gave the Compagnie a handsome profit.(1) The Vierge de Grâce expedition was, however, exceptional. French trade at Moçambique was still a novel occurrence. Indeed, one cannot really dispute Grant's statement that "as for commerce, there was no idea of it when M. de la Bourdonnais arrived in the islands."(2)

There can be no doubt that La Bourdonnais was one of the most influential personalities in the history of East-Central Africa in the eighteenth century. Born in 1699, at the age of eighteen he entered the service of the Compagnie des Indes, and by 1724 he had achieved the rank of second Captain. About 1728 he began to seek his fortune as a private merchant in the Indies, amassing a considerable fortune within a few years. On a voyage to Arabia in 1729, he saved two foundering vessels sent by the Portuguese Viceroy of India to collect tribute from the Imam of the Yemen. La Bourdonnais conducted the two Portuguese officers to their destination and then, when it appeared that the Arabs were about to seize them, personally intervened and set matters right by negotiating with the Arabs. In gratitude for his unusual succour, the Portuguese Viceroy offered him a place as a naval captain in the service of the Estado da Índia and added the attractive inducements of the Cross of the Order of Christ and letters of nobility, with the title of "Agent of His Portuguese Majesty on the

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(1) Lougnon, Receuil trimestriel, iv, pp.527-70,585,589; idem., Correspondence, (1732-1756), pp.139-40,146-7,153,156.
(2) Grant, Mauritius, p.199.

coast of Coromandel."(1) La Bourdonnais accepted the offer, entering the Portuguese service on 20 December 1729, but later confided that "what had tempted me the most in the propositions of the Viceroy was the disclosure that he made to me of a project concerning Mombaze."(2) Thus it was the attraction of involvement in East Africa, and in particular in Mombasa (which the Portuguese had again lost to Oman in 1729) which motivated La Bourdonnais to abandon the Compagnie des Indes. He served Portugal into 1732, but the proposed expedition to recapture Mombasa never materialized. When the authorities in Lisbon let it be known that they opposed the plan, he quit the Portuguese service. La Bourdonnais returned to France in 1735 and began to formulate ideas to improve the state of Ile de France and Bourbon.(3) He was especially intrigued with the possibilities of the former, which was naturally equipped with two excellent harbors, a great advantage over Bourbon. That he was fully aware of Portugal's weakness in the Indian Ocean is obvious, as was his great interest in East Africa. By 1734 his plans for developing the French islands had resulted in his appointment as Governor-General for both, thus marking the first time that the administration of both islands had been united under one head.

Although La Bourdonnais was to continue as Governor-General for twelve years, during the last seven of these his attention was preoccupied with the wider interests of the French establishment in India, especially after the extension of the War of the Austrian Succession to the East in 1744. Essentially, the truly remarkable transformation wrought by La Bourdonnais in the two colonies took

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(1) P. Crepin, Mahé de la Bourdonnais, Gouverneur-Général des isles de France et de Bourbon, 1699-1756, Paris, 1922, pp.11-17; J.F. Thomazi, Un Millionaire au service du Roi, La Bourdonnais, Paris, 1965, pp.87-9.

(2) A.C.G.da Silva Correia, "Os Francezes na Colonização Portuguesa da India," Stvdia,4,1959,pp.35-6; B.F. Mahé de la Bourdonnais, Mémoires historiques, Paris, 1827,p.7. For some unknown reason Silva Correia divides La Bourdonnais into two individuals.

(3) Crepin, La Bourdonnais, pp.19-20.

place in less than five years, from his arrival in 1735 to 1740.

Touching first at Bourbon, La Bourdonnais immediately moved on to Ile de France and established his headquarters at the vast, safe harbor of Port Louis (then known as Saint-Louis), where he found only one substantial house and a few ramshackle huts. In the following years he introduced the cultivation of cotton and indigo, and resurrected that of sugar, which had been started on both islands by the Dutch in the seventeenth century, but which had subsequently not been pursued to any meaningful extent. To improve and increase the pasturage for cattle brought from Madagascar, he introduced the hardy Fescue-grass. Furthermore, he personally offered financial backing to individual colonists to cover up to fifty per cent of their operating expenses, including the procurement of an adequate supply of slaves. On Bourbon, where the colonists were more firmly entrenched and consequently more resistant to innovation, La Bourdonnais compelled them to extend the cultivation of cereals in order to increase the food supply of the burgeoning population, both free and slave, of the two islands. The production of coffee, over which the inhabitants of Bourbon were so concerned, did not suffer as a result of his precept.

For a while, the slave population continued to subsist almost exclusively on maize, a crop which was highly vulnerable to depredations by the troublesome rats and grasshoppers, as well as vident storms, which plagued the islands. In addition, it did not seem to La Bourdonnais that the slaves were doing well on this diet. Recalling that he had observed slaves in Brazil flourishing on a staple diet of manioc, he ordered tubers to be brought to the colonies from São Tiago, one of the Cape Verde islands. He required each settler to plant 500 square feet of manioc for each slave he possessed. This innovation, which was a great success, enabled the twin colonies to support a much larger slave population than was previously possible.(1)

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(1) Ibid., pp.72-4.

Turning from agriculture, La Bourdonnais established the first sugar factories and iron foundries on Ile de France, where deposits of high grade ore were located. He reorganized the entire administration and judicial structure of the colonies, and greatly minimized the threat of raids by the Maroons. In 1737 he inaugurated the ship building industry on Ile de France with the completion of a brigantine, and by 1740 Port Louis was a small city of stone buildings, its harbor well defended by a new system of fortifications. At the same time the younger colony began to export cotton and indigo to the Persian Gulf. When La Bourdonnais returned temporarily to France in 1740, the effects of his signal activity had already extended to Moçambique.

La Bourdonnais's instructions of 1734 granted him independent power to organize the trade of the islands. No doubt there was already some enthusiasm at the islands for trading with Moçambique, in view of the recent success of the Vierge de Grâce, but La Bourdonnais had more specific reasons for hoping that French slavers would be well received there. His appointment as Governor-General of the Mascarenes coincided with the imminent accession of Nicolau Tolentino de Almeida as Governor of Moçambique. Almeida was one of the officers bound for the Yemen whom La Bourdonnais had so exceptionally assisted in 1729. As a result of this encounter, a friendship was struck between the men and apparently strengthened during the period of the Frenchman's Portuguese service.(1) According to a letter from the King of Portugal, D. João V (1706-1750), before Almeida went to Moçambique, "he had arranged with the foreigner Labordine (sic), who was at Mauritius, that he should send ships to Moçambique to trade with him." Indeed in July 1736, by which date Almeida was due to have taken over his new office, La

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(1) Lougnon, Correspondence, (1736-1741), Paris, 1955, pp.xxvii, xxxii, idem, Receuil trimestrial, iv, p.376; see AHU, MI 57, synopsis of Almeida's services in the Estado da Índia, 16 September 1712 to 7 December 1730, enclosed in parecer, Conselho Ultramarino, Lisboa, 17 March 1732.

Bourdonnais sent two vessels to Moçambique to trade for slaves. On their arrival there, however, they found that Almeida had not arrived that year, and that José Barbosa Leal was in his fourth year as Governor. Nevertheless, owing to the persuasions of the Jesuits, the French were allowed to trade there and they returned to Ile de France with at least one hundred Moçambique slaves.(1)

Needless to say, matters were greatly facilitated with the eventual installation of Almeida as Governor in 1757, whose intentions were revealed by a present of ten slaves to La Bourdonnais.(2) By the end of his three-year term of office the French were well established traders at Moçambique. Almeida apparently transgressed every instruction he had received in regard to trade. All his efforts were directed towards wooing French trade and enriching himself and his associates. He allowed the French to establish a factory at Moçambique in order to facilitate the conduct of their business and condoned the trading of firearms and munitions to the Africans, as this was the basic French stock in trade. He sold the French cowry shells, which came from the Kerimba Islands and were valued as currency in Bengal, where the French traded extensively. In addition to these and many other related charges, Almeida did not tax the trade of the French.(3)

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(1) CEHU-MF, LM 111-A, fl.3, & BM, Add.MSS 20, 890, fl.38v.-9, Crown to Louriçal, Lisboa, 28 April 1740; Lougnon, Correspondence, (1732-1736), p.322, (1736-1741), pp.48-9;66; idem, Receuil trimestriel, iv, pp.377-96, vii, Saint-Denis, 1945, pp.270-2, 278-80.

(2) Between 1736 and 1739 several attempts were made under the direction of Dupleix, La Bourdonnais's great rival, to trade directly between Bengal and Moçambique, but the Compagnie des Indes forbade this commerce. See A. Martineau, Dupleix et l'Inde française, 1722-1741, i, Paris, 1920, pp.321-5,341-2,505,525,527.

(3) Lougnon, Correspondence, (1732-1736), p.4, (1740-1746), Saint-Denis & Paris, 1940, p.12; AF, Col.C^{4} 2, "Etat General des Vivres Depensés a l'Isle de France depuis le p.^{er} mars 1737 jusquau'au 28 fev.^{er} 1738. Savoir l'Arrivée et la Sortie des V. auxiux dans l'Isle...," certified by La Bourdonnais, Port Louis, 20 March 1738; CEHU-MF, LM 111-A, fl.3-5, & BM, Add.MSS.20, 890, fl.37-40, Crown to Louriçal, Lisboa, 28 April 1740; AHU, CM 5 & CEHU-MF, LM 111-A, fl.4-7, António da Silva to Viceroy, São Pedro, 22 & 26 December 1741.

According to the estimate made by a clerk in the court of criminal justice at Goa, Almeida and certain other inhabitants of Moçambique sold between 1000 and 2000 slaves to French merchants. The clerk reckoned that the lose duties on the French trade amounted to 50,800 cruzados, although others figured them to be only 40,000 cruzados.(1) As La Bourdonnais wrote in 1740 that during his first five years in office only 2615 slaves, "partie Mozambique, partie Madagascar," had entered the islands, the Portuguese estimate seems quite reasonable.(2)

That La Bourdonnais and the French were seriously interested in developing their trade with East Africa is evident from the two requests made by the Compagnie des Indes, with the support of the French Court, that Portugal relinquish all or part of her territorial claims north of Cape Delgado. The first was made in 1739; the second in 1744. Both were refused by D. Pedro V, for the Portuguese still had dreams of recapturing Mombasa.(3) Rumors arose in Lisbon that the French had captured Moçambique by surprise, but in 1740 these were discounted as being "unbelievable" by D. Pedro, whose faith was justified by a report from the Viceroy that these were false.(4) By now the Portuguese fully appreciated, and

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(1) AHU, CM 5, António de Melo Pereira, "A Justic Autora contra Nicolau Tolentino de Almeida," Goa, 18 October 1743; ibid. & CEHU-MF, LM 111-A,fl.4, Silva to Viceroy, São Pedro, 22 December 1741.

(2) La Bourdonnais, Mémoire des Iles de France et de Bourbon (ed. Lougnon & Toussaint), Paris, 1937, p.57. Not surprisingly, Almeida returned to Goa as a prisoner. Although his guilt was apparent, his case dragged on for several years. In 1744 he was released from detention, although much of his property had been sequestered by then. As his judgment was still pending a year later, it seems not unlikely that he escaped further punishment. CEHU-MF, LM 111-A,fl.10, Viceroy to Crown, Goa, 26 December 1741; AHU, CM 3, "Autos de Livramento do Reo Nicolaõ Tolentino de Almeida...," Goa, 7 January 1744; BM, Add.MSS 20,890,fl.139-42, Crown to Marquês de Castello-Novo, Lisboa, 16 March 1745.

(3) Strandes, Portuguese Period, pp.500-4; Teixeira Botelho, "O Sonho de Mombaça," AC, 26,1929, pp.77-80. La Bourdonnais thrice proposed the establishment of a French station in East Africa during the period 1733-1740, and even suggested making Moçambique a French colony. See Lougnon, Receuil trimestriel, iv, pp.371-5; La Bourdonnais, Mémoire, pp.78,201,n.149.

frequently exaggerated, the threat posed by the French to their control of the trade of the Moçambique coast; indeed, to their pitifully weak possessions on that coast, as well as to their meaningless claims north of Cape Delgado. Similar rumors, in particular hearsay relating to a French establishment north of the Ruvuma, plagued the Portuguese for the next half century.

These fears did not prevent Almeida's successor, D. Lourenço de Noronha, from admitting the French to trade at Moçambique, although he himself was not unmoved by rumors of French machinations concerning East Africa.(1) Unlike Almeida, however, Noronha apparently sought to control and to extract some profit from this trade for the benefit of the Crown.(2) The only detailed record of the French slave trade at Moçambique during Noronha's time is a curious report, dated 9 November 1741, which was written by O.L. Hommy, the head clerk in charge of trade aboard the Dutch vessel De Brack, which sailed from Cape Town to Madagascar in search of slaves in the same year. At Bombetoka Bay, on the northwest coast of Madagascar, where the ruler of the Sakalava kingdom of Boina had his residence near Maravoay,(3) the Dutch slaver encountered a French merchant named Saveille who was also there after slaves, as well as rice, meat, and cattle. Of this encounter Hommy wrote:

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(4)(p.96) CT, ii, 1867, p.156; ibid.,iv, 1869, p.79; BM, Add.MSS 20, 890, fl.48v-50, Crown to Louriçal, Lisboa, 2 May 1740; Lobato, Evolução, p.90.

(1) CEHU-MF, LM 115,fl.171-3, D. Lourenço de Noronha to Viceroy, Moç., 14 August 1742.

(2) Castello-Novo Codex, #81, fl.244, "Orçamento da importancia dos direitos desta Alfandega...Março de 740 athe fim do outro Março de 742...," noting the duties collected on the goods sold by a M. de Lané, captain of a French ship, in 1740; Lougnon, Recueil trimestriel, viii, Saint-Denis, 1948-1949, pp.10-11.

(3) Deschamps, Histoire de Madagascar, p.101.

> The French Captain Saveille informed me that the island of Mozambique furnishes better slaves than the island of Madagascar and that it is from the former that the French take their good slaves. The price there is 40 Spanish piastres per head, men and women alike, but it is necessary to act with much circumspection and with prudence, because the South-Africans are great thieves and bloodthirsty people. The Portuguese allow no one to trade there without the permission of the King.(1)

From this account it would seem that French ships which wished to trade for slaves at Moçambique were now required to purchase some sort of temporary license from Noronha for the right to this privilege. This was still, of course, a breach of the King's law, but there is no reason not to believe that Noronha was simply trying to make the best of a situation which he felt would have continued surreptitiously, regardless of the attitude he adopted. The "South-Africans" of whom Hommy wrote were obviously the local Makua.

French trading at Moçambique continued to be carried on throughout the next few years. Some officers on a homeward bound ship from India charged that in the first six months of his administration, Pedro do Rego Barreto da Gama e Castro "had admitted three French vessels to trade at that fortress. . .and that the same Governor had taken from ten to fourteen thousand patacas from the French in exchange for Kaffirs which he would give them in the following monsoon."(2) This arrangement probably was a considerable stimulant to the island's economy, which, as we have seen, operated on a system of credit from the merchants of Portuguese India. The introduction of a large amount of patacas

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(1) A. Grandidier, et al, Collection des Ouvrages anciens concernant Madagascar, vi, Paris, 1913, p.195.

(2) Crown to Castello-Novo, Lisboa, 20 February 1748, in RSEA, v, pp.192-5. Theal's translation wrongly implies that Rego Barreto was governor for only six months.

into Moçambique, even if some of them never left the governor's pocket, must have had a beneficial effect on the local economy, despite the fact that the importation and use of foreign currency there was deplored by authorities in Goa and Lisbon as being prejudicial to the Royal Treasury.

It must be admitted, however, that factors other than greed influenced Almeida's successors. According to the Marquis of Castello-Novo, who spent over six weeks at Moçambique on his way to Goa as Viceroy in 1744, earlier in that year an epidemic of smallpox had raged along the entire Moçambique coast, taking a great toll in African lives. One result of this epidemic was that the land was left fallow, so that Moçambique Island, which produced no food of its own, was faced with a serious famine. The Viceroy observed that this lack of food

> is the main reason why French from the Islands of Mauricia, and Mascarenhas /Bourbon/, haunt this port at times, for as they are nearer they know our negligence, and they watch closely for the opportunity of coming to tempt us with provisions, when they are needed most, especially as the Governor is more diligent in executing His Majesty's Orders, which prohibit trading with foreigners. His action raises cries from the People and the Soldiers, who, seeing provisions at hand and not being able to have recourse to them, do not bear up well when they suffer from hunger.

If the governor refused to admit the French ships, he was in danger of losing control over a disgruntled population; if he acceded to their demands, he would face punishment for breaching the terms of his instructions and the likelihood was that his motives would be given "a sinister interpretation."(1)

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(1) Castello-Novo to António Guedes Pereira, Moç., 12 August 1744, in AC,iii, 1918, pp.233-40, at 233-4; see Lougnon, Correspondence, (1724-1731), pp.xxix,xlviii,LLL,138; AC, iii, 1918, p.229.

Rego Barreto was, in fact, later accused of admitting the French, during the course of his residência, which was an enquiry held at the conclusion of an official's term of office to establish if he had fulfilled, or violated, his obligations; but he was able to justify his actions.(1) Conditions were unusually serious in 1744, but the problem of food shortage was endemic to Moçambique Island, and this method of operation had been tried before by the French. Two years previously, a French ship had arrived there loaded with rice and wheat, and bearing letters for the Governor from La Bourdonnais which declared that the food was for the relief of the fortress. Noronha claimed that he rejected this offer as being a blatant attempt to trade for slaves, replying that the Portuguese had no need for the food.(2) This incident and the Marquis of Castello-Novo's explanation of the pressures brought to bear on Rego Barreto by the local populace go a long way towards indicating why even conscientious governors sometimes allowed the French to trade at Moçambique Island.

Another frequently employed French pretext for entering the harbor there was to claim that one's vessel was low on water or firewood, while declaring that as a friendly nation the Governor had no reason to refuse them entrance. Once admitted, the laborious task of taking on the necessary supply of water or wood (usually the former, as it was more practical to empty a ship's barrels of water than to dispose of one's supply of wood at sea) took quite some time to complete, since neither was available at the coast and had to be carried there from the immediate hinterland. In the meantime, the French would carry on a clandestine trade in gold, ivory, and slaves.(3)

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(1) Bordalo, Estatistica, p.121.

(2) CEHU>MF, LM 115, fl.193-4, La Bourdonnais to Gov. of Moç., Port Louis, 17 & 29 April 1742; ibid., fl.195-6, petition of MM. Jouvanie and Sanguinet, Moç., 16 June 1742; ibid., fl.171, Noronha to Viceroy, Moç., 14 August 1742, printed in Arquivo Português Oriental, n.e., iv,2(2), Bastorá, 1938, p.256.

(3) AC, iii, 1918, p.234.

Within the context of French trade and ambitions along the East African coast at this time, there appears a very important reference to the Yao trade at Moçambique. In a lengthy letter to the Crown, Rego Barreto lamented the precarious state of the colony and warned of foreign threats to the Portuguese in East Africa. Both the French and English had designs for taking control of Mombasa, he claimed, and from there either one could easily command the Kerimba Islands and ultimately seize Moçambique Island itself. Even if the Portuguese maintained their position south of Cape Delgado, the establishment of another European Power at Mombasa would still be ruinous to Moçambique, for

> all the Kaffirs of Macuana, and of the Yao Provinces, which are nearer to it /Mombasa/ than to our lands, will carry the ivory and other goods there which they now bring to us at these shores; and if these traders are lacking the patrimonies of these inhabitants /of Moçambique/, who maintain themselves on the Trade, will be ended.(1)

Rego Barreto's testimony as to the importance of the Yao and Makua ivory trade is the only one which survives from the 1740s, but in consideration of the relative wealth of information one encounters in the second half of the century, all of which supports his statement, there is no reason to doubt its accuracy. Thus, by 1745, at the very latest, the ivory trade carried on at Moçambique Island by the Makua and the Yao was considered to be the very foundation of its economic life. Furthermore, Rego Barreto's expressed fear of the crippling damage to this trade which would result from the revitalization of commercial activity along the coast north of Cape Delgado supports the belief that the bulk of Yao trade flowed to Kilwa before Portugal lost Mombasa in 1698. His statement, including the alleged proximity of Yaoland to Kilwa, which supplied Mombasa, seems to show that the Portuguese knew that

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(1) AHU, CM 3, Rego Barreto to Crown, Moç., 10 November 1745.

the growth of Yao trade to Moçambique Island was the result of unusual factors which had caused the Yao to abandon their principal route to the coast in favor of a previously less frequented one, and that the ability of the Moçambique route to maintain its present dominance depended largely on the continued depression of Kilwa.(1)

A year later, the threat of French competition was greatly diminished. Portuguese and French sources indicate, both explicitly and tacitly, that there was no French slave trading at Moçambique from 1746 through 1749, although Ingrams cites, but does not document, an instance in 1747.(2) In response to the Crown's exhortation to take all measures necessary to prevent foreign trade at Moçambique and its subordinate ports, Governor Caetano Correia de Sá reported that not a single foreign ship had entered Moçambique harbor since he had taken office in 1746, despite many futile attempts. His statement may be judged true by the total absence of references to such trading in the transcript of his residência.(3)

The rise of French trading at Moçambique was paralleled by a similar movement at the Kerimba Islands. At the beginning of the eighteenth century the Portuguese settlements at Vamizi, or Amiza as it was then known, and Ibo Islands were threatened by Omani raiders pushing to the south of Cape Delgado. Indeed, several later accounts lay the blame for the pitiful decadence of the Kerimba Islands at the time of their writing to numerous Arab invasions, which clearly took place during the turbulent years at

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(1) See below, pp. 263-5.

(2) Lougnon, Correspondence, (1746-1750), Saint-Denis, 1949, p. xxxvi; W.H. Ingrams, "Some points of contact between Mauritius and East Africa," Transactions of the Royal Society of Arts and Sciences of Mauritius, Series C, 1, 1932, p.55.

(3) BM, Add. MSS 28,163,pp.772-3, Crown to Chancellor of the Relação of Goa, /Lisboa/, 21 February 1748; cf. RSEA,v, pp.195-7; AHU, CM 3, Caetano Correia de Sá to Crown, Moç., 12 August 1749; ibid., Francisco Raimundo de Morais Pereira, Juiz Sindicante, "Treslado da Rezidencia de Caetano Correa de Saá Governador que foi desta Ilha e Fortaleza de Mosambique," Moç., 15 March - 6 April 1752.

the turn of the century.(1) Following these depredations, the islands were rather overbearingly dominated by a certain Fr. João de Meneses, O.P. His activities became so obnoxious to the few remaining Portuguese inhabitants that they complained to the Viceroy, who was subsequently ordered by the King, in 1724, to effect the Friar's permanent removal from there.(2) The order was a dead letter; Meneses was left unimpeded in his efforts to create a private domain in the Kerimba Islands.

An ageing Meneses still held power there in the 1740s, by which time the islands were becoming a favorite haunt for French slavers who sought to avoid the relative restrictions imposed on their trading at Moçambique after Almeida left office. In March 1742 Noronha resolved to send a small body of troops to the islands to prevent the French from trading there, as three ships had arrived in less than six months to take on cargoes of cowries for the French factory at Bengal, where these would be exchanged for the cloths that the French merchants would later trade for slaves. Meneses was at the center of this trade, and it was rumored that he had some sort of agreement with a Portuguese Augustinian friar who headed a secret association in Bengal which had been organized specifically for exploiting the trade of the Kerimba Islands and the Cape Delgado area. Noronha recommended that Meneses be ordered to leave the islands, and the Viceroy gave orders to this

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(1) Pissurlencar, Assentos, v, p.115; see, e.g., EHGEP, pp.256, 276,283-4; Andrade, Relações, pp.337-8,376; AC, i, 1917, pp.122-3. Certain traditions assert that the Imam of Oman also wanted to besiege the fortress of São Sebastião, at Moçambique, but that he abandoned the plan, owing to his followers' fears, probably dating from the Omani siege of Moçambique in 1670, that the Portuguese had laid mines around the fort as a means of defending it. Guillain, Afrique Orientale, i, p.522; cf. Bordalo, Estatistica, p.119; Strandes, Portuguese Period, p.250; Axelson, Portuguese, pp.142-3.

(2) Crown to Viceroy, Lisboa, 17 April 1724, in RSEA, v, pp.132-4.

effect later in 1742, but to no avail.(1) The notorious Fr. João de Meneses continued his personal domination of the Kerimba Islands until his death in 1749.(2)

Unfortunately, virtually nothing is known of Kilwa and the coast of southern Tanzania during this period. As Kilwa had suffered more recently at the hands of the Arabs than at those of the Portuguese, and as the sources of Kilwa's wealth had always been to the south, it is quite likely that Kilwa fell more within the commercial sphere of the Portuguese than that of the Arabs to the north. The Sultan of Kilwa was certainly more favorably disposed to the former than to the latter, who had so lately abused his position. According to Almeida, he negotiated at Moçambique with the son of the Sultan of Kilwa for the purpose of establishing "a new Trade" between the two islands. The establishment of an officially sanctioned and regularized trade between Kilwa and Moçambique was not accomplished, however, for the negotiations seem to have broken down. Almeida blamed "the inconstancy, and the little faith of these barbarians" for the failure to achieve this end; no doubt the representatives of Kilwa had a similar explanation to give to the Sultan.(3) Nevertheless, that such negotiations did occur suggests that Kilwa's orientation was still to the Portuguese south and not to the Arab north.

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(1) CEHU-MF, LM 115, fl.175-8, "Regim.^to q̃ ha de observar...o Cap.^m mor das Ilhas de Cabo Delgado Jose Glz̃ valverde...," Moç., 4 May 1742; ibid., fl.179-80, "O Juiz das Ilhas de Cabo Delgado Joze de Souza...farã huã inquiriçaõ...," comprising ten points regarding foreign trade at the islands, n.d.; ibid., fl.198-211, "Inquiriçaõ que tira o Juiz de Cabo Delgado Jozeph de Souza...," 20 May to 20 July 1742; ibid., fl.185, Valverde to Noronha, [Querimba], 10 July 1742; ibid., fl.191, Sousa to same, Querimba, 20 July 1742; ibid., fl. 167-70, Noronha to Viceroy, Moç., 14 August 1742; ibid., fl.165, Viceroy to António Guedes Pereira, Goa, 2 October 1742; the last two letters are published in Arquivo Português Oriental, n.e., iv, 2(2), pp.252-4,257-8. See also, Crown to Castello-Novo, Lisboa, 20 February 1748, in RSEA, v, pp.192-5; Castello-Novo Codex, # 88, fl.265-7.

(2) Lobato, Evolução, p.57.

(3) AHU, CM 3, Almeida to Crown, n.d., but probably c.1741-1742.

In 1742, in accordance with orders from the Viceroy, a Swahili courier was sent from the Kerimba Islands to Kilwa. He bore a letter from the Governor to the Sultan "warning him of the French project" to seize Mombasa, and from there to dominate the entire northern coast, and making a play for his support by reminding him that his people had a recent history of being oppressed by foreigners. If the Sultan made a reply, it is now lost. The only further piece of information to be gleaned from the letter is that it was written to the same Sultan who sent his son to Moçambique a few years previously.(1) For the most part, however, French ships did not trade to the north of Cape Delgado, although one or two must have strayed into that area in search of slaves. While serious French interest in this part of the coast began in the time of La Bourdonnais, corresponding commercial involvement did not commence until the 1770s.

If the Portuguese had reason to fear French designs on Mombasa, they had none where the British were concerned. Britain had no more desire to become involved in East Africa at this time than it did when Captain Owen declared his short-lived protectorate in 1824.(2) The basis of the Portuguese apprehensions was the fact that the British enjoyed good relations with the Arabs who traded at Bombay and Surat, and were suspected of being generally sympathetic to all Arabs. Undoubtedly, there were Indian and Arab traders operating out of Surat who traded in East Africa, but even in the 1770s British merchant ships from Bombay and Surat only put in along this coast at Pate, in search of cowries.(3) Rego Barreto's second-hand information that the British frequented the

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(1) CEHU-MF, LM 115, fl.183, Valverde to Noronha, /Querimba/, 20 June 1742; ibid., fl.170-1, Noronha to Viceroy, Moç., 14 August 1742, also in Arquivo Português Oriental (n.e.),iv, 2(2), p.255.

(2) See Gray, The British in Mombasa, 1824-1826, London, 1957, especially pp.30-53, 145-56, for the circumstances of the declaration and the British Government's refusal to sanction it.

(3) FKI, p.114.

coast from Brava to Cape Delgado simply was not true.(1) A glaring exception to this general rule was the case of the unidentified Englishman known only by his Swahili name of Kugu-Gu. The anonymous, early nineteenth century Swahili history of Mombasa, preserved only in French and English translations of two separate Arabic translations of the original text, states that this man, who was a ship's captain, and apparently well known to certain dignitaries at Mombasa, played an extremely active role in the reassertion of Mazrui rule there in 1746. The Englishman's motives were clearly commercial and he is reported to have promised to assemble further aid, if necessary, from Bombay. His own assistance - he bombarded Fort Jesus with a cannon landed from his ship - proved sufficient, however, and his name does not again appear in the text.(2) If there was, in fact, something of a small 'Mombasa party' of British merchants at Bombay, their influence would seem to have been inconsequential.(3)

The troubles of the Mazrui had begun with the change in dynasties in Oman.(4) After his proclamation as Imam in 1744, Ahmad ibn Said al Busaidi sent several ships to East Africa to receive the recognition of those towns which were nominally within the Omani domain. He was denounced as a usurper in Mombasa and this marked the beginning of a long, bitter struggle between the houses of the Mazrui and the Busaidi. Kilwa apparently recognized the suzerainty of the Imam, which probably amounted to the yearly dispatch of a single ship, or two, to Kilwa from Oman to trade for ivory and slaves. It is doubtful, in view of the Imam's enormous problems at home, that he was able to impose a governor on Kilwa

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(1) AHU, CM 5, Rego Barreto to Crown, Moç., 10 November 1745.
(2) See SD, pp.215-19, at 217-18.
(3) See below, p.152.
(4) See above, p.77.

at so early a date, as Miles implies.(1) By 1770, there were both a governor and a large Arab trading community at Kilwa, but both of these may not have taken root at Kilwa until the 1750s. By mid-century, Kilwa was experiencing a gradual revival in its trade to the north, but the attraction of Oman was weak, and Zanzibar was not yet the great entrepôt it was to be later.

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(1) S.B. Miles, The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf, London, 1919, ii, p.266; R.F. Burton, Zanzibar: City, Island, and Coast, London, 1872, ii, p.366; Guillain, Afrique Orientale, i, pp.547,555.

CHAPTER THREE

Trade at Mid-Century, 1749 - 1770

1. Obstacles to trading at Moçambique

At mid-century the Yao trade in ivory to Moçambique was at its peak, and formed the backbone of the economy of both the island and its dependent settlements of Mossuril and the two Cabaceiras, on the mainland. A certain amount of trading was also carried on by the people of this community with the Makua, but contemporary sources made a clear distinction between the importance of this business and that done with the Yao. To name only a few, Francisco de Melo e Castro, Inácio Caetano Xavier and Luís António de Figueiredo, who served as Chief Justice of Moçambique, all stressed that the latter was far more vital than the former. Xavier estimated that the Yao alone carried some 400 to 500 bares of ivory to Moçambique each year, a figure which is supported by the similar appraisals of the other two, not to mention that made by the anonymous author of the valuable Memorias da Costa d'Africa Oriental. The official figures of the exportation of ivory from Moçambique to India, which imported virtually all the ivory embarked from that port, for the years 1759-1761, lend further credence to these judgments.(1) In fact, the

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(1) TT, MR, maço 603, Melo e Castro to Crown, Moç., 20 November 1755; TT,MR,maço 604, Luís António de Figueiredo, "Noticia do Continente de Mossambique, e abreviada Relação do seo Comercio," Lisboa, 1 December 1775, in EHGEP,pp.253-4, at 264-5; TT,MR, maço 604, anon.,"Memorias da Costa d'Africa Oriental e algumas reflexões uteis para estebelecer melhor e fazer mais florente o seu comercio," Sena, 21 May 1762, in ibid.,pp.189-224,at 215, 219-220; AHU, CM 9,"Extracto do todo o Marfim que foy extrahido deste Porto para o de Goa, e Norte no tempo dos Rendeiros actuaes desta Alfandega da Ilha e Fortz.ª de Moss.e, tirado pellos livres dos despachos da mesma Alf.ª...," António Francisco Xavier,Moç., 15 Devember 1761. The total amount of ivory exported to India during these years was 1720 bares, 14 faracolas and 7 mainas. The bar (Arabic bahar), was equal to 16 arrobas in the Rivers of Sena, and to 20 faraçolas (Arabic farsala) at Moçambique. Various authorities indicate that the bar could be equivalent to anywhere from about 518 to about 650 pounds. See Lobato, Evolução,p.269; Teixeira Botelho, Historia, I,p.509,n.2; Axelson, Portuguese, p.209.

ivory which the Yao carried to Moçambique constituted approximately 90% of that traded overland to Mossuril and the Cabaceiras, and about 55% to 65% of all the ivory which entered the island itself, including that which came from the Rivers of Sena, Sofala, Inhambane, and the Kerimba Islands.

Nevertheless, the duties collected on this ivory, including those levied on the cloth and beads for which it was traded, were not sufficient to remedy all the financial ills of the Portuguese administration of that Conquest, and by 1752 the Crown realized that a drastic solution was required for improving the sorry state of its holdings there. As it seemed hopeless to expect a revival of Portuguese fortunes if Moçambique remained subordinate to the Vice-royalty of Goa, which was preoccupied with protecting its own solvency and territorial integrity, the King, D. José I (1750-1777), decreed on 19 April 1752 that in view of the "decadency of the Government of Mossambique. . . it will be more convenient to separate it from that of Goa for its restoration." The first Governor-General of the newly created independent administration was to be Melo e Castro, who had been serving as Governor of Moçambique since January 1750.(1) But while these decisions were being hopefully made at Lisbon, a more ominous change, which was of far greater significance to the internal trade of East-Central Africa, was taking place at Moçambique.

This vital turn of events was the deterioration of the peaceable, if not necessarily amicable, relations between the Makua and the Portuguese, which Frois reported to have existed in 1727. Owing to a total lack of pertinent documentation, the specific reasons for this altered situation are impossible to ascertain. But the probable cause is to be found in the fact that Makua-Portuguese relations on the mainland opposite Moçambique were naturally antagonistic, with

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(1) Lobato, Evolução, p.285, quotes the decree of 19 April 1752 in its entirety, and gives a masterly analysis of the events leading to the establishment of an independent administration of Moçambique on pp.272-307 of the same volume.

peace existing only when the Portuguese had the upper hand over the Makua. Failing this, the Makua were able to pose a serious challenge to Portuguese security on the continent, as they had in 1585.(1)

By 1749 the Portuguese had taken up arms against certain unruly Makua chieftains.(2) The result was not, however, the restoration of peace. Portuguese relations with the Makua, especially with the important chief Murimuno, whose main village lay some eight to ten leagues inland from the coast, only deteriorated further. The disturbances caused by Murimuno, whom Xavier tagged "the most arrogant of them all," were indeed serious. According to the Governor, Murimuno was "making an Asylum in his main village for all the Slaves who fled from the Inhabitants of this Island, and from the other side, robbing our Merchants, and making various exceptional disrespects to people from our Lands who go to his." Furthermore, wrote Brigadier David Marques Pereira, Murimuno "impeded the inhabitants of his Continent from carrying provisions, and ivory to this Fortress, and did the same to his neighbors, seizing from them what they carried."(3) Unsettling as these local disorders were, however, the most critical result of Murimuno's hostility was the ruinous effect it had on the trade of the Yao to Moçambique. In view of what is known about the volume of trade and trading habits of the Makua and the Yao, this is surely the only possible interpretation for the observation that the Makua were also obstructing the "trading and commerce of their nation which comes from three or four months' away," and that "this trade with us consists of the quantity of more than a thousand negroes loaded with ivory, from which this

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(1) See above, pp.28-9.
(2) Teixeira Botelho, História, p.456.
(3) Andrade, Relações, p.152; Melo e Castro to Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, Moç., 28 December 1753, in AC, iv, 1919, p.55; AHU, CM 4, Pereira to Diogo de Mendonça Corte Real, Moç., 15 November 1753; cf. AHU,CM 4, Melo e Castro to Rei, Moç., 27 November 1753.

Fortress derives great profits."(1)

In addition to the most important quantitative distinctions noted above, the trade of the Makua and Yao with the people of Moçambique was marked by certain other differences which further attest to the validity of the interpretation that the anonymous writer was mistaken in implying that the traders from the far interior were of the same nation as the Makua who were disrupting the economy of the island. Ideally, the Makua, being closer to the Portuguese coastal settlements of Mossuril and the Cabaceiras, traded with them throughout the year. The Yao, whose country was farther away, only came to the coast from the beginning of May and continued coming only until the end of October. Figueiredo's remark that patamares were not necessary for trading with the Makua tends to confirm one's conclusion that the year-round Makua traders did not come from a great distance inland, and would seem to imply that these people lived close enough to the coast not to be apprehensive about bringing their trade goods directly to the Portuguese settlements. On the other hand, the observations made by João Baptista de Montaury, long a resident of Moçambique, that patamares were sent into the interior "to call together the bands (ranchos) of the Makua and Yao, who do not come without the assurance that the patamares are waiting for them beforehand," substantiates one's suspicions that there were some Makua, as well as Yao, traders who came from the far interior to trade to

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(1) Anon., "Breve Noticia Da infelicidade que teve a nossa Expedição de Monçambique primeira que fez El Rey N.Señor D. José I.º destruida pello Rey dos Macuas em que deram fim a maior parte della com a relação dos que morrerão, e da cause que noveu esta guerra hindo na Nau Nossa Senhora da Piedade e o Corsario N. Senhora de Atalaya, que entrarão neste Porto, 8 de Maio de 1754 hindo de Ryo de Janeyro," n.d., but obviously composed in Lisbon, in AC, ii, 9, 1918, p.106.

Moçambique.(1) The trade of these Makua was, however, of slight consequence compared to that of the Yao. Furthermore, added confirmation that the traders in question were the Yao comes from Melo e Castro, who was the first of several writers to state plainly that the Yao came to the coast of Moçambique from some two to four months' journey distant.(2) Thus it was not primarily the more localized insults perpetrated by Murimuno's Makua against the Portuguese which caused the latter to declare open war against that ruler, but rather the ruin which he was causing to their vitally important trade with the Yao, for as Xavier described the truly essential role played by the Makua in the operation of trade at Moçambique:

> The dependency which we have of these Chieftains is of neighborliness, and trade of some ivory, slaves, provisions, and above all that of free passage to the Yao, who cannot come to the coast with their ivory, without passing through their /the Makua's/ lands.(3)

The vessels which bore the King's instructions regarding the new composition of the administration of Moçambique arrived there on 4 June 1753. Whatever Melo e Castro's pleasure at receiving these orders may have been, he must have been especially grateful that the

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(1) EHGEP, p.264; Andrade, Relações, p.349. The climate of southern Tanzania, northern Moçambique and southern Malawi is of the tropical monsoon type, in which almost all rainfall occurs during the months of November through April, with the remainder of the year being a sharply contrasting dry season. Appropriately, the Yao divide the year into two seasons, cuku (wet) and cau (dry), with the former being devoted to agriculture and the latter being the time for visiting and socializing, and also trading. Seasonal variations in rainfall could, however, delay the arrival of the first Yao traders until August, or even later. S.J.K. Baker, "The East African Environment," in HEA,i,p.12; Valdez Thomaz dos Santos, O Desconhecido Niassa, pp.89-91; Mitchell, The Yao Village, pp.10-12,18; AHU, Cod.1332, fl.12, D. Ana Soares de Serra to Baltasar Manuel Pereira do Lago, Cabaceira grande, 26 April 1766.

(2) TT, MR,maço 605, Melo e Castro to Crown, Moç., 20 November 1753.

(3) Andrade, Relações, pp.152-3; cf. Labato, Evolução, pp.110-11.

military expedition which had been fitted out in Lisbon in the previous year "to repress the chiefs and to terrorize Kaffraria," was also on board these ships.(1) On either 10 or 14 September, Melo e Castro sent these troops into battle against Murimuno. This force, numbering over one hundred regular soldiers, plus some 600 to 1000 auxiliaries, most of whom were supplied by the allied Sheikhs of Sanculo and Quitangonha, reached Murimuno's territory. Several deserted villages were burned to the ground without resistance being encountered. The Portuguese impetus then seems to have spent its force, and in the following hours any cohesion which remained was thoroughly dissipated by the folly of a certain Diogo Martins, who, for reasons of his own, first charged the Sheikh of Sanculo with being a traitor, and then, in view of the Sheikh's retainers, shot him dead. The force from Sanculo immediately withdrew from the field, although that from Quitangonha stayed on, but the Portuguese position was no longer tenable. With a decision to retire the entire expedition, all discipline was lost and the retreat turned into a disorderly flight of individuals to the coast. Once this disarray became known to the Makua, who were hidden in the bush, they seized the opportunity without hesitation and inflicted heavy casualties on the fleeing Portuguese. The bitterly disappointed Melo e Castro reported home that "this action was one of the most tragic, and unhappy which has been seen in this Conquest," a sentiment which was heightened by the fact that at least half, and probably more, of the regular troops were lost in this rout.(2)

The need to chastise Murimuno was thereafter accentuated by the fact that the new Sheikh of Sanculo had stopped supplying Moçambique with cattle and provisions in retribution for the murder

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(1) AHU, Cod.1510, p.10; AHU, CM 6, Saldanha de Alburquerque to Sec. St., Moç., 26 December 1758, quoted in Andrade, Relações, p.56.

(2) AC, ii, 9, 1918, pp.106-11; ibid., iv, 1919, pp.54, 56-7; AHU, CM 4, Pereira to Corte Real, Moç., 15 November 1755; Cf. above, pp.28-9.

of his father.(1) At first Melo e Castro sought the services of the powerful Makua chief Micieyra, who was the nearest neighbor of the Portuguese. Micieyra agreed to attack Murimuno, but his continual procrastination of the campaign frustrated the Governor-General, who consequently turned for aid to the faithful and reliable Sheikh of Quitangonha. Without further hesitation, the Sheikh's forces penetrated Macuana up to the main village of Murimuno and routed his followers, killing and imprisoning many of them. Murimuno sought revenge for this affront and prepared to attack the Portuguese mainland, but the Sheikh of Quitangonha got wind of Murimuno's intentions and prepared an ambush for his army. The Makua fell into the trap and were caught in a crossfire, from which they fled into the interior. The Sheikh's men pursued them ruthlessly for three days and inflicted many losses on them, as well as taking others captive. By late 1754, Murimuno had removed his center of operations farther into the hinterland of Moçambique and was seeking an entente with the Portuguese. These informal overtures were snubbed by Melo e Castro, who wished Murimuno to send personal emissaries to negotiate with the Captain-Major of the Cabaceiras and Mainland, but it did not really matter. The mainland was at peace and there was again freedom of movement and trade between Macuana and the Portuguese settlements.(2)

Very shortly, however, Murimuno was again rampaging, to the detriment of the economy of Moçambique. From late September 1756 until February 1758 the Yao were unable to come to trade with the Portuguese as a result of a war with his Makua, who refused to let them pass through Macuana to the coast. "Consequently," Xavier recorded, "this land, and the Treasury of His Majesty, suffered irremedial damage in respect to the duties of the alfândegas, as well as to the velório of the /Royal/ Monopoly which was not sold,

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(1) AC, ii, 9, 1918, p.112.
(2) AHU, CM 4, Melo e Castro to Crown, Moç., 16 November 1754; AHU, CM 5, same to same, Moç., 18 August 1755.

because they /the Yao/ consume more of it than do the rest." (1) The Royal Monopoly over the vital importation and sale of velório, the basic trade beads, at Moçambique had been created by the Royal Decree of 29 March 1755, which also abolished the supervision of the trade of Moçambique by Goa and entrusted it to the Government of Moçambique.(2) In most years, between 20,000 and 50,000 maços, or packets, of velório could be expended in Portuguese East Africa, mostly in trading with the Yao. Official requisitions for shipments of Venetian velório from Lisbon to Moçambique show that in 1758, 20,000 out of 32,000 maços (62.5%) were specifically to be of that sort "which serves for the Yao," while in the following year, 16,000 out of 25,200 (65.5%) were similarly earmarked for the Yao market. In the period during which the Makua were warring with the Yao, which included the latter part of one trading season (1756) and the entirety of another (1757), only 9295 maços of velório were sold by the Royal Monopoly. From the cessation of these hostilities until October 1758, a total of 36,592 maços were sold, most of which went for trading with the Yao, who had a two years' backlog of ivory which they brought to the coast in the course of that season.(3) These figures, together with those concerning the ivory trade, eloquently attest to the undisputed primacy in the economy of Moçambique which the trade of the Yao had attained by the middle of the eighteenth century. It was, simply, "the principal application." and "the unique commerce" by which the

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(1) Andrade, Relações, p.153; cf. Melo e Castro to Crown, Moç., 8 August 1757, AC, iii, 16, 1918, p.166.

(2) AHU, CM 5, decreto real, Lisboa, 29 March 1755; Crown to Conde de Alva, Lisboa, 4 April 1755, in RSEA, v, pp.220-2.

(3) AHU, CM 6, Pedro de Saldanha de Albuquerque to Crown, Moç., 10 December 1758, with enclosure, "Distincçaõ de Vellorio que vay de amostra, e a qualidade, que delle deve vir na monçaõ de 1760," Moç., 31 December 1758; another copy in TT, MR, maço 605; AHU, Cod. 1317, fl.8-9, anon., "Copia da Rellaçaõ sobre qualid.es de vellorio que deve vir para o Estanque Real de Moss.e," Moç., 18 August 1759; see C. Montez, "Inventário do Fundo do Século XVIII," Moçambique, 72, 1952, Document 24, p.139, for the effect these events had on the price of velório at Moçambique.

people of that island, Mossuril, the Cabaceiras, and environs sustained themselves.(1)

During the 1760s Macuana continued to be a restless and potentially dangerous area, but there were no further dramatic clashes between the Makua and the Portuguese, or Yao, during this decade. A close watch was kept by the Portuguese on the movements of Murimuno and Mauruça, the great chief of the Uticulo district, and in 1761 some undefined warring took place in Macuana. Five years later things were more threatening to the Portuguese, but the Governor-General feared a campaign against the Makua lest it should suffer the same fate as that of 1755. By late October 1766, however, their raiding, of both the Portuguese and the Yao, finally provoked a reaction from the former, who carried out some rather indeterminate operations against several Makua chieftains of Uticulo and Cambira, to the southwest of Moçambique. These were probably made with the help of Quitangonha, but most of the Portuguese raiders, for that is what they were effectively, seem to have been friendly Makua. Information is scarce for these years, but this pattern of desultory Makua raiding, with an occasional Portuguese reprisal along similar lines, seems to have characterized the fluid state of Macuana right into the next decade.(2)

While the Makua had always been a dangerous adversary, there is no doubt that the acquisition of firearms by them vastly increased their striking power. Indeed, it may well be that the deterioration of Makua-Portuguese relations can be traced to this fact. The arms trade, which had always been discouraged by Portuguese administrations, had only begun to take on serious proportions with the increased tempo

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(1) Andrade, Relações, p.141; AHU, Cod.1313, fl.47, Pereira to Crown, Moç., 10 July 1758.

(2) AHU, CM 8, /Saldanha de Albuquerque/ to P.e M. Dg.es, Moç., 24 January 1760; AHU, CM 9, carta patente, Saldanha de Albuquerque, naming Inácio de Melo Alvim as Commandant of the Cabaceiras, Moç., 5 March 1761; AHU, CM 12, Pereira do Lago to Crown, Moç., 20 August 1766: ibid., Francisco Pereira Henriques to Pereira do Lago, Cabaceira, 23 October 1766. According to the last letter, the Makua chieftains involved in the 1766 skirmishes were Corripe Muno, nephew of Muzama Muno; Emttutte Muno, nephew of Maurussa Muno, and Helimue Muno, nephew of Muere Muno.

of French trade in East Africa after 1755. Following the French lead, Brazilian traders became particularly ardent gun-runners in the second half of the century, as did individuals operating aboard the annual vessel which was sent from Portugal to trade at Moçambique. Of necessity this trade was carried on surreptitiously by the traders, who, much to the consternation of the Government, found their chief accomplices in the Portuguese inhabitants of the mainland. Despite the potentially dangerous consequences of this trade with the Makua, at whose hands these same mainland residents suffered in particular when the Makua turned their guns against the Portuguese, it continued unabated. In 1754 one man wrote that "thirty years ago none of the Makua knew the use of firearms, and they used only weapons of their own creation, which are arrows, or spears; it is not thus today."(1) Following the upheavals caused by the Makua in the 1750s, Pedro de Saldanha de Albuquerque, who had taken over the government of the colony of 5 August 1758, issued a bando, or proclamation, strictly prohibiting anyone from trading arms and ammunition to all the Africans of the continent. In 1760 the King consequently ordered that the right to do business in firearms and gunpowder would henceforth be the sole monopoly of the Royal Treasury, and that these goods were to be sold only by individuals selected by the Governor-General. But despite these orders the trade continued to flourish, and the Makua, according to

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(1) AHU, CM 4, António de Brito Freire to Crown, Lisboa, 8 November 1754, Fs 92-3; cf. AHU, CM 6, Saldanha de Albuquerque to Crown, Moç., 28 December 1758, also in AC,iv,1919,p.215. For a typical example of Portuguese participation in this trade, concerning gun-running at the village of Motomonho, where the people of Moçambique bargained for provisions with the Makua of Chief Mavere, see AHU, CM 7, bando, Saldanha de Albuquerque, Moç., 14 January 1759; ibid., report of Gregório Taumaturgo de Brito to Gov., with Mavere's mark and Arabic signature of the interpreter, Motomonho, 16 January 1759; for more on Mavere, see ibid., Fr. Pedro dos Mártires e Cunha to Saldanha de Albuquerque, Convento de São Domingo, 19 January 1759; AHU, Cod.1317, fl.105-6, "Registo de Outra Ordem sobre devassar do incendio succedido em Mutomonho," Saldanha de Albuquerque, Moç., 9 September 1759.

one who knew them well, refused to sell slaves to the Portuguese if they did not receive gunpowder in return.(1)

Similarly, the people of Mossuril and the Cabaceiras were responsible for other disorders which hampered the smooth operation of trade there. The competition for trading with the Yao and the Makua was so great that during the dry season there was a continual state of petty war waged between these individuals. One result of this vicious competition was that the Africans were able to get a much higher price for their goods, especially ivory, as each trader offered another length of cloth and a few more strings of beads for them. Thus the margin of profit for the Portuguese was considerably lowered in this trade. Furthermore, at least some of the Portuguese traders seem to have pursued a policy of setting the Makua and Yao traders against each other, as well as against the other Portuguese, each in the hope of making the greatest profit from the ensuing turmoil. Not surprisingly, these efforts only led to greater chaos, and Montaury believed that they were the cause of the havoc often wreaked on the Portuguese lands by the disgruntled African traders as they withdrew to the interior from the coast. This treatment, while it may not have precipitated the deterioration of Makua-Portuguese relations, could only have aggravated the situation during the 1760s.(2)

Seeking to minimize the disturbances which occurred in the trade with the Makua, in 1760 Saldanha de Albuquerque prohibited the people of Moçambique from going themselves, or from sending their slaves, into the interior of Macuana to procure provisions, ordering that these should be bought only in the old bazaar. In the same vein,

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(1) AHU, CM 6, bando, Saldanha de Albuquerque, Moç., 5 September 1758; AHU, Cod.1517,fl.245 and Cod.1320, no.166, Tomé Joaquim da Costa Corte Real to Saldanha de Albuquerque, Ajuda, 5 April 1760; AHU, CM 8, Cod.1517,fl.247; and CM 9, royal bando, Ajuda, 5 April 1760, published at Moçambique on 1 August 1760; AHU, CM 12, Francisco Pereira Henriques to Pereira do Lago, Cabaceira, 23 October 1766.

(2) AHU, CM 4, Brito Freire to Crown, Lisboa, 8 November 1754, IP 50; EGHEP, pp.263-4; Andrade, Relações, pp.549-50.

his successor as Governor-General forbade anyone from "sending Patamares to Macuana in search of the Yao."(1) A more striking attempt to obviate these disorders and to regulate the vital trade with the Yao was Saldanha de Albuquerque's proposal to the Portuguese inhabitants of Moçambique that they form a company in order to achieve this end. He envisioned a company embracing both rich and poor alike, and left it to them to decide among themselves what form of corporation should take. Not surprisingly, they were unable to give the Governor-General any sort of coherent reply and the great variety of the responses obliged him, against his will, to drop the project.(2) A possible reason for their failure to act on this proposal, which was so obviously intended for their own benefit, as well as for that of the State, was their inability to admit that these disorders were of their own making, and not due to the connivance of the Indian traders of Moçambique, whose continued domination of all aspects of trade there angered the Portuguese.

While the ivory of the Yao sustained the economy of Moçambique from one side, the trade of the Indians nourished it from the other. Without a regular supply of Indian cloth, the provisioning of which was still completely monopolized by these merchants, there would be little attraction for the Yao to trade at Moçambique. Furthermore, as we have already observed, virtually all the ivory of Moçambique was exported to India, and this aspect of the trade was also firmly in Indian hands. Consequently, as they had been throughout the previous half-century, the Banians and Muslim Indians of Moçambique were the most active and important body of traders there. During the administration of Melo e Castro they were spared the sort of

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(1) AHU, Cod.1317, fl.216-7, bando, Saldanha de Albuquerque, Moç., 1 May 1760; AHU, CM 11, bando, João Pereira da Silva Barba, Moç., 23 June 1764.

(2) AHU, CM 7, Cod.1317, fl.73-4. "Proposta aos Moradores, e habitantes desta Praça de Mossambique, Portuguezes, Naturaes de Goa, e Nacionaes desta Terra," Saldanha de Albuquerque, Moç., 14 July 1759; ibid., fl.71, Saldanha de Albuquerque to Sec. St., Moç., 16 August 1759.

persecution which had deviled them in the 1720s and which had resumed in the 1740s, although Muslim Indians still needed licenses from the Holy Office in order to cross over to the mainland.(1) While in 1749 the Church threatened those Portuguese who sold Christian slaves to them with excommunication, and in 1750 the Marquis of Távora forbade Muslims from owning any such slaves, this restriction was abrogated by the Crown in 1752. For his own part, Melo e Castro was most interested in revitalizing the economy of Moçambique and must have realized that to persecute these traders could only have defeated his purpose. During these years, however, a great deal of resentment was built up against them by the Portuguese inhabitants of Moçambique, as well as by the Church, with which Melo e Castro bitterly clashed throughout his tenure of office. Following the suicide of his successor, João Manuel de Melo, only three weeks after taking office on 15 March 1758, the government was entrusted to David Marques Pereira, who was decidedly not one to protect the interests of the Banians and Muslim Indians.(2)

On 9 May 1758, the Brothers of the Santa Casa da Misericórdia, acting together as the Senado da Câmara, or municipal council, of Moçambique, submitted a lengthy proposal to Pereira which violently attacked the position at Moçambique and on its mainland of the Indians, and which was completely embodied in a bando issued by the Governor-General only two days later.(3) This bando ordered that Banians who owned any property on Moçambique or the mainland, or who possessed any boats, had to sell these within three months or else have them sequestered by the State; that no Banian or Muslim Indian

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(1) See above, pp.81-4 ; RSEA,v,pp.190-2; APO,vi,1876,pp.467-9.
(2) Andrade, Relações, pp.68,79,88-9,96,98; BNL, Pombalina 742, fl. 8-9, bando, Távora, Moç., 4 August 1750; AHU, CM 6, Conde da Ega to Crown, Moç., 16 August 1758; for more about the administration of Melo e Castro, see Lobato, "A Ditadura do Primeiro Governador-Geral, em 1753," in his Colonização, pp.139-61.
(3) AHU, CM 6, Proposal of the Senado da Câmara to Pereira, Moç., 9 May 1758; ibid., bando, Pereira, Moç., 11 May 1758.

could henceforth go, or send anyone on his account, to Macuana or to Motomonho in order to get provisions; that anyone at all who traded guns or powder to the Makua would be treated as a traitor; that the necessity of acquiring from the Commissioner of the Holy Office a license for passing to the mainland was obligatory for the Banians, as well as for the Muslim Indians; and that outside of the twelve most important Banian merchants, each of whom was allowed to maintain two other Banians and four slaves as assistants, all the other Banians of Moçambique, who alone numbered some 200 individuals, as well as all the Muslim Indians would be sent back to their own country in the next monsoon.

One of the charges brought forward by the Brothers as justification for these harsh measures was that those Banians who had residences on the mainland sold their cloth to the Makua at half the prices they charged the Portuguese. It seems not at all unlikely that this was indeed the case. On the other hand, the claim that they and the Muslim Indians, together with some of the Portuguese mainlanders, were the principal traders of guns to the Makua, is contradictory to what is known about this trade. Thus its attempt to blame the Banians and Muslim Indians for the hindrance of the Yao ivory trade by the Makua was also unjustified. The other reasons cited in the recommendation of the Brothers similarly reveal that the true aim of that proposal was not to improve the state of the Conquest, but rather to ameliorate that of its Portuguese subjects at the expense of the Indians. This is not to imply that all the Portuguese of Moçambique and the mainland were so motivated, nor that all the Banians and Muslim Indians were as faithful subjects of the Portuguese Crown as they inevitably claimed to be, but only that both the successful commercial endeavors and several religions of the latter prejudiced a great many of the moradores against them.

Despite the completeness of this frontal attack on the Indians, both the Brothers and the Governor-General were not so blinded to the facts of life that they did not provide for what they believed would be enough prosperous Banian merchants "to make the trade of this land run." But the bando was clearly unacceptable to the

Indian community, and Pereira was shortly petitioned for its reversal. Pereira, who seems to have been little more than the tool of the Brothers in this affair, refused to rescind the order on their advice, and they only levelled more charges against the Indians in response to their petition. Two further pleas were made separately by the Muslims, but the situation remained unchanged until the arrival at Moçambique on 14 July of Manuel de Saldanha de Albuquerque, Count of Ega, who was en route to Goa as the new Viceroy.(1) Within a week the Banians had presented him with a lengthy representation in which they pleaded their side of the argument, a lead soon followed by the Muslims. Granted the fact that theirs is hardly an unprejudiced report, the case presented by the Banians gives a much truer picture of events than that put forth by the Brothers of the Santa Casa da Misericórdia. The Banians argued cogently that their trading constituted the main support of the economy and thus of the Royal Treasury. They also exposed such blatant falsehoods as the attempt to blame the hostility of the Sheikh of Sanculo towards Moçambique on them, rather than on the folly of Diogo Martins. Furthermore, they contended that the bando contradicted the King's decree of 29 March 1755, which freed the trade of Moçambique and of all its subordinate ports and lands "to all the inhabitants of Goa, and of the other parts and lands of Asia, subject to my Royal Dominion." Basing his decision on this last factor and citing an otherwise unknown bando from Pereira, dated 8 April 1758, which specifically reversed the King's orders as expressed in a Royal alvará of 29 July 1757, the Viceroy issued an alvará on 25 July 1758 which

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(1) AHU, CM 6, petition presented by forty Gentiles and fourteen Muslims to Pereira, Moç., 22 May 1758; ibid., Senado de Câmara to same, Moç., 4 June 1758; ibid., representation of Muslims to same, Moç., 7 June 1758; ibid., same to same, n.d. (the last two documents are enclosed in ibid., representation of Muslim traders to Conde da Ega, Moç., 25 July 1758); ibid., Conde da Ega to Crown, Moç., 18 August 1758.

nullified the effect of both of Pereira's odious proclamations and re-established the Crown's will.(1)

In view of the great confusion that had reigned at Moçambique during Pereira's brief spell as Governor-General, the Viceroy deemed that it was in the best interests of the Crown to replace him in that post with a more responsible individual. The fact that he installed his brother, Pedro de Saldanha de Albuquerque, as Governor-General, could only have further frustrated both the local Portuguese and the clergy.(2) During the next two years the Church, led by the Episcopal Administrator, Fr. João de Nossa Senhora, hammered away at the position of the Indians at Moçambique, but with scarcely any success. Saldanha de Albuquerque upheld the rights of the Indians to seek provisions on the mainland, prohibited the Chief Justice from making inventories of the possessions of deceased Indians, and declared his belief that "up to now it has not seemed convenient to me to prohibit the Trade, which the Muslims and Gentiles have with the Kaffirs of the Interior," because of its importance to the economy of the island. Considering the terms of the Secretary of State's advice in 1752, that they be allowed to maintain Christian slaves until the King should determine otherwise, which he had not, the only concession which the Governor-General felt justified in granting to the demands of the Church was that the slaves regularly

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(1) Ibid., [redacted] representation of "Baneanes, Guzerates, e Bangaçaes, Mercadores todos," to Ega, Moç., 20 July 1758; ibid., representation of Muslim traders to same, Moç., 25 July 1758; ibid., alvará, Ega, Moç., 25 July 1758; AHU, CM 5, decreto real, Lisboa, 29 March 1755; cf. BM, Add. MSS. 28, 165, fl.466-7, alvará, Rei, Lisboa, 10 June 1755, also in RSEA, v, pp. 226-30; TT, MR, maço 605, "Copia de Alvará porq̃ se faz publica a ordem de S. Mag.e, pella qual manda, que os Portos de Senna, Sofalla, e Inhambane sejaõ Livres para todos os seus Vassalos, mor.es de Goa, e das mais partes, e terras de Azia, sugeitas ao Seu Real Dominio," 29 July 1757.

(2) AHU, CM 6, Ega to Crown, Moç., 18 August 1758; ibid., Pereira to Costa Corte Real, Moç., 10 August 1758.

had to be taken by their masters to the See, for instruction in Christianity.(1) Furthermore, that the attitude of Saldanha de Albuquerque in these matters was approved by the Crown is seen from its reaction to the original proposal of 9 May 1758 to expulse the Indians from Moçambique. It registered surprise at such a request, noted that they had always resided and traded there without harm, and emphasized that the entire problem had to be judged fairly.(2)

Saldanha de Albuquerque was succeeded as Governor-General early in 1763 by João Pereira da Silva Barba, who brought with him the first carta orgânica, or instructions of organization, which had ever been issued for that colony since its separation from Goa in 1752. For the present study, the most important provision in these instructions was that which abolished the Royal Monopoly of velório, thereby freeing the trade of Moçambique from the hold of any official monopolies.(3) Silva Barba also brought something

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(1) Ibid., representation of Fr. João de Nossa Senhora, Moç., 8 August 1758; AHU, CM 7, Saldanha de Albuquerque to Crown, Moç., 2 January 1759, enclosing representation of "Banianes, Mouros e mais gentios habitantes desta Praça," to Gov., 1758; AHU, Cod.1320, n.º 174, Costa Corte Real to same, Ajuda, 5 April 1760, enclosing latter's reply to same, Moç., 9 August 1760; AHU, Cod.1317, fl.146-8, same to Episcopal Administrator, Moç., 10 September 1759; ibid., fl.148-51, further correspondence and orders, dated 5,10, & 11 September 1759, all relating to licensing Muslims to cross over from Moçambique to the mainland to trade; ibid., fl. 310-13, same to Crown, Moç., 5 August 1760; ibid., fl.247-8, same to Costa Corte Real, Moç., 14 August 1760, enclosing, fl. 248-51, his bando of 10 August 1760 concerning the instruction of Christian slaves, the Episcopal Administrator's letter to him of 24 July 1760, "Sobre a extirpaçaõ da Seita dos Mouros," and related documents; cf. Andrade, Relações, pp.67-102, for a decidedly pro-Church account of the preceeding and related events.

(2) AHU, Cod.1323, fl.56, Francisco Xavier de Mendonça Furtado to Gov., Ajuda, 27 May 1761; cf. AHU, Cod.1332, fl.121-6.

(3) AHU, Cod.1322, fl.40, "Autto da Posse," Silva Barba, 6 January 1763; AHU, CM 9, Crown to Calisto Rangel Pereira de Sá, Ajuda, 7 May 1761; cf. AHU, Cod.1322, fl.75-95; Teixeira Botelho, História, 4, pp.360-6, for a summary of the carta orgânica; AHU, Cod.1327, fl.22, Crown to Gov., Lisboa, 24 March 1763, being orders concerning the abolition of the Royal Monopoly of velório. Calisto Rangel had been nominated to succeed Saldanha de Albuquerque, but died en route to Moçambique.

less than an open mind to his job, for only three days after issuing a bando reaffirming freedom of trade for all the King's vassals and stressing equal justice for all the people of the Conquest, including Muslims, Gentiles, and Africans, he promptly issued another, on 31 January 1763, in which he completely reversed his position. Embodying several of the 1758 proposals made by the Brothers of the Santa Casa da Misericórdia, it stipulated that no Gentiles, Banians, or Muslim Indians could go, or send their goods, to the mainland or to the other ports of the coast, "selling them, however, on this Island to the Portuguese inhabitants of these Captaincies." Similarly, he ordered that those Muslims who were not residents should be sent back to India, and restricted the right of the Indians to be served by their own slaves, ordering these to be sold within three months.(1) The bando also required that anyone wishing to trade to the subordinate ports of the colony had to receive a passport from the Governor-General, and Silva Barba apparently relented by granting these to the Banians.

Presumably, the Indians who were established on the island must have decided that it was useless to protest these orders and that, so long as they were able to receive passports, they would not contend them, for no petitions are known to have been made to this effect. The only other legislation which affected this community during the remainder of Silva Barba's administration was a bando which reflected the continuation of a firm official attitude towards it. This proclamation was primarily aimed at forbidding those merchants who came to Moçambique aboard the annual vessels from India from trading on the mainland with the Yao, as they sold them their cloth at cost value and thus ruined the trade there of the Portuguese, to whom they sold the same cloth at an "exorbitant price." At the same time, however, it was also ruled that for the same reasons "the Gentile traders of this City. . .cannot personally, or through another,

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(1) AHU, Cod.1324, fl.67-8, bando, Silva Barba, Moç., 28 January 1763; ibid., fl.69-70, and AHU, CM 6, bando of the same, Moç., 31 January 1763.

trade with the same Yao, as a result of this trade remaining solely reserved for the Vassals of His Majesty established in these Dominions, being, however, obliged to obtain my License in order to be able to do so, which will be conceded to them."(1) While this restriction ran counter to the several Royal decrees and alvarás declaring the trade of Moçambique, its ports and lands, to be free to all Portuguese vassals, among whom the Indian merchants of Moçambique must be counted, they did not feel that their security was menaced, as long as they were freely able to obtain these passports. Silva Barba's measures, then, would seem to have temporarily sated the anti-Indian pressure of the Church and the moradores without seriously impairing the operation of trade at Moçambique.

From 1749 to 1765, when the smooth operation of trade at Moçambique was being threatened by forces outside Portuguese jurisdiction (the Makua) and by some within it (the trading practices of the Portuguese on the mainland and their persecution of the Indians), the actual, as well as the official, policy of the administration was to prohibit the French from trading there. In contrast to the late 1730s and early 1740s, virtually no French trading was undertaken at Moçambique in the late 1740s and throughout the following decade. The specific application to the Conquest of the general law forbidding foreign trade within the dominion of Portuguese Africa, expressed in an alvará dated 10 April 1756, was a result of French activity in the Kerimba Islands alone.(2) The effective stoppage of French trading at Moçambique in these years did not, however, weaken its economic structure, nor lessen its attraction for the Yao, for this reason: the importance of the French commercial involvement in East Africa was that, unlike every other body of traders who had sought, or was still seeking, to do

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(1) Ibid., fl.287-8, bando of same, Moç., 7 March 1765.
(2) AHU, Cod.1307, p.291, royal alvará, Lisboa, 10 April 1756; see above, p. 89 , and below, pp. 150-2.

business there, they were not primarily after ivory, which had dominated its trade since the beginning of the Christian era. What the French sought were slaves.

Consequently, after the brief upswing in the slave trade at Moçambique during, and immediately after, Almeida's encouragement of it, this business returned to its previous lethargic pace. According to official figures, from 1753 to 1760 fewer than 5000 slaves entered Moçambique from the various parts of the Conquest, including Inhambane, Sofala, the Rivers of Sena, and the Kerimba Islands, as well as the opposing mainland.(1) While it is most likely that some slaves were sporadically traded to the French by the Makua and by Portuguese contrabanders, at bays and inlets in the immediate vicinity of the capital, there is no reason for thinking that these amounted to more than a small number of individuals. Therefore, it is clear that very few slaves were brought overland to Moçambique in these years. In any case, most of these were undoubtedly the more readily obtainable Makua. The few Yao slaves who were taken on the long journey to the coast by their fellow tribesmen were described by Melo e Castro as being "of such delicate endurance, through their being subject to diseases while they are otherwise getting adjusted to the climate, that of those who are brought, ordinarily half survive, and often fewer."(2) For the ivory conscious Yao traders, slaves were as yet no more than an incidental item of trade and not of sufficient importance to influence the direction of their routes to the coast.

The French did not, however, cease trying to cultivate a market for slaves at Moçambique. In 1752 Dupleix, then Governor-General of

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(1) AHU, CM 6, "Extracto do Rendimt.^{o}da Alfandega de Mossambiq̃., do tp̈o de 5 Annos, hum mez,e 10 dias,começadas a 10 de Julho d'1753, e acabados a 20 d'Agosto de 1758...," rendeiros António Baltasar Pires, Caetano Álvaro Tavares, and João Estanislão Martins; AHU, CM 8, "Extracto do rendimento da Alfandega desta Ilha...," António Francisco Xavier, enclosed in Saldanha de Albuquerque to Crown, Moç., 18 August 1760.

(2) AHU, CM 4, Melo e Castro to Crown, Moç., 27 December 1755; also enclosed in AHU, CM 5, parecer, Conselho Ultramarino, Lisboa, 26 March 1755; cf. ibid., Melo e Castro to Corte Real, Moç., 29 November 1755.

the Compagnie des Indes, proposed a treaty of alliance with the Portuguese in India, article nine of which read: "The trade of Kaffirs at Moçambique will be permitted to the French Nation, by means of a tax per head which will be agreed upon amicably, and this number of Blacks will be able to be fixed at two thousand every year." The immediate Portuguese reply was, however, equivocating, and nothing ever seems to have come of this proposal.(1) According to official documents, in fact, no French vessels entered the harbor of Moçambique during Melo e Castro's administration and only three came there between 1758 and 1765. Although this apparent absence of French merchantmen at Moçambique during this period seems not to have been quite so total under Saldanha de Albuquerque and Silva Barba, there is no doubt that the renewed growth of their influence there stemmed directly from the encouragement they received from Baltasar Manuel Pereira do Lago, who became Governor-General in August 1765. As this development coincided with a considerable expansion of trading activity at the French islands themselves, beginning after the cessation of hostilities with Great Britain in 1763 and continuing with the assumption of their administration by the Ministère de la Marine in 1767 and the abolition of the commercial monopoly of the Compagnie des Indes in 1769, comparison with the brief period of French commercial influence at Moçambique during the collaboration of La Bourdonnais and Almeida is inevitable; for like his notorious predecessor, Pereira do Lago soon aligned himself with the interests of the French slavers.

A year after he took office, Pereira do Lago apprised the King of his commitment to "the total prohibition of entry to this Port by

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(1) TT, MR, maço 602, "Copie du Projet que M. Dupleix a envoyé par le Baron de Vicloire. Projet d'une Alliance perpetuelle entre la Nation francoise, et la nation Portugaise dans la presqu'Isle de L'Inde, "enclosed in Dupleix to Viceroy, Pondichéry, 11 February 1752; ibid., reply, Goa, 24 May 1752; see above, p. 95, n. 2.

French and English ships except in cases of urgent necessity." By condemning the fact that the French had been providing the Makua with weapons for at least the past four years, he also suggested that Saldanha de Albuquerque and Silva Barba had not always enforced the King's laws forbidding foreign trade there.(1) This implication does not lack support, notably António Pinto de Miranda's lamentation that these two men had indeed occasionally allowed it to happen, under the false impression that it was in the King's interest. On the other hand, the same writer made it clear that their mistakes were minor in comparison with the sins of Pereira do Lago on the same score. Montaury charged that French slavers only began to come continuously to Moçambique after the arrival of Pereira do Lago, while at the same time Figueiredo, for whom the Governor-General had a marked antipathy, wrote that the French were the most frequent traders there.(2) Moreover, Montaury also asserted that Pereira do Lago allowed the French to go to the mainland and trade directly with the Makua and Yao, and that these consequently received a regular supply of firearms and gunpowder.(3)

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(1) AHU, Cod.1321, fl.215-25, Pereira do Lago to Sec. St., Moç., 20 July 1766; AHU, CM 12, same to same, Moç., 13 August 1766. In fact, the only times English vessels ever touched at Moçambique were those when they were unable to reach their usual fueling station on the way to India, at Grand Comoro Island. In none of these cases is any trading known to have taken place and they usually amounted to no more than a two-day layover at Moçambique. See AHU, CM 5, Melo e Castro to Crown, Moç., 6 August 1756; AHU, Cod.1317, fl.63, Saldanha de Albuquerque to Sec. St., Moç., 25 July 1759; AHU, Cod.1321, fl.32-3, "Relaçaõ das Embarcaçoens q' entraraõ nesta Praça de Mossambique no monçaõ de Marco de 1761, the o mez de Julho do ms.° anno;" AHU, CM 9, Saldanha de Albuquerque to Crown, Moç., 16 August 1761; AHU, Cod.1321, fl.202-3, Pereira do Lago to Sec. St., Moç., 20 August 1766.

(2) Ibid., fl.179, same to same, Moç., 20 August 1766.

(3) Andrade, Relações, pp.240,274; see ibid., p.460, for what little is known of Miranda, who briefly served as Secretary of Moçambique and thereafter resided at Sena; ibid., pp.350-1; EHGEP, p.354; cf. AHU, CM 12, Henrique José de Mendanha Benevides Cirne, "Narraçaõ do Estado em que se acha a Fazenda Real no governo de Mossambique," Moç., post-August 1766; TT, MR, maço 603, anon., "Breves reflexoens, sobre o Commercio de Azia, e Africa, principalmente dos Dominios Portuguezes," n.d., but clearly referring to Pereira do Lago.

Needless to say, Pereira do Lago never informed the King of his understanding with the French, the operation of which will be described in the next chapter, although he shrewdly reported whenever, in a situation of "urgent necessity," he was obliged to allow a French vessel to enter the port and was forced to trade with it. This happened in both 1766 and 1767, when a shortage of certain necessary supplies was caused by the failure of the annual ship from Damão, in both years, and that from Diu, in the latter only, to arrive at Moçambique. In each year Pereira do Lago wrote of his trading with a French vessel for specifically needed items and paying for these with slaves and cowries. He even reported how, in 1767, he refused an offer to co-operate in this trade, with a cut of the profits, which was proposed in letters to him carried from the Governor-General of the French Islands, even though circumstances necessitated his obtaining supplies from the ship.(1)

Two other French vessels entered Moçambique road in 1767, but nothing is known of their activities there, except that Pereira do Lago complained that one of these embarked with seven Africans who had been abducted while out fishing. In the next year, he reported some trouble with a French slaver trading illegally at Fernão Veloso Bay and claimed that a vessel captained by a M. Clonard, who was later to gain some notoriety at Zanzibar, was illegally trading on the mainland at night. Whatever Pereira do Lago's complaints about the conduct of these French traders may have been, however, the fact remains that he had allowed them to drop anchor in the harbor of Moçambique and that he gave the King no explanation for their

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(1) AHU, CM 12, Pereira do Lago to Crown, Moç., 20 August 1766 and 18 August 1767; both also in AHU, Cod.1321, fl.202-3, 247-9, including related documents to the first French ship; ibid., fl.178, same to Sec. St., Moç., 18 August 1766; ibid., fl. 253-4, same to Conde de Oeiras, Moç., 20 August 1767; AHU, CM 12, same to Crown, Moç., 21 August 1767; AHU, Cod. 1333, n.º 364, Mendonça Furtado to Pereira do Lago, Ajuda, 1 April 1769; cf. AHU, Cod.1310, fl.58-9, Melo e Castro to Conselho da Fazenda do Estado da India, Moç., 12 August 1754, reporting the failure of both the vessels from Diu and Damão to appear at Moçambique that year.

presence there. Furthermore, according to a Frenchman who was clearly well versed in the intricacies of trade at Ile de France, a M. Panon, whom Pereira do Lago identified as being the supercargo of Clonard's vessel, disposed of some 5000 to 6000 piastres, in trade goods at Moçambique. In order to have done this amount of dealing there one suspects that at least a certain amount of compliance from the Governor-General must have been necessary.(1) It would also seem that the King's approval of Pereira do Lago's policy towards foreign vessels, that is, to only admit them in case of extreme necessity, probably persuaded the Governor-General to continue to sanction this trade.(2) By his actions, then, Pereira do Lago facilitated the beginning of a new period of direct French commercial influence at Moçambique.

In addition to encouraging the French to trade at Moçambique, Pereira do Lago nurtured the slave trade from there to the French islands in Portuguese and Brazilian vessels, the inspiration for which he was indebted to Saldanha de Albuquerque. In 1760 a French slaver had wrecked at the foot of Goa Island, within the harbor itself, and, avoiding the temptation to allow it to trade, Saldanha de Albuquerque ordered a full investigation to be taken. In the necessary arrangements for returning the crew and its salvaged cargo to Ile de France, however, it was decided to let the owner of the only Portuguese ship available for this task carry as many slaves as he could with him, for trading at that island. All authorities agreed that while it was clearly illegal for foreigners to trade for slaves in the Portuguese dominions, it was nowhere stated that

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(1) AHU, Cod.1552, fl.7-10, Pereira do Lago to Sec.St., Moç., 17 & 18 August 1768; ibid., fl.12-3, Francisco Pereira Henriques to Pereira do Lago, Cabaceira grande, 25 June 1768, and Mussinga muave, 25 June 1768; BM, Add.MSS. 18, 140, fl.21-2, Dumas to M. Glemet, Ile de France, 31 October 1768. Clonard, whom Pereira do Lago wrongly thought to have been Dutch, captained the (?)Labunt; for his problems at Zanzibar, see FKI, pp.13, 16, 82-3, 87, 141-2, 173.

(2) AHU, Cod.1333, n.º 334, Mendonça Furtado to Pereira do Lago, Ajuda, 28 March 1768.

Portuguese subjects could not trade from them to foreign lands.(1) This possibility appears not to have immediately inspired a new trade with the French Islands, although there is evidence that a similar voyage may have been undertaken in 1765. When Pereira do Lago arrived in Moçambique, he found a Portuguese vessel already in the process of being fitted out with a cargo of slaves for trading to Ile de France, the license for which had cost its captain 5000 cruzados. Following the advice of the Chief Justice, who reaffirmed that there were no Portuguese laws preventing this trade, the new Governor-General upheld the legality of the license. In the following year he sought the Crown's opinion on this trade, recommending it both for the fact that it was a most profitable business and that it was to be preferred to the virtually unstoppable contraband trade carried on by French vessels in the Kerimba Islands.(2)

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(1) AHU, Cod.1317, fl.185-94, "Sobre a perda de Navio Francez no dentro da Fortaleza," Saldanha de Albuquerque to Sec.St., Moç., 15 August 1760, followed by seven documents relating to same subject, dated between 5 January - 8 August 1760; AHU, Cod.1321, fl.77-9, same to same, Moç., 18 August 1762, and "Copea do Termo" relating to the examination of another French vessel with which Saldanha de Albuquerque refused to trade, bearing the names of the several examiners, Moç., 10 April 1762. The name of the first ship was São Lucas Evangelista, captained by a M.(?) Treareljovital. That of the second is unknown, but its captain was a M. Dery. For a completely unjustified attack on Saldanha de Albuquerque, including the implication that he shirked his duty with regard to the first French vessel, made by one of the disgruntled Brothers of the Santa Casa de Misericórdia, see TT, MR, maço 603, José Gomes Henriques to Crown, Moç., 20 August 1760; for more on Henriques, see TT, MR, maço 604, "Rellacam dos moradores Portuguezes que assistem em Mossambique, e nos destrictos," July 1757, where he is listed under Cabaceira Grande; also in EGHEP, p.160.

(2) AHU, CM 10, "Rezumo da Receita da Alfandega desde 1º de Janeiro, the fim de Dezembre de 1765," and similar, undated fragment, but probably from the same year. AHU, Cod.1321, fl.191-2, Pereira do Lago to Sec.St., Moç., 20 August 1766; see AHU, Cod. 1324, fl.330-1, passport issued by same to Francisco Bertrand, captain of the corvette Nossa Senhora da Conceição, e Pérola, Moç., 16 October 1765; AHU, Cod.1329, fl.69-70, passport issued by same to Francisco dos Santos e Silva, captain of the ship Nossa Senhora do Rosário, Santo António, e Almas, Moç., 6 September 1766.

Although the King discouraged his licensing Portuguese vessels for this trade, except as a last resort if he was unable to prevent their pursuing it, Pereira do Lago continued to foster this policy. Besides sending local vessels to Ile de France and to Bourbon, he apparently encouraged Brazilian traders from Bahia and Rio de Janeiro to ship slaves there from Moçambique. Figueiredo wrote that they established trading houses there, from which they despatched these slaves to the islands, as well as ivory, gold, and cowries to India. Certainly some slaves were also taken from Moçambique to Brazil, but according to Melo e Castro they had a bad reputation there and the Crown's tentative sponsorship of this trade in 1755 seems to have produced few results.(1) Nevertheless, as did his French policy, the attitude of Pereira do Lago towards this directly related trade in Portuguese and Brazilian vessels to the French islands marked the beginning of serious slave trading at Moçambique.

During the 1760s the Yao continued to dominate the internal trade of Moçambique.(2) Spared anything more than desultory raids of the Makua during the first five years of his administration, Pereira de Lago was nevertheless faced with the substantial problem of trying to organize this trade more efficiently. Taking up the lead of Saldanha de Albuquerque in 1759, several of the more

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(1) AHU, Cod.1333, n.º 350, Mendonça Furtado to Pereira do Lago, Ajuda, 29 March 1768; Andrade, Relações, p.351; EHGEP, p.254; AHU, CM 5, Melo e Castro to Crown, Moç., 18 August 1755; AHU, CM 4, same to same, Moç., 27 December 1753, enclosing "Carregaçaõ dos Escravos... p.ª serem vendidos no Rio de Janeiro.." Caetano da Silva e Savdra, 1 January 1754; ibid., same to same, 29 November 1753, enclosing chart of slaves shipped, Melo e Castro, Moç., 24 October 1753. A total of 495 slaves were sent to Brazil on this occasion aboard two ships. See also, E.C. Lopes, A Escravatura (subsidios para a sua história), Lisboa, 1944, p.166.

(2) AHU, CM 12, "Mapa dado...pello Juiz, e Verᵉˢ da Camrª, dos Morᵉˢ, e habitᵉˢ Nesta mesma Capᵗᵃˡ, e terras firmas...," Moç., 30 May 1766, enclosed in Pereira do Lago to Crown, Moç., 20 August 1766. According to this chart, of the 181 Portuguese inhabitants of the island and its mainland, 52 had listed as their "Modo da Vida" (way of life), exclusively or in part, "Negº de Majao" (trade with the Yao). As a point of interest, of these 181 individuals, 71 were listed as "Naturaes de Portugal," 74 as "Naturaes da India," and 36 as "Naturaes da Terra."

prosperous moradores proposed on 4 March 1766 the establishment of a company for trading with the Yao and the Makua. Unlike the plan for that company, however, this one was not intended to include both rich and poor among its members, but only the former, the "experienced inhabitants of credit." They charged that the others, whom they dismissed as "vagrants," had caused great disorders by sending their patamares into the interior to trade with poor quality beads and cloth on which no duties had been paid. This trading, they alleged, had cut the legitimate traders, themselves, out of the profits from this trade and was generally causing the ruin of the entire Conquest. In support of the company, Pereira do Lago not only stressed the ill effect of these irregular trading practices, which included fighting with each other and the Yao in the struggle to procure ivory, but also charged that these same inhabitants were seriously depriving the Royal Treasury of its rightful duties in the slave trade. Whereas duties were only paid on several hundred slaves per year, he claimed that almost 2000 Africans annually were spirited away, usually at night, without being taxed, through their not being embarked from Moçambique Island. Furthermore, Pereira do Lago condemned the Banians for having corrupted the Africans so thoroughly that they had become exceedingly artful in their negotiations, which also had resulted in declining profits. Having consulted the principal civil, ecclesiastical, and military officers of the Conquest, on 11 March Pereira do Lago confirmed the incorporation of the new Companhia dos Mujaos, e Macuas, which was to exercise a total monopoly over the trade in ivory, slaves, and rhinocerous horn with the Makua and the Yao. All that was permitted to the poorer Portuguese, who were not members of the company, was the right to

trade with these Africans for provisions.(1)

Pereira do Lago beseeched the King's approval for the establishment of the company for a period of six years, as originally proposed to him, but the project immediately encountered vehement opposition from several quarters. The Viceroy at Goa objected that this monopoly caused great damage to the welfare of Diu and Damão, as did the traders from those places, who were at the mercy of the company which had become their principal buyer of cloth. Whether their voices were heard or not, the company clearly lacked the support of most of the common moradores of Moçambique. Figueiredo, who was then at Court in Lisbon, asserted that the monopoly of the company would only reduce further their already miserable population, and attacked Pereira do Lago's conception of the public interest by accusing him of consorting with French traders there to the detriment of the Royal Treasury. These arguments against the company, as well as the fact that its monopoly contravened his orders granting full freedom of trade in East Africa to all his subjects, caused D. José to quash the company and to reopen the trade of Moçambique to the traders of Portuguese India.(2) While he pleaded against this decision, Pereira do Lago fulfilled the order and abolished the company in 1768.(3)

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(1) AHU, CM 12 & Cod.1325, fl.20-51, petition presented by "os homens de negocio, moradores nesta Capital, e Terra firma," to Pereira do Lago, Moç., 4 March 1766; followed by testimonies from various officials, confirmation of the company, 11 March 1766, and terms of office for its administrators, 3 May 1766; AHU, CM 12 & 35, Cod.1321, fl.168-9, Cod.1325, fl.149-51, Pereira do Lago to Mendonça Furtado, Moç., 15 August 1766; AHU, Cod.1322, pp.185-8, same to Conselho Ultramarino, Moç., 15 August 1766; AHU, CM 12, same to Crown, Moç., 24 August 1766; see also AHU, Cod.1321 fls. 200-1 & Cod.1325, fl.48-9, "os Deputados da Comp.a do Mujaos" to Pereira do Lago, Moç., 24 May 1766 & his reply, Moç., 30 May 1766.

(2) AHU, Cod.1321,fl.242-3, Pereira do Lago to Sec.St., Moç., 20 August 1767; Andrade, Relações, p.350; AHU, CM 12, Benevides Cirne, "Narraçaõ...," Moç., post-August 1766; AHU, CM 15, Pereira do Lago to Crown, Moç., 25 November 1775, enclosing Figueiredo, "Narraçaõ dos descaminhos da Fazenda Real," Ajuda, 21 March 1768, with Pereira do Lago's answers to the charges therein, Moç., 20 November 1775; AHU, Cod.1333, n.º 337, Mendonça Furtado to Pereira do Lago, Ajuda, 18 March 1768.

(3) AHU, Cod.1332, fl.35-6 & 45-6, Pereira do Lago to Sec.St., Moç., 20 September 1768

The only permanent contribution which Pereira do Lago made in these years to the stabilization of trading practices on the mainland was the establishment of two public fairs, one in the district of Mossuril and the other in that of Sancula, for the purchasing of provisions. These fairs probably formed the basis of what was to become known in the 1780s as the feira dos Mujaos, or Yao fair, and represented a step forward in the struggle to induce the Yao, not to mention the Makua, to bring their goods to the very shores opposite the capital itself. Their establishment certainly did not, however, cause people to abandon the practise of sending patamares after the Makua and the Yao, but may have helped to reduce the frequency of resorting to this practice.(1)

During the brief reign of the Companhia dos Mujaos, e Macuas, it is obvious that the Indians fared no better than those Portuguese who were excluded from trading with the Yao and Makua by its monopoly. Surprisingly, they were not much bothered by Pereira do Lago, who was extremely hostile to them. The instructions which he left for the successor he expected to replace him in 1768 contain several bitter attacks on the Banians, the Mazanes of Diu, and the "Jews, and foreign nations" of Surat, on whose concerted opposition he blamed the failure of the company. Yet the Indians of Moçambique suffered no further limitations to their freedom of trade than those already imposed by Silva Barba. When they unsuccessfully sought to have the King free them from the necessity of seeking licenses for trading on the mainland and at the subordinate ports, however, Pereira do Lago protested strongly. He added that they were presently tolerated at Moçambique only so that the duties of the Royal Treasury should not suffer.(2) As had happened before, then, by virtue of

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(1) AHU, Cod.1329, fl.236-7, bando, Pereira do Lago, Moç., 13 January 1768.

(2) AHU, Cod.1333, n.os 556 & 593, Conselho Ultramarino to Gov., Lisboa, 31 January 1769 & 18 April 1771; AHU, Cod.1325, fl.163-91, and BNL, FG, Caixa 12, Doc.o 25, Pereira do Lago, instructions to his successor, Moç., 20 August 1768; a bowdlerized verions of these instructions, omitting the references cited in the text, is in Andrade, Relações, pp.317-38; AHU, Cod.1322, pp.251-3, two letters of same to Crown, Moç., both 14 August 1769.

their being the only reliable body of energetic traders at Moçambique, and therefore the principal financers of its administration, the Indians were able to pursue their business there in relative security.

2. Trade in the interior

We have so far examined the trade of Moçambique largely from only one vantage, that of the island itself. We have seen how the trade of the Yao, especially that in ivory, dominated the economy of Moçambique; and how the disturbances of the Makua, in particular, but also of the Portuguese mainlanders, obstructed the smooth operation of this trade. We have also noted the various harassments of the Indians, who on their side were as vital to the success of the ivory trade at Moçambique as were the Yao. Finally, we have pointed out that the slow pace of the slave trade there was due to the absence of the French from that port, and that the beginning of its gradual revival came only with their reappearance there after 1765. Before turning to analyse the course of trade in the Kerimba Islands and along the Kilwa coast, then, it is necessary that we examine in some detail the operation of trade in the interior of East-Central Africa.

The ivory which the Makua brought to both Moçambique and Ibo most probably came from their own country, as in the nineteenth century they had a reputation for being great elephant hunters and they were never spoken of as being long distance traders.(1) In fact, perhaps because the amount of ivory they carried to the coast was relatively small, the Portuguese failed to leave a single word

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(1) Traditionally, the Makua had secret societies for hunting elephant. Most of their hunting was undoubtedly done with traditional weapons, but by the 1760s the Makua around Moçambique hunted elephant with firearms. E.de Froberville, "Notes sur les moeurs, coutumes et traditions des amakoua, sur le commerce et la traite des esclaves dan l'Afrique Orientale," Bulletin de la Société de Géographie, 5e Serie, viii, 1847, pp.311-29, at 322; Andrade, Relações, p.244.

on this subject. The slave trade carried on by the Makua was undoubtedly supplied exclusively from among their own people, and these probably were already domestic slaves, or individuals captured in a raid, or perhaps in a larger conflict between rival chieftains. The Ibo market was probably supplied with these two commodities by Makonde traders, as well, although there are few notices of these people until later in the eighteenth century.

While the Yao certainly procured some ivory within their own territory, they were, conversely, primarily ivory traders, rather than elephant hunters; thus their sources generally lay outside their own lands. A considerable amount of trading must have been done with the people of the upper Shire River valley, but the Shire was not the limit of Yao penetration of the interior. In 1755 Melo e Castro observed that "the Kaffirs whom they call Yao" carried ivory to the mainland opposite Moçambique from the

> Lands of the Marave, Bive, Caronga, and of various other potentates in those hinterlands bordering the Lands of our Jurisdiction of the Rivers of Sena of the other /i.e., northern/ side of the Zambezi, where our traders would acquire it if their goods did not cost so very much, which causes those Kaffirs to come to the mainland of Mossuril, opposite this Fortress, where they find them /the cloths/ cheaper by one hundred per cent, and of better quality than are introduced to them there, in those territories, by our traders.(1)

Cloths were cheaper at Mossuril than in the Rivers for two principal reasons: the cost of transporting them from Moçambique to Quelimane, and then up the Zambezi, was very high and the risk of loss great; and the prices of cloths going for sale to any of the subordinate ports were regularly raised by 50% over the current rate at Moçambique. Furthermore, the monopoly which until 1755 was exercised by Goa over the sale of the principal items of trade

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(1) TT, MR, maço 603, Melo e Castro to Crown, Moç., 20 November 1755.

was limited to the external trade of the Rivers, Sofala, and Inhambane. North of the Zambezi both internal and external trade were free of its control, so that while the prosperity of those areas subject to its supervision steadily declined, the overland ivory trade to Moçambique flourished, and the competition for this trade must have resulted in the Africans being able to secure a continuously better price for their ivory at Mossuril. Not only was the price of cloth in the Rivers exorbitant, but that of ivory was considerably less there than it was at Mossuril.(1) After 1755 the inauguration of a system of free trade in the Rivers, except for velório, might have enabled the merchants of Sena, Tete and Zumbo to recapture at least part of the Maravi ivory market from the Yao, but the simultaneous imposition of a crippling 41% tariff on all cloth going there from the capital only aggravated the situation further. This tax was extended to velório after the abolishment of the Royal Monopoly, but Macuana remained, as before, a tax free area. By trading with the Yao, rather than with the local Portuguese, the Maravi could obtain a much more favorable exchange value for their ivory. In view of these circumstances, then, one is not at all surprised to find the petitioners for the formation of the Companhia dos Mujaos, e Macuas complaining that the Yao were carrying the duty free cloths of Moçambique hundreds of leagues inland and selling them to chiefs, "in order to introduce them into our Fair of Zumbo."(2)

In the earlier seventeenth century, it was the Maravi themselves who apparently had dominated the route from their territory to Moçambique, but this priority had been lost to the Yao. While the depth of Maravi commercial penetration into the heart of the continent

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(1) Andrade, Relações, p.218; Lobato, Evolução, pp.270-1.
(2) Andrade, Relações, pp.179-81, for Xavier's opinion on 41% tax as applied to cloths; AHU, Cod.1321, fl.72-3, Mendonça Furtado to Saldanha de Albuquerque, Ajuda, 25 May 1761; and reply, Moç., 19 August 1762; AHU, CM 10, Silva Barba to Mendonça Furtado, Moç., 15 August 1763; see above, pp.54.

during the seventeenth century is not known, it is most likely that by the 1760s the Yao were already trading, at least indirectly, with the Bisa, from across the Luangwa River, and probably even with the eastern Lunda state ruled by the Mwata Kazembe in the Luapula River valley. This was certainly true by the end of the eighteenth century, and the several references to cross-continental journies by African traders, which dot the memoirs of the French slaver Morice, suggest that such connections were well established by the mid-1770s.(1)

The principal hunting ground of the Maravi was known as the Malambo and was located around the middle and lower reaches of the Luangwa. As early as 1725, the Portuguese knew that the "great lands of Uringi" bordered on Maravia, but it was only in the second half of the eighteenth century that the potential of these lands became known to them. Forty years later, the author of the Memorias da Costa d'Africa Oriental recorded that "the great hinterland of Orange /is/ situated forty days' journey to the Northwest of Zumbo," although another unidentified writer stated in 1788 that it was only a fortnight's march from the same fair to Orange.(2) Of the trade of the Orange/Uringi area, which must certainly be identified with the trans-Luangwa country, the earlier of these two commentators explained that

> neither Canarins, nor negro traders go to this hinterland, but those of that country come to Zumbo every year to trade in exchange for ivory, and copper, which they carry already cast in large bars, and of which there is a great abundancy.(3)

These traders should probably be identified as Bisa, for whom the Luangwa formed a common boundary with the Maravi. One can infer

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(1) See below, pp. 205-6.

(2) T. Price, "More about the Maravi," p.78; CT, iv, p.61; Andrade, Relações, pp.204, 402.

(3) Ibid., p.204. See also, CEHU-MF, LM 105-A, fl.13-16, Frois to Viceroy, Goa, 28 December 1754, where Frois refers to "the Provinces of the Oranjes, and Anvuas," beyond Zumbo; cf. Barreto on the Amvuas, RSEA, iii, pp.451-2, trs. 481.

from Bisa traditions that there was a migration of chiefly invaders from the Congo into their country at around the turn of the eighteenth century. The political organization imposed by these invaders probably enabled the Bisa to trade more efficiently than ever before. The fact that they traded copper ingots to Zumbo points to a source of trade in the Katanga. This end of their trading undoubtedly was transacted at the court of Mwata Kazambe II, who had established his rule over the Luapula valley about 1740, and to whom the Bisa owed tribute. This line of trade probably was stabilized and considerably augmented after the accession of Kazembe III, c. 1760.(1)

How the Yao began to trade with the Bisa, and thereby with the Kazembe Lunda, may be deduced from the following information concerning the traders from Orange, which also comes from the author of the 1762 Memorias:

> The greater part of the ivory which goes to Sena comes from this hinterland; and because gold does not come from it, the /Portuguese/ traders never exert themselves for these two commodities /ivory and copper/...as a result of which the negroes have on many occasions gone back carrying the goods which they had brought, through there not being anybody who would buy these from them.(2)

If the Portuguese traders of the Rivers of Sena were not interested in this ivory, the Yao certainly were, as were the merchants of Moçambique. The wealth of the Luangwa hunting ground must have been known to the Yao through dealing with the Maravi. Once this connection was made, the route from Kazembe's court to the East

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(1) F.M. Thomas, Historical Notes on the Bisa Tribe, Northern Rhodesia, Lusaka, 1958, pp.1-30, 33, but especially 21-3; I. Cunnison, The Luapula Peoples of Northern Rhodesia, Manchester, 1959, pp.39-41, 151-5; see also idem. (tr. & ed.), Central Bantu Historical Texts II : Historical Traditions of the Eastern Lunda, Lusaka, 1962, pp.1-68, especially from 34.

(2) Andrade, Relações, p.204.

African coast became fully operational. Bisa, Maravi, and Yao traded along this route, and each group probably dominated the carriage of goods within its own territory. It would also seem that some Bisa and Yao, more so than the Maravi, traded over the entire length of this route for themselves, and that small parties of individuals probably succeeded in travelling beyond the Luapula to the coast of Angola, as suggested by Morice's memoirs. Thus, by about 1760, an important and regular trade, based upon ivory and following a well established route to the sea, was flourishing between the eastern Lunda state of the Mwata Kazembe, in the Luapula valley, and the coast of East Africa.

This trade debouched at two main points on that coast, Moçambique and Kilwa. For the moment, we are only interested in reconstructing the route taken by the Yao, who commanded the eastern half of the trade, to Moçambique, and shall leave the Kilwa route until later. As we have seen, in the eighteenth century, the southern limits of Yaoland probably were the Mandimba hills, near the modern boundary between Malawi and Portuguese East Africa, and running from the northern end of Lake Chilwa, or Shirwa, towards the toe of Lake Malawi.(1) The Yao probably crossed into Maravi country directly over these hills, around the bottom of Lake Malawi, and thence across the Shire, or else were ferried across the great lake at any of several points where the lake narrows at its southern end, such as the important nineteenth century settlement at Ng'ombe. At the coastal end of the route, the Yao seem to have approached Mossuril from the northwest, through Uticulo, for it was the disturbances of the Makua chiefs in this district, and along a northwesterly line of march from Mossuril, which had prevented the Yao from reaching the coast in the 1750s. In between these ends of the route, nothing definite can be said, but it seems most likely that the Yao would have avoided the hilly country of the Lomwe, which lay athwart a direct route from the

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(1) See above, pp. 63-5.



Map 4: Eighteenth Century Trade Routes in East-Central Africa

southern end of Lake Malawi to Moçambique. Besides, the Lomwe were very hostile to outsiders and their country was difficult to traverse even in the late nineteenth century. That a route avoiding the Lomwe was, in fact, followed between these two points by about 1850 is proved by the thirty-three day itinerary given to Dr. Heinrich Barth by an Arab named Sherif Mohammed ben Ahmedu, who had travelled it himself. According to his account, from Moçambique one travelled northwest, through the flat country behind the coast; crossed the Lúrio, or Luli, River into Meto, reaching the town of Mwalia, the chief of Meto, on the fifteenth day out.(1), continued west through Meto until one reached the Lugenda River, which marked the beginning of Yao territory; generally followed this river to the environs of Lake Chilwa; and finally travelled along the Mandimba hills until one reached Lake Malawi at the market town of Mwala, three days to the south of Ng'ombe, from where one could cross the lake.(2)

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(1) In 1881, the Reverend Chauncy Maples of the U.M.C.A. visited Mwalia, the capital of Meto, "with the name of the sultanship, 'Mkaya'." He located this town at approximately 15°25' S. & 37°58' E., just slightly to the east of the modern post of Nungo, in the District of Niassa, Portuguese East Africa. C. Maples, "Makua Land, between the Rivers Rovuma and Luli," Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society, iv, 1882, pp.79-90, at 84.

(2) Abdallah, Yaos, pp.3,15; H.E. O'Neill, "A Three Months' Journey in the Makua and Lomwe Countries," pp.193-213, at 205; idem., "Journey from Mozambique to Lakes Shirwa and Amaramba," ibid., vi, 1884, pp.632-55, 713-41, at 644,730-2, 739-40; H. Barth, "Routes from Kano to Nyffe, and from Mozambique to Lake Nyassi. Extracted from Letters from Dr. Barth to Dr. Beke, dated Kano, March 4th, & Luka, July 25th, 1851," Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, xxiv, 1854, pp.285-8. Barth met Mohammed ben Ahmedu, a native of Moka, at Yola, in what is now Nigeria. This man had travelled the length of the East African coast, from Ras Hafun to Sofala, and offered to guide Barth across the continent for 300 dollars, to be paid at Zanzibar. There is no mention of this meeting in Barth's Travels.

In view of what we know about the trade of the Yao to Moçambique, including the extent and route of this trade in the interior, it seems worthwhile here to acknowledge the articles written by W.H.J. Rangeley which bear on this subject, as his opinions would seem to contradict what has been detailed above, and to dismiss them. His interpretation of early Yao history is purely speculative and completely erroneous. In particular, Rangeley's reconstruction of Yao trade routes must be denied, since we know that the Yao did indeed trade to Moçambique, probably by skirting the country of the Lomwe, or Nguru, whom he claimed prevented the Yao from taking this route. Furthermore, there is no evidence to support his proposition that the Yao traded around the northern end of Lake Malawi to the Kazembe Lunda, and the facts at our disposal disprove his claim that the southern route was not opened until the middle of the nineteenth century.(1) There was, in fact, at least one more northerly water crossing of Lake Malawi which was used in the eighteenth century, as well as those previously suggested, but it was not so important a route to the Luapula as that which we have examined.(2)

5. The commercial revival of the Kilwa coast

As emphasized in the previous chapter, the substitution of Moçambique for Kilwa as the favored coastal entrepôt of the Yao, and therefore of the trade of East-Central Africa, had been caused by several factors which effectively reduced the commercial activity of Kilwa to a virtual standstill. The peak years of Yao trading at Moçambique appear to have come during the middle decades of the eighteenth century, but the seeds of the decline of that place, in comparison to Kilwa, were already being sown during the 1750s, in the disturbances which we have examined above. Indeed, Figueiredo,

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(1) Rangeley, "The Ayao", NJ, xvi, 1963, pp.7-27; idem, "The Arabs," NJ, xvi, 1963, pp.11-25, at 22.

(2) See below, pp. 205-8.

Montaury, and others specifically mentioned the decline of the Yao ivory trade at Moçambique, despite its continued preeminence there, and prescribed various remedies for its rejuvenation. In addition to the unstable conditions of trade at Moçambique itself, however, its dominance of the Yao trade was being threatened by the gradual commercial renaissance of Kilwa, which was inspired by the increase of Arab trading activity north of Cape Delgado, after the stabilization of political affairs in Oman under the new Busaidi dynasty. Ever since the days of Rego Barreto, the Portuguese had been well aware of the threat posed to Moçambique by the revival of trading along that coast.(1) Information on this subject was difficult for the Portuguese to obtain, and that which they received was often no more than baseless rumor, especially where it concerned European threats to Moçambique. But the increased pace of Arab and Swahili commercial activity along that coast was a fact which was vividly felt by the Portuguese in the Kerimba Islands.

Portugal's hegemony over these islands and the opposing coast was tenuous, at best, and her sovereignty there was made a mockery of by virtually all the inhabitants of those parts. The islands were totally defenseless, with only a handful of soldiers stationed at Ibo, and without any fortifications whatever. Had any other power wished to command them, it could have done so at will. It is not surprising, then, that the Portuguese were sensitive to foreign threats, real or imagined, to their position in the islands. Melo e Castro wanted to build a fortress at Ibo to protect its harbor, which was the best suited for admitting large vessels, but there were not sufficient funds available for the task until 1760. Six years later a small company of soldiers was sent there to man it.(2) To compound matters, even the commercial ties between

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(1) See above, pp. 101-2, 105-7.

(2) TT, MR, maço 605, Melo e Castro to Crown, Moç., 20 November 1755; AC, iii,16, 1918, p.161, same to same, Moç., 10 August 1756; Teixeira Botelho, História, 4, pp.427,454,458. A great many of the Portuguese inhabitants of the Kerimba Islands appear to have been mulattoes.

Moçambique and the islands had dwindled to a minimum, despite the fact that no taxes were levied on the cloths which were sent there from the capital until after 1765. The head tax on slaves imported from the islands to Moçambique, where they were favored above all others, as well as those on other products of the area, were often evaded by the islanders, who disembarked their cargoes at Quitangonha, or Savasava, to the north of the capital. To prevent these frauds, it was ordered in 1762 that inhabitants of the islands who wished to trade at Moçambique were obliged to procure a license from the local Commandant, at Ibo. This bando must not have been effective, however, as the same order was repeated five years later.(1) Another futile attempt to control the activities of the Portuguese in the north was Silva Barba's order that all of these who lived along the coast, and scattered in the interior, had to remove themselves to either Ibo or Querimba Island, where the Commandant could supervise them more effectively.(2)

Nor did the death of Fr. João de Meneses put an end to the illegal trading practices of missionaries in the islands, for scandals erupted in 1756 and 1767 over the misconduct of particular individuals.(3) But the principal Portuguese culprits were those

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(1) AHU, CM 9, Saldanha de Albuquerque to Crown, Moç., 28 November 1762; AHU, Cod.1324,fl.21-2, bando of same, Moç., 5 May 1762; ibid., fl.26-7, registration of this bando by head clerk, João de Meneses, Ibo, 25 May 1762; AHU, Cod.1325, fl.44-5, & Cod. 1329, fl.172, bando, Pereira do Lago, Moç., 12 May 1767; Andrade, Relações, p.214.

(2) AHU, Cod.1324, fl.252, bando, Silva Barba, Moç., 26 May 1764. Today, what was formerly known as Ibo Island is called Queramba Island, of which the city of São João de Ibo is the capital. What is now designated as Ibo Island is a tiny islet lying to the east and in the shadow of Queramba Island. Querimba Island today bears the same name as it did in the eighteenth century.

(3) AHU, CM 5, Melo e Castro to Crown, Moç., 18 August 1756, also in AC,iii,16,1918,pp.164-5; AHU, Cod.1325,fl.57-8, Pereira do Lago to Gov. of the Episcopal Administration,Moç., 18 March 1768. In 1756 the scandal involved Fr.Pedro dos Mártires e Cunha, Vicar of Vamizi Island and later Commissioner of the Holy Office at Moçambique, and Fr. José de Santa Teresa, who served in the same parish, both of whom appear to have been Dominicans. In 1767 the transgressor was Fr. José de Santo Inácio, an Augustinian. See Andrade, Relações, p.101.



Map 5: The Kerimba Islands

who inhabited the island of Vamizi and its mainland. The security of this island was particularly important to the administration, as it physically commanded the coast below Cape Delgado and was the most northerly outpost of Portuguese habitation in East Africa. Vamizi was, however, some distance from Ibo, and its residents obeyed only their own instincts, trading with whom they pleased and generally leading lawless lives. In 1765, it was reported from Ibo that the Portuguese of Vamizi, all of whom had acquired their land there by virtue of royal grants, had not paid the Crown its due tithe for the past three years. In the following year, some of these people, together with local Africans and some Swahili from Tungi, looted the vessel from Damão, which was abandoned on the coast opposite Rongui Island, near Funji. Auxilliary troops led by the Sergeant-Major of Vamizi, a post created in 1762, sought the looters at Funji, where a heated battle occurred with the combined forces of one Simão Leite and an allied Makonde chieftain, who were routed. Soon afterwards, an appeal was made by some of the Vamizi rebels to the Sultan of Kilwa, under whose protection they wished to render the island. But the Sultan, being on good terms with the Portuguese authorities and warned of the treachery of these people, apparently refused the request. Thus defeated, the Portuguese of the Vamizi district patched up their immediate differences with the Commander of the Kerimba Islands, Caetano Alberto Judice, and returned loosely to the official fold.(1)

Although the main internal threat to Portuguese hegemony over the Kerimba Islands came from the Portuguese residents of that

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(1) AHU, CM 11, Caetano Alberto Judice to Pereira do Lago, Ibo, 15 December 1765; AHU, CM 12, same to same, Ibo, 20 April 1766; ibid., João Baptista to Judice, Bringano, 5 May 1766; ibid., Judice to Pereira do Lago, Bringano, 26 June 1766; ibid., Baptista to Judice, Bringano, 28 June 1766; ibid., Judice to Pereira do Lago, Ibo, 1 September 1766; ibid., same to same, Ibo, 27 October 1766; ibid., Fr.Domingos de Deus to (?)Judice, Vamizi, 8 April 1766; AHU, Cod.1324,fl.35, provisão naming João Baptista to be Sergeant-Major of Vamizi Island, Saldanha de Albuquerque, Moç., 7 December 1762; see above, p.130; cf. Teixeira Botelho, História, pp.377-80. The modern name of the promontory opposite Rongui Island is Cape Afungi.

district, the area was not free from harassment by the Africans thereabout. In the late 1750s and early 1760s, there were sporadic conflicts with the Makua on the mainland opposite Querimba Island. By 1765, however, Judice was reporting "the great thefts" which the chiefs of Macuana were committing against people from the islands who traded for ivory in the hinterland. These were so serious that he was, according to his own rather exaggerated account, obliged to put 6000 men in the field to control the situation. While the effect of this measure is not known, relations with the Makua appear to have remained strained, for at the end of the decade the appointment of João Baptista as Commandant of the Mainland of Cape Delgado was recommended by his experience in dealing with the Makua, and thus by the hope that he would be able to improve trade there.(1) In the vicinity of Vamizi Island and Tungi, there was a great deal of trouble with the Makonde in the 1760s, who regularly attacked the island and terrorized the mainland. About 1765, in reprisal for recent outrages, Portuguese forces from Vamizi successfully attacked the settlement of Pangani, burning it and capturing two chieftains, but nothing seems to have been settled by this action.(2) Without considering any external threats to their dominance of the Kerimba Islands, it is clear that the Portuguese Crown was hard pressed to maintain even the vaguest semblance of order in this part of the Conquest.

Such potential threats did, of course, exist, although they never materialized. The ease with which foreign traders managed to do business there made it unnecessary for their governments to

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(1) AHU, CM 6, João da Costa to ?Gov. of Moç., Querimba, 5 May 1758; AHU, CM 9, Vitório Vasconcelos da Silva to João de Morais, Querimba, 14 April 1761, mentioning a chieftain named Mutubulla; AHU, CM 11, Judice to Pereira do Lago, Ibo, 15 December 1765; AHU, Cod.1551, fl.181-2, carta patente, naming João Baptista as Commandant, Pereira do Lago, Moç., 17 April 1769.

(2) AHU, CM 11, Baptista to ?Judice, Vamizi, 19 October 1764; AHU, Cod.1524,fl.500-1, carta patente naming João da Silva Ferreira as Sergeant-Major of the Auxilliary Troops of Cape Delgado, Silva Barba, Moç., 29 April 1765; AHU, CM 12, Baptista to Judice, ?Vamizi, ? April 1766.

seek to avict the Portuguese from the islands. The French were the most active European traders in that area, although a few British vessels are known to have visited it, perhaps to trade for cowries.(1) It is, unfortunately, very difficult to get more than a general picture of the slave trade carried on by the French in the Kerimba Islands, as all foreign trade was illegal and inevitably transacted with the local Portuguese inhabitants and officials, none of whom were likely to report their collaboration to Moçambique. Brito Freire wrote in 1754 that the ease with which the people of the islands could trade profitably with the French was the main reason for the decline in the traditional trade between there and Moçambique, which was both risky and less profitable. Indeed, owing to Melo e Castro's refusal to admit foreigners to trade at the capital, French vessels were quite active in the islands during the 1750s. On the French side, it is known that at least two ships Le Glorieux and La Mutine were trading for slaves and cowries at the Kerimba Islands.(2) Occasional notices of foreign ships trading for slaves and cowries there filtered down to Moçambique, while the royal alvará of 1756, reaffirming the total prohibition of this trade, was issued in response to a letter from the Viceroy of Portuguese India, which complained of French vessels entering the ports of Portuguese East Africa. The same alvará also noted the receipt of a requerimento, or formal petition, from the inhabitants of Matemo Island, immediately north of Ibo, which contained their protests against the excesses of the Commander of the islands in trading with the

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(1) A. Dalrymple, Plan of Querimboo and the Adjacent Islands, From a Portuguese MS. supposed by Capt.ⁿ Bento de Almedoe, 1 November 1779, including a note explaining how to identify the islands of Querimba and Ibo by a Mr. Alexander Sibbald, "who was on this coast about 1755;" AHU, CM 11, Baptista to ?Judice, Vamizi, 19 October 1764.

(2) AF, Col.C⁴7, pp.3,4,12,15, De Lozier Bouvet to Syndics and Directors of the Compagnie des Indes, 31 August and 31 December 1755.

French.(1) For the following years, even less is known, although both Figueiredo and Montaury wrote that the French were the most active traders in the islands. The vehement counter-charges which Judice and a Lieutenant Miranda hurled at each other for trading with the French was one of the rare moments when the authorities at Moçambique were given a brief glimpse of the extent of the islanders' compliance in this trade.(2) The scarcity of information on this trade during this period makes it impossible to do more than hazard a guess as to the number of slaves annually exported by the French from the Kerimba Islands, but in view of later figures, an average of 1000 per year seems realistic, perhaps with a gradual increase in the late 1760s.(3)

While the Portuguese at Moçambique were certainly worried by the continued presence of French traders in the Kerimba Islands, they were particularly concerned at the prospect of any European power seizing Mombasa and, by resuscitating the commerce along that coast, causing the Yao to re-route their trade from Moçambique to the north. At the end of 1758, influenced by the warnings of Inácio Caetano Xavier, Saldanha de Albuquerque repeated Rego Barreto's mistake by cautioning the Crown against English intentions to occupy Mombasa. Xavier seems to have picked up this rumor in Bombay, but it was groundless. Nevertheless, his counsel made Saldanha de Albuquerque a suspicious man, and the Governor-General opposed the building of a fort at Ibo through fear that it, too, would fall to foreigners. Like Rego Barreto, in both instances the gravest consequence he could imagine resulting from such a development was that the Yao would gravitate to these places, at the expense of

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(1) AHU, CM 4, Brito Freire to Crown, Lisboa, 8 November 1754, P 90; AHU, Cod.1310, fl.4-5, Melo e Castro to Manuel de Sousa e Brito, Moç., 22 July 1755; AHU, Cod.1307, p.291, royal alvará, Lisboa, 10 April 1756.

(2) EHGEP, pp.255-6; Andrade, Relações, p.355; AHU, CM 11, Judice to ?Silva Barba, Ibo, 17 July 1765; also, AHU, CM 9, José Rodrigo Barros to Saldanha de Albuquerque, Ibo, 12 October 1762.

(3) See below, p. 168.

Moçambique, "through the propensity which Foreigners have for trade." The shipment of beads to Moçambique which were unsuitable for trading with the Yao, in 1759, again provoked his warning that if such mistakes continued, the Yao would surely go to Mombasa for this purpose.(1) In his own way, then, Saldanha de Albuquerque had recognized the two elements which were steadily to attract the trade of the Yao back to the coast of East Africa, north of Cape Delgado, at the expense of Moçambique: the revival of commercial activity along that coast, and the continuing problems which disturbed the smooth operation of trade at Moçambique. Although the Portuguese underestimated the second factor, they were right in emphasizing the first. The Kilwa coast was the traditional and favored outlet for the trade of most of the Yao, and the increase of their trade to Moçambique was dictated by its decline. A revival of its fortunes could only attract much of this trade back to the north.

This revival began to take place after about 1750. Its engineers were certainly not the English, nor were they the French. The French were primarily in search of slaves, which were still of slight concern to the Yao, and of cowries, the export trade of which was obviously of no concern to the Yao. Indeed, the considerable trade which the French transacted in the Kerimba Islands had not caused the Yao to re-channel their trade either to Kissanga, on the mainland opposite Ibo, or to Tungi, for there was no demand for their ivory at these places. The revival was due to the increased vigor of Omani Arab trading involvement north of Cape Delgado, which brought with it a renewed demand for ivory.

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(1) Andrade, Relações, pp.155,591-2; AHU, Cod.1313, fl.73-4, Saldanha de Albuquerque to Crown, Moç., 27 December 1758, also in Andrade, Relações, pp.571-2; AHU, CM 6, same to same, Moç., 30 December 1758, also in AC, iv, 1919, pp.76-9; AHU, CM 7, same to same, Moç., 1 January 1759; AHU, Cod.1317, fl.8, same to Costa Corte Real, Moç., 4 August 1759; AHU, CM 8, same to Crown, Moç., 18 August 1760; also, AHU, Cod.1317, fl.257-8, Costa Corte Real to Saldanha de Albuquerque, Ajuda, 5 April 1760.

Zanzibar was the principal Omani stronghold in East Africa after Ahmad ibn Said al Busaidi was elected to the throne of Oman, about 1744, and it had both an Omani garrison and governor, named Abdallah ibn Jaad al Busaidi. An attempt by them was made to take Mombasa, but it failed, so that Mombasa remained independent after 1746. Conversely, in 1755 the Mazrui ruler of Mombasa unsuccessfully attempted to conquer Zanzibar. In 1754, however, it was reported that there was no governor on the island and that relations with Mombasa were badly strained.

Despite this situation, Zanzibar's commercial strength seems to have been considerable, for the same report of 1754 asserts that the greatest number of Arabs in East Africa were found on that island. There were nearly 400 of these, and all of them were merchants.(1) Much of their trading was undoubtedly done at Kilwa, which had, as seen previously, agreed to Omani suzerainty under the new dynasty in the 1740s, although a governor may not have been installed there until later. In 1758 the Imam of Oman dispatched seven ships to fight against Mombasa and Pate. According to the Sultan of Kilwa, this expedition was caused by the deliverance of Mombasa by its governor to the King of Pate. The Sultan gave the name of this governor as Abdal Bunujadi,(2) whom it seems proper to identify as Abdallah ibn Jaad al Busaidi. His reappearance as governor of Mombasa suggests that his absence from

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(1) Gray, History of Zanzibar, pp.87-9, 112; HEA, pp.158-9; AHU, CM 5, Melo e Castro to Crown, Moç., 27 November 1754, enclosing news of Mombasa, Pate, Zanzibar, and Muscat, gathered by sailors of the yacht Santa Ana e São Francisco de Paula, who had gone to Ibo to build a fort there, Querimba, 1 November 1754.

(2) AHU, CM 7 & Cod.1317, fl.72-3, King of Kilwa to Gov. of Moç., n.d. This letter was received at Moçambique on either 20 or 24 April 1759. See AHU, CM 7, Saldanha de Albuquerque to King of Kilwa, Moç., 27 April 1759; copy in AHU, Cod. 1317, fl.73; ibid., fl.62-3, same to Sec.St., Moç., 24 July 1759; cf. Guillain, Afrique Orientale, i, p.555, where he states that the Imam was too preoccupied with domestic affairs to intervene in those of East Africa. Guillain does, however, correctly emphasize Oman's commercial exploitation of Zanzibar and Kilwa, stating that the Imam sent 3 or 4 ships there yearly to trade.

Zanzibar in 1754 was the result of a successful Omani seizure of Mombasa, after the withdrawal of the Mazrui forces from Zanzibar in 1755. It would also appear that, having deposed the Mazrui ruler, Masud ibn Nasr, and installed himself as governor, he decided to forsake allegiance to his kinsman, the Imam, and to make a name for himself. His deal with the King of Pate must have been the result of these ambitions. Neither the outcome of the Omani expedition of 1758, nor the fate of Abdallah ibn Jaad is known, but Masud ibn Nasr regained power for the Mazrui and ruled Mombasa until his death.(1) Nevertheless, it would appear that the expedition strengthened Omani control of Zanzibar and consequently stimulated Omani trade along the Kilwa coast, for it is in the early 1760s that the influence of this trade began to be intensely felt in the Kerimba Islands.

In the years following the Omani ouster of the Portuguese from Mombasa, Zanzibar had gradually replaced that town as the principal entrepôt for the trade of the entire coast. The presence of 400 Arab traders there in 1754 attests to the commercial importance of Zanzibar by that date, whatever the difficulties of Omani rule there may have been. As at Moçambique and the Kerimba Islands, the trade goods carried to Zanzibar were Indian. According to the French adventurer Morice, writing in 1776, the trade from Zanzibar to the coast followed this pattern:

> When the ships from India arrive in December, January or February, all the Moors from Kilwa, Mafia, Mombasa, Pate, &c., go to Zanzibar to buy cargoes and distribute them subsequently in their districts in exchange for ivory tusks, provisions and slaves, &c. In March and April all the Moors and Arabs come to the Kingdom of Kilwa to trade there for slaves, for Kilwa is the assembly point for all the slaves who come from the mainland.(2)

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(1) SD, p.218; see Strandes, Portuguese Period, p.302.
(2) FKI, p.82.

By the mid-1750s, then, Kilwa was a place of considerable commercial activity by the beginning of the dry season, when all these traders were gathered there to bargain for the ivory and slaves with which the Africans of the interior began to arrive in June. Of the smaller coastal towns to the south of Kilwa, the most important was Mongalo, later known as Mgau Mwania, which lay between Lindi and Mikindani, in the same bay as modern Sudi.(1) A limited trade in provisions and cattle had been carried on throughout the first half of the eighteenth century between the Kilwa coast and the Portuguese settlements south of Cape Delgado. The Portuguese Government specifically did not, however, allow the Swahili to trade cloth and beads in their territory, strictly limiting this cabotage to comestibles. This is clear from official agreements with the Sultan of Kilwa, in 1760, and with the King (Mwenyi Mkuu) of Zanzibar, in 1768, which permitted certified vessels of these rulers to enter Moçambique for trading within this limitation.(2) The threat of Swahili traders from north of Cape Delgado seeking to introduce these prohibited goods into Portuguese territory was first noticed only in 1754, when several small boats from Mombasa and Pate, which had come to trade at Mongalo, passed south to the Kerimba Islands in search of slaves.(3) There is no information for the immediately following years, but after 1762 there is a solid body of evidence which reveals the increasing activity of Arab and Swahili traders both along the Kilwa coast and south of Cape Delgado.

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(1) See Burton, Zanzibar, ii, p.367.

(2) AHU, Cod.1317,fl.215, Saldanha de Albuquerque to King of Kilwa, Moç., 12 May 1760; AHU, Cod.1329, fl.225, alvará, Pereira do Lago, Moç., 11 January 1768. Despite the friendship of the Mwenyi Mkuu, a Portuguese merchantman from Bengal had been robbed by the Swahili at Zanzibar in 1767. The captain of this vessel was Bento de Almeida, to whom Dalrymple credited his map of the Kerimba Islands. AHU, CM 13, Pereira do Lago to Crown, Moç., 20 August 1768; see above, p.151, n.1.

(3) AHU, Cod.1310, fl.53-4, Melo e Castro to Sousa e Brito, Moç., 19 May 1754.

In July 1762 the Commandant of the Kerimba Islands reported that there were seven Arab ships trading there. Together they had more than 50,000 cruzados worth of cloth in exchange for which he feared that they would carry off all the ivory in the district, to the detriment of the Royal Treasury. He had also received information that there were 4000 Arabs in Mombasa, where a three-masted ship was being constructed by them, and suggested that the Arabs might be considering an attack on the islands, such as those which had occurred in the seventeenth century, in order to command their trade more easily. As usual in these cases, the Commandant, who had arrived at Ibo only a month before, seems to have greatly exaggerated this last threat, but the tenuousness of the Portuguese hold on the islands caused them to react violently to such rumors. Saldanha de Albuquerque immediately issued a bando prohibiting Arab vessels from entering the islands, but it is obvious that the Portuguese did not possess the means to enforce it. The Governor-General sent a detachment of twenty-two soldiers, with two pieces of artillery, to be stationed at Vamizi Island for this purpose, but contrary winds forced it ashore before reaching Vamizi, and it was set upon by the Makonde.(1)

Silva Barba followed his predecessor's lead and sought to have all the Swahili resident in the Kerimba Islands and on the mainland recalled to Moçambique, but this was little more than wishful thinking. Further exhortations to the Commandant and the Vicar of the islands, as well as to the Commandant of Vamizi, were consequently made to stop the Swahili from beyond Cape Delgado trading there, but

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(1) AHU, CM 10, José Rodrigo Barros to Saldanha de Albuquerque, Ibo, 24 July 1762; AHU, Cod.1524, fl.27-8, bando, Saldanha de Albuquerque, Moç., 16 August 1762; AHU, Cod.1321, fl.52-3, same to Sec.St., Moç., 27 August 1762; AHU, CM 10, Conselho Ultramarino to Saldanha de Albuquerque, Lisboa, 25 June 1763, enclosing Saldanha de Albuquerque to Crown, Moç., 25 November 1762; AHU, Cod.1324, fl.300-1, carta patente of Silva Ferreira, Silva Barba, Moç., 29 April 1765.

with little success.(1) The difficulty of preventing this trade was greatly compounded by the imposition of a 20½% duty on all goods sent to the islands from Moçambique. Rather than buy cloth from the capital, the Portuguese islanders preferred to buy it illegally, and cheaper, from the Arabs and Swahili.

Further pressure from the north was felt when in 1766 the Arabs succeeded in establishing their rule over Mongalo by seizing it "almost violently" from its Makonde chief, Moanha, and placing a governor there. In June, Judice warned that "the Arabs will come with cloth to distribute them in Mongalo, as well as throughout these Islands, especially in the district of Vamizi, because of the certainty they have that cloth no longer comes from Moçambique due to the great duties which it pays in that alfândega." Two months later he reported that, so far as he could learn from his "trustworthy spies," the Arabs only intended to trade at Mongalo, and not to utilize it as a base from which to launch an attack on the Portuguese. But he confirmed his previous fears by noting that the Arabs "have spread, and continue to send, to Macuana cloth, which has already reached our territory, and which causes considerable damage to His Majesty's vassals through their not being able to procure any ivory, since the Arabs sell their cloth at a lower price."(2) In 1769 the new Commandant of the Kerimba Islands tried to enforce several drastic measures designed to control the

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(1) AHU, Cod.1328, fl.322, bando, Silva Barba, Moç., 29 May 1765; AHU, CM 11, Judice to same, Ibo, 17 July 1765; ibid., same to Pereira do Lago, Ibo, 11 October & 15 December 1765; AHU, Cod.1328, fl.321-39, various letters from Moçambique to Portuguese officials in the Kerimba Islands, 26 April 1765 to 21 April 1769.

(2) AHU, CM 12, Judice to Pereira do Lago, Bringano, 26 June 1766, & Ibo, 1 September 1766. The Swahili History of Sudi states that it was the capital of Mwanya (i.e. Moanha) and that the first Sultan of Sudi was a Shirazi called Mwenyi Mwanya. The Makonde are only spoken of as being up-country folk, distinct from the coastal inhabitants of Sudi, but this is not surprising from a late nineteenth century Swahili document. The history itself is largely garbled, but it does contain some interesting place names (Kisanga and Sawasawa) which suggest a possible connection with the coast of Portuguese East Africa. SD, pp. 230-2. See below, pp. 231-3.

trade of the Swahili in these islands, whom he asserted were depriving the Portuguese of their ivory trade, God of the souls of Africans who were being enslaved by Muslims, and the King of his taxes.(1) These efforts seem to have been no more successful than those of his predecessors.

Undoubtedly frightened by the growing strength of Oman to the north, and encouraged by reports of unrest with their domination along that coast, not to mention the arrival at Moçambique in 1765 of a pro-Portuguese pretender to the leadership of Mombasa, the Portuguese launched a farcical and abortive expedition to regain supremacy there. The Sultan of Kilwa, who had encouraged the Portuguese and whose military aid they had hoped to enlist in this cause, apparently had little need for their support, for about 1770, according to the account of Morice, Kilwa reasserted its independence from Oman. At the beginning of that year, when the Omani Arabs, including the governor, made their customary exodus for Zanzibar in order to procure trade goods,

> the Kilwa people took advantage of this absence to signify to them that they would not return to their island and that they no longer wished for a governor -- in a word, that if they represented themselves under any name other than traders they would be given no quarter.(2)

Caught off their guard and faced with the united opposition of the coast from Mafia to Cape Delgado, the Omani were unable to do anything except to comply with this demand. Quite clearly, Oman's position in East Africa, outside of Zanzibar, was considerably weaker than it had been a decade previously.

Kilwa's action did not, however, in any way adversely affect the steady progress of trade along that coast. The Omani were

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(1) AHU, CM 13, João Ferreira da Cruz to Pereira do Lago, Ibo, 8 July 1769.

(2) Strandes, Portuguese Period, pp.302-4; AHU, Cod.1328, fl. 330-1, Pereira do Lago to Judice, Moç., 26 January 1766; EKI, pp.151-2.

still established at Zanzibar and freely able to trade at Kilwa. Mongalo, which probably ousted its governor at the same time, similarly suffered no commercial decline. The revival which the Portuguese at Moçambique had feared for so many years was taking place. That it was beginning to have the effect on the trade of the Yao to Moçambique which Rego Barreto, Xavier, and Saldanha de Albuquerque had predicted it would, is indicated by Pereira do Lago's appraisal of the situation along the coast north of Cape Delgado, written just after the return to the capital of the unsuccessful Mombasa expedition, and based upon news which it had gathered there. That coast, he wrote,

> has many valuable goods, but above all a greater quantity of ivory than is brought to this Capital by the Yao and the Makua, all running to that Coast, as the goods which the Arabs and Foreign Nations introduce there are one hundred per cent cheaper....(1)

Pereira do Lago was exaggerating the part played by European traders north of Cape Delgado, but he was correct in suggesting that the ivory trade of the Yao, and to a lesser extent that of the Makua, was slowly being turned north to a more favorable market.(2) After nearly three-quarters of a century, the position of Moçambique as the principal coastal outlet for the trade of the Yao, which was increasingly that of all of East-Central Africa, was being whittled

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(1) AHU, CM 14, Pereira do Lago to Crown, Moç., 21 January 1770; cf. AHU, Cod.1552, fl.48-51, 53-4, same to Sec.St., Moç., 20 January 1770; AHU, CM 14, same to Crown, Moç., 20 January 1770, enclosing Judice to Pereira do Lago, Moç., 15 January 1770.

(2) From about 1742 to 1777 occasional Dutch vessels from the Cape of Good Hope called at Zanzibar seeking slaves. Before 1770, an English vessel called the Bonadventure Grab made three voyages to Mingoyo, in Lindi Bay, in search of cowries. On different occasions it traded near Kilwa, lay for two months off Mafia, and anchored off Tumbatu. In 1776 Morice wrote that the English only came to Pate, in small ships, to trade for cowries. Gray, History of Zanzibar, pp.89-90; idem., "The French at Kilwa, 1776-1784," TNR, 44, 1956, pp.54-5; FKI, p.114.

away. The dominance of the Moçambique route, which had been achieved by the decline of trade to the north of Cape Delgado, was being undermined both by its reinvigoration there and by the various difficulties affecting the smooth operation of trade at Moçambique. Both of these situations were to continue during the next fifteen years, and the result was to be no different.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Resurgence of the Kilwa Route, 1770-1785

1. Pereira do Lago and Morice

The fifteen years following Kilwa's reassertion of independence from Oman — the last years during which the affairs of that island-state were to be ruled by its traditional authorities -- were marked not only by a steady shift of Yao trade back to Kilwa, but also by a noticeable increase in the volume of the slave trade in East-Central Africa. Kilwa was already, as Morice tells us, the center for the Omani slave trade in East Africa and slavers from the Kilwa coast are known to have operated in the Kerimba Islands. But there is no evidence for determining the volume of the Arab slave trade and no indication of a sudden increase in the Omani demand for slaves at this time. It seems advisable, therefore, to postulate a constant, gradually increasing, slave trade from the Kilwa coast to Zanzibar, from where slaves were exported to Western India and the Persian Gulf. About 1770 the volume of this trade was perhaps 2000 souls annually.(1) To the south of Cape Delgado, the Portuguese themselves still exported only several hundred slaves a year from the overland trade to Ibo and Moçambique. The Brazilian slave trade at Moçambique, although it was prohibited by an alvará of 12 December 1772, apparently continued to be perpetrated by a few individuals, but it was not to increase until the last decade of the eighteenth century.(2) The increased demand for slaves from this part of Africa must be attributed to the

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(1) This figure is based on Morice's description of this trade. Although he nowhere indicates its volume, it is clear that, by the standards of the French trade to Ile de France, he considered it to be important. FKI, passim; cf., HEA, p.155.

(2) See below, pp. 268-70.

rapid expansion of trade at the French islands of Ile de France and Bourbon.

The factors causing this surge of prosperity and commercial activity at the twin colonies have been briefly noted in the previous pages.(1) The end of the Seven Years' War in 1763 and the transfer of responsibility for the islands from the Compagnie des Indes to the Crown both injected them with new vitality. The greatest boost to trade, however, came in 1769 with the abolition of the monopoly of the Compagnie and the substitution of free trade. Moçambique was the first place to feel the effect of these measures, as it was the particular desire of the French government to cultivate the slave trade between there and the islands. In the late 1760s it was increasingly difficult for French traders to procure slaves in Madagascar, and French officials at Ile de France recommended that the slack should be taken up by encouraging the trade to Moçambique. Their correspondence shows that some of these officials were unaware of the trade already carried on there by French interlopers, but it also reveals a change in Pereira do Lago's attitude towards this trade which seems to have occurred about 1770. During the first five years of his administration, Pereira do Lago had avoided openly sanctioning the illegal slave trade with the French, although he had allowed it to take place under the guise of "urgent necessity." Two tenders from the French to throw this trade open to all vessels from Ile de France and Bourbon had met with little success in the late 1760s. But the shortage of slaves in Ile de France led them to persist in their

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(1) See above, p. 128.

efforts and by 1775 their perseverance was being rewarded.(1)

Pereira do Lago's reasons for making this decision are not known. Costa Mendes states that his appointment as Governor-General was political exile from Portugal and that his frequent requests to be repatriated were all unsuccessful.(2) It seems likely, in these circumstances, that once Pereira do Lago resigned himself to his fate, he decided to profit by it. Thereafter, he never looked back. In 1775 the Governor of Ile de France wrote:

> Last year seven or eight French ships have done quite a considerable trade in blacks at Mozambique and Kerimba. All give much praise to the Governor-General, from whom I have received a very upright letter in which he asks me, however, not to send so many ships at one time, and never in the months of March and April, because then ships arrive in his port from Europe.(3)

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(1) See above, pp.130-1 ; AF,C^4 18, Pierre Poivre to Minister of Navy, Ile de France, 30 November 1767; AF,C^4 20, Dumas to same, Ile de France, 27 February & 24 November 1768, latter enclosing diary of M. de Clonard, commander of the frigate L'Ambulant, which made the unsuccessful voyage in 1768 and returned with only eight slaves; ibid., Dumas to Poivre, Ile de France, 24 October 1768; AF,C^4 22, Poivre to Minister of Navy, Ile de France, 15 January & 16 June 1768; latter enclosing a report on voyage of L'Ambulant to Moçambique; BM,Add.Mss. 18,140, fl.21-2, Dumas to Glemet, Ile de France, 31 October 1768; AF,C^4 24, Desroches and Poivre to Minister of Navy, Ile de France, 1 September 1769; AF,C^4 25, Poivre to same, Ile de France, 2 September 1769. I am indebted to Dr. G.S.P. Freeman-Grenville for allowing me to utilize his draft paper, "Some Eighteenth-Century Documents concerning Eastern Africa in the Archives de France," prior to its publication in the Bulletin of the Institute of African Studies of the University of Ghana. It should be noted, however, that Dr. Freeman-Grenville misdates a great many of these documents. Dumas, Desroches and Terney were successively governors of the French islands (1767-1776); Poivre and Maillart du Mesle were the first two intendants of Ile de France; Glemet was sent by Dumas on an unsuccessful mission to Madagascar in 1767; see Deschamps, Histoire de Madagascar, p.80.

(2) F. da Costa Mendes, Catalogo Chronologico e Historico dos Capitães Generaes e Governadores da Provincia de Moçambique, Moçambique, 1892, p.17.

(3) FKI, p.221.

Pereira do Lago only once gave the Crown any indication that he was allowing these vessels to trade at Moçambique and then covered up his activities with the sort of excuse he had utilized in the 1760s. By 1777, however, word had reached Lisbon that the French were "doing a great business" in slaves and cloth at Moçambique. Pereira do Lago was ordered to stamp out this trade. The next year, he reported the execution of this order, but added that in view of the shortage of provisions and of other necessities at Moçambique, he was obliged to trade with whomever could supply these needs. As he advised Lisbon, "Necessity has no law." He further justified his permissive attitude by arguing that he was the only Governor-General to let the French trade there and to make them pay duties. Finally he asserted that the reports which the King had received of numerous French vessels entering Moçambique to trade were false.(1)

The magnitude of Pereira do Lago's complicity in this trade only became known to the metropolitan authorities after his death in early June 1779. As part of his devassa, which was conducted by the Chief Justice Diogo Guerreiro de Aboim, an official account was compiled to determine how many French ships had entered Moçambique during his thirteen-year administration and how many slaves had been exported by them. According to this document, Pereira do Lago had granted licenses to thirty-two French and two Portuguese vessels for transporting slaves to the French islands; these ships had embarked a total of 9158 slaves for that destination.(2) All of these licenses presumably were granted after Pereira do Lago decided upon his new policy towards this trade, about 1770. Thus, this figure represents a yearly average of more than 1000 slaves exported from

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(1) AHU, Cod.1552, fl.129, Pereira do Lago to Sec.St., Moç., 20 August 1775; AHU, Cod.1555, n.º 415, Martinho de Melo e Castro to Pereira do Lago, Ajuda, 15 April 1777; AHU, CM 15 & Cod.1552, fl.255-7, Pereira do Lago to Crown, Moç., 15 August 1778; cf. AHU, CM 15, same to same, Moç., 20 August 1778.

(2) AHU, CM 16, Diogo Guerreiro de Aboim to Clerk of the alfândega, Moçl, 25 August 1779; ibid., certidão, Joaquim Jorge, Moç., 24 August 1779.

Moçambique to Ile de France and Bourbon. The estimates made by two independent observers, one anonymous, the other José Joaquim de Segreira Magalhães Lançous, confirm this figure: the first being 1000 annually, a bit conservative, and the second being 1500 to 2000.(1) In view of the fact that certainly some French slavers must have traded at Mocambique without Pereira do Lago's license, such as those which came at times of "urgent necessity," the lower figure given by Lançous, 1500, may be nearest to the truth.

These two documents, together with further information related to Pereira do Lago's devassa, give us a vivid picture of the operation of the French slave trade at Moçambique during the 1770s. According to the findings of the devassa, the captain of each French ship had to pay Pereira do Lago 1050 patacas (4200 cruzados) in order to obtain his license to trade there. Furthermore, the Governor-General charged them 4 patacas (16 cruzados) for each slave they exported from Moçambique. Neither Lançous nor the other writer remarked on these licenses, but both knew of the head tax of 4 patacas. In addition, both commented that the French paid the Governor-General a gift, proportionate to the size of each cargo, which seems to have averaged about 250 patacas (1000 cruzados) per ship. Furthermore, Pereira do Lago collected an unspecified sum in rents, which he charged the French for utilizing the houses which he had ordered built for this purpose. All of this money went directly into his own pocket; the Royal Treasury received none of it. True to his word, however, Pereira do Lago also charged the French a capitation tax of 2 patacas (8 cruzados) in the name of the Crown. In addition to these various expenses, the French also had to pay the local traders for the slaves whom they bought. These purchases were made in Indian cloth, on which Pereira do Lago graciously charged them no taxes. Slaves whom

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(1) AHU, CM 15, anon., "Os Francezes extraem...," n.d., but clearly post-1770; TT, MR, maço 602, José Joaquim de Segreira Magalhães Lançous, "Memorias sobre Mossambique", Goa, 5 August 1779, enclosure in same to Visconde da Vila Nova de Cerveira, Goa, 12 January 1780. Lançous was Chancelor da Reino at Goa; he touched at Moçambique on his way to India in 1778.

the Portuguese, or Indians, acquired for the equivalent of 20 to 30 cruzados, or perhaps more, were sold to the French for anywhere from about 60 to 100 cruzados. (1) Thus the average total cost of obtaining a slave at Moçambique for the French was about 120 cruzados each. Yet despite these considerable expenses and the prospect of about a 20% death rate on the return voyage, which usually took at least forty days to navigate, the French slavers could still turn a sizeable gross profit on this trade, as slaves sold at the French islands for 80, 100, or even 150 patacas each, just as they had in the 1750s. Nevertheless, the French slavers naturally sought greater profits in this trade, and after the death of Pereira do Lago they complained of the unjust taxes he used to charge them, especially his personal head tax of 16 cruzados per slave.(2)

During the 1770s, the French also continued to trade in force at the Kerimba Islands. Although there are scarcely any records of their activities there, the observations of one João Vito, captain and pilot of the Portuguese corvette Santa Ana, preserve many details of the operation of this trade.(3) According to Vito,

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(1) AHU, CM 16, Aboim to ?Sec.St., Moç., 24 August 1779, for the relevant information from Pereira do Lago's devassa. Besides swindling the Crown, Pereira do Lago also extorted the people of Moçambique by taking advantage of a bando passed by Silva Barba which determined that the pataca, which was worth 4 cruzados, would be worth 6 cruzados when it bore an official mark stamped on its face by the government. The natural opposition of the people to this inflationary measure was aggravated by Pereira do Lago, who controlled practically all the patacas which entered the island and perverted this provision for his own aggrandizement. AHU, Cod.1324,fl.269-70, bando, Silva Barba, Moç., 29 December 1764; ibid., fl.317-18, bando, Pereira do Lago, Moç., 20 August 1765; /Andrade, Relações, [redacted] pp.551,490-3; AHU, CM 16, Aboim to Crown, Moç., 24 August 1779; see Lobato, "Em torno do Problema das Moedas Carimbadas de Moçambique" and "Porque se Marcavam as Moedas de Moçambique," in his Colonização, pp.211-25.

(2) FKI, pp.64,84,167; AHU, CM 15, anon., "Os Francezes extraem...," n.d.; AHU, CM 16, Aboim to Crown, Moç., 24 August 1779; Lougnon, Correspondence, (1740-1746), p.248.

(3) ACL, Vermelho MS 275, "Noticias que dá João Vitto das Ilhas de Cabo Delgado," n.d., also in EHGEP, pp.269-72; this is an incomplete copy of the original manuscript, which has not been located. Sailing from Goa to Moçambique, the Santa Ana was forced by contrary winds to take port at Ibo on 14 April 1778, but Vito does not indicate the length of his confinement there.

the French traded there "in almost every month of the year," and when he arrived at Ibo there were two French vessels in the harbor, waiting to take on cargoes of 400 and 250 slaves, respectively. Most of these were purchased with firearms, gunpowder,(1) and cloth, with about a third of both cargoes being paid for in patacas. The price of each slave at Ibo was established at 100 cruzados. After careful scrutinization of this business, Vito calculated that the French introduced at least 100,000 cruzados in goods into Ibo every year. It would appear, then, that some 1500 slaves were annually embarked at Ibo for Ile de France and Bourbon, a figure which is supported by the same anonymous source who was so well informed on the French slave trade at Moçambique. His estimate of 1600 slaves annually was made, however, for the French trade throughout the Kerimba Islands.(2); but if the French did seek slaves elsewhere along the Cape Delgado coast, Vito was unaware of these activities. On the other hand, he was fully aware of the complicity of the Portuguese officials at Ibo in turning the French trade to their own profit. While Vito is silent on the price paid by the French for this co-operation, later accounts indicate that it was not much less than they paid Pereira do Lago at Moçambique. This is not really surprising, however, as Pereira do Lago spawned this attitude by auctioning off the office of Commandant at Ibo and by requiring the successful bidder to make him an annual payment of 3000 to 4000 cruzados. The Commandant, or Captain-General, naturally sought to make his office pay and usually received a gift of 1000 to 2000 cruzados, depending on the size of the vessel, from French slavers. He also charged them 3 patacas (12 cruzados) for each slave whom

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(1) FKI, p.189.
(2) AHU, CM 15, anon., "Os Francezes extraem...," n.d.

they exported from Ibo(1), thus making each slave as costly there as at Moçambique.

At Ibo, however, trading with the French was something more of a community project than it was at the capital, deals often being made over drinks in public taverns(2), and Vito gives a splendid description of its operation. A French captain would declare the nature of his cargo, especially the amount of patacas, to the Commandant of Ibo, who would take most of the money for his own payment for supplying slaves. The Frenchman would then rent a hut (gará) in which he could reside and at which he could hold the slaves he received.

> The same Governor /sic/ usually distributes the goods: so much for the Vicar, so much for the Curate (both of whom are natives of Goa), so much for the Commandant of the Troops, so much for the District Judge: so much for his cronies, etc. Each one of these is obliged to supply a number of slaves proportionate to the value of the goods which he receives.

Each trader would then send his patamares into Macuana to barter for slaves and this business would last two or three months. Monsieur Boudoim /? Boudoigne/, one of the French slavers whom Vito met at Ibo, had been there for four months making up a cargo of slaves.(3)

Both the wearisome and expensive business of trading illegally at Moçambique and Ibo, as well as the continuing demand for more and

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(1) AHU, CM 18, Raimundo Luís de Lima to Crown, Goa, 24 January 1781, enclosing Ricardo José da Lima, "Relacam dos descaminhos, Gravames da Faz.da Real, e Ruinas do Comercio no Governo de Monsambique," n.d., articles 20-1. The author, brother of Raimundo, was Procurador da Coroa, or special Crown agent, at Moçambique, whose diligence received the attention of the Governor, Fr. José de Vasconcelos de Almeida, Pereira do Lago's successor, and earned him seven months' imprisonment. This document was a part of Vasconcelos's residência, but the present citations clearly incriminate Pereira do Lago, as well. Cf.AHU, Cod.1472,fl.10, Crown to Saldanha de Albuquerque, Lisboa, 6 March 1782, for the orders to release Ricardo da Lima from prison.

(2) AHU, CM 18, Ricardo da Lima, "Relacam dos descaminhos...," article 23.

(3) EHGEP, pp.270-1 and note.

more slaves on the French islands eventually caused a few adventurous French slavers to seek other sources, beyond the control of the Portuguese. Not surprisingly, they turned to Zanzibar, the steadily growing entrepôt for all coastal trade north of Cape Delgado. By far the most ambitious of these merchants was the celebrated Jean-Vincent Morice, who purchased 700 slaves at Zanzibar in 1775, 500 of whom were safely disembarked at Ile de France. In the following year Morice returned to Zanzibar, where he bought 925 slaves, 860 of whom survived the passage to Ile de France. At Zanzibar, however, Morice encountered the old Moçambique slaver, Monsieur de Clonard, whose "little war" with the local authorities undoubtedly strained their relations with the French in general. In view of M. de Clonard's clumsiness, Morice, still seeking more slaves, sailed to Kilwa, already the principle source of slaves for the Zanzibar market. At Kilwa, Morice purchased another 700 slaves and made a contract with the Sultan to provide him with a steady supply of slaves. Returning to Ile de France before 5 March 1776, Morice began to formulate and to press his ultimately unsuccessful plan for a French factory and colony at Kilwa; but on 15 September he was back at Kilwa, where another of his vessels had preceded him.(1)

On the following day, Morice concluded a one hundred year treaty with the Sultan of Kilwa which granted the Frenchman primary rights in the European slave trade at Kilwa. Morice contracted to purchase 1000 slaves annually, and could take as many more as he desired before other Europeans would be allowed to trade there. By the terms of the treaty, a standard price of 20 piastres (80 cruzados) per slave was established, and Morice agreed to pay a tax

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(1) FKI, pp.12-16, 64, 74, 82, 87. Morice was not the first Frenchman to trade on the Kilwa coast. In 1754 Joseph Crassons de Medeuil took on a cargo of slaves and provisions at Songo Songo Island, between Kilwa and Mafia. As early as 1771, the French were attempting to arrange a treaty of protection with the Sultan of Kilwa. SD, p.195; AF,Col.C^{4}29, Brayer du Barre to Minister of the Navy, n.d., but c.1771

of 2 piastres (8 cruzados) to the Sultan for each slave. Furthermore, the Arabic version of the treaty stipulated that "there shall be no extra tax upon him /Morice/." Finally, Morice was granted the right to establish cannon in and to raise the French flag over the palace known as Husuni Kubwa.(1)

In June 1777 Morice was still, by his own account, "the only European who has secured a trade in slaves on the coast of Zanzibar." But he had already made three voyages there himself and, with an interest in several vessels, had purchased 2725 slaves at Zanzibar and Kilwa. Shortly thereafter, in order to secure his own position and, ultimately, that of the French at Kilwa, while he awaited a decision from France on the fate of his proposal, Morice "set up a company with which we have engaged two ships which, until the court replies, will ply to and fro with cargoes of blacks for the colony." A year later, the fame of this operation had reached Moçambique, where Pereira do Lago wrote that a French company had "now established a Factory in Kilwa."(2) Finally, on 7 February 1779, the Minister of the Navy wrote from Versailles that, "For the present it is enough for us to limit ourselves to friendship with the King of Kilwa," thereby ending Morice's elaborate plans for the French at Kilwa. Although it is not known when Morice received the news, he evidently continued to control the French slave trade at Kilwa. Sometime previous to 5 September 1779, when he sailed for Africa, he contracted to sell 600 slaves, at 32 piastres each, to the Government of Ile de France. Following this, however, Morice's activities are unknown, except that he later shipwrecked near Zanzibar and retired with a fair amount of money to Kilwa, where he was well received and where he remained until his death, which occurred sometime

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(1) Ibid., pp.70-5,83-4; see H.N. Chittick, "Kilwa and the Arabic Settlement of the East African Coast," JAH, iv, 2, 1963, pp. 179-90.

(2) Ibid., pp.96, 207; AHU, Cm 15, Pereira do Lago to Crown, Moç., 15 August 1778.

before 1782.(1)

From the incomplete figures now remaining, it seems that Morice traded for about 1500 slaves annually in East Africa after 1775, most of whom came from Kilwa. In 1776 alone, he obtained more than 2000 north of Cape Delgado. During the late 1770s, then, French traders were taking away about 4500 slaves each year from the ports of Moçambique, Ibo, Kilwa and Zanzibar. Most, but not all, of these slaves were destined for Ile de France and Bourbon. Slave population figures for both these islands in the eighteenth century are extremely haphazard, however, and about all one can conclude is that their combined net annual increase was about 2000 souls. Nevertheless, it is clear that most of the slaves obtained by the French in East Africa were destined for sale in the French islands, however many of them were actually disembarked there.(2)

On the other hand, some were destined for a more distant market: America. During the course of the Seven Years' War, France had lost her colonies of Senegal and Goree, in West Africa, to the British. One result of these losses was to force up the price of slaves along the Guinea coast for French traders, and this in turn caused them to seek new sources for supplying the vast sugar plantations on their

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(1) FKI, pp.54-5,214; AF, C^4 49, De Souillac and Foucault to Minister of the Navy, Port-Louis, 2 November 1779, enclosing draft contract with Morice for purchase of 600 slaves by Government, n.d., unsigned; SD, p.195. The ship sent to fetch these slaves, Les Bons Amis, only took on 227 at Kilwa; 98 of these died before reaching Ile de France. Noël, L'Esclavage, pp.54,229.

(2) See Baron d'Unienville, Statistique de L'Ile Maurice et ses dépendences..., iii, Paris, 1838, p.388. According to d'Unienville, the slave population of Ile de France at the end of 1767 was 16,065; at the end of 1777 it was 26,400. According to Azema, Histoire de l'Ile Bourbon, pp.144-5, that of Bourbon in 1767 was 15,047 (misprinted as 25,047), and had increased to 28,457 by 1777. For other, often conflicting, estimates of the slave populations of the two islands during this period, see anon., "La Population des iles de France et de Bourbon en 1740 et en 1761-1764," Revue de l'Histoire des Colonies Françaises, xx, 1927, p.435 (Bourbon: 15,020 in 1761; Ile de France: 15,609 in 1764); Abbé Raynal, A Philosophical and Political History of the Settlements and Trade of the Europeans in the East and West Indies, 3rd ed., ii, London, 1777, pp.74,151 (Bourbon: 15,149 in 1765; Ile de France: 11,881 in 1765); Grant, History of Mauritius, pp.155,165-4 (Bourbon: c.18,00 in 1765; 26,165 in 1776).

West Indian colonies of Martinique, Guadalupe and Saint-Domingue (Haiti). At first, French slavers ventured no farther afield than the Congo and Angola, but after the Compagnie des Indes lost its commercial monopoly in 1769 they were able to explore the possibility of seeking their slaves along the coast of East Africa. From 1769 to 1776 trade between the East Indies and France more than doubled in volume; by the end of that period, a new triangular trade with its corners at France, the Mascarenes and the East African coast, and the Antilles, had been inaugurated. French slavers from Europe began trading between Moçambique and Ile de France as early as 1771, but the enterprising Morice appears to have been the first to have sent slaves from East Africa to America: in 1774 he shipped a cargo of slaves to Cap Français, in Saint-Domingue, from the Kerimba Islands. "By 1776," Morice wrote, "there were three ships making this voyage, two for Kerimba... There are other ships on the way from Europe for the same operation. I know of two here /Île de France/. There are also others of which I do not know." Encouraged by requests for Moçambique slaves which were forwarded to him from Port au Prince and Cap Français by his associates in Lorient, Morice remained an active proponent of this new trade and is known to have shipped a cargo of 400 slaves to Saint-Domingue from Kilwa in 1777. For his own part, Morice's learned correspondent, Joseph-François Charpentier de Cossigny, attested to well established trading ties between slavers from France and the Moçambique coast.(1) Still, this trade was limited in comparison to the traditional one to Ile de France and Bourbon, and the resumption of Anglo-French hostilities during the American War for Independence (1778-1785) prevented its expansion until after the Treaty of Versailles was signed in the latter year.

Having examined the export markets for the French slave trade in East-Central Africa, we must see where the brunt of this new

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(1) A. Cobban, A History of Modern France, i, 3rd edition, Harmondsworth, 1963, pp.73-4,79,92,121-2; L. Dermigny, Cargaisons Indiennes - Solier et Cie, 1781-1795, i, Paris, 1960, pp.96-7, 90; FKI, pp.17-19, 80,140,155,157.

trade fell. Morice's initiative at Kilwa tapped a valuable new source of slaves for the French colonists of the Mascarenes. But while slaves from Kilwa were considerably less expensive than those from either Ibo or Moçambique in the 1770s, Morice concluded that the latter "are preferred to those from Kilwa and are sold for a higher price in Ile de France." Furthermore, Cossigny added a note that "the Makua slaves they bring to Ile de France are the most esteemed of all the Mozambique people."(1) Undoubtedly, the great majority of slaves exported from Ibo were Makua, but it is more difficult to determine the tribal origin of those embarked at Moçambique. Nor does Pereira do Lago's remark that "the Yao introduce infinite numbers of slaves here, and Macuana has no other commerce," help matters. According to one authority, however, of every 1000 slaves exported from Moçambique by the French, 150 came from the Yao and 570 from the Makua, with the remainder coming from Sofala (80), Inhambane (150), and Sena (250). But while Portuguese sources confirm the popularity of the Makua, as slaves, with the French, they themselves viewed the situation rather differently. As Lançous, wrote, the French "bring the best merchandise, which is money, and take away the worst commodities, which are Makua slaves."(2) This sentiment, which probably was shared by all the Portuguese of Moçambique, was a reflection of the radically worsened state of relations between the Makua and the Portuguese, a situation which was a direct result of the increased tempo of the French slave trade at that port.

According to Pereira do Lago, relations with the Makua had been tense since 1772,(3) but according to the anonymous author of the valuable Breve e verdadeira noticia da Guerra do Uticullo com o Estado de Mossambique nos annos de 1783 e 1784, there were other, more

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(1) Ibid., pp.183,189; also 152,158-9,168,195.
(2) AHU, CM 15, Pereira do Lago to Crown, Moç., 15 August 1778; AHU, CM 13, anon., "Os Francezes extraem...," n.d.; TT, MR, maço 602, Lançous, "Memorias," Goa, 5 August 1779.
(3) AHU, CM 15, Pereira do Lago to Crown, Moç., 15 August 1778.

specific factors which had led to the resumption of open warfare between the Makua and the Portuguese in the mid-1770s.(1) In 1774, during the height of Pereira do Lago's slave trading with the French, João Francisco Delgado, the Captain-Major of the Mainland, was an especially active participant in that same trade. Unsatisfied with the profits he was making by trading openly, he is said to have begun secretly to seize free Africans who were residents of Voacella, a small settlement situated two leagues from Mossuril on the route to Uticullo. These he also sold to the French. Delgado was soon joined by Mateus Coelho de Castro and the two kidnappers applied themselves diligently to this profitable business. Within a very short time, "Voacella was depopulated, as it is still found today." Murimuno, whose followers the people of Voacella were, naturally sought satisfaction, but as both his solicitations and his threats provoked no response from Delgado, he prepared to attack the coast. On 6 January 1776 Murimuno swept over Mossuril at the head of more than 8000 "well armed Kaffirs," (2), burning and looting everything they could. More than a hundred Portuguese, or their followers, were killed, and many captives, including whites, were seized. Both the fortress and the church were robbed, and the Makua returned to their settlements with the field "full of truncated bodies, and the survivors filled with such a fear that they never more will lose it."(3)

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(1) Alcântara Guerreiro, "Episódios inéditos das lutas contra os macuas no reinado de D.Maria I, segundo o Códice CXVI, fls. 179 a 184 da Biblioteca Pública de Évora," Boletim da Sociedade de Estudos da Colonia de Moçambique, 52, 1947, pp.79-109. Alcântara Guerreiro suggests that the author may have been Jeronimo José Nogueira de Andrade, who had arrived at Mocambique in 1785; see below, p.212, n.1.

(2) As in the previous decades, the Portuguese still sold firearms secretly to the Makua on the mainland opposite Moçambique, despite Morice's belief that the Makua only received these and gunpowder from French smugglers there. Ibid., p.94; FKI, p.128.

(3) Alcântara Guerreiro, "Episódios," pp.95-6; cf. AHU, CM 19, Saldanha de Albuquerque to M. de Melo e Castro, Mossuril, 9 November 1785.

Pereira do Lago's initial efforts to castigate Murimuno failed completely, and eight months later the Makua were still terrorizing the Portuguese mainland. Food supplies were low at Moçambique because the Makua had prohibited all trade with the Portuguese. By August 1776, however, he had enlisted the aid of more than twenty Makua chieftains from Cambira, "who always were useful due to their farming and their good friendship with the Portuguese." These Makua had long been anxious to establish their rule over Uticulo and thus they willingly took up the Portuguese cause as a cover for their own ambitions. Mocutoamuno, one of the most powerful of the Cambira chieftains and a long-standing friend of the Portuguese, commanded this force, which was soon driving Murimuno's people out of their villages, farther into the hinterland.(1) Nevertheless, two years later Portuguese holdings on the mainland were still largely abandoned and their owners were ever fearful of "the continual threat of those indomitable Kaffirs," a situation which was unchanged at the time of Pereira do Lago's death in 1779.(2) His policy of setting rival Makua groups against each other for the benefit of Moçambique eventually backfired, however, for in the early 1780s Mocutoamuno was numbered among the enemies of the Portuguese, as an ally of Murimuno and the other important chieftains of Uticulo.(3)

The unsettled conditions at Mossuril and in Uticulo in the later 1770s could only have harmed the operation of long distance trading to Moçambique, as they had in previous years. Not only did the Yao route to Moçambique take them through Uticulo, but Uticulo lay between that route and Cambira, so that it was probably impossible for the Yao to reach Moçambique by diverting through Cambira.(4) Certainly the

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(1) AHU, CM 15 & Cod.1552, fl.256-8, Pereira do Lago to Crown, Moç., 15 August 1776; AHU, CM 15, same to Viceroy, Moç., 15 August 1776.
(2) Ibid., same to Crown, Moç., 15 August 1778; cf. ibid., Lançous to M. de Melo e Castro, Moç., 17 October 1778, where he describes a Makua raid on Sanculo.
(3) Alcântara Guerreiro, "Episódios," pp.95,105.
(4) See above, p. 142-4.

Yao must have been unable to come to Mossuril during the chaotic year of 1776. That nothing further is known of the Yao until 1778, however, and then only very little,(1) is partially due to the sparseness of documentation for the entire decade; but it also seems to be symptomatic of a decline in the volume of trade then being done by the Yao to Moçambique, a development which is attested to by the events of the succeeding years.

2. The redirection of Yao trade to Kilwa.

Pereira do Lago's successors in the government of Moçambique had no more success than he in dealing with the bellicose Makua of Uticulo. Besides, until the return of Saldanha de Albuquerque, in 1782, these men were more interested in trading for their own profit than in restoring some semblance of order to the mainland.(2) At the end of 1779 the Portuguese mainland was still in a state of total disorder as a result of the continuous raids made by the Makua against the Portuguese. While some trade was still carried on, the Makua of Uticulo frequently robbed those African traders who passed through their territory on the way to the coast. Half a year later Makua incursions appear to have been less frequent and serious, but the situation on the mainland still remained precarious.(3) On his return to Moçambique as Governor-General in 1782, Saldanha de Albuquerque found that the general terror of a Makua raid was so pronounced that a single shout announcing their approach could send all the Portuguese on the mainland fleeing to their boats. In order to give himself time to formulate a plan of action, Saldanha de Albuquerque conveyed his wishes for peace to the Makua, together with

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(1) AHU, CM 15, Pereira do Lago to Crown, Moç., 15 August 1778; EHGEP, p.270, note continued from preceding page; see above, p. 174.

(2) See below, pp. 185-6, 194-7.

(3) TT, MR, maço 604, Aboim to Crown, Moç., 27 August 1779; AHU, CM 16, Fr. Francisco de Santa Teresa to Gov., Moç., 21 December 1779; ibid., Vicente Caetano de Maia e Vasconcelos to M. de Melo e Castro, Moç., 18 August 1780; AHU, CM 17, same to same, Moç., 25 September 1781.

presents for the chiefs, as had been the custom of each government since January 1776. As usual, the chiefs agreed, but within two months the policy of appeasement had once again failed and the Makua resumed their raiding of the Portuguese mainland. After consulting with various ranking officials, Saldanha de Albuquerque opted for a new war against the Makua of Uticulo.

It was decided to attack Uticulo in a pincer movement employing the regular and auxiliary troops of Moçambique, the combined forces of numerous friendly Makua chieftains, those of the Sheikhs of Sanculo and Quitangonha, and a special force coming overland from the Cape Delgado area. These were all to go into action at the beginning of October 1785, at the arrival of the Cape Delgado force. But its commander, Joaquim José da Costa Portugal, who was also Governor of that district, fell seriously ill on the banks of the Lúrio River and the expedition was detained there into November. Mutimuno took advantage of this delay and launched a quick, effective attack on Matibane, in the jurisdiction of the Sheikh of Quitangonha. Greatly disheartened by the failure of his grand plan to crush the Makua, Saldanha de Albuquerque's health failed and he died on 24 November 1785. As specified by law,(1) the colony was then entrusted to a provisional government consisting of the senior military, judicial, and clerical officials at Moçambique until a new Governor-General was nominated by the Court. At first, the new government was divided on whether or not to continue the war, which had begun so inauspiciously, but the repeated and increasingly bold incursions of the Makua soon determined them to persist in that effort.(2)

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(1) AHU, Cod.1472,fl.14-15, royal alvará, Ajuda, 11 February 1782; cf. Lobato, História do Presídio de Lourenço Marques,i,Lisboa, 1949,p.69.

(2) Alcântara Guerreiro, "Episódios," pp.98-100; AHU, CM 19, Saldanha de Albuquerque to M. de Melo e Castro, Mossuril, 9 November 1785; ibid., Maia e Vasconcelos to same, Moç., 12 November 1785; AHU, CM 21, Prov.Govt. to same, Moç., 7 August 1784. Each of the first three sources presents a different viewpoint of the war, as each party had its own torch to bear. For details of the organization of the force from Ibo, see AHU, CM 20, Costa Portugal to Saldanha de Albuquerque, Ibo, 27 & 28 September 1785, and A logoa de Cagavero, 5 October 1785; AHU, CM 21, João de Morais to Prov.Govt., Arimba, 22 July 1784.

On 8 January 1784 the Cape Delgado force, less than 200 men strong, supported by the powerful and friendly Makua chief Inhamacomo, also known as Comalla, attacked Uticulo. This foray produced no permanent results, however, and a fortnight later the Portuguese again struck at Uticulo, concentrating on Murimuno's own village of Mutipa, this time with greater success. With the tide running their way, for a change, the Portuguese pressed their advantage and on 11 February launched an even more successful attack against the enemy. This was followed by independent assaults made by the Sheikhs of Quitangonha and Sanculo. By this time the Makua had suffered considerable losses and many had fled from Uticulo to the interior. Tired of fighting, their chiefs sent five ambassadors to Cabaceira Grande with orders to make peace with the Portuguese.(1)

Naturally, the Portuguese required the fulfillment of certain conditions of peace by the Makua. Numbering seven, these included a call for the cessation of all hostilities among themselves, as well as with the Portuguese, support against foreign threats, and the return of runaway slaves.(2) Murimuno, whose domain was nearest to the Portuguese and who had suffered the greatest losses, was willing to accept peace on these terms, but the other chiefs of Uticulo -- Mauruça, Maviamuno, Mocutoamuno, and Mevorimuno -- refused them. Murimuno accordingly came to the coast to make his peace with the Portuguese, but his arrival was almost immediately followed, on 8 June, by yet another concerted Makua attack on Mossuril and the Cabaceiras, causing considerable damage and taking many prisoners. Nine days later, preparations were completed for the departure of a major expedition to crush Mauruça. Portuguese forces were again joined by large contingents supplied by the Sheikhs of Quitangonha and Sanculo, so that the army numbered some 3000 men. Seeing an

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(1) Alcântara Guerreiro, "Episódios," pp.100-102; AHU, CM 21, Maia e Vasconcelos to M. de Melo e Castro, Moç., 18 August 1784; see ibid., Francisco de Freitas, Moç., 25 February 1784.

(2) Alcântara Guerreiro, "Episódios," pp.102-3; see AHU, CM 19, Maia e Vasconcelos to M. de Melo e Castro, Moç., 12 November 1785; below, pp.192.

ideal opportunity to increase his own authority, Comalla independently declared war on Mocutoamuno, from his stronghold in Cambira. By 15 July the Portuguese force had returned to the coast, largely successful in its appointed task. All the chiefs of Uticulo, save only the powerful Mauruça, had been chastized, and sought peace.(1)

On 24 July, Murimuno formally ceded his country and its government to the Queen of Portugal, declaring himself to be her vassal. For their part, the Portuguese allowed him to continue as chief in these lands, under protection, so long as he remained faithful and obedient. Formal possession of this newest conquest, which included the villages of Mutipa, Namuxixi, Greja, Namusupe, and their districts, was taken for the Portuguese Crown by Rodrigo da Fonseca, the Sergeant-Major of the mainland, on 13 September 1784, in the presence of Murimuno and his people's elders. Things were not quite so neatly concluded with the other Makua chiefs of Uticulo, however, whose greater distance from the coast made their professions of peace rather less certain. Although Comalla was trying to establish one of his nephews as chief of Uticulo, it was feared that if Comalla's plan succeeded the Portuguese might one day be faced with a more powerful enemy than that which they had just defeated, in the person of Comalla's nephew. Nevertheless, Comalla had again shown his continued good faith by refusing to ally himself with some of Mauruça's followers, and thus nothing seems to have been done to discourage him from completing his design. Despite these fears, the following year was one of peace, and, after nearly a decade of hostilities, relations between the Portuguese and the Makua were

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(1) Alcântara Guerreiro, "Episódios," pp.105-9; AHU, CM 21, Maia e Vasconcelos to M. de Melo e Castro, Moç., 18 August 1784; ibid., same to Marques de Angonja, Moç., 18 August 1784. While Maia e Vasconcelos claims the hero's role for himself in defending against the attack of 8 June, the author of the Notícia severely criticized him for disobeying orders and thereby upsetting the original plan of defense.



Map 6: Moçambique and environs

free of strife.(1)

The effect of these turbulent years in Macuana on the trade of the Yao to Moçambique was clearly decisive. Although trade was stopped completely only during the seasons of 1783 and 1784, when fighting between the Portuguese and the Makua was virtually continuous,(2) it is strikingly clear that the volume of the Yao ivory trade to Moçambique had declined radically since its heyday at mid-century, when 400 to 500 bares were carried there in each trading season. A general, yet telling, indication of the harmful effect which the Makua wars had had on this commerce is the inclusion of the following article, and the prominence given to it by the Portuguese, as one of the conditions for peace with the Makua in 1784: "That they /the Makua/ must allow the Yao, or any other Kaffirs who should come to trade with the Portuguese, to pass freely through their territory."(3) In its immediate context this demand referred to the total severance of trade relations with the Yao which the then current fighting had produced. But it seems also to have been an attempt to recreate those conditions of stability which reigned during the 1730s and 1740s, and which were so important to the flourishing of the ivory trade. For by the early 1780s the Yao were bringing no more than 100 to 130 bares of ivory to Mossuril, annually, and the sum of all their yearly trading, which included slaves, iron, provisions, fowl, and tobacco, as well

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(1) AHU, CM 21, Prov.Govt. to M. de Melo e Castro, Moç., 6 August 1784, and enclosure, anon., Moç., 24 July 1784, describing Murimuno's vassalage; AHU, Cod.1555, fl.55, portaria, Prov.Govt. to Rodrigo da Fonseca, Moç., 30 July 1784; ibid., fl.55, Bernardo da Silva, "Autto da Posse tomada das Provaçoens abaixo declarada, e Seus destrictos por vertude da Portaria supra," 13 September 1784; AHU, CM 21, João Vicente de Cardenas e Mira to Senado da Câmara, Mossuril, 6 October 1784; ibid., reply, Moç., 7 October 1784; AHU, CM 25, Maia e Vasconcelos to M. de Melo e Castro, Moç., 20 August 1785.

(2) AHU, CM 19, same to Fr.Amaro José de São Tomás and Antônio de Morais Durão, Moç., 21 July 1784, although Maia e Vasconcelos incorrectly attributed their absence to the effect of Saldanha de Albuquerque's corporation of merchants, which he bitterly opposed; cf. below, p. 191.

(3) Alcântara Guerreiro, "Episódios," pp.102-3.

as ivory, was calculated at being worth no more than 300,000 cruzados.(1) In the 1750s the ivory alone was worth from 400,000 to 500,000 cruzados each year. Thus it is clear that the Yao were no longer flocking to Moçambique as they had in previous years.(2)

While there can be no doubt that the persistence of unstable conditions in Macuana was the principal cause of this decline, at least at the Moçambique end, we must not neglect the less obvious role played by official Portuguese efforts to limit the commercial power of the Banian traders there. Pereira do Lago, despite his personal sentiments on the matter, which he had made clear to the Crown in a remarkably antipathetical letter of 1772,(3) had, in view of the financial interests of Moçambique, and perhaps of his own purse, refrained from taking further action against them other than continuing to enforce Silva Barba's bando which required the Banians to seek the Governor-General's license for the purpose of crossing over to the mainland, or going to the subordinate ports. One week after his death, however, public sentiment again manifested itself much as it had during the administration of David Marques Pereira: all the commercial ills of Moçambique were blamed on the Banians.(4)

As we have seen,(5) their monopoly as suppliers of Indian trade cloths made it virtually impossible for any morador to compete with

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(1) AHU, CM 21, Maia e Vasconcelos to São Tomás and Morais Durão, Moç., 21 July 1784; see AHU, CM 19, José Ferreira Nobre to Saldanha de Albuquerque, Inhambane, 11 June 1785; AHU, CM 18, Lima, "Relaçam dos descaminhos," article 15.

(2) See AHU, CM 25, Maia e Vasconcelos to M. de Melo e Castro, Moç., 20 August 1785, noting the arrival of the Yao at Mossuril in 1785; see below, pp. 191, 204.

(3) AHU, CM 19, Saldanha de Albuquerque to Crown, Moç., 12 August 1785, enclosing Pereira do Lago to Crown, Moç., 10 August 1772; see above, p. 136.

(4) AHU, CM 17, Senado da Câmara to Prov.Govt., Moç., 10 June 1779, enclosing requerimento dos moradores to Senado da Câmara, n.d., both included among documents pertaining to the residência of Fr. José de Vasconcelos e Almeida, conducted by João Nogueira da Cruz in 1781.

(5) See above, p. 119.

them in trading with the Yao and the Makua. Although there seems not to have been a considerable growth in the resident population of the Indian community at Moçambique since the 1750s, when it was about 200 individuals, their holdings on the mainland do appear to have increased, for some two dozen Banian trading houses were established there by 1781.(1) Furthermore, whereas in the 1750s it was rare for more than one ship to come from Diu and one from Damão each year to Moçambique, by the late 1770s it was normal for five to appear there from Diu alone in a single monsoon.(2) This new development was a direct consequence of the termination in 1777 of the monopoly of the Moçambique trade there by the Company of Mazanes, which had been established in 1686. Freed from this monopoly, the energetic Banian traders of Diu thereafter converged on Moçambique every year in unprecedented numbers. There must therefore have been a proportionately large seasonal increase in the Indian population of Moçambique which, coming as it did during the height of the Yao trading season, the moradores undoubtedly resented. That such an increase did occur is confirmed by the fact that Saldanha de Albuquerque was greeted by more than 300 Banians on the island at his arrival in 1782;(3) as for evidence of the general Portuguese antipathy for these seasonal arrivals, not to mention their fellow countrymen who were regular inhabitants of Moçambique, there is more than ample documentation.

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(1) See above, pp.120-1 ; AHU, CM 17, Maia e Vasconcelos to Crown, Moç., 18 August 1781; ibid., residência of Vasconcelos e Almeida, 1781; see also, AHU, CM 19, "Mappa das Cazas, Palmares, Chaõs, Negros, Negras, Gados, Navios, Bateis, e mais Embarcaçoens, q̃ possuem nesta Villa Cap.al de Moçambique os Banianes existentes nella, e nas Terras firmes feito em o Mez de Dezembro de 1782...," summarized in Teixeira Botelho, História, 1, p.597. In 1776, the total number of moradores, of all ages, in Moçambique, was 270; in Mossuril, 71; in the Cabaceiras, 79; in 1778, these figures were 271, 68, and 72, respectively: AHU, CM 15, anon., mapas of population of moradores, 21 May 1776, and 1778.

(2) EHGEP, p.269; AHU, CM 17 & Cod.1345, fl.95-6, Maia e Vasconcelos to Crown, Moç., 18 August 1781; AHU, CM 19, Pereira do Lago to Crown, Moç., 10 August 1772; ibid. & AC, i, 1917, pp.251-5, 275-80, at 255, Saldanha de Albuquerque to Sec.St., Moç., 12 August 1785.

(3) Ibid., p. 255.

During the brief administration (4 June to 16 December 1779) of the provisional government which succeeded Pereira do Lago, no response was made to the requerimento of 10 June.(1) This was not the case after the arrival of the new Governor-General, for as much as any of his predecessors Fr. José de Vasconcelos de Almeida sought to utilize his position for his own personal profit. Eager to make a killing, he was only too willing to attack the monopoly of the Banian traders. On 27 May 1780, in response to the wishes of the Senado da Câmara and the moradores, he issued a bando which prohibited the trade of the Yao and all the mainland to "all those who are not nationals of this Continent, and Portuguese." He also formed an exclusive company of twelve men, with himself at its head, to trade with the Yao. The effect of these two measures was to squeeze out completely the Banian merchants from trading at Moçambique.(2).

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(1) At the request of sixteen local merchants, however, among whom were included both Banians and Muslims, a plan was formulated by Diogo Guerreiro de Aboim, who as Chief Justice was a member of that government, to organize a new company of trade for Moçambique which would put an end to the disorders which free trade had brought to the Conquest. The plan was never implemented, nor did it make mention at all of the trade of Macuana or of the Yao, which it presumably intended to remain free, as it had been throughout the century. AHU, CM 16, two attestations that Aboim met with sixteen merchants to discuss the organization of trade at Moçambique, one initiated by Aboim, the other signed by the merchants, both dated Moç., 6 August 1779; TT, MR, maço 604, Aboim to Crown, Moç., 27 August 1779, enclosing his Plano da Companhia, Moç., 24 August 1779; AHU, Cod.1472, fl.3-4, Crown to Govt of Moç., Lisboa, 25 February 1781; see AHU, CM 18, Aboim, "Memoria rellativa ao decadente Estado, e interesses da Capitania de Mossambique," Lisboa, 24 January 1782; Lobato, Lourenço Marques, i, pp.115-16. For another proposal for curing the commercial ills of Moçambique, see TT, MR, maço 602, Lançous, "Memorias sobre Mossambique," Goa, 5 August 1779.

(2) AHU, CM 16, bando, Vasconcelos de Almeida, Mossuril, 27 May 1780; TT, MR, maço 604, residência of Aboim, 27 November 1780 to 4 January 1781; AHU, CM 18, Lima, "Relaçam des descaminhos," articles 15-16; see AHU, Cod.1472, fl.13-14, & Cod.1340, n.6. 448, Saldanha de Albuquerque to Crown, Junqueira, 15 October 1781; AHU, CM 16, Vasconcelos de Almeida to M. de Melo e Castro, Moç., 20 August 1780, in which he falsely asserts that the company was open to all those who wished to enter it, including Banians. It is worth noting that one of his associates in this company was the unsavoury João Francisco Delgado; see above, p. 175.

Few details are known about this new Sociedade de Mujao, but Vasconcelos de Almeida's measures against the Banians were later spoken of as being unusually harsh. Seeing no other way to prosecute their case at Moçambique, these retaliated by not ordering any trade cloths to come from Diu in the winter monsoon of 1780-1781, as a result of which the revenue from alfândega duties fell by some 55,000 cruzados in the latter year.(1) But this was scarcely of any concern to Vasconcelos de Almeida, who died on 7 May of that year, having amassed a fortune of more than 90,000 cruzados during his brief term of office.(2)

Following the precedent when David Marques Pereira became Governor-General, the Senado da Câmara elected the senior military officer of the colony, Maia e Vasconcelos, to succeed Vasconcelos de Almeida. Although the new Governor-General had been an intimate councillor of his predecessor, as well as a member of his exclusive society, he did not seek to continue the latter's monopoly under his own tutelage. But he did press the assault against the Banian traders, in an effort to throw open the trade with the Yao and the Makua to the entire local Portuguese community.(3) Thus, on 1 June 1781, Maia e Vasconcelos promulgated yet another bando which specifically and absolutely forbade all Banians from going to Mossuril to trade with the Yao. According to its terms, they were to be limited to selling their cloth to moradores on the capital-island itself, and only at the prices which were established in the alfândega.

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(1) AHU, CM 17, Maia e Vasconcelos to Sec.St., Moç., 25 September 1781; ibid., Senado da Câmara to Gov., /Moç./, 7 August 1781; ibid., AHU, Cod.1545, fl.95-6 & Cod.1544, fl.2-3, Maia e Vasconcelos to Crown, Moç., 18 August 1781.

(2) AHU, Cod.1472, fl.38-9, Crown to Custódio Dias de Sousa, Ajuda, 7 March 1785, gives the official figure of 37:135$200 réis, or 92,838 cruzados; Alcântara Guerreiro, "Episódios," p.97, ₣15, gives it as over 100,000 cruzados.

(3) See AHU, Cod.1472, fl.40-3, Crown to Dias de Sousa, Ajuda, 21 March 1785. Maia e Vasconcelos began by ordering, unsuccessfully, that all the Banians living in the Kerimba Islands should be dispossessed from there and resettled at Moçambique; AHU, Cod. 1545, fl.12, Maia e Vasconcelos to Gov. of Cape Delgado Islands, Moç., 14 May 1781.

As a palliative, he made provisions facilitating the collection of their debts from the moradores, who always bought on credit, but this was not a satisfactory substitution for the right to trade for themselves.(1) The ensuing conflict which took place over the legality of this bando echoed those which had raged before, but centered on the interpretation of the royal free trade proclamations of 1755 and 1757. The Banians rightly argued that these had freed the trade of the entire colony to all Portuguese subjects, including themselves, while the Senado da Câmara claimed, less plausibly, that the trade of Mossuril, by virtue of its not being specifically mentioned by the Crown, was not open to the Banians. In the end, however, the outcome was determined not by legal merits, but by economics. Realizing that it was virtually impossible for the government to break the monopoly of the Banians in supplying Indian trade cloths to Moçambique, and fearful that the alfândega would suffer another crushing loss of revenue in the coming year, as it had in the present one, the Senado da Câmara and Maia e Vasconcelos bowed before the economic pressure which the Banians were able to exert if they so chose. It is also clear that another form of economic pressure, the crossed palm, was influential in convincing the Governor-General to reverse his decision. On 7 August both agreed to the granting of licenses which would allow individual Banians "to go to the mainland of Mossuril to trade for ivory with the Yao, Makua, and other Kaffir nations," notwithstanding the contrary bando of 1 June 1781, from which the recipients were excepted. The licenses

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(1) AHU, Cod.1645, fl.17-8, bando, Maia e Vasconcelos, Moç., 1 June 1781; and fl.32-3, 9 June 1781.

were immediately granted to seventeen Banians.(1)

Nevertheless, shortly after he made this concession, Maia e Vasconcelos dispatched a scathing letter, condemning the Banians for a multitude of sins, to the Crown. The only way to remedy the situation, he avowed, was to form a monopolistic company in which only fourteen, or fifteen, of the principal Banian trading houses of Moçambique would be allowed to participate.(2) But nothing was done towards this end until the arrival of Saldanha de Albuquerque, who, although he had formerly been a champion of the Banians' rights, had now become their most bitterly prejudiced adversary. Furthermore, influenced by the harsh reports of Pereira do Lago and Maia e Vasconcelos, the Crown, recently assumed by the fanatically devout Maria I (1777-1816), was not so inclined to protect enemies of the faith, as it had been under the liberal dictatorship of Pombal. The new Governor-General's orders not only disapproved of the licensing arrangement of his predecessor, but also ordered that he was "under no circumstances, to grant the trade of the continent to

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(1) AHU, CM 17, Maia e Vasconcelos to Sec.St., Moç., 25 September 1781, enclosing "Requerimento dos Banianes mercadores existentes nesta Capital, sobre o Comercio da Terra firme de Mossuril," /Moç./, n.d., but probably 28 June 1781, and "Reposta da Camara," Moç., 14 July 1781; cf. also Cod.1545, fl.52-67, for copies of these two, and related, documents; AHU, CM 17, testimonies supporting the Banians' case, Caetano de Quadros and José Francisco de Segreira e Pires, both dated Moç., 21 July 1781, and Inácio de Melo Alvim, Moç., 22 July 1781; AHU, Cod.1545, fl.68-80, "Reposta dos mercadores Banianes," Moç., 5 August 1781; AHU, CM 17, Senado da Câmara to Gov., Moç., 7 August 1781; AHU, Cod.1471, fl.40-5, Crown to Dias de Sousa, Ajuda, 21 March 1785; AHU, CM 24, devassa of Maia e Vasconcelos, 1787; AHU, Cod.1545, fl.87, "Registo da Licença se passou ao Baniane...Punja Velgy, p.a hir comerciar as terras firmes de Mossuril, e aos mais Banianes abaixo declarados," Moç., 7 August 1781.

(2) AHU, CM 17 and Cod.1545, fl.95-6, Maia e Vasconcelos to Crown, Moç., 18 August 1781; AHU, Cod.1540, n.º 465, Conselho Ultramarino to Gov. of Moç., Lisboa, 29 January 1782; see above, p.121.

the Banians and Moors." (1) Not surprisingly, then, in response to the wishes of the moradores, he soon issued a bando that all Banians must be recalled from the subordinate ports to Moçambique and that no Banian could go to the mainland without receiving his personal passport, nor could he send his slaves there. Far more drastically, he ordered that all those Banians who owned property, including slaves, on the mainland, must sell all to Christian moradores within a month.(2) This last order was not immediately implemented, but the compilation, in December, of a list of all the property owned by Banians in Moçambique and on the mainland, indicates that Saldanha de Albuquerque had certainly not abandoned the idea. Concurrently, the Senado da Câmara was taking other steps to break the commercial power of the Banians on the mainland; namely, by forcing the dispossessment of the native Swahili and Makua, whom the Senado da Câmara looked upon as agents of the Banians in their trading with the Yao, from the settlements of Nandoa, Mutamulamba, and Savasava.(3)

By springtime, the cumulative effect of these measures had led to their logical conclusion: the virtual suspension of trade.(4) Saldanha de Albuquerque's solution to the problem of invigorating and Lusitanizing the trade of the colony was to propose the formation

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(1) See above, pp.123-4 ; AHU, Cod.1472, fl.12-13, M. de Melo e Castro to Saldanha de Albuquerque, Ajuda, 8 March 1782; see AC, i, 1917, pp.251-5, 275-80, for the latter's most vituperative anti-Banian tirade (12 August 1783), which is also notable for its distorted review of his predecessors' attitudes towards the Banians; Boxer, Race Relations, pp.83-4.

(2) AHU, CM 18 & 19, & Cod.1355, fl.233, bando, Saldanha de Albuquerque, Moç., 16 October 1782; AHU, CM 17, same, fragment concerning his orders to the Senado da Câmara and their surveillance of the selling of Banians' patamares, n.d.

(3) AHU, CM 19, "Mappa das Cazas...q' possuem...os Banianes," Moç., December 1782; AHU, CM 18, Caetano de Quadros to Saldanha de Albuquerque, Cabaceira, 24 December 1782; ibid., Senado da Câmara to Morais Durão, Moç., 15 January 1783; ibid., Morais Durão to Quadros, Moç., 18 January 1783.

(4) AHU, CM 19, Saldanha de Albuquerque to M. de Melo e Castro, Moç., 1 August 1783.

of a new, monopolistic trading company.(1) Discussion of the form which this corporation should take lasted from mid-April until early June, when it was finally created. At first, Saldanha de Albuquerque, the Senado da Câmara, and the principal Portuguese merchants of Moçambique were strongly inclined towards making it an exclusively Portuguese concern, while the last party wanted no part of the trade of the subordinate ports, but only that of Mossuril. In the end, however, the reasoning of Morais Durão, the Chief Justice of the colony, persuaded them that unless the principal Banian merchants of the island were admitted into the company, not only would it be doomed to financial failure, but it would certainly be rejected by the Crown, as the resident Banians were "Vassals of the Sovereign, like the rest." The Portuguese merchants were also induced to support the idea of a comprehensive monopoly. In its final form, the corporation had a monopoly of all trade in common trade cloths, beads, ivory, rhinocerous horn, hippopotamus teeth, and cashew wine, although the buying of slaves remained outside its provenance. The trade of these items was to be controlled by the corporation throughout the entire province, save only the bay of Lourenço Marques, which was controlled by a separate society of traders.(2) Standard prices were to be fixed for all cloths and for ivory, which were the most important of all articles of trade. The numerous conditions for the establishment of the company were subscribed to by eighteen moradores and thirteen Banians.(3)

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(1) This is somewhat surprising in view of his strong condemnation of Almeida de Vasconcelos's company; see AHU, Cod.1340, n.º 448, and Cod.1472, fl.13-14, Saldanha de Albuquerque to Crown, Junqueira, 15 October 1781.

(2) See Lobato, Lourenço Marques, i, pp.124-6, 130, 132-3.

(3) AHU, CM 19, Saldanha de Albuquerque to M. de Melo e Castro, Moç., 1 August 1785, enclosing copies of (a) Morais Durão to Saldanha de Albuquerque, Moç., 22 April 1785; (b) twelve Portuguese merchants to same, Moç., 29 April 1785; (c) Morais Durão to same, Moç., 2 May 1785; (d) eleven Portuguese traders to same, Moç., 6 May 1785; (e) "condiçoens com que se fundou a Corporaçaõ," Moç., 5 June 1785; (f) alvará, Saldanha de Albuquerque, Moç., 7 June 1785. For more details on the administration of the corporation, see Lobato, Lourenço Marques, i, pp.117-20.

The new corporation was not, however, without its opponents, foremost of whom was, surprisingly, Maia e Vasconcelos, who was doubtless disgruntled at not being privy to these proceedings. It was also attacked by the merchants of Damão. Not least of all, it failed to fulfill its purpose, as trade and revenue plummeted. Besides, as Lobato has so rightly observed, it was customary "to undo, before long, all the works of any governor," so that Saldanha de Albuquerque's corporation shortly came to the same end, after his death, as had that of Vasconcelos de Almeida. Its existence was doomed by the Crown on 2 March 1785, and the order faithfully executed by the provisional governors, Morais Durão and Maia e Vasconcelos, on 22 August 1785. But while it was ordered "that Trade should continue to be carried on with the same Freedom which formerly was practiced," it was equally stipulated "that the prohibition of the Banians trading personally on the mainland should remain in effect, until Her Majesty, being better informed, should determine what seems fitting in this matter."(1)

Despite the marked decline in the volume of the Yao ivory trade to Mossuril, it is clear that in the early 1780s the feira de Mujaos, or Yao market, where all commercial transactions with the Yao and Makua were now negotiated, still handled "the best trade of all others that are lauded in this /part of/ Africa," as the Banians themselves attested.(2) The Banians had gained a monopoly of this trade both by giving the Yao, and the Makua, a better price for their

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(1) AHU, CM 19, Maia e Vasconcelos to M. de Melo e Castro, Moç., 15 October 1785; AHU, CM 21, same to São Tomás and Morais Durão, Moç., 21 July 1784; AHU, CM 19, Manuel da Costa to Crown, Moç., 10 November 1785; AHU, CM 21, Prov.Govt. to M. de Melo e Castro, Moç., 6 August 1784; AHU, CM 22, bando, Morais Durão and Maia e Vasconcelos, Moç., 22 August 1785; AHU, Cod.1472, fl.23-4 & Cod.1357,n.° 520, M. de Melo e Castro to António Manuel de Melo e Castro, Samora Correa, 2 March 1785; Lobato, Lourenço Marques, i, pp;121-4,151, 134-5; cf. Teixeira Botelho, História, 4, pp. 516-17, who incorrectly states that the corporation existed for four years and similarly implies that Maia e Vasconcelos supported it.

(2) AHU, CM 17 & Cod.1345, fl.52-5, "Registo do Requerimento dos Baneanes mercadores existentes nesta Capital, sobre o Comercio da Terra firme de Mossuril," Moç., probably 28 June 1781; see Lobato, "Rellação dos Estabelicimentos Portugueses na Costa Oriental de África em 1809 per Henrique Salt segundo "O Investigador Portugues em Inglaterra", Moçambique,37,1944,pp.7-45, at 35-6, n.8.

ivory and by utilizing considerably more acumen in their personal, as well as commercial, relations with them than did the Portuguese, who looked upon the Africans simply as "barbarians," and who saw no reason to trade intelligently with them. Moçambique being their colony, they believed that the Africans should "naturally" come to trade with them, at whatever price they chose. The Banians were not so naive. According to a requerimento of the moradores, the Banians,

> through their slaves, make themselves known to the various /Makua/ chiefs at the price of large presents, so that these chiefs should direct to them not only the produce of their own lands, but also the Yao, who pass through their territory, and resorting to these subtleties in this manner, they make the chiefs believe that only they themselves are masters of the shipments of cloths, and that they alone order these to come to their country.(1)

Whether the last part of this indictment was more truth than subtlety is debatable, but it does serve to illustrate the way in which the Banians wooed the Makua chiefs.

In another tirade against the trading practices of the Banians, the Senado da Câmara complained that whereas the Portuguese had formerly bought ivory "with the usual cloths," they were no longer able to do so, because the Banians had

> insinuated themselves into, and corrupted, the Yao and Makua, solely to attract their trade, by cleverly giving them fashionable wide-sleeved tunics, caps, and shoes, with new colors, which they especially order to come from Diu...,/and/ that the negroes, seeing these strange painted cloths to be to their liking every year, hasten to the Banians, and not to any Christian trader, and when one accidently does so, he leaves disconsolate, and certainly does not return again. And the rest is that when it is time for the Yao to come, the Banians

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(1) AHU, CM 17, requerimento dos moradores to Senado da Câmara, n.d., enclosed in Senado da Câmara to Prov.Govt., Moç., 10 June 1779

> immediately send their patamares
> half way out along the route, only
> in order to induce and forestall
> them from going to the moradores.(1)

Furthermore, the Banians apparently did not fail to cultivate good personal relations with the Africans with whom they dealt commercially, for Pereira do Lago observed that "the Kaffirs respect them." The only morador of whom this was said, although there were probably several others, was João de Morais, who was widely respected by the Africans of the mainland opposite the Kerimba Islands.(2)

In view of these conditions, and the fact that the Banians gave the Yao a better price for their ivory,(3) it seems highly probable that any measures which prevented the Banians from trading on the mainland with the Yao would have discouraged many of them from trading with the Portuguese at Mossuril. In addition to the various restrictions of this nature which we have already examined, Vasconcelos de Almeida's regulation affecting the price of ivory can only have had a similar effect. Incorporated in his 1780 bando against the Banians, this established that one could not purchase ivory from the Yao and the Makua at a price greater than 40 cruzados per arroba, equal to about 32 pounds, which was considerably less than the price of 56 cruzados per arroba which had been customary at the feira de Mujaos since the late 1760s. This depressed maximum evaluation remained in effect even after Maia e Vasconcelos agreed to allow properly licensed Banians to trade again at Mossuril. It was not discarded until after the arrival of Saldanha de Albuquerque,

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(1) AHU, CM 17 & Cod.1345,fl.62-7, "Reposta da Camara," Moç., 14 July 1781, P.6.

(2) AHU, CM 19, Pereira do Lago to Crown, Moç., 10 August 1772; see MHGEP, p.279; AHU, CM 17, Maia e Vasconcelos to Crown, Moç., 25 September 1781, and enclosures.

(3) AHU, CM 19, Pereira do Lago to Crown, Moç., 10 August 1772; AHU, CM 17 & Cod.1345, fl.95-6, Maia e Vasconcelos to Crown, Moç., 18 August 1781; AHU, CM 18 & 19, bando, Saldanha de Albuquerque, Moç., 16 October 1782; ibid., alvará, same, Moç., 7 June 1785.

and perhaps then not until the establishment of his corporation in 1785.(1) The Yao and Makua, who were famous for "the excessive price for which they reckoned ivory," (2) must have been driven away from Mossuril by such regulations. Furthermore, the corporation of merchants was not known for its generosity, either, but rather for "selling the cloths which they carried to the Negroes at very high prices, and buying very cheaply the goods which they received from them; which is precisely the way to ruin at its foundations all the Portuguese Business; /and/ to make ourselves odious to the Negroes."(3) It seems clear, then, that the various measures taken against the Banians by the government of Moçambique constituted an important factor in the decline of the Yao ivory trade to Mossuril.

Although the overland ivory trade to Moçambique was obviously plummeting during this period, the slave trade continued to be pursued vigorously and successfully. Only several of the men who governed Portuguese East Africa after the death of Pereira do Lago took advantage of their power to trade for their own profit in ivory; all not only followed his lead in slave trading with the French, but apparently eclipsed his excesses in that endeavor. Maia e Vasconcelos, for one, was known to have collected a gift of 1500 to 3000 cruzados from each French ship which came to trade at Moçambique and to have continued the custom of charging the French a 16 cruzado head tax on every slave which they exported. According to Saldanha de

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(1) AHU, CM 16, bando, Vasconcelos de Almeida, Moç., 27 May 1780; AHU, CM 12, caderno of Francisco António Xavier, Moç., 1767; AHU, CM 14, João Vito da Silva, "Memoria A respeito da Correspondencia de Comercio de Goa, Dio e Damão com Moçambique," including a "Pauta das Avaliaçoens de muitos generos na Alfandega de Moçambique," post-1777; BNL, Cota 2320,FG, fl.107-8, "Guia para o Negocio da India e Africa Oriental, e uzo de todos os que o frequentaraõ," c.1777; AHU, Cod.1545, fl.87, bando, Maia e Vasconcelos, Moç., 7 August 1781; AHU, CM 21, same to São Tomás and Morais Durão, Moç., 21 July 1784.

(2) AHU, CM 19 "Condiçoens com que se fundou a Corporaçaõ," Moç., 5 June 1785, article 7. João Vito da Silva should be identified with João Vito, author of the "Noticias" on the Kerimba Islands; see above, p. 167, n. 3.

(3) AHU, Cod.1472, fl.47-9, M. de Melo e Castro to A.M. de Melo e Castro, Ajuda, 5 April 1785; IP 9; also in Lobato, Lourenço Marques, i, p.155; see AHU, Cod.1472, fl.43-4, Crown to Dias de Sousa, Ajuda, 30 March 1785, for an almost identical passage.

Albuquerque, this practice was standard procedure, and the greed of his predecessors often led them to exact yet another 1500, or 2000, cruzados from the French captains.(1) When Saldanha de Albuquerque arrived there in 1782, he found three French slavers anchored in the harbor, each having entered under one of the usual false pretexts. Shortly thereafter yet another French vessel was run aground on the bar, its captain piously claiming that it had sprung a leak. On inspection, a leak was found, but it was obviously made for the purpose and could have been plugged easily. Saldanha de Albuquerque learned that the captain had indeed caused the leak himself, but that this is what the previous governors had wanted. Furthermore, he was told by one of the ship's officers, this vessel had been sent to Moçambique by the Governor-General of Ile de France, who needed slaves for the French Asian fleet and who expected it to be received in good faith, and there were to others still to follow. The privilege of their trading at Moçambique had been granted, he continued, by Vasconcelos de Almeida, and Maia e Vasconcelos also had agreed to this, while the original arrangement even called for the stationing of a French agent on the island. Annoyed at the foolishness of the system of false pretext, Saldanha de Albuquerque granted the captain a license to trade and ordered him to enter openly. When the other two ships arrived, they were to do the same. Within two months this first vessel had a cargo of 400 slaves and on its departure carried a letter from Saldanha de Albuquerque to the Governor-General of the French islands, François de Souillac.(2)

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(1) Ibid., ff.40-5, Crown to Dias de Sousa, Ajuda, 21 March 1785; TT, MR, maço 604, Le Fevre de Chantraine to Gov., Moç., 29 July 1779; AHU, CM 24, devassa of Maia e Vasconcelos, 1787; AHU, CM 19 & AC, i, 1917, pp.36-42, Saldanha de Albuquerque to M. de Melo e Castro, Moç., 1 August 1785. Maia e Vasconcelos was imprisoned at Lisbon on 22 January 1788 for his various crimes against the Crown; F. Santana (ed.), Documentação Avulsa Moçambicana do Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, i, Lisboa, 1964, p.78.

(2) AC, i, 1917, pp.36-42.

In this letter Saldanha de Albuquerque proposed to his French counterpart that although Portuguese law forbade foreigners to trade at Moçambique, except in cases of extreme need, he would encourage Portuguese merchants to supply the French islands with as many slaves as were needed there. Souillac's response was limited to reporting that he had made this decision known to the colony's shipowners and to assuring Saldanha de Albuquerque that Portuguese vessels would be received as usual at the islands.(1) But Saldanha de Albuquerque was deeply impressed with the potential value to the Portuguese Crown of the French slave trade. Thus he recommended that it be legalized and regulated in such a manner as to turn it to the Crown's profit and to the advantage of the Portuguese colony.(2) As we shall later see, his ideas found a receptive audience in the Secretary of the Navy and Overseas Dominions, Martinho de Melo e Castro. Nevertheless, neither Saldanha de Albuquerque's letter to Souillac, nor his righteous denunciation of his predecessor's sins prevented him from allowing the French to trade at Moçambique during his term of office. At the time of his death, the French ship La Rose was in the harbor trading for slaves, reportedly in accordance with an agreement he had made with Souillac, although this may have been merely an erroneous interpretation of the letter previously cited. Furthermore, the usual 16 cruzados was paid for every slave embarked on La Rose.(3) The provisional government which succeeded Saldanha de Albuquerque similarly continued to allow the French to trade at Moçambique in

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(1) AHU, CM 18, Saldanha de Albuquerque to Souillac, Moç., 18 November 1782; AHU, Cod.1472, fl.70-1, reply, Ile de France, 20 February 1783.

(2) AC, i, 1917, pp.36-42.

(3) AHU, CM 19, Maia e Vasconcelos to M. de Melo e Castro, Moç., 12 November 1785; AHU, CM 21, São Tomás and Morais Durão to Crown, Moç., 26 March 1784, enclosing related reports by Maia e Vasconcelos, Moç., 28 January 1784; Morais Durão, Moç., 25 February 1784; and João da Silva Guedes, Moç., 24 February 1784; AHU, Cod.1472, fl.43-4, Crown to Dias de Sousa, Ajuda, 30 March 1785.

exchange for the usual remunerations.(1)

Unfortunately, there is absolutely no document which gives us any clue to the volume of the French slave trade at Moçambique after the death of Pereira do Lago. There is, however, one which records that of the Portuguese slave trade there from 1781 through 1785, giving a total of 7790 slaves exported aboard Portuguese vessels during that period. The yearly figures are: for 1781, 515; for 1782, 1045; for 1783, 1765; for 1784, 2513; and for 1785, 2552.(2) While all the vessels on which these slaves were shipped may have flown Portuguese colors, it is virtually a certainty that many were no more than nominally Portuguese. Some may have been of French ownership, but captained by the lone Portuguese aboard. Nevertheless, if these figures are at all accurate, they not only indicate a considerable expansion of Portuguese slave trading at Moçambique during the early 1780s, but also suggest that at least as many slaves may have been carried away on French vessels. Certainly in 1781, for instance, during the corrupt administrations of Vasconcelos de Almeida and Maia e Vasconcelos, a good many more than 515 slaves were sold at Moçambique to French merchants.

In the Kerimba Islands there was far less administrative confusion than at the capital, as Costa Portugal headed the government at Ibo from 21 May 1778 to 31 July 1786.(3) As a consequence, the French always knew what to expect at Ibo: full co-operation. Although there seems to have been a period in late 1783 when the French were feared to have ceased trading at Ibo, this break in commercial

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(1) AHU, CM 22, Manuel Galvão da Silva to Crown, Moç., 28 August 1785; see AHU, CM 22, requerimento, Pierre le Bonhomme Duhazais, Moç., n.d., but after 9 June 1785, when he, as captain of the ship Le Marechal de Saxe, was granted a passport to go to Moçambique by Camille Charles le Clerc de Frene and Étienne Claude Chevreau, at Port Louis, Ile de France.

(2) AHU, CM 33, anon., "Mappa da Importancia das fazendas, marfim, ouro, escarvos, e patacas...," (1781 to 1790), Moç., September 1796.

(3) A.HU, Cod.1484, fl.21-3, termo da entrega, Costa Portugal, Ibo, 21 May 1778, and carta patente, Pereira do Lago to same, Moç., 2 May 1778; ibid., fl.27-8, carta patente, Saldanha de Albuquerque to same, Moç., 28 March 1783; Lobato, Lourenço Marques, i, pp. 108-11 & ii, pp.11-39, discusses his activities as governor of Lourenço Marques.

relations was only temporary. Otherwise, the French slave trade at Ibo continued to operate on about the same scale, and with the same procedure, as it had in the 1770s. The only change appears to have been that Costa Portugal raised the head tax on each slave exported from 12 to 16 cruzados.(1) The Crown's general concern over the French contraband in that captaincy led, in 1785, to a devassa against the malconduct of Costa Portugal. This investigation proved not only his complicity in trading with the French in slaves, cloth, arms and gunpowder, not to mention that with the Swahili in ivory and cloth, but also implicated six of his associates, including João Ferreira da Cruz, João de Morais, and one Natée Viseramo. But the fact that Costa Portugal made a clean breast of his guilt, and that his services to the Crown had otherwise been exceptional, exempted him from punishment. Similarly, his accomplices apparently suffered no penalties.(2) Despite his close escape from the justice of the Crown, however, Costa Portugal appears not to have let this alter his policy of trading with the French. In July 1785, only three months after his devassa was completed, it was reported that there were three French ships trading for slaves in the Kerimba Islands.(3)

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(1) AHU, CM 20, António de Paiva Pinto to Gov./Costa Portugal/, Ibo, 24 November 1783; AC, i,1917, pp.36-42; AHU, CM 21, four Portuguese and two Banian traders to Prov.Govt., Moç., 27 February 1784; ibid., Morais Durão to ?Maia e Vasconcelos and São Tomás, Moç., 8 March1784; AHU, CM 22, same to ?Sec. St., Moç., 8 July 1785; see above, pp. 167-9.

(2) AHU, CM 22, Crown to Morais Durão, Ajuda, 14 March 1781, and devassa of Costa Portugal, Moç., March-April 1785, enclosed in Costa Portugal to Morais Durão, Ibo, 7 March 1785; see ibid., same to same, Ibo, 8 March 1784, and reply, Ibo, 18 February 1785; AHU, CM 24, devassa of Maia e Vasconcelos, Moc., 1787, question # 55 and replies, and testimony (#1) of Costa Portugal, fl.26-8; SD, p.192.

(3) AHU, CM 22, Morais Durão to ?Sec.St., Moç., 8 July 1785. The only figures for the slave trade at Ibo during these years relate to the exportation of 966 slaves and to the duties of 7589 cruzados collected on these and remitted to Moçambique. This last fact indicates that the slaves were embarked on Portuguese vessels. AHU, CM 22, certification by Silva Guedes, Moç., 25 March 1785.

By this date, some considerable changes had taken place in the operation of the French slave trade at Kilwa. Until his death in about 1781, Morice seems to have held a monopoly of this trade there as a result of his treaty with Sultan Hasan bin Ibrahim. Thereafter, however, a number of French slavers began competing with each other for the lion's share of this lucrative new market. Writing late in 1784, Joseph Crassons de Medeuil gave an account of "the trading that has been done in this port for the last three years, without counting traders not personally known to me." According to Crassons, in the fourteen voyages, including two of his own, a total of 4195 slaves were embarked by French traders at Kilwa, "and certainly there must have been more in three years."(1) Although the slaves were "superb specimens if they are selected with care," Crassons made it clear that, whatever the arrangements had been during the period of Morice's monopoly, the traders of Kilwa now dictated the terms under which the slave trade with the French functioned. He protested that

> This selection we cannot make ourselves, being at the discretion of the traders, who are now aware of our needs and who know that it is absolutely essential for us to sail at a given season in order to round the Cape of Good Hope. In addition to competition amongst ourselves the expeditions have never been properly thought out and always left to chance, and so it happens that three or four ships find themselves in the same place and crowd each other out.

In view of the considerably increased tempo of the French slave trade at Kilwa, especially that to the French West Indies, and of the obvious competition for cargoes among the French, it is not surprising to see that the price of slaves also rose in the early 1780s. Morice

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(1) See AHU, CM 20, António de Paiva Pinto to ?Gov., Ibo, 24 November 1785, in which the writer, "through certain notices," states that three French ships were then at Kilwa; AHU, CM 21, Prov. Govt. to M. de Melo e Castro, Moç., 7 August 1784; reporting that "in a few months...more than ten ships," had taken on cargoes at Kilwa.

had agreed to pay the equivalent of 80 cruzados for each slave at Kilwa, in addition to an 8 cruzado head tax to the Sultan. Lacking the protection which the conditions of Morice's treaty imposed on both the Sultan and the Swahili traders of Kilwa, the French now found themselves having to pay about 40 piastres, or 160 cruzados, for each slave they purchased there--exactly twice what Morice had agreed to pay. According to information which the Governor-General of Moçambique received from some Swahili from Kilwa in 1786, the local traders of Kilwa were not the only ones to profit from the increased demand for slaves and the cessation of Morice's conditions of trade. In a description which complements that of Crassons, he wrote that the French trade "is made immediately with the King of Kilwa, who after charging a tax of ten patacas /40 cruzados/ per head, sells them the slaves all together, at a price which suits him, without their having the freedom to reject them." It should be noted, however, that Crassons states that the capitation tax was only 6 piastres /24 cruzados/. Still, the Sultan of Kilwa, who was probably the same Hasan bin Ibrahim who had welcomed Morice, had increased his share in this trade considerably. Nevertheless, slave trading at Kilwa was still cheap in comparison to that at Moçambique, "where," Crassons complained, "they make us pay fifty or sixty piastres /200 or 240 cruzados/ each for them. This does not include presents and tiresome vexations."(1)

During the 1770s the prices paid by the French for a slave at Kilwa were appreciably less than those demanded at Moçambique. This disparity continued into the next decade. The striking fact is that

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(1) SD, pp.194, 196-7; AHU, CM 25, A.M. de Melo e Castro to M. de Melo e Castro, Moç., 14 August 1786; see above, pp.166-7,170-1. According to FKI, p.216, the slaving figures given by Crassons related to a period of only twenty-eight months; in view of these, and the probable volume of the French slave trade at Moçambique during this period, the view that Anglo-French naval hostility in the Indian Ocean from 1778 to 1783 "seriously dislocated commercial intercourse between Mauritius and East Africa" would seem to be untenable; cf. J.M. Gray, "The French at Kilwa, 1776-1784," p.40; J. Prior, Voyage along the Eastern Coast of Africa...in the Nisus Frigate, London, 1819, p.67.

during the course of only ten years, the rising French demand for slaves at these market gave rise to a parallel increase in costs. By the mid-1780s the price of a slave at both Moçambique and Kilwa had doubled in comparison with what was paid in the 1770s.

The fear that another European power might successfully establish itself to the north of Cape Delgado led, as it had previously in the century, to a spate of unfounded rumors at Moçambique concerning the establishment of a French factory at Kilwa. Certainly Morice had personally set himself upon the island, but here again things changed noticeably after his death. Ending several years of speculation on this matter, António Manuel de Melo e Castro explained to Lisbon "that the French have not yet obtained permission from the King of Kilwa to make the establishment for which they have been aspiring for a long time." Having completed their cargoes, he continued, they at once departed from Kilwa, "without a single Frenchman remaining there, leaving evacuated a house in which they usually stayed on land, which is perhaps what has given place to it being said that the French have an establishment, and factory, there."(1)

By the mid-1780s, the commercial revival of Kilwa and the difficulty of trading to Mossuril had combined to cause a marked shift of the bulk of Yao trade to the one from the other. A typical interpretation of the cause and probable effects of this important change in the direction of Yao trade, made by the three members of the provisional government of Moçambique in 1784, stresses the role

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(1) AHU, CM 23, A.M. de Melo e Castro to M. de Melo e Castro, Moç., 14 August 1786; see above, pp. 171-2 ; AHU, Cod.1472, fl.12-13, M. de Melo e Castro to Saldanha de Albuquerque, Ajuda, 8 March 1782; AHU, CM 19, reply, Moç., 1 August 1783; AHU, CM 21, Maia e Vasconcelos to São Tomás and Morais Durão, Moç., 21 July 1784; ibid., Prov.Govt. to M. de Melo e Castro, Moç., 7 August 1784, two letters bearing same date; AHU, CM 25, same to same, Moç., 20 August 1785. Cf. also, Bordalo, Estatistica, iv, p.29; J. de Andrade Corvo, Estudos sobre as provincias ultramarinas, Lisboa, 1883-87, 4 vols., ii, p.85, which is certainly based on Bordalo here; J.M. Gray, "A Note on Joseph François de Cossigny (1736-1809)," TNR, 51, 1958, pp.246-9; FKI, p.55.

of the French at Kilwa, and the Omani fear of the possible exercise of French naval and military power along that coast. As it was in Rego Barreto's time, four decades earlier, the domination of the vital Mombasa coast by another European nation was seen to be at the root of this problem.

> From it unerringly follows a great deterioration of the trade of this Captaincy, because all the Yao who carry their slaves, ivory, and other goods, to here, making our trade flourish, will necessarily bear them to Kilwa, not only because it is a shorter journey, but also, and principally, because they receive all the Kaffir cloth/ which they come to seek here/ at very moderate prices from the French; and besides this, they receive all the supply of powder, and arms, which is denied to them here, and these will pass easily to the Makua, our ancient enemy; already the alfândega duties are diminished, and all will shortly fall into total ruin...(1)

By the 1780s, the gross profits made by the Swahili traders of Kilwa from the French slave trade probably made it possible for them to give the Yao a consistently good price for their ivory. And the French do seem to have traded in cloth and velório there, as well as patacas.(2) But the Yao were still primarily ivory traders, and slaves were incidental to their business, although of increasing importance. Their interests were more closely to be identified with the Omani and Swahili ivory trade at Kilwa, rather than with the French slave trade. In this respect, even the Portuguese realized that "it is true, that in Kilwa, and on the Island of Zanzibar

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(1) AHU, Cm 21, Prov.Govt. to M. de Melo e Castro, Moç., 7 August 1784; for the Portuguese belief that the Yao had a shorter journey to Kilwa than to Moçambique, see above, pp. 101-2 ; below, pp. 263-5.

(2) Ibid., Maia e Vasconcelos to São Tomás and Morais Durão, Moç., 21 July 1784.

/principally on the latter/ the Arabs of Muscat carry on a considerable trade." As for the sources of the French slave trade at Kilwa, and presumably of the Arab trade there, too, Crassons implied that the slaves there generally did not come from the far interior when he wrote that "the slaves caught in the neighbourhood are of very good quality."(1) Although it was the threat of French domination of the East African coast to the north of Cape Delgado which most impressed contemporary Portuguese observers, it was rather the less spectacular revival of Arab and Swahili trading there which had undermined the position of Moçambique as the principal coastal outlet for the trade of East-Central Africa.

Perhaps, had conditions been more favorable along the route to Moçambique, and at Mossuril itself, the revival of Kilwa would not have so adversely affected the Yao trade to the south. As we have seen, this was not the case. While the governing triumvirate was ascribing the shift of the Yao trade to Kilwa to the influence of the French, João Ferreira Nobre was, with considerably more justice, blaming it on the renewal of war with the Makua in 1783-1784. The Makua so destroyed everything, disrupting both the trade and agriculture of the mainland,

> that great famines have been experienced, all through their hindering the trade which they used to have with the inhabitants of the mainland, as it was also customary for large groups of the Yao Kaffirs, traders from the interior of the hinterland, to come to these shores every year with their merchandise, such as ivory, slaves, rice, and other goods which their lands yield; these, as soon as they had reports of the new campaign, from the first who arrived here, turned around and took the route to Mombasa, and

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(1) Ibid., Prov.Govt. to M. de Melo e Castro, Moç., 7 August 1784; FKI, p.215.

> Mafia, and went there to trade, and up to the present there has been no news of them.(1)

With the return of peaceful conditions, many of the Yao again came to Mossuril in the following year, as Maia e Vasconcelos reported with considerable relief.(2) But Moçambique had clearly been eclipsed by Kilwa as the favorite coastal entrepôt, just as it had superseded Kilwa earlier in the century, and for the same basic reason: more favorable trading conditions. Specifically, at Moçambique, the main factors influencing this development were the long period of hostilities in Macuana, and the high price, and sometimes irregular supply, of trade cloths, which was largely the result of Portuguese measures against the Banians. At Kilwa, the prime factors were the existence of stable conditions and the low price of cloth, which meant that the Yao could receive more cloth in exchange for their ivory.

5. The penetration of coastal influence into the interior

One of the most important consequences of the commercial revival of Kilwa was the increase of coastal influence on the people of its hinterland. Before the second half of the eighteenth century a few adventurous souls from the coast undoubtedly travelled inland to trade, but these would have been isolated cases. By the 1780s, more meaningful contact between the coast and the interior, through the medium of Swahili traders and superficially aculturated Yao traders, appears already to have begun to take place. Morice made several references to Swahili traders travelling inland and crossing the continent to the coast of Angola. In view of the well-established routes from both Kilwa and Moçambique to the Mwata Kazembe's capital

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(1) Ibid., Nobre to ?Sec.St., Moç., 18 August 1784.
(2) See above, p. 183, n.2.

on the Luapula River, and of the intimate commercial relations between there and the Angolan coast, these references, vague and rather garbled though they are, cannot be dismissed merely as something Morice wished he had heard.(1)

While one may certainly dispute the veracity of Morice's belief that organized caravans departed on this transcontinental journey every year, there are several independent sources which confirm the existence of trading connections across Lake Malawi, and thence to the East African coast, at this time. According to the traditions of both the Tumbuka-Kamanga peoples and the Ngonde, whose territories border, respectively, on the northwest and the extreme northwest of Lake Malawi, about 1780/1800 a new trade route was opened across the lake to the coast. In consideration of Morice's evidence, the earlier date would seem to be the more likely. Owing to differences in their political organization, this development had a more dramatic impact on the Tumbuka than it did on the Ngonde. Until this period, the Tumbuka-Kamanga peoples were a loosely organized congerie of communities without any central tribal authority. About 1780, a party of ivory traders, "coming as Arabs" from across the lake, according to tradition, arrived in their country and settled there. Led by one Mlowoka ("he who crossed over"), they had undoubtedly been attracted by reports they had picked up about the quantity of ivory there. They were not disappointed, for "the locals were found using tusks as seats, bed-props and so forth without any idea of trading value." Gradually, and peaceably, we are told,(2) Mlowoka, as a result of his opening the area to the trade of the coast, was accepted as chief by most of the people living in Nkamanga.

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(1) See above, pp. 137-45 ; I. Cunnison, "Kazembe and the Portuguese, 1798-1852," JAH, ii, 1, 1961, pp.61-76; idem., Luapula Peoples, pp.59, n.4., and 151; FKi, pp.48-9,76,102,105-6,112,118-19, 136-7.

(2) But see Gamitto, King Kazembe, i, p.147.

Power was centralized in his own person and the country controlled through the agency of his travelling companions, whom he established as district chiefs over the local headmen. A dynasty, whose rulers after Mlowoka styled themselves Chikuramayembe and which remained in power until the Ngoni invasions of the mid-nineteenth century, was established.(1)

It is clear, from the traditional account, that Mlowoka and his party were not Arabs, while the absence of any references to their being Muslim, or holding markedly different religious beliefs of any sort, suggests that they were not true Swahili, but rather up-country African traders who had adopted Swahili dress and had superficially assimilated certain Swahili mannerisms, such as strapping one's knife to the biceps of the left arm. The fact that Mlowoka confirmed the authority of indigenous local headmen by ceremoniously presenting them with "a large turban of plain blue cloth" also bespeaks a strong coastal influence.(2) It is quite possible that Mlowoka and his cohorts were Yao. Specific evidence to this effect is scrappy, but the Yao dominance of the coastal trade routes and the existence of Yao villages along much of the eastern shore of Lake Malawi support such a supposition.(3)

To the north of Nkamanga, the Ngonde people were already organized into a kingdom by the early part of the seventeenth century. Ngulube, the mythical founder of the Kyungu dynasty of Ngonde is traditionally

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(1) Young, Notes, passim, but especially pp.27-36; idem, "The 'Henga' People in Northern Nyasaland," NJ, v, 1, 1952, pp.33-7; see M. Tew, Peoples, pp.51-60; M. Wilson, The Peoples of the Nyasa-Tanganyika Corridor, Cape Town, 1958, pp.2-3,38-40. At first, the ivory which came from Nkamanga was probably all acquired from the hunters of that kingdom, but eventually a certain amount must have been received in trade from the Bisa.

(2) Young, "The'Henga' People", p.35; idem, Notes, pp.37,41-2,45; see Mitchell, Yao Village, pp.61-78,91-5, for a discussion of the political organisation of the Macinga Yao of southern Malawi, to which the basic outlines of the system instituted in Nkamanga by Mlowoka bears strong resemblance.

(3) Young, Notes, pp.37-40; Tew, Peoples, p.53; for Yao villages on the lakeshore, see Abdallah, The Yaos, p.3; Gamitto, King Kazembe, i, pp.64-5; J. Rebman, Dictionary, p.v; Krapf, Vocabulary of Six East-African Languages, Tübingen, 1850, p.viii.

linked to the Nyakyusa, Namwanga, and Kinga chiefs, to the north of the Ngonde. Chieftainship here derives from the Nyamwezi-Sukuma culture of central Tanganyika. Like Mlowoka, however, Ngulube, who clearly represents a period rather than an individual, opened up Ngonde to trade with the coast, although tradition indicates that the route by which the Ngonde sent their ivory to the coast ran to the north, "over the hills of the Ndali," rather than to the east, across the lake. During the reign of the tenth Kyungu, Mawangende, a constitutional crisis occurred in the Ngonde state. The Kyungu, who had previously remained in religious seclusion, began to increase his secular power and to limit that of the hereditary nobles of Ngonde. The late Godfrey Wilson has written:

> About this time the direction of the trade in ivory changed. The present /1934-1938/ Kyungu told us: 'Later, after the first Kyungus, Mwangende and his successors used to exchange the ivory with the Marabi who came from across the lake; the men of Mwela rowed them across. These traders brought cloths, red and white and dark cloths. But when the first Kyungu arrived in Ngonde there was no trade-route across the lake at all.'(1)

It is possibly for this reason that Mwangende's reign has been said to have been contemporary with the arrival of Mlowoka at Nkamanga. Here again, Morice's invaluable evidence suggests that such a dating is quite acceptable. Whether the "Marabi" were true Swahili or superficially assimilated African traders from the interior, they did not affect Ngonde the way that Mlowoka did Nkamanga. At Ngonde they found, instead, a well organized kingdom, familiar with the coastal

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(1) G. Wilson, The Constitution of Ngonde, Rhodes-Livingstone Papers, No.5, Livingstone, 1939, pp.10-19,44; HEA,i,pp.194-7; M. Wilson, The Peoples, pp.13-14,46-60; see Tew, Peoples, pp. 71-87; FKI, p.76, where Morice's evidence confirms that the lake was crossed in boats with oarsmen.

trade goods and aware of the value of ivory at the coast.(1)

By the last quarter of the eighteenth century, then, there appear to have been three basic water routes across Lake Malawi: one at the extreme north, between Mwela country and Ngonde; one in the middle, between the eastern lakeshore and Nkamanga; and one at the extreme south, between points such as Ng'ombe and the southwestern lakeshore.(2) From Lake Malawi, the southernmost of these routes definitely led either to Mossuril or to Kilwa. The direction of the northernmost cannot be determined with any precision. It would seem that the adventurous "Marabi" traders crossed the lake farther to the north than did Mlowoka's party, disembarking from the country of the Mwela. These Mwela should probably be identified with the Mwelya, who inhabit the extreme northeastern lakeshore, at the foot of the Livingstone Mountains. But there is no indication that the new route which the "Marabi" traders opened to the coast led them to Kilwa. It may just as likely have led them across the Rufiji River to some point on the coast nearly opposite Zanzibar. In either case, however, the opening of this new route is indicative of the commercial revival of the entire coast between Cape Delgado and the stretch opposite Zanzibar.

While Tumbuka-Kamanga tradition, like that of Ngonde, does not indicate from whence on the coast came Mlowoka, the Swahili Ancient History of Kilwa Kivinje, despite its many confusing inaccuracies, contains information which suggests that Mlowoka probably came from the Kilwa coast. According to this chronicle, a man named Mkwinda, whose original home was around Lake Malawi, settled at Kilwa after living for many years at Machinga. It was he who inaugurated trade between the lake and Kilwa. Mkwinda, like Mlowaka, represents a

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(1) In this context, "Marabi" probably should be identified with the Swahili Mwarabu, wa-, meaning Arab, rather than connecting it with Maravi. See F. Johnson, A Standard Swahili-English Dictionary, Oxford, 1939, reprinted 1965, p.519.

(2) See above, pp. 142, 144.

period in the history of Kilwa Kivinje. He seems also very probably to have been, in his representative identity, a Yao, a belief which is supported by his lengthy stay at Machinga.(1) The beginning of trade between Kilwa Kivinje and the interior, under the leadership of Mkwinda, cannot have been earlier than the late eighteenth century, for Kilwa Kivinje was only a small village then.(2) The description that "at this time trade was very profitable, because the people of the hinterland were stupid, not knowing the value of things of this coast," obviously indicates that Mkwinda had opened up a new area of the interior to coastal trade. In view of the extent of trading relations in Yaoland, among the Maravi, and in Ngonde, it seems not unlikely that the area to which he was trading was Nkamanga. This is, of course, only a tentative theory; but the added information that a kinsman of Mkwinda named Mroka, a name which bears a striking resemblance to Mlowoka, came from the lake area to settle at Kilwa Kivinje suggests that the ties between it and Nkamanga may have been close. It also lends credence to the belief that Mlowoka and his followers were Yao.(3)

The routes from Lake Malawi to Kilwa can only be vaguely reconstructed. The main route generally followed the Lugenda River to its confluence with the Ruvuma River, and from there the traders struck out for Kilwa in a more or less direct line. Traders going to Kilwa from south of Lake Malawi probably picked up the Lugenda somewhere north of Lake Chiuta and the Mandimba Hills. As we have

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(1) See above, pp. 69-70.

(2) FKI, p.104,202 & 206 (maps 2 & 4); [J.B.] Lislet Geoffrey, Memoir and Notice Explanatory of a Chart of Madagascar..., London, 1819, p.59, where he is translating "Observations on the Coast of Africa by Lieut. the Chevalier Saulnier de Mondevit, of the Royal French Marine;" this was published in the original French a year later by M.M.J.B. Eyries and Malte-Brun, Nouvelles Annales des Voyages, vi, Paris, 1820, pp.552-59; see also, Dalrymple, Plan of Quiloa and Its Environs on the East Coast of Africa from the Observations of the Sieur Morice, 9 May 1784; HEA, i, pp. 152-4.

(3) C. Velten, Prosa und Poesie der Suaheli, Berlin, 1907, pp.254-5.

already seen, the Moçambique route followed the Lugenda for some distance and one reached the Ng'ombe area by traversing the Mandimba hills.(1) Of the middle route, that which traders coming from Nkamanga used, there is no information. It would seem most likely that the greater extent of its length lay in Tanzania, perhaps passing through the Tunduru area and only crossing the Ruvuma in its upper reaches into Portuguese East Africa; but this is only a suggestion. In this connection, it is well worth remembering, as Alison Smith has pointed out, (2) that these routes were not clearly defined roads, but simple trails which probably had to be re-opened each trading season. While the general course of each route was known, yearly changes in the specific path one followed were probably as much the rule as the exception.

The commercial revival of Kilwa brought more Yao traders into closer contact with Swahili culture. From the second half of the eighteenth century, certain Swahili mannerisms and tastes were slowly carried inland by them and were gradually adapted, or adopted, into Yao culture by those individuals who knew the ways of the coast.(3) Yet despite this penetration of coastal influence into the interior, the impetus to trade still came from the people of that interior, rather than from those of the coast. In general, caravans set out from the interior, not from the coast; it was the people of the hinterland, in particular the Yao, who handled the bulk of the trade.

On the coast, however, a series of circumstances had led to the reassertion of Omani rule over Kilwa Kisiwani by early 1785. In 1783 Ahmad ibn Said al-Busaidi, Imam of Oman and founder of the Busaidi

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(1) Abdallah, The Yaos, pp.12-13; Krapf, Travels, Researches, and Missionary Labours, during an Eighteen Years' Residence in Eastern Africa, London, 1860, pp.419-20; see above, pp. 63-7, [redacted] for Gaspar Bocarro's route to Kilwa in 1616.

(2) A.Smith, "The Southern Section of the Interior, 1840-84," HEA i, p.267; see FKI, p.76,106,118-19, and Abdallah, The Yaos, pp.12-13, for some idea of the organisation of trading parties during this period; see also, W.P. Johnson, Nyasa, pp.26-8; Rangeley, "The Ayao", p.19.

(3) See above, pp. 70-1.

dynasty, died. He was succeded by his son Said ibn Ahmad. A younger son, Saif ibn Ahmad, disputed his brother's claim to the throne,but, realizing that there was no hope of his gaining more support in Oman, he set out for East Africa with his followers in an attempt to create his own dominion there. Saif sought supporters along the coast at first, primarily at Kilwa, where he met Crassons, who was then engaged in negotiating a new trading agreement with the Sultan. Crassons obligingly offered Saif armaments and money, but they were not accepted. Early in 1784 Saif landed at Zanzibar, and, being unable to storm the Omani garrison there, began a leisurely seige of the fortress. Before this had been successfully terminated, a substantial expedition, loyal to the Imam, had reached Zanzibar from Muscat. Saif was persuaded to relinquish his claim to the throne and was permitted to retire to Lamu, where he died shortly afterwards.

After strengthening Omani control of Zanzibar, one ship from the relieving squadron, which was commanded by the Imam's son, Ahmad ibn Said, and his uncle, Sultan ibn Ahmad, sailed to Mombasa, which was reached in late January 1785. Possession of Fort Jesus was taken for the Imam without a struggle. Other vessels from the fleet were sent to the south with instructions to reassert Omani rule along the coast, in particular at Kilwa. There, however, the Arabs met with some resistance, for the Sultan of Kilwa cannot have been anxious to share the revenues from the again lucrative trade of his state with the Imam. The fighting was brief, but violent, with the Arabs, led by one Masudi, winning the day. Peace terms were meditated by a Frenchman, Monsieur Sausse, whose ship was then anchored in the harbor. The Sultan was allowed to keep his title, but sovereignty, as well as between one-half to four-fifths of the customs dues, passed to the Imam. Later in the year, Ali ibn Saif, the son of the thwarted usurper, was appointed Omani governor of Mafia and Kilwa, where he thereafter resided. As Sir John Gray has suggested, this was probably the most convenient way for the Imam to disarm a potential troublemaker, stationing him at the extreme

outpost of Omani territory. It also afforded Ali a gracious way out of a difficult situation. With an Omani governor to supervise its trade and an Omani garrison in the old Portuguese Fort of São Tiago, Kilwa had indeed lost its independence. It was never again to regain it. But the political events of 1785 did not inhibit the commercial growth of Kilwa. The reaffirmation of Omani involvement in East Africa, with secure bases at Zanzibar and Kilwa, created more stable conditions for trading.(1) During the next quarter century, the Yao, and other peoples of the interior, continued to carry most of their goods to that coast, while the persistence of old problems to the south of Cape Delgado, and the added burden of a new one there, inhibited their trading to Mossuril and Ibo.

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(1) Gray, "The Recovery of Kilwa by the Arabs in 1785," TNR, 62, 1964, pp.20-4, & sources cited therein; idem, "A French Account of Kilwa at the End of the Eighteenth Century," TNR, 63, 1964, p.224; FKI, pp.53-4, 56; Strandes, Portuguese Period, p.358, being J. Kirkman's topographical note on Kilwa. Freeman-Grenville has read the date of the weatherworn Arabic inscription over the gate of the Portuguese fort at Kilwa, recording its restoration by the Omanis, as 1 Muharram 1200 (4 November 1785), while Kirkman has interpreted the same date to be 1 Muharram 1204 (2 April 1789). J.J. Nogueira de Andrade, "Do Estado em que ficavão os Negocios da Capitania de Mossambique nos fins de Novembro do Anno do 1789 com algumas Observaçoens, e reflecçoens sobre a causa da decadencia do Commerçio dos Estabelecimentos Portugueses na Costa Oriental da Affrica," 1790, in AC, i, 1917, p.125, states (without naming him) that Saif ibn Ahmad came to Moçambique before going to Kilwa and Zanzibar, but there is no mention of this visit in the official correspondence from Moçambique. News of the reassertion of Omani rule at Kilwa seems not to have reached the Portuguese until 1788; AHU, CM 25, Manuel Antônio Correira to A.M. de Melo e Castro, Ibo, 15 February 1788.

CHAPTER V

The Growing Influence of the Slave Trade, 1785-1810

1. French domination

The coastal trade of the Yao, both to Kilwa and to Moçambique, was based on ivory. The Yao shift from Kilwa to Moçambique in the first half of the eighteenth century, as well as the movement of their trade back to Kilwa in the second half of that century, was made in response to factors affecting the coastal ivory market. Throughout this period slaves were incidental to the Yao trade in ivory. The increased demand for slaves along the coast of East-Central Africa, inspired by the Omani Arabs, as well as by the French, was supplied principally by and from African peoples living near the coast. At Moçambique, Yao slaves were less favored than the Makua, primarily because the combination of the long journey from the interior and the debilitating coastal climate caused a high mortality rate among them. Nevertheless, Yao traders must have been impressed by the increasing demand for slaves, and there was undoubtedly a slow growth in the Yao slave trade during the eighteenth century.

After 1785 the slave trade in East-Central Africa expanded more markedly than ever before. It is from this date that the Yao began to become increasingly involved in trading slaves. To be sure, ivory still dominated the long distance trade to Kilwa; but even as early as 1785 it appears that the Yao of southern Tanzania were seriously involved in supplying the Kilwa coast with slaves. Furthermore, there is evidence that by the first decade of the nineteenth century the Yao who were still trading to Moçambique were dealing primarily in slaves, not ivory.(1) These Yao, unlike

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(1) See below, pp. 234, 240-2, 254-5, 270-6.

those living in Tanzania, however, were clearly long distance traders. As such, they were the first of the Yao long distance traders to reflect the growing influence of the slave trade in East-Central Africa. This response grew much more gradually among most Yao, who carried their goods to Kilwa, not to Moçambique. In order to understand the varying responses of the Yao trading to Kilwa and those trading to Moçambique, we must first examine the changing conditions affecting the coastal market. Foremost among these is the commanding role played by French slavers.

French domination of the slave trade in East-Central Africa reached its zenith between 1785 and 1794. During the brief period of peace following the conclusion of the American War for Independence, up to the beginning of the Napoleonic Wars, an unprecedented number of French merchantmen called at the ports of this coast. While it was a time of outstanding prosperity for Ile de France and Bourbon, whose traders did an increasingly large trade in slaves from the continent,(1) the greatest activity was the noticeably expanded slave trade between French America and these ports. The re-establishment of the Compagnie des Indes on 14 April 1785 was bitterly opposed by those who favored the system of free trade which had prevailed since 1769, but it did not inhibit the remarkable expansion of the trans-Atlantic trade from East-Central Africa. Before the termination of its monopoly in 1790, the Compagnie issued 119 licenses for trading along the coast of East Africa during the years 1786-1789 alone. Many of these ships, as Dermigny has suggested and the Governor-General of Moçambique confirmed, intended

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(1) P.J. Barnwell & A. Toussaint, A Short History of Mauritius, London, 1949, p.88. According to one source, 2630 slaves were brought to Ile de France from the coast of East Africa during the period of November 1786-January 1788. D'Unienville's figures also show that the importation of slaves there reached its peak between 1786 and 1794. See Dermigny, Cargaisons Indiennes, i, p.111, n.27; D'Unienville, Statistique, iii, p.588; see also AHU, Cod.1565,fl.17-18, A.M. de Melo e Castro to Luís da Costa Ferreira de Azevedo, Moç., 12 February 1791, for a license permitting the addressee to take 40 slaves to Ile de France.

to sell their cargoes of slaves in America.(1)

The French slave trade from East Africa to America made rapid progress in spite of the longer voyage which it required than that from West Africa and of the fact that the mortality rate was consequently higher. By the mid-1780s, wrote one French merchant, slaves were difficult to procure on the Guinea coast and the prices asked for them exorbitant. Compared to these, slaves from East Africa were much less expensive to buy. According to figures given by Dermigny, profits of well over 500% on each slave appear to have been normal. It is not surprising that the fears expressed by certain individuals, both French and Portuguese, over the ability of this trade to withstand rising prices in East Africa and problems at home in dispatching ships to these ports, were groundless.(2) Only war, or the fear of war, was able to inhibit its operation.

At Moçambique, the many years of flagrant disregard by successive governors of the royal orders prohibiting trading with foreigners finally led to a reversal of this longstanding policy. The reappraisal of official policy towards such trade formed part of a larger reorganization of the colony's entire commerce. Supervised by Martinho de Melo e Castro, the Secretary of the Navy and Overseas Dominions, this general reorganization of trade was designed to terminate the years of administrative chaos which had followed on the

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(1) See Dermigny, Cargaisons Indiennes, i, pp.98-103,153; AHU, CM 23, A.M. de Melo e Castro to M. de Melo e Castro, Moç., 26 September 1787; H. Weber, La Compagnie Française des Indes (1604-1875), Paris, 1904, pp.616-54; see above, pp. 172-3 . Rare examples of particular vessels which are known to have been bound for French America are the French corvette L'Euphraisie, Captain Labat, and the Spanish vessel La Pepita, Captain Nicolas Baudin, which was equipped by French merchants from New Orleans and embarked 200 slaves at Moçambique: AHU, CM 25, Benjamin Ferrão, auto da visita, Moç., 30 October 1788; AHU, CM 23, Mateus Inácio de Almeida, "Condiçoens com que se permitte ao Navio La Pepita... fazer Escravos em Moçambique," Moç., 31 July 1787; Dermigny, Cargaisons Indiennes, i, p.103.

(2) Dermigny, Cargaisons Indiennes, i, p.110,n.23,98; AC,ii,1918, p.56. Although no comparative figures for slave mortality are known from French sources, one Portuguese document records that there was a 50% death rate for slaves being transported from Moçambique to Rio de Janeiro, as compared with a 20% rate on the West Africa to Brazil passage: AHU, CM 13, anon., "Os Francezes extraem...," n.d.

death of Pereira do Lago and which had culminated in Saldanha de Albuquerque's illegal trading company.(1) The executor of these reforms was the Secretary's nephew, previously the Governor of the Rivers of Sena, António Manuel de Melo e Castro, who took office as Governor-General of Moçambique on 11 March 1786, replacing the inept and corrupt provisional government which had succeeded Saldanha de Albuquerque. The new Governor-General was ideally suited for the task and his six-year administration of the colony was the most outstanding since that of his illustrious father, Francisco de Melo e Castro.(2)

The new regulations were drawn up on 19 April 1785, but it does not appear that they were put in effect until the middle of 1787, after António Manuel had closely studied the situation. Unfortunately, there are no accounts at all of French traders at Moçambique during this important period, as a result of which there appears to be an abrupt change, rather than any sort of transition, from the old methods of illegal trading to the new legalized system. In any case, the 1785 orders specifically instructed Melo e Castro to admit French traders to the port of Moçambique, as it was clear to all that they would continue to arrive there, and this was preferable to the extortions to which previous governor-generals had subjected them. This decision was the logical sequitur to the royal alvará, issued several days previously, which strictly forbade Crown officials from private trading in the colony, or from tampering with its official economic apparatus.(3) It is notable, however, that Melo e Castro was directed by his uncle that this permission should appear to be "your own decision, so that no one can perceive, or

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(1) See Lobato, Lourenço Marques, i, pp.140-6; ii, pp.291-9; see above, pp. 185-91.

(2) See Costa Mendes, Catalogo, pp.51-5; cf. Lobato, Lourenço Marques, i, p.159.

(3) AHU, Cod.1472, fl.53-5, royal alvará, Ajuda, 14 April 1785.

suspect, either directly or indirectly, that you are doing this on the order, or suggestion of this Court." In this way, general Portuguese colonial policy remained publicly unaltered, while at Moçambique trade with the French was secretly authorized.

The procedure to be followed by the Governor-General was carefully detailed in his instructions. Immediately on the arrival of the French ship at Moçambique, a guard was to be placed on board, all the indispensable necessities were to be seized, in order to prevent the unloading of wares directly on the mainland, and the Captain and Super-cargo were to be brought before the Governor-General and Chief Justice. The decision to admit a ship was to be the Governor-General's prerogative, without limitations, but he was obliged to inform the Crown of each permit so granted. Entrance having been conceded, all merchandise, save only firearms and gunpowder, which were the monopoly of the Royal Treasury and to which they had to be sold, was to be transported to the alfândega for evaluation. Anything caught being smuggled from the ship to the mainland would be seized and a fine equal to twice its value levied; a second offence was punishable by immediate imprisonment. No French traders were allowed to leave the island for the mainland, and all export trade outside of slaves and provisions was completely forbidden. Each adult slave was to be taxed at the rate of 16 cruzados, with minors paying only 12 cruzados per head. None of the crew could remain at Moçambique after his ship had departed. Within these conditions, which were to be strictly observed and for which the Governor-General was entirely responsible, the French could trade freely at Moçambique. The Secretary also suggested the imposition of a 10% or 12% duty on all French imports. Finally, all French trading at subordinate ports, especially at the

Kerimba Islands, was to be ended, if that were possible; Moçambique alone was to be the center of the French slave trade in Portuguese East Africa.(1)

Late in June 1787 Melo e Castro launched the new policy, making no attempt, however, to camouflage the fact that the Crown had ordered the change. His proclamation embodied the 1785 instructions with only minimal modifications. The most important of these was that all patacas would be deposited in the alfândega, not only for the collection of the new 2% duty on specie, but also so that they could be exchanged for marked patacas. The inclusion of this provision raises the possibility that, despite the recent royal order that all patacas, marked or unmarked, should be worth 4 cruzados,(2) use of the inflationary stamped pataca was still necessary in the colony, which was perennially starved for currency. The Governor-General also added that French goods which had been deposited in the alfândega were to be re-exported on each ship's return voyage, confirmation that all purchases were to be made in specie. He further explained that imprisoned contrabanders would be returned to their ship on its departure from Moçambique. Emphasizing Portuguese determination to defend the subordinate ports against French traders, Melo e Castro conveyed the substance of this proclamation to his French counterpart at Ile de France a month later.(3)

The first vessel which is known to have traded under the new regulations arrived at Moçambique in mid-July 1787. Thereafter, until

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(1) Ibid., fl. 65-70, M.de Melo e Castro to A.M. de Melo e Castro, Ajuda, 19 April 1785.

(2) Ibid.,fl.51-2, Crown to same, Ajuda, 15 April 1785, registered by same at Moç., 14 April 1787.

(3) AHU, CM 23, A.M. de Melo e Castro, "Condiçoens com que Serão admitios os Navios Francezes nesta Capital até a Real Rezoluçaõ de Sua Magestade, " Moç., 20 June 1787; AHU, Cod.1478,fl.38, same to Visconde de Souillac, Moç.,23 July 1787. François de Souillac was Governor-General of the French islands from 1779 to 1787; see Barnwell and Toussaint, A Short History, Appendix 2, pp.253-4.

March 1794, the great importance of the French slave trade at that port is vividly attested to by the many autos de visita (writs of inspection) which one encounters in the Portuguese archives from this period.(1) Although the available statistical sources for this trade do not inspire great confidence, they too reflect the growth of the slave trade at Moçambique during this period. One list gives the following figures for the years 1786-1790: (2)

Year	In Portuguese Ships	In Foreign Ships
1786	2847	-
1787	3665	4548
1788	5506	5510
1789	2687	6987
1790	656	6697
Total	15,361 slaves	23,742 slaves

The accuracy of these figures is, however, very suspect. The suspiciously large Portuguese figures for 1787 and 1788 may well be due to the fact that, in order to circumvent the higher capitation taxes levied on French exported slaves, local Portuguese traders took a large umber of slaves through customs on their own account, only to deliver them to French slavers with whom they had previously struck a bargain. Other sources record that in 1789 a total of 1886 slaves were exported from the capital aboard Portuguese vessels, while 4838 were shipped under foreign colors. These figures are consonant with the alfândega duties collected on the slave trade in that year. Similarly, it appears that the correct figures for exportation of slaves

(1) See AHU, CM 26, Benjamin Ferão, auto de visita taken aboard the French frigate Breton, Captain Guardon, Moç.,16 July 1787. These autos are records of the Chief Justice's inspection of the foreign ships which came to trade at Moçambique, in accordance with the regulations of 1787. Each auto includes the name (and usually, the type), of the ship, the name of its captain, its nationality, and a detailed accounting of its cargo. Regrettably, the port for which the vessel was destined is only very rarely indicated. See also, Dermigny's Cargaisons Indiennes, i, pp.156-7.

(2) AHU, CM 33, anon., "Mappa da Importancia...," Moç., September 1796.

in 1790 are some 758 in Portuguese ships and 6387 in foreign ones.(1) No capitation figures exist for the years 1791-1794, but one can deduce the minimum number of slaves embarked at Moçambique from the taxes collected on this trade. According to these, one gets the following picture:(2)

Year	In Portuguese Ships	In Foreign Ships
1791	1376	4147
1792	1214	3730
1793	1000	3273
1794	764	1576
Total	4354 slaves	12,726 slaves

During the period 1786-1794, then, according to official figures, about 14,662 slaves were exported from Moçambique aboard Portuguese vessels, while some 34,009 were shipped by foreigners.

The effect of this greatly expanded slave trade on the general economy of Moçambique was striking. The Governor-General wrote that the trade of both the island and the interior was growing at a terrific pace. The great influx of specie and trading cloths, the latter from Diu and Damão, was due solely to "the great exportation of slaves, the most flourishing branch of trade of this Captaincy." Gold and ivory, which had formerly been the most important exports of the colony, were now "faded, and in precipitate decadency." Melo e Castro related

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(1) AHU, CM 25, João da Silva Guedes, "Resumo do Rendimento da Alfandiga no anno preterito de 1789," Moç., 11 August 1790; AHU, CM 27, A.M. de Melo e Castro to M.de Melo e Castro, Moç., 24 August 1790; AHU, CM 27, same to same, Moç., 28 August 1791, enclosing alfândega figures for previous year, Silva Guedes, Moç., 15 March 1791; see Lobato, Lourenço Marques, ii, p.359.

(2) AHU, CM 33, anon., "Mapa dos Rendimentos Reais da Capitania de 1788 a 1793," Moç., August 1794; ibid., anon., "Mapa dos rendimentos de 1791 a 1795," n.d.; cf. Lobato, Lourenço Marques,ii, pp.357-8, 388. These figures are calculated by dividing the head tax of 16 cruzados for adult slaves exported on foreign ships into the total amount of duties collected on that trade, and the corresponding tax of 8 cruzados paid by Portuguese vessels for similar slaves into that total. This is the same method employed by the Portuguese, as the 1789-1790 figures reveal. It yields, however, a minimal figure, as it ignores the fact that young slaves were taxed at a lower rate, so that the total sum of the revenue collected must have represented a larger number of slaves in proportion to the number of minors embarked.

that whereas gold and ivory had once paid for virtually all the imports of Moçambique from India and Portugal, they now barely accounted for a third of these. Furthermore, the volume of these imports had also increased considerably. There was no doubt in his mind that the stimulus to this growth, and the sole bastion supporting the colony's relative prosperity, was the French slave trade.(1) Melo e Castro's observations were corroborated by Jerónimo José Nogueira de Andrade, who in 1790 had just returned to Lisbon after nearly eight years' service in Moçambique. Devoting a lengthy section of his highly informative memoir on the trade of Portuguese East Africa to the French trade at Moçambique, Nogueira de Andrade argued strongly against the complaints of some moradores that this trade was harmful to the colony. He also praised Melo e Castro's regulation and supervision of the French trade. Utilizing the same data as the Governor-General, he reasoned that the increase in trade from India was due to the increased demand for trading cloths with which to acquire slaves for selling to the French. Likewise, he pointed out that the increased imports from Lisbon to Moçambique were financed by the patacas with which the French bought their slaves.(2) In view of these recommendations, it is not surprising that Martinho de Melo e Castro instructed his nephew's successor, D. Diogo de Sousa [Coutinho], to continue this policy of tacit toleration. Sousa's restatement of this policy at the end of May 1793, two and a half months after he had assumed office, only added a provision forbidding the raising of the French, or any other foreign, flag on Portuguese territory to the original decree of 1787.(3)

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(1) AHU, CM 26, A.M. de Melo e Castro to M.de Melo e Castro, Moç.,14 August 1789; AHU, CM 27, same to same, Moç., 24 August 1790 and 20 August 1791.

(2) AC, ii,1918, pp.32-6. Nogueira de Andrade estimated that the Moçambique coast provided some 4000 to 5000, or more, slaves each year.

(3) AHU, Cod.1472, fl.107-111, M.de Melo e Castro to D.Diogo de Sousa, Queluz, 12 October 1792; AHU, Cod.1361, fl.16-17, Sousa, "Condisoens que os Capitaens dos Navios Francezes, vindos aeste Porto de Mossambique com o fim de cargarem escravatura devem exactamente observar,...," Moç., 30 May 1793; see ibid., fl.15, same to Francisco António Tavares de Sigueira, Moç., 31 May 1793; ibid., fl.15-16, same to João da Costa Xavier, Moç., 4 June 1793.

During this decade, the price paid for a slave at Moçambique continued to rise. In the 1770s the average price had been about,120 cruzados per head; by about 1784 it had doubled to anywhere between 200 and 240 cruzados each.(1) Within the next five years the average price for an adult male slave, according to Portuguese sources, seems to have varied between about 250 cruzados to more than 400 cruzados each, not including the 16 cruzado capitation tax. A clear distinction was made between slaves newly arrived from the interior and those who had acquired desirable skills through having served Portuguese masters on the coast, with the latter fetching the higher prices.(2) As for distinctions of sex, age, and stature, Blancard furnishes prices current at this time for eight classifications of slaves, the highest of which are somewhat lower than the contemporary Portuguese figures. They are especially valuable, however, in that they suggest the limitations one faces in relying on official Portuguese figures for the slave trade, based, as these appear to be, on the presumption that each slave exported was an adult. Blancard's figures read:(3)

Classification	Price in piastres
Males, aged 20 and over	35 to 45
Females, aged 18 and over	30 to 35
Males, aged 15-20, being 4'1" to 4'2" tall	30
Males, aged 15-20, being 4'6" tall	35 to 45
Males, aged 8-15, being 3'8" to 3'11" tall	20 to 25
Females, aged 8-15, being 4'6" tall	30 to 35
Females, aged 8-15, being 4'5" tall	25 to 28
Females, aged 8-15, being 3'6" to 3'11" tall	18 to 22

(1) See above, pp. 167, 200.

(2) AHU, CM 25, "Declaração dos negociantes cristãos e baneanes da praça de Moçambique," Moç., 30 June 1789; AHU, CM 26, Manuel do Nascimento Nunes to Crown, "Denuncio do Serviço de Sua Mag.e no Estado de Mos.e de 1790 por...," Moç., 10 June 1790; see Lobato, Lourenço Marques, ii, pp.358-9,388, n.1. The denúncio of Nascimento Nunes includes details which corroborate the general details of the French slave trade at Moçambique during this period. He was apparently a rival of Nogueira de Andrade.

(3) P. Blancard, Manuel du Commerce des Indes et de la Chine, Paris, 1806, pp.16-19. Blancard lived in the East from 1770 to about 1790; see Gray, "A French Account of Kilwa," p.224. Blancard also notes the necessity of paying a baptism tax of about 2 cruzados on each slave which was exported.

Although the increased demand for slaves at Moçambique was matched by rising prices, French traders continued to frequent that port in strength until March 1794. Thereafter, until early in 1796, no French vessels entered Moçambique harbor, as a result of the war, although friendly relations were maintained between Sousa and the French Governor-General, Malartic.(1) Besides the fact that the urgency of the French demand for slaves gave them little choice but to do a large portion of their business with the Portuguese, the innovation of the 1787 regulations for that trade would seem to have been a factor in inducing them to return to trade at Moçambique. Under the administrations of both Melo e Castro and Sousa, French traders knew what was expected of them; prices were high and restrictions rigidly but honestly applied. The time-consuming business of bribing the Governor-General and the uncertainties of being subject to his whims no longer existed. Moçambique was now fully geared to supplying slaves and the government saw to it that this was done with the maximum of efficiency.

Such was not the case at the Kerimba Islands, where the French slave trade declined during this decade. Complaints continued to be voiced that French contraband was still rife there, but these appear to have been partly based on slightly outdated information and repeated as a matter of habit.(2) Two factors influenced the decline of French slaving at the islands: stricter enforcement of official Portuguese policy prohibiting this trade, and the greater concentration of French commercial activity to the north of Cape Delgado. Melo e Castro continually warned the Governor of the Kerimba Islands during the first eighteen months of his administration against allowing the French to trade there. He particularly stressed that Portuguese officials

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(1) M.V. Jackson, European Powers and South-East Africa, London, 1942, p.45.

(2) See TT, Ministério do Reino, maço 604, Joaquim José Varela, "Discripsão da Capitania de Monsambique, e Suas povoasoans, e producçoins, pertencentes à Coroa de Portugal,n.d., but dated internally to 1788, published in EHGEP, pp.281-310, at 284, incorporating alterations included in later copy, [redacted] which is itself published as an anonymous memoir in Andrade, Relações, pp.375-405, at 376; AHU, Cod.1472, fl.80, M.de Melo e Castro to A.M.de Melo e Castro, Ajuda, 20 March 1789; AC,i,1917, p.123; AHU, CM 26, Nascimento Nunes to Crown, "Denuncio...," Moç., 10 June 1790.

were forbidden to trade privately, as ordered by the royal alvará of 14 April 1785.(1) On one occasion, Melo e Castro permitted a French ship, A Modestia (La Modestie), captained by a M.Liborne, to go to Ibo in order to take on 80 slaves which were owed him by one João Ferreira. The Governor, Agostinho de Melo e Almeida, was instructed to give the Frenchman as much aid as he needed in collecting this debt, so that the latter would have no future pretext for returning there.(2) While there is no evidence which reveals Melo e Almeida's execution of these restrictive orders, his successor, Manuel António Correa, seems to have faithfully carried them out on the one occasion when a French slaver is reported to have arrived at Ibo.(3).

The establishment of a factory and an alfândega at Ibo, in accordance with the general reorganization of the colony's trade, may well have encouraged this new efficiency, as did Melo e Castro's own example.(4) This trend was apparently intensified after António José Teixeira Tigre was nominated Governor and Commandant of the islands in September 1788.(5) Late in 1790 Tigre reported the shipwreck, in September, of a French vessel from Bourbon on Mtundo Island, just south of Vamizi Island. Several of the officers and crew perished, while the survivors were spared an attack from certain Portuguese moradores and their African retainers only by the vigilance of a friendly chief and the Commander of Vamizi. A month later, another French ship, La Bonne Henriette, Captain Jean Jagault, tried to obtain

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(1) AHU, Cod.1478, fl.1-3, A.M.de Melo e Castro to Agostinho de Melo e Almeida, Moç., 11 September 1786, enclosing same to Costa Portugal, Moç., 20 June 1786; AHU, Cod.1484, fl.46, same to Melo e Almeida, Moç., 23 July 1787; AHU, CM 23, same to same, Moç., 5 August 1787. Melo e Almeida was named Governor on 1 August 1786; see AHU, Cod.1484,fl.41, carta patente of same, Moç., 1 August 1786.

(2) AHU, CM 23 and Cod.1478, fl.13, A.M. de Melo e Castro to same, Moç., 18 September 1787.

(3) Ibid., fl.16-17,13 & v., same to Manuel António Correa, Moç.,15 & 22 April 1788. Correa became interim Governor of the Kerimba Islands following Melo e Almeida's appointment as Governor of the Rivers of Sena in November 1787; see Andrade, Relações, p.528.

(4) AHU, CM 32 & Cod.1478, fl.7-9,A.M. de Melo e Castro, alvará,21 July 1787; AHU, CM 23 & Cod.1478,fl.6-7, same, alvará, 23 July 1787, registered at Ibo, 11 August 1787; AHU, CM 24, António da Silva Teixeira to A.M.de Melo e Castro, Ibo, 9 October 1787; AHU, Cod.1475, fl.2, same to same

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leave to trade at Ibo, but Tigre ordered it to depart within twenty-four hours.(1) Even stronger evidence of Tigre's zeal in administering these restrictions is the verification by a later Governor of the Kerimba Islands that Tigre had "religiously" guarded against the French trading within his jurisdiction.(2) Tigre was succeeded by Correa, again acting as interim Governor, in the early 1790s, but there is no reason to believe that he welcomed the French any more than he had previously. During the height of French slaving activity along the coast of East-Central Africa, then, the conscientious execution of official Portuguese policy, which had been thoroughly flounted by successive governors of the Kerimba Islands for the previous half century, excluded the French from trading in what had once been their favorite area of supply.(3)

Despite this turn of events, the French continued to receive slaves from this area as a result of the inability of the Portuguese to inhibit the Arab and Swahili pangaio (a type of sailing vessel) trade from the islands and mainland to the towns located north of Cape Delgado. This coasting trade had always frustrated the Portuguese, (4) but its importance seems to have grown considerably after 1786,

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/.. footnote continued from page 224.

(4) Ibo, 9 October 1787; AHU, Cod.1475, fl.2, same to same, Ibo, 9 October 1787; see Lobato, Lourenço Marques, ii, pp.294-7.

(5) AHU, Cod.1478, fl.20-1, A.M. de Melo e Castro to António José Teixeira Tigre, Mossuril, 16 September 1788.

(1) AHU, CM 26, Tigre to A.M. de Melo e Castro, Ibo, 8 November 1790; AHU, CM 27, same to same, Ibo, 13 November 1790, enclosing petition of Jean Jagault, and Tigre's reply to it, both dated Ibo, 22 October 1790.

(2) AHU, CM 28, Constantino António Álvares da Silva to Sousa, Ibo, 9 October 1795.

(3) News of the declaration of war between France and Portugal was sent to Ibo from Moçambique in the spring of 1794; see AHU, Cod.1478, fl.49-52, Sousa to Correa, Moç., 18 May 1794. Despite the decline in French slaving at the Kerimba Islands, Blancard includes prices for the various types of slaves there. These range from a top price of 35 to 40 piastres for adult males, to 18 to 20 piastres for the youngest and smallest females: Blancard, Manuel, pp.19-21.

(4) See above, p. 157.

when the French began to face opposition to their trading personally at Ibo and to devote increasingly more attention to the Kilwa coast. The extension of Omani hegemony over Kilwa also influenced the growth of the pangaio trade. This trade was harried with some success in 1787, when the Portuguese seized a number of slaves from Swahili merchants, and there were fears at Ibo that a retributive attack was imminent.(1) But none took place, as the setbacks were only temporary. The great extent of Swahili commercial activity by April 1789 is attested to by the fact that some 35 boats were registered by the Portuguese as having taken port at Ibo in the pursuance of the legal trade in provisions to the Portuguese establishments. Most of these were from Pate and the surrounding region.(2). The illegal trade in slaves was equally flourishing, it seems. The issue came out into the open after Tigre forwarded to Melo e Castro a request by some otherwise unidentified inhabitants of the islands to be allowed to send slaves to the French at Kilwa, after paying the required duties at Ibo. Due to a contrary monsoon, they claimed, it had been impossible to send them to Moçambique. The Governor-General strongly denounced such an idea as being diametrically opposed to the purpose of the Crown's prohibition of foreign trade in the subordinate ports, that is, that such trade was injurious to the national trade. In another letter, written a few days later, Melo e Castro advised Tigre to expect the arrival at Ibo of the Prince of Pate,

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(1) AHU, CM 25, Correa to A.M. de Melo e Castro, Ibo, 4 March 1788; AHU, Cod. 1478, fl.16-17, reply, Moç., 15 April 1788.

(2) AHU, CM 26, Tigre to A.M. de Melo e Castro, Ibo, 2 April 1789, enclosing same, "Rellaçaõ das Embarcaçoens de Mouros da Costa q̃ tem a Porta do nesta Ilha de S. Joaõ do Ibo de passagem p.a a Capital de Moss.e, outras, que ficaraõ p.r algum Portos piquenos desta jurisdiçaõ...," Ibo, 2 April 1789. Of 40 craft, 17 were reportedly from Pate, bound for Moçambique; 10 from around Pate, of which 4 were destined for Moçambique, while 3 were staying at Ibo, 2 at Arimba, and 1 in Querimba; 5 were from Zanzibar, bound for Moçambique; 2 from Mombasa and 1 from Kilwa, with the same destination; an additional 5 from Anjouan Island were at ports in the Kerimba Islands.

who would be returning home after having discussed the problem of the clandestine trade carried on in the Kerimba Islands by the Swahili of the northern coast. A third communication, dated 4 April 1789, from the Governor-General warned his subordinate that the passports which many Swahili traders bore were worthless, as they were granted by virtually non-existent rulers. It also ordered the proclamation in the islands of a bando, is his name, "absolutely forbidding the clandestine trade of the Swahili of the coast of Zanzibar, Pate, Mafia, Kilwa, Mombasa, &ª. . .." Contrabanders were threatened with serious penalties, including heavy fines, imprisonment, and, for a third offender, banishment from Portuguese territory. Tigre published this bando on 18 April 1789 and soon sent notice of it to the rulers of Kilwa, Pate, Zanzibar, and Mombasa.(1)

The bando was soon followed by further instructions from Melo e Castro on regulating and taxing the legitimate trade in provisions and cattle. All was to no avail. In the following year Tigre reported with alarm that the Swahili from Pate "travel through the lands of the jurisdiction of this Command, establishing themselves almost as masters of them, and fortifying themselves in Quirimize," from whence their boats embarked to trade along the coast and to all the islands without regard for the Portuguese. Some of the moradores on the mainland, notably the ageing, but still important João de Morais, even protected them, in return for assistance in their own settlements. In September a large boatload of slaves from the interior had set out from Quirimize

(1) Ibid., same to same, Ibo, 22 February 1789; ibid.& AHU, Cod.1478, fl.27-8, reply, Moç., 3 April 1789; ibid, fl.26-7, same to same, 4 April 1789; ibid., fl.25, & AHU, CM 26, same to same, Moç. 6 April 1789; ibid & AHU, Cod.1500, fl.18, Tigre, bando, Ibo, 18 April 1789; AHU, CM 26, same to A.M. de Melo e Castro, Ibo, 16 July 1789; cf. Teixeira Botelho, História, pp.588-9, who misdates this bando to 1788.

to be sold to the French at Kilwa.(1) The magnitude of this trade is unknown, but there is no doubt that it continued to flourish for as long as there was a market for slaves at Kilwa and only a minimal demand at Ibo.

As they had since Morice's day, French slavers to the north of Cape Delgado concentrated their activities at Kilwa. At the same time, however, a concerted effort was made by the French to open up trade with Mongalo. Morice had noted Mongalo only as a place with a small harbor, where one could buy smaller cowries than at the Kerimba Islands. It was scarcely better known to Crassons in 1784, who wrote of the coast between Cape Delgado and Kilwa that the Swahili and Arabs lived there

> take from it a prodigious number of blacks (in margin: inferior to those of Kilwa but which they bring there to sell to us), particularly from the river Mongallo, a little-known river which flows through fertile and thickly populated country stretching a long way inland.
>
> This stretch of country is entirely unknown to us, the approach to it is very difficult and we rarely go there.(2)

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(1) Ibid. & AHU, Cod.1478, fl.22, A.M. de Melo e Castro to Tigre, Moç., 26 April 1789; AHU, CM 27, Tigre to A.M. de Melo e Castro, Ibo, 8 November 1790. Quirimize, Kirimizi, or Kirinuzi is the name of the spit of land and village there situated opposite the most easterly point of Matemo Island, about 9 miles south of Mucojo and 20 miles north of Kissanga: see Dicionário Corográfico, i, p.153; A Handbook of Portuguese Nyasaland, London, 1920, pp. 159-60; W.B. Worsfold, Portuguese Nyasaland, London, 1899, larger of the two maps enclosed in pocket inside rear cover.

(2) FKI, pp.90, 103-4, 108, 120, 124, 173; SD, pp.192-3.

But from 1786 to 1789, Mongalo became the focus of French attempts from Ile de France to secure a foothold in East Africa. (1)

In 1784 the French Minister of the Navy, Marshall de Castries, ordered the frigate La Venus, under the command of Count de Rosily, to make a special mission of reconnaissance from Ile de France to East Africa and the Persian Gulf. The Minister also requested Governor-General de Souillac to propose to a local shipowner, who would be indemnified by the government in case of failure, that he send one or two ships to follow up this mission. Accordingly, on 1 July 1785 La Venus, accompanied by the royal corvette La Prévoyance, commanded by Lieutenant le Chevalier Saulnier de Mondevit, set out from Port Louis for the Persian Gulf. At the same time, or shortly thereafter, Les Bons Amis, owned by the Mauritian shipowner Commarmond, whose offer was accepted in consideration of his previous success in mounting lucrative voyages to these places, departed for the East African coast. Les Bons Amis seems to have sailed to Mombasa, where a certain amount of hostility was encountered from the Arab governor. If it visited any other ports, these are not mentioned, but later comments by Commarmond indicate that it did not go to Mongalo. The vessel returned to Ile de France at the end of the year, carrying 74 African slaves and yielding its owner a very slight profit. (2)

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(1) See Andrade, Relações, p. 375, for an example of general Portuguese knowledge of Mongalo before the beginning of French enterprise there.

(2) AF, Col. C^4 96, Le Chevalier d'Entrecasteaux & Motais de Narbonne to Minister of the Navy, Port Louis, 30 January 1789; AF, Col. C^4 72, "Raport de M. Le Brasseur au Ministre sur l'expedition de la Frigate la Venus et les demandes du S.^{r} Comarmons employé dans la dite Expedition," n.d., but post-10 December 1785; AF, Cod. C^4 85, Commarmond to Minister of the Navy, Ile de France, 20 June 1789; see also AF, Col. C^4 73, De Souillac to le Vicomte de Loemaria, Ile de France, 20 November 1786, which contains references to French complaints against the Governor of Mombasa and to subsequent appeals for protection of the Imam of Oman in East Africa.

La Venus, too, did not reach Mongalo; (1) but Saulnier de Mondevit's vessel did, and that officer has left us with two extremely valuable accounts of that place. (2)

In the journal of his voyage , Saulnier de Mondevit states that La Prévoyance left Basra on 29 October 1785 and reached the island of Pemba, to the north of Zanzibar, on 28 December. From Pemba she followed the coast to Kilwa, which Saulnier de Mondevit knew and where he hoped to acquire directions, or a pilot, to Mongalo, his destination. But at Kilwa he got only vague responses, intimating the impracticability of such a proposal, as only very small boats usually went there. It seems clear that Saulnier de Mondevit was rebuffed at Kilwa, where the local traders, the Sultan, and the Omani governor would have been reluctant to see the French open direct commercial relations with a town nominally subordinate to Kilwa. La Prévoyance departed from Kilwa on 4 January 1786 and soon arrived at what was thought to be Mongalo, but which proved to be Lindi. (3) The French were well

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(1) See AF, Col. C^4 95, De Souillac to Minister of the Navy, Ile de France, 18 May, 1786; cf. Coupland, East Africa and Its Invaders pp.84-7.

(2) AF, Col. $C^4$80, Saulnier de Mondevit, "Memoire sur la Baye de Lindy et la Riviere de Mongale, située à la côte orientale de l'Afrique -- Extrait du journal du Ch.^{er} Saulnier de Mondevit, Lieutenant de Vaisseau, commandant la Corvette du Roi, La Prevoyande, armée de 10 cannons & 30 hommes d'equipage, partie de l'Isle de France le 1er Juillet 1785, sous les ordres de M. le C.^{te} de Rosily, Capitaine de Vaisseau commandant la Fregate de Sa Majesté, La Vénus," n.d., but dated internally to 1786; A^F, Col. C4 84, idem, "Mémoire sur la nécessité & de les Moyens de former un Etablissement françois á Mongalo sur la Côte Orientale d'Affrique," n.d., but probably composed at same time. The following paragraphs are based on these two documents, except where otherwise specified.

(3) The Swahili Ancient History of Lindi reveals that relations between the rulers of Lindi and Mongalo (Mgao Mwanya) were very close; see SD, p.228.

received at Lindi, which was "under the domination of the King of Kilwa," and the people living in the many villages dotting the inner bay there offered to trade with them in slaves and ivory. After four days La Prévoyance continued south from Lindi to Mongalo, which was reached after a six hours' sail. Going ashore, the French met with the ruler of Mongalo, but Saulnier de Mondevit's remark that all the local chiefs were willing to receive him bears out the impression one gathers from the Swahili History of Sudi that the Mwenyi Mwanya's rule was less than absolute in Mongalo. (1)

According to Saulnier de Mondevit, the French were unknown to the people of Mongalo, who mistook them at first for Portuguese, for whom some antipathy was felt. Two local traders, who had been to Moçambique, told him in limited Portuguese that such a large vessel had never before been seen at Mongalo. They wondered why he had not gone to Kilwa instead, but did not let this prevent them, and their fellows, from raising the subject of trade. Saulnier de Mondevit explained that they were not there to trade personally, although he elsewhere indicates that the ship's officers did indeed purchase slaves at Mongalo on this voyage, and that his purpose was to negotiate terms for the inauguration of direct trade between them and the French. Two days later (? 9 January 1786) the authorities of Mongalo sent him a written agreement in which were set out the conditions of this trade. These specified (a) that the French of Ile de France were to supply them with all the merchandise that they should request, (b) that these be traded for slaves and ivory, and (c) described the manner in which a French vessel was to identify itself on entering the roadstead. A copy of this agreement with the French monarch's seal affixed was requested by the authorities of Mongalo, to which Saulnier de Mondevit agreed. It was too promising an offer to refuse, for the second article stipulated that male slaves, regardless of age or size, should never cost more than 25 piastres

(1) See above, p.58; SD, p.230.

each. The price of women and children was not specified, but these were always less costly. As Saulnier de Mondevit was well aware, from his knowledge of the French slave trade at Kilwa, the Kerimba Islands, and Moçambique, this was a much lower maximum price than that obtaining at any of these other markets. (1)

His argument for the necessity of establishing a French factory at Mongalo was based upon this very premise. Slaves were necessary to the Mascarenes and prices had more than doubled at the Portuguese strongholds in recent years. The parallel with Morice's proposal for Kilwa is obvious. (2) As did Morice with Kilwa, Saulnier de Mondevit praised the many natural advantages of Mongalo, which he said had a superior supply of fresh water than had Kilwa. (3) Similarly, of particular interest are his remarks on the people, general situation, and trade of Mongalo. According to what he learned, Mongalo was founded by the Swahili, who shared it with the Makonde who embraced Islam. Mongalo, as well as the towns below it to Cape Delgado, was considered to recognise the authority of the Imam of Oman, but it never rendered him any tribute. His claim to obeisance seems to have been accepted by the Swahili as the result of his religious authority as Imam; but the Makonde, who originally came from the neighbouring plateau, did not recognise his authority, even though they lived in Mongalo. (4) Saulnier de Mondevit suggested that French protection

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(1) Cf. Dalrymple, Plan of the River Mongallou on the East Coast of Africa Lat. 10°7'S. Var.° 18°40'W. From a French MS., 31 April 1789. Dalrymple's source was almost certainly Saulnier. The legend to this map includes the following passage: "The Blacks are very fine & at good price. The Moors are the Proprietors of the Country and carry on a great trade, as well in Blacks, which they send to Kilwa, as in Ivory, which they sell to the Arabs.

(2) See above, pp.[illegible].

(3) But cf. Dalrymple, Plan of the River Mongallou, in which water is said to be difficult to procure there.

(4) For evidence of the intimacy of Makonde ties with both Lindi and Mikindani, which flank Mongalo to the north and south on the coast, see SD, p.227, and K.Weule, Native Life in East Africa, (trs. A. Werner), London, 1909, p.258.

of Mongalo would scarcely be contested by the Imam, as he gained no tribute from it. On the other hand, he believed that it would be welcomed by the Swahili, who lived in fear of the Arabs.

For the most part, the Arabs who frequented Mongalo came from Mombasa. All trade to the north, particularly that in Indian goods, was controlled by them , while the Swahili were obliged to see European merchandise at Moçambique. The Mombasa Arabs reputedly tyrannized the people of Mongalo in their commercial transactions, obliging them to sell their slaves and ivory in exchange for low quality cloth from Surat, iron, muskets and powder. Without indicating the unit of measure, Saulnier de Mondevit pointed out that the Arabs paid only 7 or 8 piastres for the Africans' ivory, whereas Europeans paid twice or thrice this price. "If the Arabs are contrary, they burn the villages," he added. The Islamicized Makonde were particularly eager to be freed from their despotic behavior.

Mongalo's proximity to Portuguese territory was also advantageous, Saulnier de Mondevit claimed, as it would enable the French to tap the trade of that interior for themselves. Elaborating on this point, he observed:

> Mongalo is the part of the /East/ African coast most sunken in the continent; consequently, it is nearer to the mountains inhabited by the Makua, the Makonde, the Ndonde, and the Yao, all different people, continually at war, solely to make each other prisoners, whom they sell. The bands of slaves from this part would come out of preference to Mongalo if there were a European establishment there.

Mongalo is, in fact, most decidedly not "sunken in the continent," but the edge of the Makonde plateau is very near to the coast at Mongalo, as it also is at both Lindi and Mikindani. The real importance of Saulnier de Mondevit's statement is that it shows the Makonde of Tanzania to have been in occupation of the plateau by at least 1785; (1)

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(1) Cf. Dias, Os Macondes, i, pp. 62-5, 75 and map 2.

that it contains clear references to both the Makua and, especially, the Yao being settled in that region by the same date; and that it includes the first known reference to the Ndonde. (1) Furthermore, his observation shows that the Yao living close by the Kilwa coast were already actively engaged in supplying those market towns with slaves.

Saulnier de Mondevit's encouraging reports on trading prospects at Mongalo were immediately followed up by Commarmond, who dispatched Les Bons Amis and Le Furet to that place in February 1786. Both were ill-fated. Le Furet never reached Mongalo, and after taking port at Pondichéry in June was sold there; Les Bons Amis was lost on its arrival at Ile de France, from Mongalo, in December, although its cargo of 400 slaves, wax, and ivory was apparently salvaged. Late in May 1787 he sent the brig La Bonite to Mongalo, where it was followed by La Légère, in August, and La Françoise, in December. Yet another ship, appropriately named Le Mongalo was also being readied for a voyage to Mongalo at the end of that year. Count de Rosily wrote that Commarmond expected to send some 900 slaves from Mongalo to America, but these hopes were unfulfilled, partially due to the loss of La Françoise, at Zanzibar, in February 1788. According to Blancard, the small French vessels which had traded at Mongalo each embarked only 100 to 150 slaves. Furthermore, the prices of slaves at Mongalo were equal to those of Kilwa by 1787, and had, by mid-1789, doubled since the time of Saulnier's first visit in 1785. In view of this situation, the fact that the head tax of 3 piastres each which one paid there, not including presents to the ruler and his chief subordinates, was less than that paid at either Moçambique or Kilwa, made little difference. (2)

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(1) According to Dias, the generic name Ndonde is applied by the Makonde of the plateau to those who live in the valleys and plains of the area, including Makonde, Yao, and Makua. Over the years, however, the Makonde-linked Ndonde evolved certain peculiar customs which set them apart from their neighbours. See ibid., pp.63-86; also Tew, Peoples, pp.26-7; TDB, ii, Lindi: "Tribal History and Legends," p.2 (191), and "Laws, Manners and Customs", p.9 (199)

(2) AF. Col.C4 78, Commarmond to Minister of Navy, Port Louis, 1 November 1787; AF, Col.C4 85, same to same, Ile de France, 20 June 1789; AF, Col.C4 72, "Raport de M.Le Brasseur...," c.1785-1786; Dermigny, Cargaisons Indiennes, i, pp.106, 110, n.23; Blancard, Manuel, p.23

But as both Commarmond and the administrators of Ile de France explained to the Minister of the Navy, the mission of these ships was not restricted to trade. According to Commarmond, Saulnier had first raised the French flag at Mongalo at the end of 1785. Commarmond had accepted the task of maintaining the French present there until an official establishment could be undertaken by the French Government. In fact, he explained, La Bonite was being kept at Mongalo "solely to show the French flag there," a sacrifice which had cost Commarmond a great deal of money. By late 1787 Commarmond's men had constructed a warehouse on the mainland at Mongalo, "under the protection of a small vessel armed with four cannons and with about a twelve man crew." The Governor-General and the Intendant of Ile de France reported that Commarmond had doubled his staff there so that Saulnier's observations could be verified and the rivers which entered the bay could be ascended. All three men strongly urged the Minister of the Navy to found an official French establishment at Mongalo, but their request must have fallen on deaf ears in Paris, for the Revolutionary Government was violently opposed to slavery.(1) Indeed, by the law of 8 Ventôse II (26 February 1794), the slave trade at Ile de France, and presumably also at Bourbon, was temporarily suspended. (2)

After a promising beginning, the French effort to establish a foothold at Mongalo soon failed. Commarmond, who apparently exercised a monopoly of trade there in return for his services to the State, was equally unsuccessful in making Mongalo into an independent rival to Kilwa. The particular welcome which the French had been accorded at Mongalo was apparently somewhat worn out by early 1789, although Commarmond seems not to have been aware of this change when he wrote in June. According to the Portuguese Commandant of Vamizi Island, a

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(1) AF, Col.C^4 95, de Souillac to Minister of the Navy, Ile de France, 14 March 1787; AF, Col. C^4 78, Commarmond to same, Port Louis, 1 November 1787; AF, Col. C^4 85, same to same, Ile de France, 20 June 1789; AF, Col. C^4 96, d'Entrecasteaux and Motais de Narbonne to same, Port Louis, 30 January 1789.

(2) K. Noël, L'Esclavage à l'Ile de France pendant l'Occupation française (1715-1810), Thèse pour le doctorat de l'Université presentée à la Faculté des Lettres de l'Université de Paris, 1953, p.56.

French sloop was forced to quit Mongalo, either as a result of threats from the Sultan of Kilwa, or, as seemed more likely from news he had received from Tungi, from where the sloop had lately departed because of a conflict with the ruler of Mongalo over the non-payment of certain fees. (1) Not surprisingly, the temporary French establishment at Mongalo nevertheless threw a considerable scare into the Portuguese. For some unknown reason, however, they did not realize that it was located at Mongalo. In 1787 it was reported from Vamizi that a French factory had been erected at Mikindani, a belief to which Nogueira de Andrade vigorously subscribed two years later. (2) It is most unlikely that this was so, especially as Mikindani passes all but unnoticed in contemporary French records.

For all the involvement at Mongalo, then, Kilwa remained secure as the principal source of slaves for the French north of Cape Delgado. In fulfilling this role it undoubtedly continued to dominate the ivory and slave trade of Mongalo, as well. According to the figures given by Blancard, which date from 1787, the price for an adult male slave at Kilwa had not risen since 1784, averaging from 35 to 40 piastres. As at Moçambique and the Kerimba Islands, the prices for females and younger males were proportionately less. By 1787, however, not only had the head tax on slaves been raised slightly from 6 to 6½ piastres, but a considerable outlay had to be made in the way of additional presents to various local dignitaries for each cargo. For a sale of 300 slaves made in that year, a French trader had given the Sultan of Kilwa present of cloth and glass equal to about 100 piastres; to his two brothers and an uncle, similar gifts totalling 60 piastres; a further 30 piastres each went to the Sultan's 'Minister' and his

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(1) AHU, CM 26, Bruno de Morais to Tigre, Vamizi, 7 February 1789.
(2) AHU, CM 24 Correa to A.M. de Melo e Castro, Ibo, 25 December 1787; AC, i, 1917, p. 124.

'Secretary'; while 60 piastres were paid to the Omani Governor of Kilwa. While these presents were not so exorbitant as those once demanded by the Portuguese officials to the south, against which Crassons had so strongly protested, they were an extra expense. Another new development in the operation of the French slave trade at Kilwa, and one of which Crassons no doubt approved, was the fact that the French no longer competed among themselves for cargoes, but did their trading in orderly fashion, each vessel in its turn.(1).

No precise figures exist for the volume of the French slave trade at Kilwa during this period. Among others, Crassons was still doing business along that coast, but the grounding there in 1788 of his ship, Pactole, probably terminated his lengthy career as an active slaver in East Africa. Crassons was taken on as a passenger at Kilwa by Captain Levannier of Le Don Royal, which had sailed from Le Havre on 4 March 1788. Leaving Kilwa on 16 September 1788 with a cargo of 500 slaves, Le Don Royal set sail for Saint-Domingue, but was subsequently lost off Assumption, a small desert island to the north of Madagascar. All the slaves were lost, or destroyed, according to Malte-Brun, but Crasson, Levannier, and some of the crew made their way to Anjouan, whence they were transported to Moçambique in a Portuguese ship. From there, passage to France was readily found. It is doubtful if Crassons was able to undertake any further African ventures before his death in 1793.(2)

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(1) Blancard, Manuel, pp.21-3, translated in J.M. Gray, "A French Account," pp.224-5; see above, pp.199-201. According to Captain P. Dallons, in 1788 the head tax on slaves purchased within the dominion of the Imam of Oman was fixed at 5 piastres. It seems doubtful that this limit was ever observed at Kilwa. Dallons says that the treaty was negotiated by a M.de Roussillon, "the commander of a frigate," under the orders of the French government; is it possible that Dallons, writing in 1804, was uncertain of the man's name, and that the French agent was the captain of La Venus, de Rosily, who had treated with the Imam in 1785? See S.D, p.200.

(2) Malte-Brun, Annales des Voyages, Paris, xiii, [illegible], pp.151-2, relevant passages translated in J.M. Gray, "The Recovery of Kilwa by the Arabs in 1785," p.25; AHU, Cod.1472,fl.88, M. de Melo e Castro to A.M. de Melo e Castro, Ajuda, 5 April 1791, enclosing "Registo da Memoria da Informaçaõ que Se pede da parte da Corte de França, pelo Seo Embaixador o Conde de Chalon," which concerns the death at Moçambique of Henri de la Balme, the 17 year old son of Jacques Henri de la Balme, Secretary to Louis XVI, who had been aboard Le Don Royal.

More generally, in December 1788, it was reported to Tigre that there were seven French ships trading at Kilwa, as well as two at Mongalo, but no further particulars are known of these vessels, or their trade. Less than a month later, Melo e Castro reported that eleven French ships were doing business at these ports and at Mikindani, while a Captain Le Maitre told Nogueira de Andrade that during the nine months in which he had lived at Kilwa, five other French ships were taking on slaves there. Le Maitre, who was engaged in the American slave trade, also led Nogueira de Andrade to believe that the French still had a trading convention with the Sultan of Kilwa, and that a stretch of shorefront there which had been sold to a French ship's captain now belonged to the French Crown, to whom the captain presented it. There is no confirming evidence of this, and one must doubt its accuracy, in view of official reaction to Morice's original proposal and the establishment of Omani hegemony at Kilwa. On the other hand, Melo e Castro's belief that the effective campaign to prevent the French from slave trading in the Kerimba Islands was an important factor in driving them to the Swahili ports appears to have been well founded.(1)

Very little is known about the French slave trade along the Kilwa coast in the early 1790s. Apparently, it continued to flourish at the same pace into 1793, after which time the fear of war caused a temporary hiatus, just as it did at Moçambique. (2) In the

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(1) AHU, CM 25, Tigre to A.M. de Melo e Castro, Ibo, 24 December 1788; AHU, CM 26, A.M. de Melo e Castro to M. de Melo e Castro, Moç., 14 January 1789; AC, i, 1917, p.125

(2) AHU, CM 31, Alves da Silva to Sousa, Ibo, 19 August 1795.

following year the Sultan of Kilwa is known to have written to the Portuguese Governor-General, but as the correspondence has not been found it is unknown if this was in any way related to the French trade.(1).

Although the French resumed slave trading at Moçambique and the Kilwa coast after a lapse of only about two years, after 1794 they no longer occupied the uniquely dominating position in that trade which they had in the previous decade. The French slave trade in East-Central Africa did not apparently decline, and they continued to play an important part, but the increasing importance of Brazilian, and, to a far lesser extent, American slavers along that coast, prevented the continuation of their near monopoly. Of course, one must remember that throughout this period the Arabs were also trading for slaves at Kilwa and its associated ports. Moreover, despite the lack of documentation, it would appear that this trade was steadily increasing. Were there sources from which one could evaluate the volume of this trade, the present impression of French domination of the slave trade along the Kilwa coast might well need some revision.

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(1) AHU, CM 28, Correa to same, Ibo, 22 February 1794.

2. Yao responses

During the period of French dominance of the external slave trade of East-Central Africa, the internal trade of that area was marked by the continuing trend of the Yao to carry their goods to the Kilwa coast, rather than to Moçambique. To be sure, there are a few passing references to the Yao at Moçambique, but these suggest that their trade was of less importance than in years past.(1) In the trading season of 1795, the Governor-General of Moçambique wrote that the introduction of better quality trading cloths at Zanzibar, as well as of European goods, was "diverting from us the concourse of the Yao, who, in the time of my predecessors, used to convey from two hundred to three hundred bares of ivory to Mossuril, now, since that of the government of my predecessor [i.e., since 1786], and during mine, bring scarcely thirty to forty." (2) Sousa's observation is particularly valuable in that it comes at the end of a decade in which there were no unusual disturbances on the Moçambique coast which might have inhibited the Yao from trading there. The scarcity of references to the Makua in the documentation remaining from this period tactily bears witness to the absence of serious conflict between them and the Portuguese. Those which have been found support this impression, and although desultory raids were made on Mossuril in the middle of 1789, there are no indications that these in any way affected trading to Moçambique. (3) Similarly, the

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(1) Tigre to A.M. de Melo e Castro, Moç., 28 March 1790, in C. Montez, "Inventário do Fundo do Século XVIII," Moçambique, 76, 1953, p.134, Document 69; BNL, FG Cod. 8105, anon., "Moçambique," n.d., but post-1783; cf. EHGEP, pp.295-6, and Andrade, Relações, p.389, although this reference merely echoes earlier descriptions of this trade.

(2) AHU, CM 31, Sousa to M. de Melo e Castro, Moç., 22 August 1795; cf. Teixeira Botelho, História, 1, p.493; Jackson, European Powers, p.95; see also, AC, i, 1917, p.126.

(3) AHU, CM 22, Manuel Galvão da Silva to ?same, Moç., n.d. but dated from other sources to August 1785; AHU, CM 26, A.M. de Melo e Castro to same, Moç., 14 January & 19 August 1789.

Banians appear to have been allowed to carry on their business at Moçambique with a minimum of bother. Although the royal orders of 1785 advised Melo e Castro to continue the prohibition against their "trading personally on the mainland," the Governor-General appears to have reinstituted the granting of passports to individual merchants. Besides, the Banians frequently consigned merchandise to Swahili agents who lived on the mainland and introduced it tax free at Quitangonha and Cabaceira Pequena.(1) In fact, in view of the controversy over the position of Banian traders at Moçambique up to 1785, one is disappointed to find that there are few references to the problem during the following two decades. The picture that emerges, then, is that the Yao were directing most of their trade to the Kilwa coast for the single reason that they were able to get a better price, and better merchandise, for their ivory there.

Matters become less simple after 1795, which marks the beginning of a period of considerable confusion along the Moçambique coast. Peaceful conditions were upset not only on the continent, but also in the coastal waters. The debilitating effect of these disturbances was most pronounced in the already decadent Portuguese possessions in the Cape Delgado area. At the same time, one begins to detect the growing importance of the slave trade among the Yao, or at least among those trading to Moçambique. This is not a development which can easily be traced. On the one hand, the increasing Portuguese preoccupation with military affairs is harshly reflected in official documentation by a disappointing lack of references to matters of internal trade, such as those which abound from about 1750 to 1785. One must rely far more extensively on the accounts of visitors, or

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(1) EHGEP, pp.295-6, and Andrade, Relações, pp.388-9; AHU, CM 25, Tigre, to A.M. de Melo e Castro, Ibo, 24 December 1788; AHU, CM 26, Nascimento Nunes to Crown, "Denuncio...," Moç., 10 June 1790, pp 19; AHU, CM 54, Sheikh of Quitangonha, Zafir Salimo, requerimento, /Moç./ n.d. but definitely post-1804 and probably c.1810; see above, p.191; see also Lobato, Lourenço Marques, ii, pp.298 & 312, for further evidence of Melo e Castro's and Sousa's toleration of the Banians.

the scattered memoirs of individual Portuguese officials. On the other, it is from this epoch that one's ignorance of the internal divisions of the Yao becomes most critical, and that the inclination to regard the Yao as an undifferentiated whole becomes progressively more unsatisfactory. The nascent tendency of at least some Yao to regard slaves, rather than ivory, as their most important stock in trade, seems possibly to have modulated the responses which they had made throughout the eighteenth century to factors affecting the ivory market at the coast.

As we have seen previously, longer periods of peaceful relations between the Portuguese and their African neighbours were generally characterized by the building up of petty grievances which eventually led to the recommencement of hostilities by the latter. These periods reflected the temporary triumphs of Portuguese power over the local chiefs.(1) This process of deterioration was probably acerbated after 1787 by the decision in that year to permit the residents of Moçambique legally to trade firearms and gunpowder to the Makua, with whom a brisk trade was at once begun by leading Portuguese, whose agents negotiated these goods exclusively for slaves.(2) Peace finally was broken by the eruption of fighting between the Sheikh of Quitangonha and the Portuguese in 1795. A declared state of war existed from 1795 to 1796, and, after an uneasy truce, from 1799 through 1801. The Sheikh, formerly a Portuguese ally, commanded a wide following not only on the island of Quitangonha, but also on the mainland of Matibane. From the beginning of the conflict, the Portuguese sought to ally the

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(1) See above, pp. 109, 112-14, 116, 174-82.

(2) AHU, CM 23, A.M.de Melo e Castro to M. de Melo e Castro, Moç., 27 August 1787 (two letters bearing same date); AHU, CM 26, same to same, Moç., 13 August 1789; for a reference to the forging of musket balls by local Makua smiths, see AHU, CM 22, Galvão da Silva, "Noticia Sobre as duas Minas de ferro, e a mostras de pedras que mando," Moç., 21 August 1785.

important Makua chiefs to their side. The Portuguese repulsed an attack on Mossuril in 1799 and by late August of that year had made preparations for a major expedition of their allies, said to number more than 14,000 strong, against the Sheikh. For the moment, both Mwaviamuno and Mauruça had joined the Portuguese against Quitangonha, and in December Mauruça carried out a damaging raid in Matibane. Despite the grandiose plans of the Portuguese for large expeditions, however, most of the warring was carried out by individual chiefs acting independently and for their own purposes.(1)

Several years later, the roles were reversed, with the Portuguese lined up with the new Sheikh of Quitangonha, who had succeeded on the death of his recalcitrant predecessor in 1804, against Murimuno, who had submitted to Portuguese rule in 1784.(2) Once again the catalysts of the conflict were the robbery of trade goods sent by the Portuguese into the interior and the harboring of fugitive slaves. In the latter case Murimuno was demanding the not inconsiderable ransom of 20 cruzados for each of these slaves. During 1807 the Portuguese carried out several strikes against his territory. While these were successful, only limited damage was inflicted on the Makua, who soon retaliated with a raid on Mossuril. It was the same sort of conflict which had always prevailed between these two foes. A report by the Governor-General on the progress of the war is especially illuminating in that it reveals the extent to which the Portuguese were involved in the

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(1) AHU, CM 31, Sousa to Manuel Pereira Baptista, Moç., 8 February 1795; AHU, CM 28, Alves da Silva to Sousa, Ibo, 9 October 1795; AHU, CM 35, Francisco Guedes de Carvalho e Meneses da Costa to D. Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho, Moç., 25 August 1799; AHU, CM 36, Luís Correa Monteiro de Matos to ?Gov., Mossuril, 5 December 1799; ibid., same, or José António Caldas to ?Gov., Mossuril, 1799 [fragment]; AHU, CM 37, António Álvares de Macedo to Gov., Uticulo, 16 February 1801; AHU, CM 38, Meneses da Costa to Sousa Coutinho, Moç., 21 September 1801; ibid., Isidro de Almeida de Sousa e Sá to same, Moç., 23 September 1801; see Teixeira Botelho, História, pp.501-3, 529-30.

(2) AHU, CM 44, Isidro de Almeida de Sousa e Sá to Visconde de Anadia, Moç., 28 October 1804; see above, pp.180-182.

"court" intrigues of their Makua neighbors, a policy which was dictated by their military weakness on the mainland. The Governor-General first was hopeful of placing a disgruntled relative of the previous Murimuno into that chieftaincy. When this candidated proved fainthearted, the Portuguese looked to a kinsman of the deceased Uticulo chief Impahiamuno to be installed as a more pliant Murimuno. At the writing of his report, the Governor-General was planning to convoke "a public congress in conformity with African manners" for his nomination.(1)

While it is not known if a rival Murimuno actually was installed by the Portuguese, it is clear that the situation in Macuana remained very confused and potentially explosive. In 1808 the robberies committed by Napitamuno, whose bailiwick was located on the coast just north of Quitangonha, as well as certain other Makua disorders around Mossuril, annoyed the Portuguese; but the outbreak of serious fighting in Uticulo, early in the next year, posed a far more serious problem. (2) As early as March 1809 internal warring had driven the reigning Impahiamuno from Uticulo to the Portuguese Crown land which served as a buffer between the coastal settlements and the interior. Impahiamuno soon sought retaliation against Mauruça, his chief rival, but by early May the Portuguese were actively seeking to maintain peace with this powerful ruler. There had recently been some skirmishes between Mwaviamuno and Mocaromuno, and the Portuguese feared that this might lead to a more dangerous situation. For the Portuguese, António Alberto Macedo emphasized his desire for peace with Mauruça, courting him with presents

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(1) AHU, Cod.1372, fl.26v.-28, [Francisco de Paula e Albuquerque de Amaral Cardoso] to same, Moç., 9 October 1807; cf. Salt, Voyage to Abyssinia, pp.38-9, who incorrectly attributes the Makua sacking of the parish church at Mossuril, which occurred in the raid of 1776, to the 1807 attack; see above, pp.174-5.

(2) BNL, FG,Cod. 8470,n. 4, Caldas to Prov.Govt., Moç., 5 November 1808; AHU, CM 50, José António Caldas to Prov.Govt., Moç., 17 August 1808; see Dicionário Corográfico,ii,p.102.

and assured him that "you can freely send your people to the coast to trade." A week after writing to Mauruça, Macedo reported that Impahiamuno had turned up at his residence in the middle of the night, having again been driven from Itoculo.(1)

The outcome of that year's fighting is not known, but events of the following year indicate that there was no resolution of differences between the various Makua chiefs. As always, everyone pursued his own interests and alliances of convenience abounded. No single power on the mainland was able to enforce its will on the others, so that there was a constant jockeying for position which must have considerably upset peaceful conditions there. The most active protagonist of 1810 was the Sheikh of Quitangonha, who rendered the Portuguese considerable service by his actions. In May, after first seeking Portuguese sanction, he joined Mauruça in a successful war against a certain Madulamuno, whose territory appears to have been located well to the north of Uticulo. Following some indeterminate warring among various Makua chiefs in the neighborhood of Mossuril in June, which the Portuguese discreetly observed without daring to intervene, the Sheikh began in August an extensive campaign, at specific Portuguese request, against a number of Macuana chiefs. In the following weeks he was not only instructed to chastize dissident chiefs near his own territory, such as Cherepomuno (or Cherepwemuno) and Moveramuno to the north, but also those to the south of Moçambique, like the Sheikh of Mogincual, which necessitated an amphibious attack. Unofficial fears of the Sheikh of Quitangonha's ultimate intentions proved completely unfounded, as the Makua alone continued to harass the mainland.(2)

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(1) AHU, CM 52, Macedo to Prov.Govt., Moç., 10 April 1809; ibid., same to Mauruça, Mossuril, 9 May 1809, enclosed in same to Prov.Govt., Mossuril, 10 May 1809; ibid., same to same, Mossuril, 16 & 17 May 1809.

(2) AHU, CM 53, Macedo to António Manuel de Melo Castro e Mendança, Moç., 7 May 1810; AHU, Cod. 1380, fl.35-6, Mendonça to Conde das Galveâs, Moç., 8 November 1810; AHU, Cod.1377, fl.38, 45-7, same to Sheikh of Quitangonha, Mossuril, 1 August, 29 September, & 7 October 1810; ibid., fl.49, same to same, Moç., 3 November 1810 (two letters bearing same date); AHU, CM 53, Sheikh of Quitangonha, Zafir Salimo, to ?Mendonça, Campo de Chagan, 6 October 1810.

On 16 November a combined force of some 1300 men, armed with guns and under the orders of Mwasemuno, Cherepomuno, and Moveramuno, attacked Sanculo and Lumbo on the coast. As Portuguese retaliation on their withdrawal to the interior was unusually effective, and the ever active Sheikh of Quitangonha followed this up with an immediate raid involving more than 3500 men, the Portuguese decided to mount a final, crushing expedition against these Makua. This brief campaign was notable chiefly for the fact that in it the Portuguese utilized field artillery for the first time against the Makua. The general effect of these combined efforts was to restore a temporary semblance of Portuguese hegemony over parts of the immediate interior, but the area was in such a state of general unrest that complete order remained unattainable for the moment.(1)

If conditions around Moçambique were precarious at the end of the first decade of the nineteenth century, they were desperate at the Kerimba Islands and the coast below Cape Delgado. Whatever hopes there may have been in the mid-1790s for a revival of this important Portuguese frontier with the Muslim north were crushed by the series of blows struk at these establishments in the following years. In 1794 prospects were bleak enough, with the islands "totally uninhabited" except for the poor and miserable denizens, almost no troops, provisions scarce, and the fortifications in disrepair, according to the local governor.(2) Throughout that same year there were numerous petty conflicts with the Makua, who had risen in " a great revolution" on the death of João de Morais, long the only

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(1) AHU, CM 54 & Cod.1374, fl.85-6, João Vicente de Cardenas e Mira, Campo de Impoença, 24 November 1810; AHU, Cod.1380, fl.46-8, Mendonça to Galveâs, Moç., 28 November 1810; AHU, CM 53, Cardenas é Mira to Mendonça, Mossuril, 12 December 1810.

(2) AHU, CM 29, Correa to Sousa, Ibo, 10 June 1794, enclosed in Sousa to M. de Melo e Castro, Moç., 20 August 1794.

bastion of Portuguese authority on the mainland. During the next year it became increasingly difficult to prevent French corsairs from slaving along that coast, and in 1796, despite official French protestations of peace, French vessels attacked both Ibo and Pangani, the latter located on the mainland opposite Macaloe, now known as Mahato, Island. (1) The end of the century saw a continuation of Makua harassment, a severe famine and an epidemic of an unidentified fever in 1798, and a move towards the abolition of the alfândega at Ibo. Trade was at a standstill, except for the Swahili slave trade from around Vamizi to the north.(2)

In 1800 a new threat to the islands appeared from the sea: these were the Sakalava and allied raiders from the northwest coast of Madagascar. During the next two decades they were the cause of extensive devastation along the African coast from Ibo to Mafia, where the presence of their fleet of lakas, single sail and single outrigger canoes, in the Moçambique Channel was a threat to all other shipping in those waters. The original impetus for these raids, which were organized for the express purpose of capturing slaves, did not come from the Sakalava, but from the piratical Betsimisaraka of the northeastern coast of the great island. The idea of striking at the Comoro archipelago and eventually at the coast of East Africa may well have been partly introduced by French slavers and pirates, or by the Antalaotes, a people of mixed Arab, Malgache, and African blood, speaking a Swahili dialect, who had a long tradition of commercial intercourse with these places. The

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(1) Ibid., Correa to Sousa, Ibo, 27 January 1794; ibid., Sousa to Correa, Moç., 6 November 1794; AHU, CM 31, bando, Álvares da Silva, Ibo, 27 August 1795; AHU, CM 30, same to Sousa, Ibo, 18 October 1795; AHU, CM 32, same to same, Ibo, 26 March 1796 & series of letters dated 10-12 October 1796; cf. Teixeira Botelho, História, pp.551-3; Jackson, European Powers, pp.47-8.

(2) AHU, CM 35 & Cód.1472, fl.149-50, royal alvará, Lisboa, 13 or 14 March 1798; AHU, CM 35, Álvares da Silva to Meneses da Costa, Ibo, 2 June 1798; ibid., 24 moradores to same, Querimba, 28 February 1799; ibid., António da Silva Pinto to same, Ibo, 21 November 1799; AHU, CM 36 Meneses da Costa to Silva Pinto, Moç., 19 June 1800; ibid., Álvares da Silva to Nicolau Luís da Graça, Ibo, 8 March 1799.

first raids were organized in the last quarter of the eighteenth century and until 1800 extended no farther than the Comoro Islands. The Portuguese first learned of them in 1789 from a Comorien "prince" who sought aid for himself and other local rulers from "the continual invasions of the Sakalava pirates."(1) The expeditions appear to have been raised annually or biennially, with the greater ones coming at four year intervals. Beginning towards October, Betsimisaraka chiefs from Tamatave assembled boatloads, of about three dozen warriors each, in proportion to their personal power. These then departed together for the north, slowly picking up the boats of other Malgache chiefs as they passed along the coast and around the northern end of Madagascar to the small island of Nossi-Bé, off the extreme northwest coast of Madagascar. Here, or sometimes at Karakadzouro, a Sakalava port, they were joined by the Sakalava boats which were sent independently by various chiefs and not at the order of the Sakalava ruler, then Queen Ravahiny. In the years of the great expeditions, as many as 400 to 500 outriggers carrying 15,000 to 18,000 men set out from the northwest coast against the Comoro Islands and the African coast. Expeditions which had originated around Tamatave in October of one year did not set out from Nossi-Bé until the August monsson of the next.(2)

The Sakalava raid of 1800 (the Portuguese almost always identified them by this name alone) gave only a tiny glimpse of what was to follow in later years. Only three small boats with some sixty men

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(1) AHU, CM 26, Principe dos Mulates to "Senhores," n.d., but enclosed in folder dated 1789. This ruler was probably a sheikh on Mayotte (Maotwe), rather than Mohilla (Moali)Island; see Coupland, East Africa and its Invaders, p.164.

(2)Deschamps, Histoire de Madagascar, p.44-6,52,93,100-1,103-8; A.Gevrey, Essai sur les Comores, Pondichéry, 1870,pp.127-8,131,187,210-13; Capmartin & E.Colin, "Essai sur les îles Comores, presenté à la Société d'Émulation de l'Ile-de-France," in Malte-Brun, Annales des Voyages,iii,1811,pp.129-70; Guillain, Documents sur l'Histoire, la géographie et le commerce de la partie occidentale de Madagascar, Paris, 1845, pp.33,199-200; cf. W.H. Smyth, The Life and Services of Captain Philip Beaver, London, 1829,p.256; see below, pp.250-1.

were involved in several hit and run raids in the Vamizi district, after their arrival there on 29 November. Yet despite superior numbers the local inhabitants panicked in the face of these attacks. According to Teixeira Botelho, who misdates these raids to 1801 and incorrectly states that Portuguese resistance was responsible for driving them off, in the next year the Sakalava returned again and carried out a series of desultory strikes against various points along the coast. He says that they appeared as far south as Sanculo and Mogincual, where they were withstood with the help of the Sheikh of Mogincual, whose usual belligerence against the Portuguese was undoubtedly overlooked in view of the challenge of a common enemy.(1) In 1804 a Portuguese vessel from Moçambique, A Boa Mai, was sacked by the Sakalava in the port of Domoni, at Anjovan Island. Reacting to this outrage, to a call for help from the Sultan of Domoni, and to news that the Sakalava were assembling a 600 boat expedition to attack the Portuguese, in January 1805 the Portuguese Governor-General dispatched the royal schooner Emboscada to patrol those waters and "to vanquish them [the Sakalava] at sea and on the land." It was well over two years later before the Portuguese learned definitely that the Sakalava seized and burned the Emboscada, as well as annihilating its entire crew.(2)

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(1) AHU, CM 38, Silva Pinto to Meneses da Costa, Ibo, 24 February 1801; Teixeira Botelho, História, pp.565-6; see also J.J. Lapa & A.B.C. de Castro Ferreti, Elementos para um Diccionario Chorographico da Provincia de Moçambique, Lisboa, 1889, p.2.

(2) AHU, Cod.1372,fl.7v., Sousa e Sá to Anadia, Moç., 9 July 1805; ibid., fl.11v.-12, Amaral Cardoso to same, Moç., 6 January 1806; ibid., fl.28v., Prov.Govt. to same, Moç., 10 October 1807; cf. Teixeira Botelho, História, pp.566-8, where he suppresses the fact that the Portuguese ship and crew were destroyed by the Sakalava, falsely explaining that storms forced it to return to port without achieving its mission, after several indecisive encounters with the enemy. He also omits all details of the more successful Sakalava raids against Portuguese territory.

In the meantime, rumors had reached Moçambique that a massive attack involving some 20,000 to 25,000 warriors was being contemplated by the Sakalava. While these were discounted by the Governor-General as being exaggerated, he reported that a horde of perhaps 10,000 Sakalava had indeed overrun both Mohilla and Mayotte Islands.(1) Finally, in September 1808, the long dreaded attack came. According to the report of two Banian traders who encountered the Sakalava, they struck first at Arimba, south of Ibo, and then moved down the coast as far as Shanga cove, where the important settlement of Ushanga was located, from where they turned back towards the islands again. The Sakalava, whom Guillain states numbered as many as 8000 men, attacked the main Portuguese settlements on Ibo and Querimba Islands, driving all those inhabitants who were not captured, or who had not taken refuge in the fort at Ibo, into the interior of the mainland. Eventually they set off towards the Vamizi coast, attacked Tungi, and penetrated some distance inland. They remained at Tungi until 4 January 1809 before quitting the coast to return home. The damage they had wreaked during these months was extensive. The capital of Ibo was in a miserable state, while virtually all other Portuguese settlements were even worse hit. Some eight hundred prisoners, including the foreira (female lessee) of Vamizi, were known to have been captured by the Sakalava, and a good many more must have been taken in areas lying outside the immediate jurisdiction of the Portuguese. Nevertheless, the expedition was not completed without a considerable loss of life by the Sakalava, many of whom died from small-pox. Rather appropriately, it seems from Guillain's account that the disease was contracted in 1807 from Moçambique slaves who were aboard a French vessel which had been captured near Cap d'Ambre, the northernmost point of Madagascar, before the Betsimisaraka and the

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(1) AHU, CM 46 & Cod.1372, fl.11 & v., Amaral Cardoso to Anadia, Moç., 4 January 1806

Sakalava contingents joined forces at Nossi-Bé. But this news cannot have been sufficient to still the fears of the people who had experienced the raids of 1808. Late in 1810 they heard from both the Sultans of Grand Comoro and Anjowan, the latter of whom had sent a pangaio "to sound the alarm at every port of this coast from Zanzibar to this port of Ibo, that the Sakalava were preparing a great number of boats for coming to make war on this coast in the /forth-coming/ appropriate monsoon /i.e. of August 1811/." (1)

Throughout most of this decade the Makua, and occasionally the Makonde, continued to harass the coastal settlements of the Portuguese. Fighting extended along the length of the Kerimba Islands mainland and the populace lived in considerable fear of attack from the Africans. The chief belligerents were the Makua chiefs Mugabo and Mutuga, who should probably be identified as Mutica, a chief who by mid-century, if not necessarily at this time, was subordinate to Mugabo. Mutuga's town was then situated near the mouth of the Tari River, just north of Pemba Bay, while Mugabo's stood behind the coast between that bay and the Lúrio River. According to the Portuguese, Mutuga's power was such that he dominated both the coast and the immediate hinterland from the mouth of the Lurio River north to Kissanga, the principal Swahili settlement on that part of the coast. The prazo, or Portuguese Crown grant estate, of Arimba was in his possession.(2) He was especially odious to the Portuguese adminstration because he encouraged Swahili traders from north of Cape Delgado to trade in his domain,

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(1) AHU, CM 48, Prov.Govt. to Pereira, Moç., 20 September 1808; ibid. & Cod.1372,fl.32v.-33, same to Anadia, Moç., 10 November 1808; AHU, CM 52, Pereira to Prov.Govt., Ibo, 1 April 1809; AHU, CM 54, Jerónimo Fernandes Viana to same, Ibo, 16 & 19 February 1810; AHU, CM 53, Francisco António de Sousa César to Mendonça, Ibo, 28 December 1810; Guillain, Madagascar, pp.200-1; for a description of Shanga cove and Ushanga, see Dicionário Corográfico,i,pp.9-10. Cf. RSEA, ix,pp.5,12-13.

(2) For a rare reference to the prazo system in the Kerimba Islands and to the donas de Ibo, such as the woman captured by the Sakalava in 1808, see Boxer, Portuguese Expansion, pp.60-1.

welcoming them especially at the Tari. The Portuguese feared to attack his town there, as it would lead at once to a major war with Mutuga. From Kissanga to Vamizi district the Makua and Makonde limited themselves to small raids, which Governor Pereira admitted were usually "caused by our people, who capture and sell any Kaffir still free," so that there was no end to these disturbances. Agriculture was thus limited by the fact that many Africans had fled the immediate coast for the interior in order to escape being enslaved.(1) Lacking the military power to deal with the Africans as they would have liked, the Governor-General could only advise the continuation of a policy of conciliation and amity.(2) As did the Sheikh of Mogincual and the Portuguese at Moçambique, the Africans and the Portuguese in the northern part of the province undoubtedly suspended their hostility when both were more seriously threatened by the Sakalava.

It was impossible for any considerable external trade to be carried on in these conditions. Owing to Makua and Makonde hostility, neither coastal traders, nor their patamares, could travel in safety through the interior.(3) The danger of encountering the Sakalava, in combination with Portuguese antipathy in the Kerimba Islands towards French corsairs, prevented a revival of the French slave trade at Ibo, although two vessels took on a small number of slaves

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(1) AHU, CM 38, Silva Pinto to Sousa e Sá, Ibo, 5 November 1801; AHU, CM 40, same to António Francisco Bernandes, Ibo, 24 March 1802; AHU, CM 46, Rodrigo Berri to Sousa e Sá, Ibo, 16 February 1805; ibid., parecer, Senado da Câmara, Ibo, 12 November 1805; AHU, CM 48, Pereira to Amaral Cardoso, Ibo, 26 February 1807; Dicionário Corográficao,i,pp.96-7,115,165; see also Worsfold, Portuguese Nyassaland, larger pocket map,,for location of the Tari River.

(2) AHU, CM 48, Amaral Cardoso to Pereira, Moç., 23 March 1807.

(3) AHU, CM 48, João Gonzales Delgado to António da Costa Portugal, Mocimboa, 25 November 1806; ibid., Costa Portugal to Pereira, Muluri, 12 January 1807.

there in March and April 1805,(1) The only trade which continued regularly to be plied was the slave trade with the Swahili from the north. As we have seen, this was actively encouraged by Mutuga. There is no way to calculate the volume of this trade during the first decade of the nineteenth century, but there can be no doubt that virtually all sabotage was halted during the Sakalava campaign of 1808. Thereafter, one suspects that this trade dwindled whenever word reached the African coast that a new expedition was being mounted at Madagascar. Nevertheless, when Swahili traders arrived in the islands, whether coming from the northern coast, or the Seychelles, Comoros, or Madagascar, the local moradores gave them full cooperation. Despite repeated bandos to the contrary, this trade was almost their only way of maintaining themselves above a level of mere subsistence. In recognition of this fact, and of the miserable state of the moradores in the wake of the Sakalava onslaught, at the end of 1810 the local Governor at last relented and began to issue licenses for Swahili vessels wishing to trade legally for non-Christian slaves in the islands.(2).

In the interior, there was a movement away from carrying goods to the coast opposite the Kerimba Islands and towards taking them to ports lying north of Cape Delgado. This shift was well under way by the very beginning of the new century and was certainly not reversed during the remaining years of that decade. António da Silva Pinto,

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(1) AHU, CM 41, Berri to Sous e Sá, Ibo, 15 December 1803; AHU, CM 46, same to same, Ibo, 15 April 1805; AHU, CM 47, same to Amaral Cardoso, Ibo, 30 January 1806.

(2) AHU, CM 38, Silva Pinto to Sousa e Sá, Ibo, 25 February & 5 November 180[illegible]; AHU, CM 46, Berri to same, n.d., but probably 1805; ibid., same to same, Ibo, 17 January 1805; AHU, CM 50, Pereira to Amaral Cardoso, Ibo, 26 February 1807; AHU, CM 48, same to same, Ibo, 10 March 1807; AHU, CM 54, Sousa César to Mendonça, Ibo, 28 December 1810; enclosing requerimento, the moradores of the Kerimba Islands, n.d., but post-July 1810.

Governor of the islands at the beginning of the nineteenth century, (1) wrote:

> All these lands [i.e. within Portuguese jurisdiction] are surrounded by the Makua Kaffirs, and through theirs run trails (estradas de comunicação), some which go to Moçambique, and others to Zanzibar.
>
> There used to be a considerable trade in ivory, rice, maize, and oils which were exported every year in great quantities to Moçambique. This [trade] is extinct as a result of the Kaffirs of the interior going to Zanzibar, for they find there greater profit and better clothes than ours.(2)

It may be seen, then, that the Yao were not the only people in East-Central Africa who were responding to basic changes in the conditions of trade at the coast by shifting the direction of their trade from the Moçambique to the Kilwa coast.

As suggested at the beginning of this section, however, the pattern of Yao trading during this period was not so simple as that. While all relevant evidence emphasizes the continuation of this trend, there is other documentation which suggests that the Yao slave trade to Moçambique was gaining in importance. The most logical explanation for this phenomenon is that while most of the Yao were indeed channelling their trade, especially that in ivory, to the Kilwa coast, those chiefs, or perhaps that section of the Yao nation, who were trading to Moçambique were concentrating their efforts on developing the slave trade, so that ivory was becoming of secondary importance to them. This was a direct reversal of traditional Yao commercial priorities.

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(1) AHU, Cod.1485, fl.16, termo de posse (term of tenure), Silva Pinto, Ibo, 23 June 1799; ibid., fl.21, termo de posse, Berri, Ibo, 17 June 1802.

(2) AHU, CM 38, Silva Pinto, "Discripção das Terras do Cabo Delgado pertencentes a Coroa," Ibo, 24 November 1801; for a verbatim citation of this report, see AHU, CM 50, Prov. Govt. to Crown, Moç., 22 October 1807.

A careful examination of the sources reveals the forces which were influencing the trade of East-Central Africa during this period.

The end of the eighteenth century was a time of experimentation for the commercial administration of Portuguese East Africa. Beginning in 1787 and ending in 1804, after which date they remained unaltered until 1846, the alfândega duties in force at Moçambique were repeatedly juggled in a futile attempt to get the colony on its feet financially. Those of importance to the trade of the Yao were the taxes levied on the importation of trading cloths, beads, and the exportation of goods to the Rivers of Sena. Before 1787, imports of velório, the basic trade beads, were taxed at a rate of 20% on their value, while all re-exports going to the Zambezi paid a 40% duty. From 1787 to 1793, the tax on velório was reduced to 15% and the re-exportation tax on cloths only to 30%. In 1793 both were further lowered to 10%, but the measure was soon attacked from several quarters for being detrimental to both trade and the Royal Treasury. The re-export tax was pushed all the way back up to 40% by 1800, but in the next year it was finally established at the 1787 rate of 30%. At the same time, however, the import duty on velório was re-set at 20%, while merchandise arriving from Diu and Damão, the chief sources of trade cloth at Moçambique, was taxed at a 10% rate. It is not clear whether goods entering Moçambique on foreign vessels paid 15% or 20% of their value.(1) From the point of view of the African trader, the high

(1) AHU, CM 32 & Cod.1478,fl.7-9, alvará, A.M. de Melo e Castro, Moç.,21 July 1787; AHU, CM 29, Sousa to M. de Melo e Castro, Moç., 28 July 1794; AHU, CM 33, Merchants of Moç. to Sousa, Moç., 17 October 1796; ibid., decision taken by the Deputies of the Junta da Fazenda Real, Moç., 8 April 1797; AHU, Cod.1472, fl.155-6, Crown to Meneses da Costa, Queluz, 2 April 1799; Annaes do Conselho Ultramarino, parte não official,v,1864, pp.65-6; Lobato, Lourenço Marques, ii,pp.291-8, 308-13,397-402; see also, AHU, CM 33, João da Silva Guedes, "Declaraçaõ expecificada do modo por que se cobravaõ os Direitos nesta Alf.a por entrada e Sahida...," n.d., but perhaps c.1797; AHU, Cod.1472,fl.176-83, D. Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho to Sousa e Sá, Lisboa, 28 February 1801; AHU, Cod.1500,fl.59, Vicente José da Silva Negrão, "Pautta da Regulaçaõ dos Direitos da entrada, e Sahida da Alfandega de Moss.a," Moç., 10 August 1803.

taxes prevailing in the Rivers of Sena continued to inflate the value of the merchandise in which the Africans were most interested, so that they were consequently offered less cloth and fewer beads for their goods there.

In the middle of the eighteenth century, identical circumstances had caused trade which would normally have been expected to go to Tete to be diverted in preference to Moçambique.(1) In fact, ivory exportations were unusually high in 1793, totalling about 12,885 arrobas (more than 800 bares, as compared with an average of less than 600 bares in the years 1759-1761); but they were not quite half this in 1801, and rose only to about 7300 arrobas in 1809.(2) Furthermore, all the evidence which we possess explicitly emphasizes the decline of the Yao ivory trade to Moçambique in this period. There are also indications that the ivory trade from the subordinate ports to Moçambique was proportionately more important than it had been previously. (3) One's belief that such was the case is strengthened by the dramatic decline in the ivory exports from Moçambique between 1793 and the first decade of the nineteenth century, when Portuguese coastal waters below the capital were constantly threatened by French corsairs.

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(1) See above, pp. 138-9.

(2) AHU, CM 32, Silva Guedes, "Relação exacta dos despaches do Marfim... que desta Capital se exportou em o anno de 1793," Moç., 18 July 1796; AHU, CM 38, idem., "Mapa do marfim...q. se despachar. p.r sah.a p.a a India...," Moç., 3 September 1801, enclosed in Sousa e Sá to Sousa Coutinho, Moç., 5 November 1801; AHU, Cod.1381, fl.4, Silva Guedes, "Mapa de Marfim... nesta Monçaõ de Agosto de 1809;" see above, p. 108.

(3) See AHU, CM 39, Joaquim Giraldes Rosa, "Mappa da Carga que tras a Goleta Maria do Porto de Inhambane para esta Capital dado pello Capitaõ...," [Moç.], 11 April 1802 (2070 tusks, weighing 64 bares, 11 arrobas); ibid., José Sebastião Jorge de Brito, "Mapa do Estado atoal do Brique S.to Ant.o Deligente," "Hoje d'Agosto [sic] de 1802," (420 arrobas); AHU, CM 43, anon., "Mapa da Carga da Cruveta Felis Costa," n.d. (30 bares); ibid., António Norberto de Barbosa de Vilasboas Truão to Felix Lamberto da Silva Bandeira, Tete, 5 November 1804; AHU, CM 50, Prov. Govt. to Crown, Moç., 22 October 1807, reporting that, in 1806, a total of 4375 tusks of ivory were sent from the Rivers of Sena to Moçambique; Lobato, Lourenço Marques, ii, pp.414-15.

While the supply of ivory declined at Moçambique, the demand did not. There was a sharp rise in both the official evaluation of ivory at Moçambique and in the market price paid for it there. In 1810 the official price for large ivory (Marfim grosso), which had been unchanged since 1787, rose from 80 cruzados to 100 cruzados. On the market, by the beginning of the nineteenth century a bar of Indian cloth, which formerly brought 10 to 11 arrobas of ivory, could buy no more than 4½ arrobas. Henry Salt noted in 1809 that the merchants of Moçambique demanded from 104 to 128 cruzados for their ivory. (1) For those Yao who cared to trade their ivory to Moçambique, prices were clearly better than ever. But the fact that most of the Yao still preferred to carry their ivory to Kilwa, rather than to Moçambique, indicates that the Moçambique prices were not competitive with those to the north.(2)

Other factors at Moçambique which previously had played their role in influencing the shift of Yao trade to the Kilwa coast were warfare in Macuana and commercial persecution of the Banians by the Portuguese administration at Moçambique. As we know, there were considerable disturbances in Macuana at this time. During the early years of the nienteenth century, the Banians continued to be granted licenses for trading personally on the mainland and firmly maintained their monopoly on the financing of trade in the province. According to the inquisitive French visitor at Moçambique, Epidariste Colin, not only their persons and property, but also their religion appeared to be respected by the Portuguese, although he suggests that they came by these liberties at a considerable price.(3)

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(1) AHU, CM 53, Joaquim José de Melo e Costa, "Acrescimo que houve da antiga Pauta da Alfandega formalizada no anno de 1787, para a que se formalizou no prezente de 1810," Moç., 12 December 1810; AHU, Cod.1472, fl.176-7, Sousa Coutinho to Sousa e Sá, Lisboa, 28 February 1801; Salt, Voyage to Abyssinia, p.82.

(2) But see above, p.233.

(3) M.J.G. Loureiro, Memorias dos Estabelecimentos Portuguezes a l'Este do Cabo da Boa Esperança..., Lisboa, 1835, p.289;AHU, CM 41, petition of José Mariano Ribeiro, n.d., granted by Gov., Moç., 4 July 1803; AHU, CM 42, petition of Tanaclande Gopal, n.d., granted Moç., 20 August 1803; Colin, "Notice sur Mozambique," in Malte-Brun, Annales des Voyages, ix, 1809, p.314.

By late 1805, however, the Banians had lodged formal complaints about the extortions of the new Governor-General, Amaral Cardoso. He alledgedly had threatened them with deportation to Diu and actively sought to sequester their wealth. In August 1807 they charged that he had squeezed about 125,000 cruzados out of the various Banian merchants. On one occasion, the Banians claimed that one of their number was falsely charged by the government and that Amaral Cardoso stated his willingness to drop the matter for a payment of 50,000 cruzados, which he eventually received. After Amaral Cardoso's death at the very end of 1807, the Banians pressed their claims for compensation for his extortions. While no further references to their case have been found, it is unlikely that they received satisfaction from the corrupt provisional government which ruled Moçambique until August 1809. There is also evidence that official harassment of the Banians was maintained by Governor-General Mendonça, who succeeded to this administration.(1) It is clear, then, that the factors which had earlier been responsible for inhibiting the Yao ivory trade to Moçambique were still working, although not apparently in such great force, towards that same end.

Unfortunately, our precise knowledge of the details of the ivory trade on the Kilwa coast and of the ivory market at Zanzibar is no greater for this period than it is for the mid-eighteenth century. Nevertheless, we do know that Zanzibar increasingly was consolidating its position as the greatest commercial entrepôt in East Africa, and that Kilwa's ties to Zanzibar progressively were becoming more intimate. (2) Following the futile attempt, in 1784-1785, of Saif ibn Ahmad to create a personal empire in East Africa, there were no major challenges to Omani hegemony over Zanzibar. Peaceful conditions reigned for the

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(1) AHU, Cod.1374, fl.31-62, "Registo do Requerimento e mais Documentos de Lacamichande Matichande que deio a informer a este Governo,"n.d., but last of the appended documents is dated 29 November 1808; AHU, CM 46, idem, "Mappa das Embarcaçoens, que posseum os Banianes, e mais Gentios nesta Capital de Mossambique," Moç., 13 November 1805; AHU,CM 62, Sir Evan Nepean to José Francisco de Paula Cavalcanti de

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next three decades both there and at Kilwa. Zanzibar yielded the Imam of Oman personally no less than 40,000 piastres in annual revenue, and perhaps as much as 60,000 piastres. This revenue, the equivalent of which could be paid in ivory, was raised largely from the collection of a 5% duty on all imports to Zanzibar. This tax had been only 3% in Morice's day. The total sum of duties collected are said to have been no less than 150,000 piastres. Between sixty and one hundred vessels may have come there from Arabia, the Persian Gulf, and western India in the trading season.

Not surprisingly, the French and British visitors from whom we have descriptions of Zanzibar at this time stress the importance of the slave trade and say very little about the ivory trade. This is to be expected, as ivory was of virtually no interest to them. Consequently, we are left with the impression that slaves were already the most important item of trade at Zanzibar. There are firm grounds for challenging the reliability of these indications in the reasons given below by Portuguese observers as influencing the movement of Yao trade away from Moçambique to Kilwa and Zanzibar. The fact that the Imam's yearly revenue could be paid in ivory also argues for the great importance of this product. Lacking substantial figures of any sort for the Zanzibar ivory trade, there is little hope for establishing definitively the priority of either item, slaves or ivory, over the other in this period. It seems more likely, however, that ivory was of greater importance than slaves to the trade of both Kilwa and Zanzibar at the end of 1810.

/.. footnote continued from page 258

(1) Albuquerque. Bombay, 11 November 1817, and enclosures; AHU, Cod.1383, n.º 1013, Crown to Mendonça, Rio de Janeiro, 20 April 1810, enclosing same to Senado da Câmara of Moç., Rio de Janeiro, 19 April 1810; AHU, Cod.1377, fl.22, Francisco Carlos da Costa Lacé to Subachande Seuchande, Moç., 5 February 1810.

(2) For the following two paragraphs, see Gray, History of Zanzibar, pp.92-108, who quotes the more important sources at length.

Turning to the relevant Portuguese sources, one sees vividly that ivory still dominated the long distance trade of East-Central Africa at the turn of the nineteenth century and that it was the concentration of most Yao trade on ivory which continued to draw them to Kilwa, away from Moçambique. These sources strikingly bear out the picture of trading operations which has been reconstructed in an earlier chapter, but they also add important details and variations to it.(1) In 1798 the great Portuguese explorer, Dr. Francisco José de Lacerda e Almeida, who journeyed in that year from Tete to the court of the Mwata Kazembe, where he died, observed that the ivory trade of the Yao to Moçambique "had diminished considerably, because those Kaffirs had shifted their trade to Zanzibar and other neighboring ports." This much is clear from the letter of D. Diogo de Sousa, written three years earlier.(2) The Yao did not trade directly to the Mwata Kazembe's capital, although it seems likely that some of them must have done so occasionally. Generally, the Yao are said to have received their ivory directly from the Bisa, with whom they were known to have been "trading for a long time", according to the testimony of Manuel Caetano Pereira, who had already visited Kazembe and whose father, Gonçalo, had first begun dealing with the Bisa in 1793. The Bisa, in turn, received most of their ivory by trading with the Mwata Kazembe, who is said to have made them tributary after waging several wars against them. Lacerda not unnaturally tends to over-empahsize the Mwata's dominance of Bisa, but it is undeniable that their commercial ties with his court were of the closest sort. According to the diary kept by P.J. Baptista,

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(1) See above, pp. 137-45.
(2) F.M. de Lacerda e Almeida, Travessia da Africa, Lisboa, 1936, p. 155; see above, p. 240.

one of two mulatto pombeiros (the Angolan equivalent of patamares) who reached Kazembe's town in 1806 and were detained there into 1810, the Bisa were "the first travellers who ever traded with Kazambe,"(1) The goods with which the Bisa purchased ivory from the Mwata Kazembe came to them from the Yao, and Lacerda strongly suspected that the Yao were receiving them from the Swahili traders of Zanzibar and the Kilwa coast, because, as Manuel Caetano Pereira had told him,

> the great quantity of ivory, which every year leaves the kingdom of Kazembe, and those kingdoms or lands which he has conquered..., ends in the hands of the Yao, their [the Bisa's] neighbors, and these do not sell it all in Moçambique, for there is a notorious difference between the quantity of ivory which the Yao formerly brought to Moçambique, and that which they presently introduce, [especially] in view of the increased trade which the people of Zanzibar have carried on in that commodity since then.(2)

One is surprised by the apparent lack of Maravi involvement in this trade. At one point a Bisa chief told the explorer that he sold his ivory to the Manguro, who lived along the Shire River, and that the Yao received it from the Manguro. Considering the ethnological vagueness of the name "Manguro," it seems most likely that in some cases Mang'anja traders acted as short haul intermediaries between the Bisa and Yao. Generally, however, the Maravi appear to have been cut out of much of the long distance trade, surrounded as they were by two peoples who were each extremely active and determined traders. It is probably this factor which accounts for the

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(1) Burton, The Lands of Cazembe, London, 1873, pp.33,228; see Cunnison, "Kazembe and the Portuguese," pp.65,70-2.

(2) Lacerda e Almeida, Travessia, pp.208,233,385-7; see also, ibid.,p.238.

annoying robberies to which traders were subjected when travelling through Maravi territory. (1)

From Manuel Caetano Pereira, Lacerda also learned that Bisa traders occasionally carried their ivory all the way to Quelimane.(2) These trips would seem to have been exceptional at this date, revealing, rather, the adventurous spirits of a few individuals than the beginning of a general movement towards trading at Quelimane. This town did not become an important coastal terminus for the long-distance traders of East-Central Africa until after its rise as a self sustaining slaving port, later in the nineteenth century. Another new route which is elsewhere suggested as being in operation at this time led from the interior to the Kerimba Islands. As early as 1790, Nogueira de Andrade, in a confusing passage, seems to have had the Yao and Maravi trading there beside the Makua and Makonde. A decade later the Governor-General of Moçambique, in reporting the results of the expedition to Kazembe, wrote that "the Negroes who usually go from Kazembe's to Tete, are the same who usually come each year to Moçambique and to the islands of Cape Delgado." This is nowhere stated in Lacerda's diary, nor in that of Fr. Francisco João Pinto, who assumed command of the expedition on the former's death. Presumably, it is merely an inaccurate generalization on the part of Meneses da Costa. The use of cowrie shells as ornamentation by the Maravi suggests that there possibly was some trading between the coast opposite the Kerimba Islands and the interior, but this is no proof that a regular route had yet been opened to that part of the coast. Besides, the cowries which Lacerda saw worn by the Maravi more probably came from the Kilwa coast, where Mongalo was known for its fine cowries, or from Moçambique. Furthermore, we have already seen that trade from the interior of Cape

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(1) Ibid., pp.208, 385-6; but see below, p.273.

(2) Lacerda e Almeida, Travessia, p.388.

Delgado was moving away to the Kilwa coast, and there is no evidence at all from Ibo that the Yao or Maravi had as yet penetrated to that part of the coast. (1) Like the route to Quelimane, that to Kissanga, opposite Ibo, did not become important until well into the nineteenth century.

A final problem which requires airing is one which is first raised in 1784: namely, the Portuguese belief that a reason for the Yao trading to Kilwa was that it was a shorter trip for them than that to Moçambique. (2) Lacerda suggests that the ivory which once had gone to Moçambique, but now went to Zanzibar, did so "not only because they evaluate it better there, but also because this [i.e. Yao] country is closer to Zanzibar, than to Moçambique." This seems to be specious reasoning. In this matter, Meneses da Costa seems nearer to the general truth when he writes, albeit in the same letter which we have seen to be inaccurate in respect to trading at the Kerimba Islands, that when Kazembe was questioned as to the source of his standard trade beads and the destination of his merchandise, he replied that the beads "came to him from Moçambique, and from the Zanzibar coast to where they also sent their ivory and slaves to be sold, since the distances were equal," Several years later, Meneses da Costa noted to the same effect that "those chiefs and Negroes of the interior attribute little importance to distance, be it longer or shorter, in sending their caravans and their trade to more distant places, when the profits of trade pay them for their extra trouble..." (3) We need not rely solely on his information, however, as the same opinion is expressed by Dr. António de Vilasboas Truão, who was no

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(1) AC, i, 1917, p.126; AHU, CM 36, Meneses da Costa to Sousa Coutinho, Moç., 29 July 1800; a copy of this letter is in AHU, Cod. 1366, fl.94v., where it is misdated to 29 June 1800; excerpts from this copy are published in Lacerda e Almeida, Travessia, pp.69-71; see also, ibid., p.200; see below, p.274.

(2) See above, p.262.

(3) Lacerda e Almeida, Travessia, pp.233, 71; AHU, CM 34, Meneses da Costa to Crown, Lisboa, 1 February 1804.

less concerned with these affairs than his late predecessor as Governor of the Rivers of Sena.

In 1806 Vilasboas Truão wrote a report on the state of the Rivers. This report includes a separate section which vividly reveals the effect on African trade of the high tariffs imposed on the trade of the Rivers by the provincial government.(1) He argued that taxing the trade goods desired by the Africans in this way was necessitated

> that the Kaffir traders of the interior should diminish in equal proportion the value of their gold and ivory, in order that such duties should not damage our trade. Ordinarily it is the buyer who pays this increase in price, but this is not what happens in this part of Africa.

Continuing his attack on these duties, he explained:

> The Kaffirs who sell us gold and ivory, after establishing a certain price, and being used to it, by principle never pay more than that for trade goods, and are able to carry their ivory on a journey of two months longer, in the hope of seeing if they get a small rise in price.

Vilasboas Truão added that the Swahili traders of the Zanzibar coast, including Kilwa, exported much of the gold and ivory taken by those Africans to that coast. Since Lacerda's expedition, the trade of the Rivers with Kazembe, with the Bisa, and with the Maravi region had been interrupted. But these same Africans had not, he stressed, given up

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(1) See above, pp. 255-6.

> selling their ivory to the Yao Kaffirs, who have carried it to the ports of the coast of Zanzibar, as is known from certain information; and some of these Kaffirs [presumably the Bisa and Maravi] still continue that trade because it is more important to them, as they have told our traders. (1)

There is no reason to believe that the proximity of Kilwa to the Yao was an important factor in influencing the shift of trade to there from Moçambique. Certainly, the most northeasterly section of the Yao--the Mwera--did live closer to Kilwa. Saulnier de Mondevit's description of the Mongalo hinterland appears to be confirmation that they were established north of the Ruvuma by the late eighteenth century. (2) But the most active Yao traders, judging by what is known of the Yao from more recent evidence, would appear to have been the Macinga and Masaninga, who lived in the heart of Yaoland. There is, however, no way to confirm this impression from the documents. (3)

Although the primary African product of the long-distance trade was ivory, one should not neglect the other commodities involved in this trade. Copper bars and wax were traded from Kazembe's to the coast of East-Central Africa. Iron hoes, founded by the Maravi, but traded to Moçambique by the Yao, also figured in long-distance commerce. These hoes, which were known as "Yao hoes" (enxadas de mujau) at Moçambique, sold there for 300 réis each. They appear nor only to have been locally consumed, but also to have been exported, probably to India. (4) It seems likely that Maravi hoes, as well as

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(1) Vilasboas Truão, "Extracto do Plano para um regimento ou nova constituição economica e politica da Capitania de Rios de Senna..," Tete, 20 May 1806, in Annaes do Conselho Ultramarino, p.n.o., i, 1857, p.414; cf, Burton, Cazembe, pp.168,200,226-7.

(2) See above, pp.233-4.

(3) See, e.g. Mitchell, The Yao Village, p.37.

(4) Annaes do Conselho Ultramarino, p.n.o., i, 1857, p.411, ACL, MSS Azul 1013, Galvão da Silva, "Diário das Viagens, feitas pelas terras de Manica," Sena, post-14 November 1788, published in EHGEP, pp.323-32, at 328; Lobato, Lourenço Marques, ii.p.360.

those fashioned by the Cisi Yao, were also traded to Kilwa. (1) But slaves were easily the most important item of long-distance trade after ivory, and the vital role of the slave trade should not be minimized.

Not much is known of the French slave trade at Kilwa in the late 1790's and 1800s. In 1797 relations were strained between the French and the people of Kilwa as a result of an act of piracy by a M. Labadie against a boat from that port. Seven years later a British cruiser captured a French corsair about those waters; in 1809 there is another brief reference to the French slaving at Kilwa. (2) Mongalo passes unnoticed at this time, although Mikindani is described in 1808 as "presently belonging to the King of Kilwa, with a population of three thousand Swahili capable of bearing arms." (3) In fact, after 1795 most French slaving to the north of Cape Delgado was done at Zanzibar, which was ever becoming a growing slave market, in addition to its role as the principal ivory market of the Indian Ocean.(4) The estimate made by Captain Thomas Smee, in 1811, that the total number of slaves exported yearly from Zanzibar was "not less than 6000 to 10,000," is probably fairly accurate. Many of these slaves, if not most, undoubtedly came from the Kilwa coast. Freeman-Grenville's suggestion that the annual exportation of slaves from Kilwa probably topped 6000,

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(1) Abdallah, The Yaos, pp.10-12; see above, pp.67-8.

(2) Gray, "The French at Kilwa in 1797," TNR, 58 & 59, 1962, pp.172-3; Jackson, European Powers, p.61; RSEA, ix, pp. 1-2 In 1800 an American ship touched at Ibo on its way to Kilwa: AHU, CM 37, Antônio da Silva Pinto to Meneses da Costa, Ibo, 10 July 1800.

(3) AHU, CM 48, Antônio Alberto Pereira to Prov.Govt., Ibo, 16 August 1808; see also, AHU, Cod.1372,fl.33 & v., Prov.Govt. to Anadia, Moç., 11 November 1808.

(4) Gray, History of Zanzibar, pp.92-108; AHU, CM 44, Meneses da Costa to Crown, Lisboa, 6 January 1804; RSEA, ix, p.13.

therefore seems quite within reason. At the same time, the logic of his reckoning, from the information supplied in 1804 by the French slaver Dallons, that the duties of 6000 piastres paid each year by the Omani governor of Kilwa to Muscat were based solely on the slave trade, wrongly implies that the ivory trade was not very important there.(1)

In any case, we have already seen that Crassons implied that most of the slaves brought to Kilwa in his day did not come from the far interior. Saulnier de Mondevit's remarks on Mongalo suggest the same.(2) On the other hand, certainly some slaves were being led to the Kilwa coast by the Yao, although one cannot even venture a guess as to the numbers involved in this trade. According to Abdallah, most of the slaves which the Yao acquired in trade were Nyasa, Senga, Cikunda, and Bisa. "Of these slaves, some they took to the Coast to buy trade-goods with them, others they kept at home to hoe the gardens, build houses, and do other village work." Indeed, among the Yao, political power was based upon the number of followers a chief commanded, so that slaves were highly valued by Yao chiefs and headmen not only as a source of wealth for trading, but also as potential subjects, provided one could afford to maintain them.(3) Yet, notwithstanding this domestic demand for slaves, our knowledge of Yao trading to Moçambique at this time clearly indicates that they were bringing an appreciable number of slaves to that port each year.

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(1) Gray, History of Zanzibar, p.104; HEA,i,p.156; SD, p.200.
(2) See above, pp. 203; 233-4.
(3) Lacerda e Almeida, Travessia,pp.71, 208; AHU, CM 34, Meneses da Costa to Crown, Lisboa, 1 February 1804; Abdallah, The Yaos,p.15; see Mitchell, The Yao Village, pp.34-7; Douglas, "Matriliny and Pawnship," p.309; cf. R. Codrington, "The Central Angoniland District of the British Central Africa Protectorate," The Geographical Journal, xi,1898, p.518.

There is no doubt that the French slave trade at Moçambique declined after the peak years up to 1794; but it certainly continued to be plied actively until 1808, when Franco-Portuguese hostilities were finally joined in the Indian Ocean. Until then, neither French corsairs, nor the series of statutes prohibiting the French islanders from slaving, were able to suppress the trade. Neutrality prevailed in spite of both difficulties in Europe and local demands made by British cruisers for fulfillment of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. Occasional restrictions of trade at Moçambique similarly did not seriously threaten the trade.(1) Meanwhile, the slave trade between Brazil and Moçambique began to be pursued more actively from the 1790s, when it was actively encouraged by Governor-General Sousa.(2) Statistics are minimal for this period, but in 1803 the official figures for exportations of slaves from Moçambique are 2335 on Portuguese ships and 2904 on foreign vessels. This is a total of 5239. From the beginning of 1805 to October 1806, duties collected on the slave trade constituted two-thirds of the total amount of revenue taken on exportations at the alfândega. In 1805, the large majority of these duties were levied on slaves shipped by foreigners, undoubtedly French, with one American exception; in 1806, there was an

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(1) See Jackson, European Powers, pp.45-63; Noël, L'Esclavage, pp.39, 56-62; Malte-Brun, Annales des Voyages, ix, 1809, p.314; for specific examples of French ships trading at Moçambique, see, e.g., AHU, Cod.1370, fl. 112-3, Sousa e Sá to Anadia, Moç., 4 October 1803; AHU, CM 43, autos de visita issued at Moçambique to the following French vessels: L'Pirvia (16 January 1804), General Isidro (11June 1804), Dois Irmãos (11 August 1804), and Lonechal (30 September 1804).

(2) AHU, Cod.1472, fl.107-111, pp.10, M. de Melo e Castro to Sousa, Queluz, 12 October 1792; Santana, Documentação, i, pp.83-4; AHU, CM 32, Sousa to Luís Pinto de Sousa, Moç., 26 September 1796; AHU, Cod.1370, fl.16, Sousa e Sá to Sousa Coutinho, Moç., 28 August 1802, reporting shipment of 620 slaves aboard the Castelão to Rio de Janeiro and the death of nearly 500 of them in a storm which drove the ship back to port; AHU, CM 45, petition of José Domingues, Captain of the Africana, of Rio de Janeiro, to trade to Ile de France, granted by Gov., Moç., 13 February 1805.

abrupt reversal, with Portuguese transported slaves accounting for four-fifths of the total. For both years, just over half the taxes were yielded by Portuguese slavers.(1)

Following the extension of the war between France and Portugal to the Indian Ocean in 1808, the external trade of Moçambique would seem to have dropped sharply. According to the alfândega registers, between May 1805 and May 1808, 75 ships, 46 of which were Portuguese and 29 foreign, had entered Moçambique; from May 1808 to late November 1809, only six more, three of each, had arrived there.(2) French corsairs roamed the Moçambique Channel, inflicting considerable losses to Portuguese shipping, while early in 1809 a French vessel blockaded the entrance to Moçambique harbor for nearly two months. The Portuguese were unable to defend the port by themselves, so that when there were no British cruisers there to protect it for them, trade could be stopped, or a disturbance caused, by the French.(3) Nevertheless, in August 1809, Henry Salt recorded the departure for India of seven vessels from Moçambique. These carried about 500 slaves, in addition to their more important cargoes of ivory and gold. Salt, who was a keen observer, also noted that "five ships loaded with slaves went this year to the Brazils, each vessel carrying from three to four hundred." The same pace of trade between Moçambique and Rio de Janeiro, where the Portuguese court had been removed in 1807-1808, apparently continued in 1810.(4) In the end, then, there was only a very short period during which French corsairs posed a serious threat to the

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(1) AHU, CM 44, Silva Guedes, "Mapa do rendimento que houve na Alfândega no anno proximo passado de 1803...," Moç., 1804; Jackson, European Powers, p.85, n.2; E. Donnan, Documents Illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade to America, Washington, 1935, iv, pp.504, 505n.; AHU, CM 47, Andrew Ross to Gov., Moç., 11 April 1806.

(2) AHU, CM 51, Silva Guedes, Moç., 24 November 1809; see also, ibid., requerimento, Costa Lacé, n.d.; and same to Judge of the alfândega, n.d.; ibid., testimony of Joaquim de Rosário Monteiro, Rio de Janeiro, 9 May 1809.

(3) AHU, Cod.1372, fl.32v.-3, Prov. Govt. to Anadia, Moç., 10 November 1808; RSEA, ix, pp.1-3; Jackson, European Powers, pp.74-9.

(4) Salt, Voyage to Abyssinia, pp.34-5, 80; RSEA, p.12.

export trade of Moçambique. Beginning in 1808, it effectively ended with the British capture of Ile de France and Bourbon in 1810.

There is very little Portuguese information on the source of slaves at Moçambique in this decade. In 1807, when the volume of trade may have been about 5000 souls in all, 1080 slaves were sent to the capital from the Rivers of Sena. Only a little trade was carried in Macuana by the patamares of Moçambique merchants.(1) This was probably a result of the disturbances in Macuana. If this is so, as one suspects, then the fact that the trade with the Yao was distinguished by their coming to trade with the Portuguese at a regular fair on the Portuguese mainland, may explain the apparent predominance of Yao slaves at Moçambique in the 1800s. Loureiro emphasized the desirability of encouraging all the Africans to trade in this fashion.(2) But Portuguese archives contain no descriptions of Yao trade at Moçambique at this time, yielding only a few passing references to it.(3) For details we must rely on the observations of Epidariste Colin and Henry Salt.

Colin spent the peak trading months of August and September 1804 at Moçambique. Some of his comments on trade there are gross exaggerations of the truth, such as his estimate that some 15,000 to 16,000 slaves and 700 to 800 tons of ivory were exported annually from Moçambique. He seems also to have been confused in believing that

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(1) AHU, CM 50, Prov.Govt. to Crown, Moç., 22 October 1807; see also, RSEA, ix,pp.4-5.

(2) Loureiro, Memorias, pp.289-90.

(3) AHU, CM 41, petition of José Mariano Ribeiro, n.d., granted by Gov., Moç., 4 July 1803; AHU, CM 42, petition of Tanachande Gopal, n.d., granted Moç., 20 August 1803; AHU, CM 50, José António Caldas to Prov. Govt., Mossuril, 18 October 1808; AHU, CM 52, petition of António Martins de Matos, acknowledged Moç., 5 October 1809; AHU, Cod.1379,fl.57, notation of license granted to João Rebelo de Albuquerque, [Moç.], 27 June 1810.

patamares penetrated 250 to 300 leagues inland and returned with bands of 400 to 500 slaves, each of whom carried one or more tusks of ivory. (1) On the other hand, Colin gathered valuable information on the types of slaves available at Moçambique, a subject which he clearly examined with care: "The blacks whom the traders prefer to all the others are the Makua [Macquois]; they reach Mozambique in good health, having made a journey of only 30 leagues, and sometimes less. They withstand the rigors of the sea better...than the other blacks." The Makua slaves were known as gay and enterprising, but cruel. They were more prone to revolting aboard ship than other slaves, whom they scorned and with whom they refused to eat. Continuing his remarks, Colin wrote:

> The Yaos [Monjavos] are the most common type of blacks at Mozambique. One recognizes them by the stars which they make on their bodies and on their cheeks, as well as the two or three horizontal bars below their temples. Their humor is gentle and melancholic; they are much attached to their master, provided that they are not maltreated; they are better made, in general, than the Makua, but rather less robust. One must realize that when they reach Mozambique, they have made a journey of 250 leagues, and are prostrated with fatigue; this is undoubtedly the reason why so many of them die at sea.

Colin's misguided generalities are easily compensated for by these detailed notes. They both confirm what earlier sources indicate, and add valuable details to those descriptions of the slave trade at Moçambique, while later writers substantiate his detailing of Yao

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(1) Malte-Brun, Annales des Voyages, ix,1809,pp.304,312.

and Makua tribal markings.(1) His remarks on the Yao are also especially valuable in that they remind us that the Yao enslaved each other, a fact which is not admitted by Abdallah. Colin also distinguished Maravi slaves at the coast, whom he correctly realized "are closely related to (ont beaucoup de rapport avec) the Yao, above all in respect to (du côté des) customs; however they are not as well made, and they are shorter." The Makonde were reputed for their intelligence, but Colin's description of their tatoos does not tally with any of those given by Professor Jorge Dias.(2)

Salt, who was at Moçambique for just over three weeks in August-September 1809, describes the Yao in even greater detail than Colin, and his observations deserve to be quoted at equal length:

> In the afternoon [29 August] we walked to the house of one of the planters, about a mile distant, in the village of Mesuril, for the purpose of seeing some native traders from the interior, of a nation called Monjou [Yao], who had come down with a cafila of slaves, (chiefly female) together with gold and elephants' teeth for sale. I was informed that they had been upwards of two months on their journey, having rested at times on their way, but that the distance they had travelled might be got over in about forty-five days. . .
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> Some of the Monjou said that they had been three months from home, others two, and another thought it might be accomplished in one and a half, allowing for days of rest. . . They told me themselves that they were acquainted with other traders called Eveezi [Nyamwezi] and Maravi, who had travelled far enough inland to see large waters, white people (this must be taken comparatively) and horses.(3)

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(1) Ibid, pp.320-1; for a comparison with Colin's description of Makua facial and corporal sacrifications, see H.E. O'Neill, "A Three Months' Journey," pp.193-213 Froberville, "Notes sur les...amakoua," pp.313-14; for Yao tatooing, see M.J. Viana, "Da Tatuagem-Nembo entre os Wa-Yao," Boletim Geral da Colónias, 270, 1947, pp.9-29; see above, pp. 127, 173-4.

(2) Malte-Burn, Annales des Voyages, ix, 1809, pp.322-3; Dias, Os Macondes, ii, pp. 56-72.

(3) Salt, Voyage to Abyssinia, pp.32-3. Salt's doubts that Nyamwezi and

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Though less certainly than Colin, Salt suggests that the Yao, or at least those whom he met, were primarily slave traders. His notes on the long journey which the Yao made for the interior confirm the impression that they did not, generally, trade directly to Kazembe's. On the other hand, both his and Colin's references to the Maravi act as a valuable counterbalance to Lacerda's impressions of the interior trade of East-Central Africa, which slight the role of Maravi traders, except for one passing note.(1) That the Yao had met Nyamwezi traders, however, suggests that the Yao may have encountered them at Kazembe's court, where P.J. Baptista seems to have found them trading at that time. Alternatively, Yao knowledge of the Nyamwezi may also have resulted from contact with the Yeke, a Nyamwezi people who raided into Bisa country in search of slaves and ivory, at about this time.(2) It is also possible that their main contact with the Nyamwezi was at the coast, through Yao who had travelled beyond the Rufiji River and met Nyamwezi traders arriving from central Tanzania. This last alternative seems less likely, though, for we know that Kilwa was the northern coastal terminus of Yao trade, Portuguese references to their trading to Zanzibar and Mombasa notwithstanding. Indeed, even Salt realized this fact and wrote, in an unpublished note, that "The Monjou - trade up as far as Quiloa - the Ambeze or Eveze higher up."(3)

/.. footnote continued from page 272.

(3) Maravi traders had seen whites are unfounded in view of the strong commercial ties between Kazembe's and the Angolan coast. Morice's evidence indicates that some Africans trading to Kilwa had already crossed the continent three decades previously. For trade between Kazembe's and the Angolan coast, see Cunnison,"Kazembe and the Portuguese;" see above, pp. 204-5.

(1) Lacerda e Almeida, Travessia,p.196.
(2) Burton, Cazembe, p.188; Thomas, Historical Notes, pp.25-6,29; HEA,i,pp.265-6,278.
(3) BM, Add. MSS 19,419,fl.14. See Andrade, Relações,p.151, for Xavier's intriguing remarks on African traders called Mussucumas (Sukuma?).

Salt's conjectures as to the location of Yaoland are purely speculative; one wonders how he came to place it "in a north-easterly direction from Mosambique." Personally, he thought the Yao to be unusually ugly and was clearly repulsed by their negroid features. The weapons he saw them carrying were simple, but strong, bows; long arrows, barbed and poisoned; and "very short spears with iron shafts." They had no firearms.(1) On 30 August, Salt returned "to the house of the planter where the Monjou traders resided," where he bought a bow and some arrows from one of the Yao.

> In the cool of the evening, the planter took us to a kind of fair held in the neighbourhood for the purpose of bartering with the traders lately arrived. The articles displayed to tempt these simple savages were very trifling, such as salt, shells, beads, tobacco, coloured handkerchiefs and coarse cloths from Surat; a circustance that proves how artfully the Portuguese have carried on this species of traffic, otherwise they could not for so long a period have kept the natives in an ignorance thus suitable to their purposes. I was informed that in the interior, the traders are still able to purchase for about the value of two dollars, in the above articles, either a slave, or an elephant's tooth from sixty to eighty pounds weight. This fair was superintended by a guard of the Portuguese native troops. . .(2)

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(1) Salt, Voyage to Abyssinia, pp.32-3.
(2) Ibid., pp.35-6 ; cf. RSEA,ix,pp.4-5; Lacerda e Almeida, Travessia, pp.297-8, for Pinto's listing of prices for ivory, slaves, and copper at Kazembe's; Burton, Cazembe, p.229, for prices at Kazembe's in 1806-1810.

Salt was unaware of the decline of Yao trade to Moçambique from former years. The seemingly unimportant items which he saw at the fair, of which he alone has left a description, were highly valued in the interior. The need for salt was a factor which influenced the growth of early Yao coastal trade, while Lacerda remarked upon its importance, and the use of cowries, among the Maravi. Beads and cloth were, of course, staples of long-distance trading. But it is unlikely that there was much demand for foreign tobacco by the Yao traders, as both the Yao and the Maravi grew their own. Like salt, tobacco was early an object of trade for the Yao, and it remained so through the nineteenth century.(1) Far from being ignorant, or simple, traders, the Yao were resourceful, intelligent, and selective.

That some Yao preferred to continue trading to Moçambique, while most were travelling to Kilwa, is not surprising in view of the long contacts the Yao had with the Portuguese town. Trade was not moribund there, and the fact that most of the Yao had shifted their trade to Kilwa probably ensured those who did go to Moçambique of a good reception by the local traders. Perhaps these Yao belonged to a section of the nation which had always had closer ties with Moçambique, so that there was no strong tradition of trading to Kilwa, such as that retained by the Yao best known to Abdallah, who appear to have been a majority. A factor of this sort can only be recovered from the Yao themselves. With these intangible influences in mind, it also seems possible to postulate that, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Yao who were trading to Moçambique were in

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(1) Ibid. p.197 ; Annaes do Conselho Ultramarino, p.n.o., i, 1857, p.411; Burton, The Lake Regions of Central Africa, new edition, New York, 1961,ii,p.418; UMCA MSS, A1 (iii), envelope 2, Edward Steere to R.M. Heanley, London, 21 June 1877; Abdallah, The Yaos,p.13; see above,p.262.

the process of becoming slave traders who also traded ivory, rather than ivory traders who also traded slaves. As such, the various conditions which affected the ivory market in East-Central Africa, and which were causing most Yao to trade to Kilwa, would not have turned them away from Moçambique, where there was a steady demand for slaves, not to mention a great desire, with resultant high prices, for ivory. These Yao were not isolated from their fellow Yao, with whom they obviously had frequent dealings, but the evolution of their trading habits seems to have been setting them apart from most Yao. During the next four decades, that is, until the great dispersal of the Yao at about mid-century, the Yao trade to Moçambique continued to be based increasingly on slaves. The transition to this state of affairs was only later achieved along the Kilwa route.

CHAPTER SIX

Epilogue, 1810 - c. 1850

The first half of the nineteenth century in East-Central Africa was marked by the continued and rapid growth of the slave trade. All along the coast the demand for slaves steadily rose; certainly at Moçambique ivory became progressively less important. In 1809 ivory exports to India had declined to about 7300 arrobas; in 1817 these had sunk to less than 4000 arrobas. Two years later the unpopular Governor-General of Moçambique, João da Costa de Brito Sanches, observed that "the present commerce of the Colony only consists of the principal article of slaves, and some ivory, which is exported to the North [i.e., India] in two, or three vessels." (1)

The slave trade at Moçambique expanded rapidly after 1810 and dominated all other commerce there. Most of the demand came from Brazil, but French slavers from Bourbon and Spanish vessels from Cuba also frequented Moçambique. The original stimulus for the development of the Brazilian slave trade to Moçambique and other ports

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(1) See above, p.256; AHU, CM 62, Silva Guedes, "Relaçaõ do Marfim e mais generos q̃ Se despacharaõ nesta Alf.ª p.r Sahida p.a os Portos da Azia, no mes de Agosto do prezente ano de 1817;" AHU, Cod. 1394, fl. 15-17, João da Costa de Brito Sanches to Conde dos Arcos, Moç., 10 October 1819. According to a later Governor-General, whose memoirs on Moçambique do not inspire confidence so far as the Yao are concerned, there was a marked renaissance of the Yao ivory trade to Moçambique in the late 1820s, during his administration. S.X. Botelho, Memoria Estatistica sobre os Dominios Portuguezes na Africa Oriental, Lisboa, 1835, pp.371-3; Botelho's description of this trade looks suspiciously derivative; cf. EHGEP, pp.264-5; ACL, Azul MS 1028, D. Francisco Inocêncio de Sousa Coutinho, "Breve, e util Idea do Commercio, Navegaçaõ, e Conquistas d'Azia, e D'Africa...," fl.21-3. Sousa Coutinho was Governor-General of Angola from June 1764 to November 1772; see R. Delgado, "O Governo de Sousa Coutinho em Angola," in three parts, Stvdia, 6,1960,pp.19-38; 7,1961,pp.49-86; 10,1962,pp.7-47. [redacted].

of Portuguese East Africa was the establishment of the Portuguese Court there in 1808. Following on Britain's abolition of the slave trade to British subjects in 1807, much pressure was brought to bear on the Portuguese Crown first to restrict and then to abolish the Portuguese slave trade. These measures did not achieve their purpose, but by legally limiting, in 1815, the Portuguese slave trade to Portuguese possessions in Africa lying south of the equator, they encouraged the diversion of much of this traffic from West Africa to Portuguese East Africa. The achievement of Brazilian independence, in 1822, further frustrated Britain's attempts to abolish the slave trade. Thus, although slaves from Moçambique were less desired in Brazil than those from the western coast of Africa, and, at least in Maranhão, they did not apparently flourish there, this trans-Atlantic trade was pursued vigorously.(1)

Milburn's estimate that some 10,000 slaves annually were exported from Moçambique at the beginning of the second decade of the nineteenth century seems to be rather exaggerated; but by the end of that decade this was probably a minimal figure.(2) Generally, some fifteen to eighteen Brazilian vessels arrived at Moçambique between July and October to trade for slaves in exchange for money. According to D.Fr. Bartolomeu dos Mártires, Prelate of Moçambique from 1819 to his death in 1828, in 1819, sixteen Brazilian ships left there with cargoes of slaves. Fr. Bartolomeu states that the Brazilians bought 9242 slaves, 1804 of whom died at Moçambique; of the 7920 who were embarked, 2196 died on the voyage to Brazil, so that only 5234 were landed there. Furthermore, some 1200 slaves who were awaiting sale at Moçambique died before being bought. In 1819, then, at least 10,442 slaves were

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(1) See RSEA, ix, p.12; PRO, FO 84/122, Robert Hesketh to Lord Palmerston, London, 3 August 1831, enclosure 2, "State of the Slave Trade on the Northern Coast of Brazil."

(2) W. Milburn, Oriental Commerce, London, 1813, i, p.59; see RSEA, ix, p.16; AHU, CM 61 & 62, Silva Guedes, despachos issued for 12 Brazilian merchant vessels, Moç., 9 February 1817 to 26 March 1818.

known to have been carried to Moçambique for sale to Brazilian slavers alone. (1)

Figures complied by British consulate officials in Brazil, in particular at Rio de Janeiro, reflect the increasing volume of the slave trade with Moçambique during the 1820s, but they are undoubtedly incomplete. This suggests that many slaves were disembarked without paying duties at Rio de Janeiro, just as numbers were illegally embarked along the coast running north and south from Moçambique. Moreover, in 1821, the first year for which these figures exist, only 2941 slaves were reported by the British as having been embarked at Moçambique aboard Brazilian vessels. In the same year, Dos Mártires, who was by then a member of the Revolutionary Provisional Government which replaced Brito Sanches, tells us that export duties were collected on 12,272 slaves at Moçambique. (2) It is in this light that the

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(1) Arquivo da Casa de Cadaval, Cod.826(M IVI 32), D.Fr. Bartolomeu dos Mártires, Memoria Chorografica da Provincia e a Capitania de Moçambique na Costa d'Africa Oriental Conforme o estado em que se achava no anno de 1822, fl.29-30. I am most grateful to the Marquesa de Cadaval for allowing me to see this important manuscript and to Fr. Francisco Leite de Faria, who is Keeper of the Arquivo da Casa de Cadaval and who enabled me to use it in Lisbon. Lengthy extracts from the Memoria have been published, with an introduction, by V. Rau, "Aspectos étnico-culturais da ilha de Moçambique em 1822," Stvdia,11,1963,pp.123-62, at 148-51. Cf. AHU, CM 64, Pedro Simião, "Mappa das Embarcaçoens, que entrarão e Sahirão do Porto de Mossambique no ano de 1819," Moç., 31 December 1819, with enclosure, which also has sixteen vessels departing for Brazil, but to Pará and Maranhão, as well as Rio de Janeiro, Bahia and Pernambuco, the three ports given by Dos Mártires.

(2) PRO, FO 84/17, Henry Hayne to Marquis of Londonderry, Rio de Janeiro, 16 January 1822, enclosing "Slaves imported at Rio de Janeiro during the year 1821;" Cadaval Cod.826(M IVI 32),fl.35. See Costa Mendes, Catalogo,pp.57-60; Teixeira Botelho, História,pp.625-9.

following British figures must be read:

Number of Slaves

Year	Embarked at Moçambique	Landed at	
1822	4973	Rio de Janeiro,	3584; Maranhão, 137
1823	4204	"	3503; Bahia, 300
1824	3173	"	2702
1825	3753	"	3406
1826	NO FIGURES		
1827	2810	"	2496
1828	6655	"	5996
1829	7789	"	5945; Bahia, 268; Pernambuco 281
1830	6350	"	5048
Total (9 years)	39,707		35,641 (1)

(1) PRO, FO 84/17, Hayne to Earl of Clanwilliam, Rio de Janeiro, 15 May 1822, enclosure, & 21 August 1822, enclosure; PRO, FO 84/24, H. Chamberlain to George Canning, Rio de Janeiro, 25 January 1823, enclosure, & 15 August 1823, enclosure; PRO, FO 84/31, same to same, Rio de Janeiro, 5 January 1824, & enclosure, & 31 March 1824, & enclosure; PRO, FO 84/42, same to same, Rio de Janeiro, 4 January 1825 & enclosure; PRO, FO 84/55, same to same, Rio de Janeiro, 4 January 1826, enclosure; PRO, FO 84/71, A. McCarthy to John Bidwell, Rio de Janeiro, 10 November 1827, enclosure; PRO, FO 84/84, A.J. Heatherly to same, Rio de Janeiro, 15 January 1828; ibid., McCarthy to same, Rio de Janeiro, 26 April 1828, enclosure, & 9 August 1828, enclosure; PRO, FO 84/95, same to same, Rio de Janeiro, 26 February 1829, & enclosure, & 30 April 1829, enclosure; ibid., same to Earl of Aberdeen, Rio de Janeiro, 11 July 1829, & enclosure; PRO, FO 84/112, William Pennell to same, Rio de Janeiro, 25 January 1830, enclosure, & 15 July 1830, enclosure; ibid., Charles G. Weiss to same, Bahia, 6 February 1830, enclosure; ibid., John Parkinson to same, Pernambuco, 13 February 1830, & enclosure; PRO, FO 84/122, Pennell to same, Rio de Janeiro, 8 January 1831, enclosure; see also, PRO, FO 84/95, Arthur Aston to same, Rio de Janeiro, 30 September 1829, enclosure#3, "List of National vessels to which Passports have been granted for the Slave Trade to Moçambique." Secretary of State's Office, 15 September 1829.

Indeed, in 1826, the Captain of a British cruiser anchored at Moçambique wrote:

> Between eight and ten thousand [slaves] are entered at the Custom house annually as being exported from the Port of Moçambique to the Brazils - however I consider about ¼ or more may be added to that number as being shipped off to the Brazils in these vessels. This additional fourth is smuggled on board to cheat the Custom house. (1)

Though less important, a considerable business in slaves continued to be carried on by the French at Moçambique. Operating from the Seychelles, ships from Bourbon and Mauritius boldly traded there despite British efforts to end this particularly localized trade and the perennial Portuguese ban on foreign trading in her African dominions. Moçambique slaves were also carried on Arab vessels to the Comoros, where French traders purchased and then transported them to the Seycelles, before introducing them to the Mascarenes. The key to this system was the period of "Frenchification" which the slaves had at the Seychelles. After acquiring a smattering of French, they were introduced to Bourbon and Mauritius under the pretext that they were already the slaves of French residents of the islands, not new slaves being introduced there. In 1826, Captain Acland remarked that "I have been given to understand that 35 Cargoes of Slaves have been shipped off in French vessels within the last 2 years from the Portuguese settlements. These vessels are not large perhaps averaging about 200 Slaves each Cargo."(2)

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(1) PRO,CO 415/7,A. No.172, pp.12-13, Captain Acland's Journal #2, Moç., 9 October 1826; see also, ibid., A.No.172, p.34, Captain Pilkington's Journal, post -12 December 1826; AHU, Cod.1425, fl. 3-5, Paulo José Miguel de Brito to Sheikh of Quitangonha, Moç.,9 & 17 March 1830, condemning the contraband slave trade from Quitangonha to Brazilian vessels in Moçambique harbor.

(2) RSEA, ix, pp.16,51; AHU, CM 57, autos de visitas issued to eleven vessels with British passports, from Mauritius and the Seychelles; AHU, Cod.1386, no.1167, António de Araujo de Azevedo to Marcos Caetano de Abreu e Meneses, Rio de Janeiro, 18 June 1814; ibid., no.1213, Marquês de Aguiar to same, Rio de Janeiro, 31 July 1815; AHU, Cod. 1380, fl.240-3, Brito Sanches to Conde dos Arcos, Moç., 27 September 1819; AHU, Cod.1391, no.1414, Dos Arcos to Brito Sanches, Rio de Janeiro, 11 February 1820; AHU,Cod.1394,fl.69v.,Brito Sanches to Dos Arcos,Moç., 15 July 1820; PRO,CO 415/7, A.No.172,pp.14-15.

Many of these vessels operated outside Moçambique, at Ibo, Quelimane, Inhambane, and Lourenço Marques, but there is no doubt that some of them did their business at the capital, where the District Judge observed in 1829 that the French were the most frequent foreign traders. (1) Indeed, the many years of slave trading from Moçambique to the Mascarenes is reflected in the fact that, as early as 1806, more than two-fifths of the slave population of Mauritius were considered "Mozambiques." In 1830, this category included Yao, Makua, Makonde, Maravi, Ngindo, Africans from the Zambezi area, Inhambane, and Nyamwezi, so that the appelation was not strictly accurate; nevertheless, it attests to the long-standing trading connections between the Mascarenes and East Africa. (2)

Even less is known of the slave trade to Cuba, but in 1819 four or five Spanish vessels from there entered Moçambique, certainly to take on slaves, before continuing on to Zanzibar to complete their cargoes (3). Mention should also be made of the Arab and Swahili slave trade to Madagascar, much of which was supplied from the coast

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(1) ACL, Azul MS 847, "Estado das Relações Commerciaes da Capitania de Mossambique ate o dia 21 de Agosto de 1829 dado pelo Juiz de Fora de Mossambique Dionisio Ignacio de Lemos Pinto em sua informação de 2 de Novembro de 1829 dirigido ao Gov.^{or} e Cap.^{am} General da d.^{a} Capitania Paulo Jose Miguel de Brito," fl.13.

(2) Noël, L'Esclavage, p.33, quoting Milbert, Voyage pittoresque à l'Ile de France, Paris, 1812, p.233, who states that in 1806 there were 26,670 "Mozambiques" in a total slave population of 60,646; d'Unienville, Statistique, i, pp.249,276-9, who gives the slave population of Mauritius in 1830 as 67,619, in one place, and as 69,476, in another; cf. Malte-Brun, Annales des Voyages, xiii, p.380.

(3) AHU, CM 64, Simião, "Mappa. . .," Moç., 31 December 1819.

adjacent to Moçambique. The great numbers of Makua now living in northwest Madagascar apparently bear witness to the volume of this trade, although this may partially be accounted for by earlier contact.(1)

Considering all this activity, then, the frequently expressed estimate that at least 15,000 slaves were exported each year from Moçambique during the 1820s and 1830s seems quite reasonable. (2) Notwithstanding the abolition of slave trading in Portuguese territory in 1836 and a British blockade of Moçambique from 1840, which led to the Anglo-Portuguese Slave Trade Treaty in 1842, it does not seem that there was more than a minimal decline in the slave trade in the vicinity of Moçambique (3). Furthermore, Bishop Dos Mártires' evidence that large numbers of slaves brought to Moçambique for exportation died before being purchased suggests that perhaps nearly 20,000 slaves annually were gathered in the vicinity of Moçambique during this period.

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(1) See AHU, Cod. 1379, fl.43,46,50,90-1, being licenses granted to eight Swahili and Arab traders to embark slaves at Moçambique, the average request being for 50 slaves, 14 March-12 April 1810, 1 February & 16 March 1812; ibid., fl.66, license granted for buying 40 slaves to "Massane Bunu Portador da Rainha Vaine de Bom-Bottoque," 8 January 1811; AHU, CM 60, requerimento, Said bin Saif, from Zanzibar, to go to Madagascar, granted, Moç., 2 April 1817; ibid., requerimento, Sidi Hasan, returning from Madagascar, to go to Zanzibar, granted, Moç., 25 September 1817; PRO, Admiralty 1/69, no.63, Joseph Nourse to John Wilson Croker, H.M.S. Andromache, at Sea, in the Moçambique Channel, 15 December 1823; Cadaval Cod. 826 (M IVI 32), fl.31-2, also in Rau, "Aspectos," pp.152-3; PRO,CO 415/4, no.61, "Interrogatories adressed to Mr. Copall and Mr.Copall's Answers relative to the State of Madagascar," nos.200,202, Port Louis, 8 October 1827; Deschamps, Histoire de Madagascar, p.87 & map 12, p.295; see also, J.F. Elton, Travels and Researches among the Lakes and Mountains of Eastern and Central Africa (ed.H.B. Cotterill), London,1879, p.162.

(2) RSEA, ix, pp.32-3; cf. ibid., pp.18,50; F.T. Texugo, A Letter on the Slave Trade still carried on along the Eastern Coast of Africa.., London, 1839, passim, but especially p.34; Lopes, Escravatura, p.169, citing Virey, Histoire naturelle de genre humaine, new ed., Bruxelles, 1834, ii, p.67. AHU, Cod.1444, no.198, /Crown to Gov./, 27 June 1839, confirms that Texugo was a political exile from Portugal.

(3) See Jackson, European Powers, pp.195-6, 198-201,222; Marguês da Bemposta Subserra, et al, Untitled memorandum on Portuguese East Africa addressed to the Crown, Lisboa, 28 April 1856, pp.19-20; McLeod,Travels, i, pp.304-11,313,316-21,325.

While there is no doubt at all that most of these slaves exported from nineteenth century Moçambique were Makua (1), it is equally clear that the Yao were the second greatest suppliers of the Moçambique slave market. In 1819 Brito Sanches wrote that the reason Brazilian ships were leaving Moçambique laden with slaves

> is due to the abundance which some types of cafilas called Yao, who come from the interior near Tete, the farthest of the Rivers of Sena, bring to the Mainland of Mossuril, so that this year they brought more than 3500 slaves, and not due to those which come from the environs of this City. . . (2)

As more than 12,000 slaves were embarked for Brazil in 1819, Brito Sanches was clearly mistaken in minimizing the importance of the Makua slave trade, but the detailed observations of Dos Mártires confirm his remarks on the Yao.

Dos Mártires, with surprising accuracy, locates Yaoland between 10° and 14° latitude south of the equator. The Yao themselves he describes as "a great, and numerous Nation. . ., who have always maintained a trade with the Portuguese which has been very profitable to the Colony. These Kaffirs are independent of any other Nation . . ..." While the Prelate's belief that their homes were some three or four months inland is inaccurate, it does indicate the extended nature of their trading habits, thereby confirming the observations of earlier writers.(3) Each year the Yao came to Moçambique, he continues, bringing 2000 to 3000 slaves, together with only "some ivory, and a small quantity of provisions," as well as tobacco and iron wares. Their slaves were bought at a low price, owing to the fact, again noted by previous observers, that the change in climate between their own country and the coast seriously debilitated them until they made

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(1) ACL, Azul MS 847, fl.10; Cadaval Cod.826(M IVI 32), fl.17-18.
(2) AHU, Cod.1394, fl.16, Brito Sanches to Dos Arcos, Moç., 10 October 1819; for passing references to the Yao, see AHU, CM 59, requerimento, Muhammed Hasan, n.d., with enclosure, Moç., 12 August 1815; AHU, Cod. 1380, fl.235-6, Prov.Govt. to Dos Arcos, Moç., 19 February 1819.
(3) See above, p.272.

the adjustment. Dos Mártires also gives a lengthy and fascinating description of the organization of Yao slave caravans, which in turn sheds much light on the nature of Yao slave trading at that time.

According to his account, all their slaves were Yao. In passing through enemy territory in Macuana, the caravan was defended by "a few Kaffirs, their compatriots." Dos Mártires believed that the slaves did not know that they were to be sold at the coast, "because the secret of their business is only confided to a few: out of 3000, less than 30 return to their lands." That they did not forcibly seize their freedom he attributes to the fact that they were outcasts in their own country and that they surely would be killed or enslaved in foreign lands. In effect, they had no alternative except to submit. In greater detail he writes:

> Now these Yao certainly are not prisoners of war, because they are of the same nation as their sellers: but all are victims of some crime, either real, or supposed; and among them there are some crimes which, although committed by only one individual, the onus falls upon his entire family, and most remote relatives; thus it is not rare to see the father, mother, sons, daughters, nephews, etc., being sold in the same fair. (1)

Dos Mártires is very probably mistaken in his belief that there was no internecine Yao warfare at this time, but it also seems not unlikely that the increased demand for slaves may have caused criminal liability to be more widely applied in Yao customary law than before. As to the organization of Yao caravans, Froberville, writing a quarter-century later, noted that Makua captives, although "sometimes as numerous

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(1) Cadaval Cod. 826 (M IVI 32), fl.27, 63, also in Rau, "Aspectos," pp. 143-4. 158-9.

as their masters,. . .rarely seek to regain their liberty by force."(1) It is obvious that the notorious forked slave-stick (Kiswahili, kongwa; Ciyao, likongwa, ligole, or likoli), was not utilized in the slave trade to Moçambique at this time. (2)

After Dos Mártires, there is very little information on the Yao at Moçambique. Owen mentions them briefly in 1823. He also indirectly substantiates Dos Mártires' identification of the origin of the slaves traded by the Yao to Mossuril by remarking that "the practice of tatooing is here universal, and, as each tribe has its distinguishing marks, a slave-dealer can at first sight tell to which particular one his victim belongs." (3) Botelho's confusing remark that the Yao nation comprised one of the Karanga kingdoms at least has the virtue of eliciting this response from a critical reviewer in 1837: "Mujao or M'iao slaves are numerous at Moçambique, and they could have readily satisfied Sr. Botelho, had he made any enquiry of them, that they are not Macarangas." (4) F.T. Texugo, who was at Moçambique in 1838, does not mention the Yao by name, but his

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(1) Froberville, "Notes sur les...amakoua," p.323. For references to conflicts among the Yao, see Rangeley, "The AmaCinga Ayao," NJ, xv,2,1962, p.42; see also, Sanderson, "The Use of Tail-Switches in Magic," NJ, viii,1,1955, p.40. For Yao crimes, see Abdallah, The Yaos, pp.4,9; Lamburn, "Some Notes on the Yao," pp.81-2.

(2) See F. Johnson, Swahili-English Dictionary, p.220; Sanderson, Dictionary of the Yao Language, pp.106,109,110.

(3) W.F.W. Owen, Narrative of Voyages to explore the shores of Africa.., London, 1833,i,pp.190-2,276,295-6; see above, p.168; for other passing references, see Santana, Documentação,1,pp.163,300-1; ACL, Azul MS 648, no.9, anon., "Possessions Portugaises en Afrique...," n.d.,c.1820.

(4) Botelho, Memoria Estatistica, p.311, but see 389; anon.,"Botelho on the Portuguese Colonies," The Edinburgh Review, or Critical Journal lxiv,1837, p.421. For Botelho's reply, see his Segunda Parte da Memoria Estatistica sobre os Dominios Portuguezes na Africa Oriental, Lisboa, 1837, p.59. For a fascinating earlier instance of identifying a people living south of the Zambezi as mujaos - people who are clearly not Yao - see BNL, FG, Cod.4179, no 5, "Rellaçaõ q̃ da o capitaõ, e Feitor que foi Alexandrino de Oliveira da Feitoria do porto de Imhambane...," n.d., but post-1739.

description of caravans arriving from the interior undoubtedly refers to Yao caravans. Thereafter, until the 1850s, there are no further published references to the Yao trading to Moçambique. (1)

Throughout this period it appears that Portuguese hindrance of the Indian trading community was a less important factor in influencing the Yao trade to Moçambique than it had been during the eighteenth century. Although the Indians continued to monopolize the finances of the island, the demand for slaves to which the Yao were responding lay beyond their control. Furthermore, Indian cloths became less important to the operation of Yao trade, as European-produced trade cloths progressively captured a larger share of the African market. Favored during the second and harried during the fourth decade of the nineteenth century, though always defended by the Crown, the varying fortune of the Banian and Muslim Indian traders at Moçambique seems to have had little decisive effect on Yao commerce during these decades. (2)

It is rather more difficult to assess the role played by the Makua in influencing the direction of Yao trade during the first

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(1) Texugo, Letter, pp.34-5; cf. Gamitto, King Kazembe, i, p.65; PRO, FO 63/836, McLeod to Malmesbury, Hyde Park, 30 November 1858; see below, p.292.

(2) See, e.g., AHU, CM 60, Aguiar to Conde de Sarzedas, Rio de Janeiro, 25 January 1816; AHU, CM 66, requerimento of twelve Banian traders, /Moç./, n.d., but c.1817; AHU, CM 63, Dos Arcos to José Francisco de Paula Cavalcanti de Albuquerque, Rio de Janeiro, 4 July 1818; AHU, CM 64, João Vicente de Cardenas to Gov., Moç., 27 September 1819; AHU, Cod.1402, fl.41 & v., Prov. Govt. to Simião and António José Segundo, Moç., 6 November 1821; AHU, Cod.1413, fl.8, João Faustino da Costa to José António Marcelino Pereira, Moç., 26 July 1827; ibid., fl.105, S.X. Botelho to João Bonifácio Alves da Silva, Moç., 6 May 1829; AHU, MM 11, petition of Lauchande Cancadas, granted, Moç., 18 October 1830; AHU, Cod. 1445, no.2117 (or 2108), António Abrucísio Jarvis de Atongonia to Gov. of Moç., Paço do Ramalhão, 12 September 1835; Botelho, Resumo, pp.11-14; idem, Memoria Estatistica, p.376; Texugo, Letter, pp.38-9,41.

half of the nineteenth century. Following a Portuguese expedition against the Uticulo chiefs in 1811, there appears to have been nearly a full decade of peaceful relations between the Makua and the Portuguese of Moçambique.(1). Trouble arose in 1819 with Mauruça and Impahiamuno, in whose lands coastal traders had frequently been robbed. Despite a recommendation of peaceful conciliation from the Crown, a campaign was waged against the latter in his territory of Mutipa towards the end of 1820. Notwithstanding glowing reports of a crushing defeat of Impahiamuno, the problem persisted for the next few years, at least. (2) By 1830, however, relations with the Uticulo chiefs were good, but during the next three years there was a great deal of commotion around Fernão Veloso, where the Portuguese were attempting to establish a station. The conflict involved the Sheikh of Quitangonha and the Uticulo chiefs, and may have spread as far north as Simuco. As usual, alliances were tenuous; Mauruça and his fellow chiefs were willing to fight against Quitangonha in concert with the Portuguese in 1830, but in 1833 they were equally ready to invade Mossuril again if the Portuguese did not treat them with due respect. In these circumstances, Portuguese interests were clearly favored by negotiating with the Sheikh of Quitangonha. (3) In general,

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(1) AHU, Cod. 1385, no.1074, Galveâs to Mendonça, Rio de Janeiro, 4 June 1811; AHU, CM 55, same to same, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1811; AHU, CM 54, Mendonça to Galveâs, Moç., 31 October 1811; AHU, Cod. 1380, fl.110, Marcos Caetano de Abreu e Meneses to same, 5 February 1813.

(2) AHU, Cod.1394, fl.31-2, Brito Sanches to Dos Arcos, Moç.,11 November 1819; AHU, Cod.1391, no.1437, & CM 67, reply, Rio de Janeiro, 2 August 1820; ibid, reply, Moç., 10 November 1820; AHU, Cod. 1394, fl.78, & CM 67, same to same, Moç., 7 December 1820; ibid., same to same, Moç., 8 & 9 December 1820; Cadaval Cod.826(M IVI32), fl.27, also in Rau, "Aspectos," pp.142-3; RSEA, ix, p.18; cf. O'Neill, "Journey from Mozambique to Lakes Shirwa and Amaramba," p.634.

(3) See Santana, Documentação, i,p.169; AHU, MM 11, Paulo José Miguel de Brito to Conde de Basto, Moç., 8 August 1830; AHU, Cod.1432 /fl.19v.-20v./ same to?same, Moç., 27 October 1830; AHU, Cod. 1425, fl.11-12, same to Mauruça, Moç., 30 October & 14 December 1830; AHU, MM 11, Gabriel José de Sousa Ferreira to Brito, Mossuril, 22,24,25 & 26 November, 14 & 24 December 1830; AHU, Cod. 1432 /fl.23v.-24/, Brito to Manuel da Silva Gonçalves, Moç., 8 January 1831; AHU, Cod.1440, Silva Gonçalves to José Antônio Pereira, Moç., 13 & 19 March 1833; ibid., same to Chief Justice,

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the situation in Macuana was extremely fluid and highly volatile. Nor did the Portuguese have greater control over events there at mid-century. (1) But if these disturbances had an appreciable effect on the Yao trade to Moçambique, the available sources do not mention this until, once again, the 1850s.

Before examining this mid-century reference, we must briefly note the growth of the slave trade at both Ibo and Quelimane. Until 1820 the continual threat and realization of Sakalava raids, as well as attacks from the neighboring Makua, completely paralyzed the trade of the Kerimba Islands, except for that carried on by a few bold Swahili. By that date, not only had the Portuguese finally reorganized themselves at Ibo, but the power of the Sakalava was already in the process of being broken. (2) Definite references

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/ Page 288 , note (3) continued/ Moç., 23 April 1833; ibid., portaria, Prov. Govt., Moç., 23 April 1833; ibid., Silva Gonçalves to Interim Commandant of Mainland, Moç., 3 May 1833; BNL, FG, Cod. 8470, fl.71, Sheikh of Quitangonha to Prov. Govt., Quintangonha, 1 December 1833; AHU, Cod.1432 /fl.81-2v./, Silva Gonçalves to António de Vasconcelos e Carvalho, Moç., 3 December 1833; AHU, Cod. 1440, same to Pereira, Moç., 25 January 1834.

(1) See Bemposta Subserra, "Resumo sôbre a Província de Moçambique," Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa, lv, 7-8, 1937, p.301; Bordalo, Estatistica, p.50.

(2) There is a rich body of documentation on the Sakalava raids against the coast of East-Central Africa during this decade in the following places: AHU, CM 54,55,56,58,59,60,64,66; AHU, Cod.1380,1394,1478; BNL, FG, Cod.8470; see also, Cadaval Cod. 826(M IV 32), fl.39-42; Bispo de Himeria, "Padroado de Portugal em Africa," Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa, 14ª Serie, 7-8, 1895, pp.699-700; Guillain, Madagascar, p.201. For the Makua conflicts, see AHU, Cod. 1478, fl.233, Caetano José Resende to Mendonça, Ibo, 1 September 1811; AHU, CM 55, reply, Moç., 1 October 1811; AHU, Cod.1380, fl.79, same to Galveâs, Moç., 11 December 1811; AHU, Cod.1385, no.1116, Aguiar to Mendonça, Rio de Janeiro, 20 May 1812; AHU, CM 57, Manuel Onofre Pantoja to Abreu e Meneses, Ibo, 23 February 1813; ibid., António da Costa Portugal to same, Ibo, 23 February 1813; AHU, Cod. 1377, fl.154, Abreu e Meneses to Pantoja, Moç., 12 August 1814.

to French slavers at Ibo began to appear in 1824. Three years later a notorious French slaver named Charles Letord, who was better known as Dorval, stated that there were nearly always slaves ready for purchase there. According to him, the export slave trade at Ibo was exclusively French, as Brazilian vessels never went there. A man named Fortuné Bataille, who was a friend of the Governor, was the principal supplier to the French slavers at Ibo. In 1829 Botelho warned the new Governor of the islands against admitting foreign vessels there, indicating that the majority of these "fantastic arrivals" were French ships from Bourbon. Nevertheless, this traffic continued to flourish and by the 1850s Ibo had acquired a reputation as "the great Warehouse for Slaves." (1)

The slave trade at Quelimane was a direct result of the royal alvará of 4 February 1811, which opened the subordinate ports of Moçambique to direct trading by Brazilian vessels, without requiring them to call at the capital. As early as 1807 such a ship had been specifically allowed by the Provisional Government to carry a cargo of slaves directly from Quelimane to Ile de France, but this was an unusual exception. The Governor-Generals of Moçambique were violently opposed to this trade, some because it hurt Moçambique and the Crown's

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(1) AHU, Cod.1402, fl.105v., Prov. Govt, to José Antônio Caldas, Moç., 14 February 1824; T. Boteler, Narrative of a Voyage of Discovery to Africa and Arabia..., London, 1835, ii,pp.55,64; Owen, Narrative, ii, pp.9-10,14; PRO, CO 415/7, A. No.172, pp.3-4, Acland's Journal #1, Ibo, 24 June 1826; PRO,CO 415/9, A.No.238, "Correspondence and Documents furnished to Captains Polkinhome and Acland...29 Sept. 1827 relative to the Slave Trade on the Coast of Africa," Document 1, Article 6; Santana, Documentação, i,pp.119,457; AHU, Cod.1413, fl.110, Botelho to José Amanti da Lima, Moç., 2 June 1829; AHU, Cod. 1427, fl.8, Brito to Bernardes, Moç., 5 October 1830; AHU, Cod.1207, fl.91-2, portaria, Joaquim Pereira, Moç., 29 August 1840; PRO, FO 63/836, McLeod to Malmesbury, Hyde Park, 30 November 1858.

finances, others more probably because it affected their own pockets. (1) Their pleas were not successful, however, and Quelimane soon became a thriving slave port. Official figures compiled at Quelimane in 1820 show that in the previous six years 15,055 slaves were exported from there to Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, and Pernambuco. A third of these were accounted for in 1819. In 1823 Boteler estimated that this town yielded 10,000 slaves annually and considered it to be "now the greatest mart for slaves on the east coast." Three years later another British officer observed that many French slavers from Bourbon also traded there. Indeed, Dorval thought that perhaps 12,000 to 15,000 slaves were taken away from Quelimane by 1827.(2) The statistics compiled by the British at Rio de Janeiro for slave importations from Quelimane in the years 1821-1825 and 1827-1830 total 34,466 souls. As we have already noted in respect to the accuracy of these accounts for the Moçambique trade, they are undoubtedly incomplete, but useful nonetheless. In 1838 Texugo reaffirmed Boteler's opinion of Quelimane, adding that "during the whole year the harbour was never without some slavers." This situation remained unaltered during the 1840s.(3)

Quelimane and Ibo provided the Yao alternative outlets to Moçambique. This is demonstrated in a curious memoir written by the

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(1) ACL, Azul MS 847, fl.11,16; AHU, CM 49, petition, Joaquim da Rosário Monteiro, granted, /Moç./, 28 April 1807; AHU, CM 50, Prov. Govt. to Crown, Moç., 22 October 1807; AHU, CM 59, & Cod. 1380, fl.152-3, Abreu e Meneses to António de Araujo de Azevedo, Moç., 1 October 1815; ibid, fl.189, Cavalcanti de Albuquerque to Conde da Barca, Moç., 23 September 1817.

(2) Jackson, European Powers, p.189; RSEA, ix,p.33, Boteler, Narrative, i, pp.248-9; Owen, Narrative, i, pp.292-3; PRO, CO 415/7, A. No. 172, pp.34-5, Polkinghome's Journal; PRO, CO 415/9, A. No.238, Document 1, article 4; see also, AHU, Cod.1414, no.1837, José António de Oliveira Leite de Barros to Botelho, Ajuda, 19 April 1828.

(3) See above, p.280, n.1, for the relevant British sources; Texugo, Letter, p.34; Coupland, East Africa and its Invaders, pp.496-8.

Marquis of Bemposta Subserra. Although there is no evidence that he ever visited Moçambique, he obviously was keenly interested in developing the trade of the colony and was probably abreast of the current economic situation there when he composed his Resumo in December 1853. (1) Whatever the exact provenance of his information, his remarks throw valuable light on the new direction being taken by Yao trade as a result of the growth of the slave trade in East-Central Africa. Indeed, his observations are not limited to the Yao. Each year, he wrote,

> great mangas [i.e., caravans] of Negroes, some Bisa, who come from the lands of the Kazembe, others Yao, and of different tribes or nations, all of them traders, show up on that peninsula [Cabaceira], in order to trade their merchandise for others which they need; a makeshift fair is set up for this purpose, in which everyone cheats with the greatest expertise and perspicacity. These Negroes do not enter our territory without permission, nor do they usually commit any acts of violence there; when, however, they are unable to overcome the difficulties which they encounter in the interior on the part of other nations, they go to Quelimane or to Ibo.(2)

Although he does not mention the slave trade in this passage, it is clear that this was the stock in trade of the Bisa, Yao, and other Africans who traded to these ports. The routes to Ibo and Quelimane seem surely to have been fairly recent developments, built up in response to the sudden rise of both towns as important slave markets.

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(1) See Bemposta Subserra, "Resumo sôbre a Província de Moçambique," pp.269-270 (introductory note by João Farmhouse); Grande Enciclopédia Portuguesa e Brasileira, xlviii, 1939, p.508.

(2) Bemposta Subserra, "Resumo sôbre a Província de Moçambique," p.303; see above, p.[illegible], for the Moçambique route to Lake Malawi at this time.

A few Bisa were trading ivory to Quelimane in the 1790s, but not, apparently, on a very large scale. Certainly, by 1861, after the great Yao migration into modern Malawi, the Yao were well known at Quelimane. (1) As to the route to Ibo, Rebman says that the slave who served as his informant in compiling his Kiniassa Dictionary

> was an Mniassa, who in consequence of international expeditions for slave-catching was seized by a tribe called Wapogera, who sold him to the Wamaravi, and these to the Swahili slave merchants who had come from Uibu (a small island belonging to Moçambique and on the map called Ibo). At Uibu which was reached after two months' travelling at a very slow rate (in effective march only half the time is wanted), he was at last brought by slave-merchants from Mombas.

This was, perhaps, in 1844. (2)

As this example suggests, by the 1840s, at the latest, much of the demand for slaves at Ibo was being generated by the exigencies of the booming slave market at Zanzibar. The same factor had also caused the rise of Tungi as an important slave depot. (3) The growth and operation of the slave trade at Zanzibar has been described in detail by both Sir John Gray and Reginald Coupland. The most important fact to stress in this respect is that the slave trade at Zanzibar constantly was increasing throughout these decades. (4) We are, however, more interested in the effect this rising demand had on the Kilwa coast, and consequently on the Yao. At the same time, one must

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(1) See above, p.262-3; Annaes do Conselho Ultramarino, p.n.o., iii, 1862, p.87; see also, Thomas, Historical Notes, p.33.

(2) Rebman, Kiniassa Dictionary, pp.iv-v; for the Wapogera, see Young, Notes, pp.25-6.

(3) See Gray, History of Zanzibar, pp.177-8.

(4) See ibid., pp. 129, 153-4, 224-58; Coupland, East Africa and its Invaders, pp.300-3, 313-14, 498-523.

remember that alongside the slave trade there was a flourishing trade in ivory at Zanzibar, where American traders, in particular, augmented the longstanding demand of the Indian market. (1) The shift of Yao trade back to Kilwa in the later eighteenth century had been a reaction to the revival of the demand for ivory there. Unlike the situation at Moçambique, ivory continued to play a vital role in the trade of Kilwa during the first half of the nineteenth century. It is for this reason that most Yao continued to prefer Kilwa to Moçambique during the early decades of the century.

In 1811, Smee commented that the various tribes which supplied the Zanzibar slave market were "too numerous to describe," but that the chief one was the Nyamwezi. Among the others which he identified were the Makua, the Yao, and the Ngindo. (2) A year later, when H.M.S. Nisus visited Kilwa, a temporary decline in the slave trade seems to have set in there as a result of the recent British seizure of the Mascarenes, and James Prior, the ship's surgeon, takes particular note of the ivory trade there. Prior also makes a passing reference to the slave and ivory trade at Lindi and Mongalo. (3) In both 1816 and 1817 both Kilwa and Mafia were attacked by large Sakalava fleets. After suffering considerable losses in the first year, a combined

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(1) See Gray, History of Zanzibar, pp.194-6,204; Burton, Lake Regions, ii, pp.408-12.

(2) Burton, Zanzibar, ii, pp.510-11.

(3) Prior, Voyage, pp.80, 64; cf. Smyth, Philip Beaver, p.279.

expedition of local Swahili and Omani forces from Zanzibar handed the Sakalava a crushing defeat. (1)

Shortly thereafter, the Sultan of Kilwa, Yusuf bin Hasan, died. In 1819, when the gifted Oriental linguist, Fortuné Albrand, visited Kilwa, the Sultan's successor had not yet been chosen. This, however, had little effect on the trade of Kilwa, as commercial and political power there were firmly in the hands of the Omani. Alluding to its medieval splendor, Albrand remarked that it was "now only a miserable village (bourgade) to which the slave trade alone gives it any importance." He was nevertheless skeptical of the assurance he received at Zanzibar that 13,000 slaves were imported there from Kilwa each year. While he does not refer to the ivory trade at Kilwa, Albrand does remark that "in addition to the traffic in blacks, Zanzibar also does as extensive a trade in ivory." (2) During the next decade the Arab slave trade at Kilwa was supplemented by a renewed spurt of activity by French slavers at the several ports below it, where there was less effective Omani hegemony. Of these, Mongalo seems to have been more important than either Lindi or Mikindani, for in 1826 the Omani governor of Zanzibar told Acland"'that Mongalo

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(1) See AHU, Cod. 1374, fl.96-7, Caldas to Abreu e Meneses, Ibo, 3 December 1816; AHU, Cod. 1377, fl.210, Cavalcanti de Albuquerque to the Sultan of Kilwa, Moç., 29 March 1817; AHU, CM 60, Sultan of Tungi to Caldas, Tungi, 24 May 1817; ibid., Caldas to Cavalcanti de Albuquerque, Ibo, 13 November 1817; BNL, FG, Cod. 8470, fl. 71, Salimo Bono Sahi Bono Saude USaiude Seleman to Gov. of Moç., ? Zanzibar, n.d., but c. 1817-1818; SD, pp. 224, 198-9; TDB, ii, Mafia, pp. 3-4, 8 (124-5, 129); F. Albrand, "Extrait d'un Mémoire sur Zanzibar et sur Quiloa," Bulletin de la Société de Géographie, 2e Serie, x, 1838, p.82.

(2) Ibid., pp.81, 75; Dictionnaire de Biographie Française, i, Paris, 1933, pp.1288-9.

was the principal depot for the French'"(1)

In the 1830s, Kilwa Kisiwani, plagued by political dissension and an increasingly unhealthy climate, was gradually replaced by the previously unimportant village of Kivinje, which was popularly called Kilwa Kivinje, as the principal collection point for slaves on the Kilwa coast. By 1841 Kilwa Kivinje had become a thriving market town. Although its fame was justifiably built on the slave trade, it was also "the port to which the ivory, gum copal, &c., are brought from the interior and chiefly sent to Zanzibar for sale," according to Atkins Hamerton, who served as British Consul at Zanzibar from May 1841 to his death in July 1857. Writing in 1842, Hamerton's additional remark that the rebellious Omani Governor of Kilwa Kivinje had recently levied a special tax on ivory exported to Zanzibar suggests that this trade may well have been even more important economically than the slave trade.(2) The slave trade there expanded even further, however, in the following years, boosted by both the ingenious French "free" labor immigration scheme, which was inaugurated in 1843, and the increasing need for hands to work the clove plantations on Zanzibar and Pemba. (3) In 1850 Krapf described Kilwa Kivinje as "the most important town on the coast between Moçambique and Zanzibar," and a great trading centre. Its

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(1) See BM, Add. MSS 41,265, vol.v., fl.3-6, R.T. Farquhar to Imam of Muscat (sic). Port Louis, 10 May 1821; ibid., fl.7-8, same to Marquis of Hastings, Port Louis, 11 May 1821; ibid., fl.67-70, "Memorandum connected with the final Suppression of the Slave trade on the East Coast of Africa," c. December 1821; PRO, CO 415/7, A.No.171, pp.1-5, 16-19, "Observations by Captain Owen on the Slave Trade in Aug. 1824...with Dorval's remarks thereon, 30 May 1827, " articles 1-6; ibid., A.No.172, pp.5-8,17-20, 25-9.

(2) SD, pp.224-5; Boteler, Narrative, ii, p.47; Hamerton's letter is quoted in Gray, "A History of Kilwa: Part II," p.35, and again in his "The British Vice-Consulate at Kilwa Kivinje, 1884-1885," TNR,51, 1958, p.176.

(3) Gray, "Zanzibar and the Coastal Belt, 1840-1884," in HEA,i,p.227; idem, History of Zanzibar, pp.226,239.

population he estimated to be between 12,000 and 15,000 inhabitants. He reckoned slaves to be the principal item of trade there and he was told that some 10,000 to 12,000 slaves, both from central Tanzania and from the vicinity of Lake Malawi, passed through Kilwa Kivinje each year. At the same time, however, Krapf also observed that the town "drives a very considerable trade in ivory, rice, copal, tobacco. . ." If slaves were the mainstay of Kilwa Kivinje's trade, they were not to the exclusion of all other products.(1)

Judging from the available sources, it does not appear that the Yao trading to Kilwa were inclined to regard slaves as a much more important item of trade than ivory until the late 1830s, and perhaps not even until after the great Yao migrations which occurred about mid-century. The Yao undoubtedly were trading large numbers of slaves to the coast, but the general impression is that their main business was still in ivory. Certainly some of the Yao whom Smee found in the Zanzibar slave market in 1811 were those living in southern Tanzania. As we have already seen, these were involved in extensive slaving as early as 1785. By 1819, according to Albrand, these Yao, as well as the coastal Makonde and Ngindo behind whom they dwelled in the interior, were Muslim. Kiswahili, Albrand believed, was the common language of all three. (2) The earliest notice of Yao long distance traders during this period only appears in the following year, when Brito Sanches remarked that both the Yao and the Bisa were carrying their slaves and ivory to Zanzibar [i.e., Kilwa], where the Arabs bought both items at a high price. Referring to the same problem in 1827, it was reported from Sena that "the various tribes" who had previously traded to Moçambique, now carried their ivory each

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(1) Krapf, Travels, p.423

(2) See above, pp.233-4; Albrand, "Extrait d'un Mémoire," p.80.

year to be sold at Zanzibar. This was allegedly due to the "injustice and mistreatment" which they had suffered at Moçambique during the administration of Brito Sanches' predecessor as Governor-General.(1)

A.C.P. Gamitto's few notes on Yao trade in his invaluable account of the 1831-1832 expedition to Mwata Kazembe indicates that the same pattern of trade described by Lacerda prevailed more than three decades later. The Bisa traded ivory and slaves from Kazembe's and their own country to the Yao, who subsequently carried them to the Kilwa coast. Much of this trade was done directly between the Bisa and Yao, at the upper Shire River, most probably very near to Lake Malawi; there was also a considerable boat traffic across the lake. According to information which Krapf acquired from a Swahilized Mwera tribesman from Kilwa, who had travelled with a caravan into the heart of Yaoland in this general period, the lake traffic seems to have been predominantly in ivory. This man's observations confirm Abdallah's assertion that the lacustrine trade was controlled by the Maravi, whose boats ferried back and forth across the lake. They also substantiate Gamitto's information that the Yao occupied the eastern shore of Lake Malawi. (2) It should further be noted that, by the time of the Portuguese expedition, Swahili traders were well known at Kazembe's court. They must also have been active in Yaoland, where their caravans probably operated side by side with those of the great Yao chiefs. It seems, however, that Arabs were still only just beginning to penetrate East-Central Africa at this time and may not have dared enter Yaoland until the following decade.(3)

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(1) AHU, Cod.1394, fl.46, Brito Sanches to Dos Arcos, Moç., 12 January 1820; [illegible] Santana, Documentação, i, p.170.

(2) Gamitto, King Kazembe, i, pp.64-5, ii, pp.87,144,169-71; Krapf, Travels, pp.419-20; Abdallah, The Yaos, p.15.

(3) See Gamitto, King Kazembe, ii, pp.119-20; Abdallah, The Yaos, pp.15-17; Cadaval Cod. 826(M IVI 32), fl.26-7, also in Rau, "Aspectos," pp.141-2; Albrand, "Extrait d'un Mémoire," pp.80-1; Cunnison, Luapula Peoples, pp.42,155; W.Y. Campbell, Travellers' Records of Portuguese Nyassaland, London [?c.1900], p.19; Barth, "Routes," pp.285-8.

In the late 1830s, at a time when slaves had probably become as important to the Yao as ivory, the first of several massive migrations occurred which were to have a profound effect on the subsequent history of the Yao. As is well known, the Ngoni invasions, by destroying the fabric of society among people like the Maravi and the Tumbuka, greatly augmented the potential supply of slaves in the Lake Malawi region. This process began with the crossing of the Zambezi in 1835 by the main body of the Ngoni, under Zongendaba, and their stay in Nsenga country for the next few years. By about 1840, the Ngoni, their numbers now swollen by the incorporation of people through whose country they had marched, including the Tumbuka, finally settled on the Fipa plateau, to the southeast of Lake Tanganyika. Perhaps a year or two after Zongendaba's Ngoni crossed the Zambezi, a smaller Ngoni group, led by Mputa Maseko, also crossed the river. Without pausing in Maravia, apparently, these traversed the Shire, continued north along the hills lying east of Lake Malawi, and finally settled in Songea District of southern Tanzania. Although the Maseko Ngoni apparently incorporated a large number of Yao, these may have been those living at the extreme northwest of Yaoland, for Abdallah's silence on this point implies that this migration had no great effect on the main body of Yao.

In about 1845 Zongendaba died and there was a second dispersal from the Fipa plateau. One of the Ngoni sections, led by Zulu Gama and Mbonani, moved east into Songea, where they joined forces with Mputa's Ngoni. Eventually, there was a struggle for control between these two groups and Mputa Maseko was killed. Led by his successor, Chikuse, this Ngoni group retreated along the route they had followed to Songea, to the east of Lake Malawi, and finally settled at the southwest of the lake, where they became known as the Gomani Ngoni.

after Chikuse's son, Gomani. The date of the Ngoni reatreat through western Yaoland is not known, but here again Abdallah tacitly implies that it had little influence on the Yao.(1) On the other hand, Krapf was told "that in the year 1847 about 7000 Wahiau were captured and sold to Kilwa" by a Ngoni group, known locally as Maviti, who lived at the southwest of Lake Malawi.(2) If some Yao were at this time victimized by the Ngoni, the bulk of them apparently were not. It is clear, however, that by mid-century East-Central Africa was already in an acute state of unrest, and that the previous pattern of trading, which itself had been determined by African reaction to the penetration of the Portuguese up the Zambezi in the sixteenth century, had been seriously interrupted, if not destroyed.

At about this time the Yao were attacked from the east by their Lolo neighbors, a name applied to both the Makua and the Lomwe. Each of the various traditional accounts of this war which have been collected presents this war as a unique event, but it seems far more likely that there was a long period of conflict between the Yao and their neighbors from across the Lugenda and that it is only the final scattering of the Yao which remains uppermost in their memory.(3) Furthermore, it is clear that each of these published accounts has been related from a localized point of view. According to Abdallah, the Lolo were Makua from Meto; Johnson's information supports this view. But another source states that the Lolo were Lomwe, and the traditions recorded by Macdonald and Stannus also suggest this identification. Makua traditions recorded in the Tanganyika District Books reveal both internal

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(1) See HEA, i, pp.208-9; Tew, Peoples, pp.94-5; M. Read, The Ngoni of Nyasaland, London, 1956, pp.9-10; P.H. Gulliver, "A History of the Songea Ngoni," TNR, 41, 1955, pp.20-1; cf. M.S. Alberto, "Os Angones - os últimos povos invasores de Angónia Portuguesa," Moçambique, 27, 1941, pp.87-9,95-6.

(2) Krapf, Vocabulary, p.viii; see also, idem, Travels, pp.423-5.

(3) See above, p.292.

struggles among the Meto chiefs and attacks by the Lomwe into Meto. Indeed, the Yao probably were attacked not only by both the Meto Makua and the Lomwe during this period, but also by the Makonde and the Ngoni, as is stated by Dias and Stannus, respectively. One possibility is that these assaults may have been stimulated by sudden disruption to trade which was caused by the Ngoni invasions. The slave trade seems clearly to have played a major part in instigating these conflicts, while famine also appears to have been an important factor. The antagonism between the Yao and their eastern neighbors, which was a factor in diverting Yao traders to Kilwa in the second half of the eighteenth century, was surely aggravated by both these additional elements, especially the first. During the 1850s there was probably a continual movement of people throughout this area, with large numbers of Makua and Yao crossing the Ruvuma into southern Tanzania. The culmination of these attacks on the Yao came in about 1858 or 1859, when the Macinga Yao were routed from the Mandimba hills. From here they fell against the Mangoce Yao and, driving them ahead, both groups poured into southern Malawi.(1)

This crucial period in Yao history is as yet imperfectly understood; the key to it lies in the gathering and analysis of a greater body of Yao, as well as Makua, Lomwe, and perhaps Gomani Ngoni, tradition than is presently available. Nevertheless, the mid-nineteenth century Yao migrations into both Tanzania and Malawi clearly stand as an important milestone not only in Yao history, but also in the history of East-Central Africa. Throughout the eighteenth and even in the first

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(1) Abdallah, The Yaos, pp.17-19; UMCA, MSS, A1 (iv), /Johnson/, "Up the Lujenda," /1880/, Johnson, Nyasa, pp.100-1; anon., A Journey to Lake Nyasa, pp.39-40; D. Macdonald, "Yao and Nyanja Tales," Bantu Studies, xii, 1938, p.275; Stannus, "The Wayao of Nyasaland," pp.231-3; Dias, Os Macondes, i,p.80; TDB, i, Masasi: "Tribal History and Legends," p.1(149); TDB,ii, Lindi: "Tribal History and Legends," p.6(195); ibid., Mikindani, "Tribal History and Legends," pp.4-6(211-13); Livingstone, Last Journals, i, p.88; cf. Rangeley, "The Ama Cinga Ayao," pp.40-2; idem, "The Ayao," pp.10-11,13; idem, "The Arabs," pp.23-4.

half of the nineteenth century, the Yao seem to have dealt with their neighbors as traders. Even when the slave trade became as important as the ivory trade this seems to have been the case. As Abdallah states, and as the writings of Livingstone and all the Europeans who followed him into the eastern half of East-Central Africa reveal, the effect of these migrations was to turn the Yao into marauding invaders. For the rest of the century the Yao were as much raiders as traders, and slaves dominated their trading as never before. Rather than weakening them, this dispersal led to the beginning of Yao hegemony throughout large areas of southern Tanzania and southern Malawi, while Yaoland itself remained firmly in their control. Its effect was to spread, rather than limit, their influence. (1) In many respects it marks the beginning of the modern period in Yao history; while the collapse of the earlier commercial network, developed by the Maravi and the Yao during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in response to the arrival of the Portuguese, and dominated by the Yao during the next century and a half, exposed East-Central Africa to increasing disintegration and destruction, which in turn led to the establishment of a new political order.

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(1) Cf. HEA, i, p.286.

SOURCES

Manuscript

Portugal

Academia das Ciências de Lisboa

Azul MSS 384, 648, 847, 1013, 1028.
Vermelho MS 273.

In these volumes are useful memoirs on the trade of Moçambique in the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; João Vito's description of the Kerimba Islands is particularly valuable. It and two others are published in EHGEP.

Arquivo da Casa da Cadaval

Códice 826 (M XI 32)

An extremely informative report on the population and trade of Moçambique by D. Fr. Bartolomeu dos Mártires, written in 1822. Excerpts are published by V. Rau, "Aspectos étnico-culturais da ilha de Moçambique em 1822," Stvdia, 11, 1963, pp. 123-62.

Arquivo Histório Ultramarino, Lisboa

Códices of the defunct Conselho Ultramarino.

211, 212. These include deliberations relating to Kilwa and to the Maravi in the seventeenth century.
1207. Copies of correspondence from Moçambique, 1831-1845.

Códices from Moçambique.

1307, 1310, 1313, 1317, 1320, 1321, 1322, 1323, 1324, 1325, 1327, 1328, 1329, 1331, 1332, 1333, 1340, 1344, 1345, 1355, 1361, 1363, 1366, 1370, 1372, 1374, 1377, 1379, 1380, 1381, 1383, 1385, 1386, 1391, 1394, 1402, 1413, 1414, 1425, 1427, 1432, 1440, 1444, 1445, 1471, 1472, 1475, 1478, 1484, 1485, 1500.
These códices, originally housed in the Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa, contain copies of correspondence, beginning in 1750, to and from officials of Moçambique. These sometimes duplicate material in the Moçambique caixas, but they also include numerous documents of which the originals apparently have been lost. It is therefore a most valuable supplement to the caixas.

Papeis avulsos, Caixas Moçambique 1-64, 66-7.

This collection constitutes the basis of any study of eighteenth and early nineteenth century Moçambique. The first three caixas cover the period 1600-1749, while the remainder span the years 1750-1820. There is a marked preoccupation with military and purely administrative matters in this body of documentation after about 1800.

Papeis avulsos, Maços India 18, 19, 23, 29, 37.

The volumes consulted contain isolated but valuable references to Macuana and to Indian traders at Moçambique in the 1720s.

Papeis avulsos, Maço Moçambique 11.

This includes correspondence relating to Portuguese relations with the Makua of Uticulo.

Arquivo Nacional da Tôrre do Tombo, Lisboa

Ministério do Reino, maços 602, 603, 604.

The important accounts by F. de Melo e Castro, Lançous, Miranda, Figueiredo, Xavier, and Varella, among others, are to be found here. The last four are published in both EHGEP and Andrade, Relações.

Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa

Fundo Geral, Códices 29, 826, 1987, 2320, 4179, 4406, 4408, 8105, 8470, Caixa 12.

Códice 29 is a variant of António Bocarro's Livro do Estado da Índia and has been published by A. Botelho da Costa Veiga. Códice 8470 is an important collection of correspondence between the Portuguese and indigenous rulers along the Moçambique coast, Comoro Islands, and Madagascar. The originals of the letters to the Portuguese are mostly in Arabic script, although there is some Malgache correspondence in Roman lettering, and there are contemporary Portuguese translations of most of these. The other volumes include random letters of interest.

Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos, Lisboa - Microfilm Collection

Livros das Monções 3-A, 12, 17, 18, 21-A, 21-B, 22-B, 103-A, 111-A, 115.

This series contains correspondence from local officials to the Viceroy, as well as that between the Crown and the Viceroy. The series on microfilm at the CEHU is the one at Goa, in the former Arquivo Histórico do Estado da Índia. The volumes utilized include valuable comments on Maravi trade in the seventeenth century.

Sociédade de Geografia de Lisboa
MS Res. 1-C-159

This is the French cartographer d'Anville's not very useful "Description Geographique de la partie de l'Afrique, qui est au Sud de la Ligne Equinoxiale. . .," c. 1738.

France

Archives Nationales, Paris
Colonies série C4 (Ile de France) 2, 7, 18, 20, 22, 24, 25, 28, 49, 72, 73, 78, 80, 85, 95, 96.

The French at Ile de France were in close contact with the coast of East-Central Africa from the 1730s; the correspondence and reports in these volumes, covering the years 1736-1789, are an invaluable supplement to those of the Portuguese. The French were frequently more observant of the Africans than the Portuguese.

England

Library of Professor C.R. Boxer, Berkhamsted
Castello-Novo Codex.

This is a volume including reports and observations on the trade of Moçambique, submitted to the Viceroy during his stay at Moçambique Island, 8 July-22 August 1744. Individual documents have been published by Professor Boxer in "A Dominican account of Zambezia in 1744" and "The Querimba Islands in 1744."

British Museum, London
Additional Manuscripts.
18,140. Miscellaneous papers and publications relating to Ile de France.
19,419. Notes by Henry Salt on the Yao, 1809.
20,890. Includes copies of correspondence from the Portuguese Crown to the Viceroy, relating to the legal proceedings against Nicolau Tolentino de Almeida, 1740-1745.
20,906. Copies of correspondence of the Count of Ericeira, 1717-1720.
28,163. Eighteenth century Portuguese colonial documents.
33,765. Papers of Alexander Dalrymple, including an account of Ile de France in 1752.
41,265, volume v. Offical correspondence of Sir Robert Farquhar, Governor of Mauritius, concerning the slave trade from East Africa to the Mascarenes, 1821.

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Pedro Barreto de Rezende's revision of António Bocarro's Livro do Estado da Índia Oriental, 1646.

Public Record Office, London

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69. Contains information on the slave trade in East Africa, 1820-1825.

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Letters from members of the first missionary society to penetrate Yaoland, 1874-1882. W.P. Johnson's observations on the Yao are of special interest.

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